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For Fiji’s people
Isa lei, na noqu rarawa,
Ni ko sana vodo e na mataka.
Bau nanuma, na nodatou lasa,
Mai Suva nanuma tiko ga.
Vanua rogo na nomuni vanua,
Kena ca ni levu tu na ua
Lomaqu voli me’u bau butuka
Tovolea ke balavu na bula.*
*  Isa Lei (Traditional).
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In 1979, a young New Zealand graduate, who had just completed 
a  PhD thesis on government responses to the Great Depression in 
New  Zealand, arrived in Suva to teach at the University of the South 
Pacific. Everything about Fiji and the university challenged that graduate’s 
limited understanding of the world and offered a steep learning curve 
that ultimately transformed his academic and personal life. The result has 
been a fascinating educative journey, sometimes tumultuous but always 
rewarding. Now, at the end of that journey, it is time to take stock of what 
he has learned and to bring his story of Fiji up to date.
Histories are invariably partisan, which is one reason they are always 
rewritten. Their biases derive from the status of their authors (are they 
insiders or outsiders?), the sources used and the ideologies conveyed. 
None of these biases necessarily determine whether the result is good 
history or bad history; that derives almost solely from the quality of 
the work produced. But biases can also be time-bound. Early histories 
of Fiji were invariably captured by the prevailing colonial ethos and, 
later, by  its postcolonial antithesis.1 Across both perspectives strode the 
spectre of race, which came to dominate many interpretations of Fiji 
during and after the 1980s when military interventions added yet another 
dimension to Fiji’s troubled history. Understanding these transformative 
dimensions is a central goal of the first two parts of this book. Fiji’s 
contemporary history, however, slid into unchartered territory after its 
military crushed a populist revolt in 2000. On this occasion, neither 
colonial nor postcolonial explanations sufficed, nor crude references to 
racial divides. Instead attention shifted to the military and its radical 
transformation from indigenous Fijian protector to multiracial enforcer. 
1  Two contrasting examples are RA Derrick’s A History of Fiji (Suva: Government Press, 1950) 
and Jai Narayan’s The Political Economy of Fiji (Suva: South Pacific Review Press, 1984).
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The second two parts of this book tell the complex story of that uneasy 
and messy transformation  and its impact on democracy within Fiji, 
with a conclusion examining post-2014 politics until 2017.
For many people, Fiji is simply a typical Third World basket case. For those 
who journey to Fiji from Australasia, North America and Asia for restful 
holidays, Fiji remains an uncomplicated small South Pacific island 
paradise. Of course it is neither. As one of the most developed Pacific 
states, Fiji strides the South Pacific islands as a colossus. It is a regional hub 
for travel and trade. It possesses outstanding infrastructure for tourism 
and education, and its economy is increasingly diversified. But, like any 
country, success depends ultimately on the quality of leadership. In this 
regard Fiji has suffered most. Partisan interests that are prepared to exploit 
populist and identity divisions for political and economic gain have often 
captured its leadership. Hence, the story of Fiji is a human one, rather 
than an exceptional one, but no less relevant as a consequence.
Too many people, especially colleagues and friends in Fiji and beyond, 
have assisted me over the years to mention them all here, but one who 
does stand out for helping me (the imperfect student) most to understand 
the intricacies of Fiji and for enduring my frequent absences (both real 
and virtual) is my wife, Jita. To her I owe an enduring debt of love and 
gratitude for a life well lived and shared. 





The iTaukei language contains consonants that are pronounced differently 
from their representation in English. These include:
b – pronounced mb as in number
c – pronounced th as in they
d – pronounced nd as in candy
j – pronounced ch as in chest
g – pronounced ng as in singer
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Col colonel
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GDP gross domestic product
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PCPI Pacific Centre for Public Integrity
PDP People’s Democratic Party
PER public emergency regulations
PICTA Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement
PIDF Pacific Island Development Forum
PIF Pacific Islands Forum
PINA Pacific Islands News Association
PNG Papua New Guinea
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Introduction
His admirers said he was a charismatic leader with a dazzling smile, 
a commoner following an ancient tradition of warrior service on behalf 
of an indigenous people who feared marginalisation at the hands of 
ungrateful immigrants. One tourist pleaded with him to stage a coup in 
her backyard; in private parties around the capital, Suva, infatuated women 
whispered ‘coup me baby’ in his presence. It was so easy to overlook the 
enormity of what he had done in planning and implementing Fiji’s first 
military coup, to be seduced by celebrity, captivated by the excitement 
of the moment, and plead its inevitability as the final eruption of long-
simmering indigenous discontent. A generation would pass before the 
consequences of the actions of Fiji’s strong man of 1987, Sitiveni Rabuka, 
would be fully appreciated but, by then, the die had been well and truly 
cast. The Major General did not live happily ever after. No nirvana 
followed the assertion of indigenous rights. If anything, misadventure 
became his country’s most enduring contemporary trait.
Rabuka understood from the very beginning that the path he took in 
overthrowing a new and democratically elected government on 14 May 
1987 might ultimately prove his undoing, and not only for logistical 
reasons. Assertions of racial exclusivity or supremacy hung uneasily in 
a world that was still mired in post-fascist politics. Globalisation and its 
accessory, multiculturalism, had yet to be fully comprehended, let alone 
embraced globally, not that his followers paid much attention to how the 
world viewed their actions. 
Rabuka declared himself the saviour of tradition in a country whose 
indigenous peoples still saw themselves as respectfully hierarchical. 
Democracy threatened that feature because it threatened the paramountcy 
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of what they held to be indigenous interests;1 it threatened Fijianness and 
the traditional relationships that Fijianness entailed. This was justification 
enough, and Fiji’s first coup followed this script. Soon after, the country’s 
traditional chiefs met and returned leadership to the Fijian elite who had 
ruled the country since independence in 1970. There the matter might 
have rested, perhaps uncomfortably for a time but, nonetheless, with 
inevitable finality. Unfortunately for its architects, political actions tend 
to promote unintended consequences that are less easily dismissed.
Rabuka came to power by overthrowing a democratically elected 
government that many Fijians viewed as illegitimate because the basis of 
its power lay predominantly with the votes of the descendants of Indian 
migrants. But he did so by first overthrowing his own military commander, 
a high-ranking Fijian chief. Within five months, he would also turn his 
overwhelmingly Fijian military machine against the same chiefs to whom 
he had initially entrusted power. He believed that they were about to 
cut a deal with the very politicians he had overthrown, leaving him out 
in the cold and possibly exposed to charges of treason. This unscripted 
intervention, however, brought its own difficulties.
Declaring Fiji a republic could not hide for long the fact that the military 
was not itself well positioned to seize control. Nonetheless, this second 
coup set the scene for a new and prolonged confrontation with the Fijian 
elite, even after Rabuka changed his mind three months into his second 
coup and restored the Fijian elite to power and delivered a new constitution 
heavily weighted in its favour. When solely communal elections were finally 
held in 1992, Rabuka emerged as the country’s first elected, republican 
prime minister. For commoners like himself, democracy enabled a more 
meaningful future. But the experience took its toll. Within a short time 
1  The ‘indigenous’ peoples of Fiji, the Taukei, have until recently called themselves Fijian, 
a description derived from assuming ownership of the country’s name, itself reputedly derived from 
the Tongan pronunciation of Viti (Fisi). Until 2010, no other communities in the country (including 
the equally indigenous Rotumans) were permitted to use the national name to describe themselves; 
instead, they were identified solely by ethnicity, although, in the case of peoples deemed Indians, it is 
a national rather than ethnic description that is used. The decision to democratise Fiji’s national name 
in 2010 addressed one longstanding grievance held mainly by non-indigenous citizens but overlooked 
the issue of indigeneity, the definition of which in Fiji never fully aligned with that accepted by 
the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which describes peoples who not only have 
continuity with precolonial society and also belong to non-dominant sectors of society. In Fiji since 
independence, the Taukei have always been politically dominant. With that ambiguity in mind, 
I will use the standard naming conventions of the periods where possible, and refer to the Taukei 
(or iTaukei) as Fijians until 2010. Similarly, I will describe the migrant community as Indians until 
independence, thereafter as IndoFijians.
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he would learn that democracy is best practiced by reaching consensus 
with all of a country’s citizens. In other words, apartheid and aristocratic 
privilege could not form the basis for the economic growth and prosperity 
everyone craved, especially the Fijian people on whose behalf he claimed 
to act in 1987. 
Reaching that point proved difficult, not least because accommodating 
his country’s marginalised minorities and introducing a new democratic 
power-sharing constitution in 1997 meant challenging everything he had 
at one time stood for, including his popular support base. Rabuka would 
not be the first political leader to discover that hero status has a short 
shelf life. More importantly, he would learn that there were others less 
persuaded of the value of his transformation who would seek to emulate 
his past and, in time, earn his country the epithet ‘Coup-Coup Land’.
The Rabuka legacy was not confined to military coups. It also ensured 
that  democratisation assumed limited economic characteristics. 
In part this was both a colonial and postcolonial legacy but it was also 
a contemporary defensive mechanism. Rabuka could only avoid the 
personal consequences of his actions and maintain control over the levers 
of power by prioritising the growth of his military, buying elite support 
with access to state resources, paying off cronies and increasing the roles of 
traditional chiefs. Despite the politically important rhetoric of affirmative 
action for Fijians, these political priorities meant paying lip service to 
economic and social development for the mass of his people. For those 
of Indian descent, at best it meant neglect. 
Coups are by their nature fixed firmly on control of the state as their 
primary prize. Hence they are unlikely to weaken the centrality of the 
state in economic and social life. Despite some attempts after 1987 to 
suggest a new and determinedly postcolonial economic trajectory, Fiji’s 
early coups were far from revolutionary. If anything they were backward-
looking, embracing a false memory of peaceful communal harmony 
and order but with one important difference: the colonial era was over, 
government had been restored to Fijian leadership. That was the central 
purpose of the coups and it would remain the raison d’être of post-coup 
administrations. There were limits, then, to what ordinary Fijians could 




Fijian people will have the political say in their country and [a constitution 
to] safeguard their birthright, their land, their forests, the minerals and 
things; but not one that would make them so strong that they do not need 
a central government.2
In other words, authority would never be decentralised, civil society 
would always face constraints and development would continue to be 
bureaucratically led, as it had been ever since the country’s high chiefs and 
colonial authorities had created the golden age of Fijian administration 
back in the 1940s. The legacy of its chief architect, Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, 
was honoured from that time on, and Rabuka never had any intention 
of challenging it, even if sometimes when out of favour with the chiefs 
– and, in particular, Sukuna’s protégé, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara – he 
articulated the frustration it engendered in neglected commoners. Central 
government should never be challenged, he reminded a group of Fijian 
trade unionists in 1991. It was ‘the goose that lays the golden egg’.3 But 
for whom did the goose lay its golden egg? Clearly not ordinary Fijians; at 
least, not those who subsisted in rural villages and certainly not those who 
increasingly flocked to urban slums looking for work. There were limits 
to what they could expect if hierarchies of administration and power were 
to be respected. 
This view, while not originating with Rabuka, had tremendous 
repercussions for the small state. Fiji might have the largest and most 
diversified economy among the independent island states of the south-
west Pacific, but its economic performance over the next two decades 
served only to promote emigration and spiralling poverty. It added to the 
background dissatisfaction that Fijian rivals would employ to challenge 
Rabuka electorally in May 1999 and to mount their own ‘civilian’ coup 
one year later against the political coalition that they had inadvertently 
caused to succeed him. The coup could not succeed without military 
backing, but it did enable the formation of a new post-Rabuka political 
force that, over the next six years, would achieve the kind of Fijian 
political unity Rabuka had only been able to dream of, in part by reaching 
accommodation with supporters of the abortive 2000 coup. Yet, in terms 
of economic strategy, it was essentially Fijian Paramountcy 101, the 
post-1987 strategy reasserted and with a similarly narrow group of Fijian 
beneficiaries who were intent on capturing for themselves what wealth 
remained to be squeezed from the nation. 
2  R Foley, ‘Rabuka says interim government a “sideshow”’. Canberra Times, 11 August 1988.
3  Fiji Times, 6 May 1991.
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In itself, this did not doom the government, which won fresh elections in 
2006 and finally made significant overtures to its parliamentary opposition 
by forming a multi-party cabinet as the 1997 Constitution had intended. 
Multiracial accommodation now seemed possible. But the coup attempt 
in 2000 left another, less easily resolved legacy in exposing deep fractures 
within the military that, within months of the coup’s resolution, exploded 
into a bloody mutiny designed to remove the military commander, Frank 
Bainimarama, and restart the coup. The mutiny collapsed but, from 
that moment in November 2000, the Commander became increasingly 
intolerant of the government he had put in place and especially of its 
efforts to accommodate those responsible for the 2000 coup, against 
which he publicly campaigned. An increasingly shaky multi-party cabinet 
and continued controversy over affirmative action programs provided his 
officers with additional ammunition to question the direction of the Fiji 
state and to launch its ‘coup to end all coups’ in December 2006. 
Unfortunately, like all coups, the immediate impact of this fourth 
coup simply made long-term planning more difficult. Its economic 
consequences proved as disastrous for the beleaguered nation as those 
experienced nearly 20 years before. It further debilitated already weakened 
state institutions and it bitterly divided once-thriving civil organisations. 
Despite fluid promises to introduce transformative constitutional 
changes, the military consolidated its role as the nation’s final political 
arbiter, leaving citizens to wonder at the state in which they would find 
Fiji by the time they emerged from the glare of elections in 2014 to survey 
their new democratic landscape.
This is a story of those tumultuous years, but of course it cannot be a story 
solely of Fiji. The events that occurred in Fiji did not take place within 
a  vacuum. Instead they are part and parcel of the human story that is 
every bit as connected to the world as any other national story. This is not 
to deny the uniqueness of the Fiji experience, but to view it in terms of the 
broader stories of which it forms as essential an example as that from any 
other nation. Fijians exist because they derive from a wider set of Pacific 
migrations and interactions that began over 6,000 years ago far away in 
the South China Sea. During the 19th century, their diverse descendants 
were enveloped by the global reach of European economic, social and 
political activities, their peoples Christianised and their social structures 
transformed. For the first time they became Fijians, rather than Lauans 
or Kai Colo, although those late precolonial identities persisted, at least 
The GeneRAl’s Goose
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for political purposes, in the contemporary era.4 Any form of identity, 
whether based on race, religion or nation, is a social invention. Becoming 
a British colony from 1874 further deepened change: new political 
structures and a colonial economy based on sugar and the labour of 
imported Indians, whose own country had been even more transformed 
as a result of British conquest. Fijian chiefs fought to retain some measure 
of control over their people and were accommodated in so far as the 
colonial system of indirect rule proved effective in maintaining order. But 
historically, accommodation was short lived; during the 1960s the global 
anti-colonial ‘wind of change’ swept also across the Pacific and, from 
late 1970, Fiji found itself an independent Third World nation, active 
on the world stage in pursuing postcolonial agreements on trade access 
and sugar, the law of the sea and peacekeeping duties for an increasingly 
pressed United Nations. 
Fiji may be a small and relatively insignificant Pacific island compared 
with large Pacific rim countries, but it is nonetheless just as integrated into 
the globalised world of aid, education and training, health, labour, media, 
militaries, migration, mining, non-government organisations (NGOs), 
politics, religion, regions, tourism, trade, transport and unions; the list 
is endless. It might seem odd today that a country that is so successful 
in utilising global opportunities for the benefit of its people has been so 
undermined by insular introspection.5 But, in the age of Donald Trump 
and Brexit, we should more easily recognise Fiji as an unexceptional 
example of humanity, one whose study offers insights just as useful for 
understanding our world as that of any society. Of course Fiji has not 
always been seen in this way. We often fail to look beyond superficial 
differences or at what appears unique. This is an examination of those 
perceptions and of the kind of society Fiji has become.
Central to an examination of both are notions of development and 
modernity. We sometimes patronisingly assume that development is 
a concern only for countries seeking to catch up with already ‘developed’ 
countries. Indeed, since the Second World War, modernising and 
4  These older identities are increasingly undone by the fluid movement of Fijian (Taukei) people 
as they marry, raise children and work across the country (and beyond), outside old physical, ethnic 
and political boundaries. In that sense, Fijians have themselves again become more diverse.
5  The former judge and Fiji Vice President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi once argued that ‘Those who 
wish to turn back the clock or shake their fist at the outside world are an endangered species. There is 
no … turning back’. The aspirations of the young ‘can only be fulfilled pursuant to engagement with 
the world at large on its own terms’ (‘Ethnic tensions and the law’, Fiji Times, 25 September 2004).
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collectively improving society has become a central goal of almost 
all societies, and a vast array of multilateral and international civil 
organisations now exists to assist states to achieve economic growth or 
direct attention to human and social development. But, this focus should 
not seduce us into overlooking the reality that development concerns all 
societies, however they rank themselves globally. It is the shifting character 
of development debates, from basic infrastructure and social wellbeing to 
issues concerning ageing populations, changing technologies, economic 
competitiveness, inequalities and climate change that shapes perceptions 
in ways that often obscures commonality.
If we were able to return to the early 19th century, when a quickly 
evolving industrial revolution created the most dramatic changes human 
societies have ever faced, we might be less inclined to view development in 
binary terms. Many of the features of what was once called Third World 
development were then in evidence as people sought to reconstruct states 
and systems of governance to cope with the stresses of change and their 
consequences for regional balances of power. At that time, development 
came to be conceived of as progress, and its leaders took great pride in 
asserting that it denoted also national or racial superiority, using it to 
justify acts of aggression against neighbours or distant peoples. What we 
sometimes call the age of colonialism or imperialism, a time which not 
only saw the world carved up between a few leading industrial nations 
but also afflicted by devastating wars, was simply one manifestation of the 
desire to actively develop and change societies. And, for much of the 19th 
and 20th centuries, notions of fitness and human evolution were used 
to justify either the occupation and incorporation of whole societies or 
the rapid expansion of inequalities within societies. Development, always 
universal, carries with it tremendous baggage.
Part of that baggage is our tendency to dichotomise the world. How easily 
comparisons such as First World–Third World, developed–developing, 
north–south, East–West, tradition and modernity roll off our tongues, 
encapsulating generalisations and stereotypes that have long since lost 
their validity, if indeed they ever held any. In addition, nation-building 
responses to industrialisation over the past two centuries have also led us 
to regard nations as essentially natural homogenised units, to neglect or 
suppress evidence of internal diversity, and to reify culture and modernity. 
Consequently, we still tend to believe that homogeneity is an essential 
element for successful development, with the result that we fail to 
accommodate diversity within our models for growth. 
The GeneRAl’s Goose
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Contemporary globalisation renders failure more dangerous. One  only 
has to listen to debates on multiculturalism and migration to appreciate 
the continued strength of attachment to perceived national norms. 
Because many developing countries were created with attention 
to  essentialised differences rather than national norms, their inability 
to successfully pursue the development examples purportedly set by 
the early industrialising countries, those we often misleadingly describe 
as the  West, has been attributed – over the past half century or more 
– to their plurality or lack of cohesion. The argument becomes more 
convoluted still if we claim that the basis of Western development lies 
in free markets and democracy, something that most Western countries 
never enjoyed until recently. In other words, these features were products 
of development, not its prerequisites. 
Democracy is an excellent case in point that is often held to be the result 
of a peculiarly Western cultural inheritance traced back to classical Greece 
or the English Magna Carta. This interpretation obscures the complex 
social and economic struggles that made different forms of democracy 
possible, a triumph of mass society and the growing middle-class nature 
of developing societies. This feature is evident also in Fiji. Democracy was 
never a historical feature of European societies or something that grew 
naturally from their past. Many only became democratic after 1945 and 
some have only experimented with democratic institutions since 1989. 
Even the United States only extended democratic rights to all its adult 
citizens in 1965, Australia in 1967.6
6  Kwame Anthony Appiah makes a similar case in relation to the notion of the West really 
only having assumed its modern meaning with the Cold War. People, Appiah argues, believe that 
an identity that survives must be propelled by some potent common essence. In the case of the 
West, that essence hung around a grand narrative about Greek democracy, the Magna Carta and the 
Copernican revolution, and a culture that became individualistic, democratic, liberal-minded and 
tolerant, progressive, rational and scientific. Of course, finding evidence for such a common culture 
across premodern Europe or even 20th-century Europe is impossible. It did not exist. Consequently, 
claims Appiah, we need to abandon the idea of an organic whole for a more cosmopolitan one. 
Every element of culture is separable, and open for adoption by anyone. Values are not a birthright; 
instead, they are choices that people need to make, ‘not tracks laid down by … destiny’; ‘Culture – 
like religion and nation and race – provides a source of identity for contemporary human beings. 
And, like all three, it can become a form of confinement, conceptual mistakes underwriting moral 
ones. Yet all of them can also give contours to our freedom.’ Hence social identities can expand our 
horizons beyond our small-scale lives, even to the global human level. But our local lives still need to 
make sense (‘There is no such thing as Western civilisation’, Guardian, 9 November 2016).
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INtrodUCtIoN
Of course difference can always be used to rationalise pathways 
and institutions that are markedly dissimilar to the norms of many 
comparatively wealthy countries today. Invariably such arguments 
amount to little more than political point scoring. Development is not 
a Western project. The goals of development and the circumstances under 
which it occurs constantly change. At one time development was simply 
a state project. Today it is far more diverse, enveloping everything from 
the individual to regions.
It is important to understand the fluid nature of human relationships 
and development. Nothing is homogeneous or static. Everything interacts 
and is in constant flux. Under such circumstances, dichotomies do not 
describe reality, only perceptions of reality. We might look at subsistence 
farmers and regard them as traditional, but how traditional are they if they 
also produce for an urban market, make use of motorised transportation, 
and possess mobile phones to mobilise market data?
Globalisation introduces another dynamic that confounds narrow 
readings of the past and understandings of change. By fostering novel 
relationships, it has enabled new ways of seeing the world that prioritise 
human empowerment. It is this agenda that is often perceived as 
a  threat to ‘traditional’ powerholders who fuel the modernity–tradition 
dichotomy for self-serving purposes. Thus globalisation, democracy and 
contemporary social movements have more in common than many people 
realise. Rather than assume a dichotomy between modernity and tradition, 
we might better argue that almost all societies are modern because they are 
all engaged – however unequally –with a globalised world. In this respect, 
Fiji serves as a useful example.
Modern Fiji in 1970 confronted development through the lens of race 
and privilege. When development failed to satisfy Fijian expectations 
and constitutional paramountcy tempered by multiracialism failed the 
privileged elite, Fiji’s coup season began with Rabuka’s 1987 attempts 
to mandate absolute Fijian dominance. When they too failed to 
deliver economic transformation, Fiji restored multiracialism in 1997, 
hoping that communal electoral reform alone might compensate for 
its development biases. That initiative was, however, doomed by two 
responses. First, a civilian coup in 2000, which swept aside a multiracial 
government and, through the military, reinstated the country’s elite to 
power; and, second, a military coup in 2006 that rejected the communal 
basis for multiracialism and sought to address the biases inherent in Fiji’s 
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development strategies. That latter coup has, to date, endured; following 
elections in 2014, Bainimarama emerged as prime minister, leading a new 
multiracial party that overwhelmingly dominates the new parliament. 
But a weakened and confused iteration of the old party of the Fijian or 
Taukei elite survived. In an echo of the past, it would soon be led by 
the very man who had first sought to transform Fiji by military means – 
a resurrected and much older Rabuka, a man now haunted by his past.
This, then, is the story of Fiji’s prolonged contemporary misadventure 
and its impact on the south-west Pacific’s leading island state.
11
1
1  Fiji lies between 15 and 22 degrees south latitude and 175 degrees east and 177 degrees 
west longitude. It consists of two main islands, Viti Levu (10,386 square kilometres) and Vanua 
Levu (5,535 square kilometres) and some 330 smaller islands (2,151 square kilometres combined) 
predominantly within archipelagic thrusts west (the Yasawa group), south (Kadavu), and east (Taveuni 
and the Lau group). The small Polynesian island of Rotuma lies 400 kilometres to the north. From 
north to south, Fiji stretches some 1,000 kilometres and, from west to east, 500 kilometres.
The challenge of inheritance
Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka derived from Nakobo, an isolated village in 
Natewa Bay, south-eastern Vanua Levu. Although a commoner, he was 
educated at Queen Victoria School (QVS), an elite colonial boarding 
school established in rural Tailevu for the sons of Fijian chiefs. Graduates 
of QVS have dominated the upper echelons of government in Fiji, 
sometimes bringing with them insular views of Fiji that neglected both its 
multicultural character and the diverse nature of the people they claimed 
to represent. This was unfortunate; Fiji’s past has never been as insular 
or singular as they often asserted, and the political repercussions of such 
claims would be profound.
Indeed, 3,000 years of settlement has left legacies that we are only 
beginning  to understand. The first migrants to the south-west Pacific 
islands of Fiji1 were the coastal-based ancestors of today’s Polynesians, 
who had travelled over 1,000 kilometres from the Bismarck Archipelago 
in present-day Papua New Guinea or from the eastern Solomon Islands. 
They were descendants of Austronesian migrants from Southern China 
and Taiwan over 6,000 years ago who had reached the Pacific via the 
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Philippines and Indonesia.2 They settled along Fiji’s coasts, on its western 
grasslands and in its valleys, becoming increasingly pressured by climate 
change and the massive migration of Melanesians from the Solomons and 
Vanuatu after 1,000 CE. The latter migrants bestowed over 300 related 
languages on the Fiji group. But they also transformed Fiji in other 
ways, revolutionising agriculture and establishing the basis for the social 
and political structures that are today regarded as traditionally Fijian.3 
Population pressure at a time of climate change resulted in competition for 
resources that rapidly intensified warfare in Fiji. Fortified villages sprung 
up and, during the 19th century, they were augmented by increasingly 
large political confederacies (matanitu) and alliances for defensive and 
offensive purposes.4 Huge wars were fought.
By then, Fiji had divided at least superficially into the Kai Colo of inland 
Viti Levu (nominally western Fiji) and the Kai Wai of Fiji’s coastal 
regions and islands (again nominally eastern Fiji), with south-east Viti 
Levu (containing the fractious Bau, Rewa and Verata matanitu) the most 
densely populated region in the South Pacific.5 The peoples of maritime 
Fiji were heavily influenced by trade and political alliances with Polynesian 
island groups, especially nearby resource-scarce Tonga, which colonised 
parts of eastern Fiji and lent troops to Fijian allies. Polynesian influence 
gave eastern Fiji a more hierarchical social and political character, which 
contrasted with the comparatively egalitarian nature of western Fiji. 
Whether the Kai Colo peoples of western Fiji are remnants of an early 
Melanesian wave that was pushed inland by successors is uncertain, 
but this late period of Fijian history undoubtedly left its people deeply 
scarred and disoriented. It also dislocated and scattered whole tribes across 
Fiji on a scale never before imaginable. In 2006, when working on the 
history of a Tailevu village that was seeking to recreate its ring ditches and 
fortifications for an ecotourism project, Canadian anthropologist Tara 
Mar and I learned of its people’s movement from Ra and down eastern 
Viti Levu, possibly as a consequence of warfare. The Tai village’s ancestors 
2  B Su et al., ‘Polynesian origins: Insights from the Y chromosome’, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science, 97: 15, July 2000, pp. 8225–28.
3  C Walsh, ‘Fiji’s prehistory: Lapita’, in C Walsh, Fiji: An Encyclopaedic Atlas. Suva: University 
of the South Pacific, 2006, pp. 394–95. Fijian social organisation began first with the family and 
then the extended family as the land holding unit, either the i tokatoka or the larger sub clan – the 
mataqali. The yavusa or clan is a grouping of mataqali, and related clans comprise a vanua. 
4  In the east, the Tovata confederacy of vanua dominated the Lau group of islands and most of 
Vanua Levu. In eastern and northern Viti Levu, Bau held sway under the Kubuna confederacy while 
the Rewa confederacy of Burebasaga dominated southern Viti Levu.
5  Walsh, ‘Fiji’s prehistory: Ring-ditch fortifications’, in Walsh, Fiji, 2006, pp. 396–97.
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eventually found sanctuary as warriors for Verata, but the secrets of their 
past remain jealously guarded by family groupings (mataqali) and are not 
shared for fear of resurrecting ancient quarrels.6
At the University of the South Pacific during the 1990s and 2000s, a team 
of scholars led by Paddy Nunn revealed something of the many layers 
of that past and, in the process, challenged the general Fijian perception 
that they are derived from a single people, who arrived from the west 
with a great fleet led by the chiefly canoe, Kaunitoni, and then dispersed 
across Viti Levu. So powerful is the myth that, in 2005, the Fiji Museum 
and Radio Fiji sponsored its recreation. Fiji TV also broadcast a series 
devoted to exploring the myth, among others, although less for purposes 
of resolution than for reinforcement. That the myth bestows legitimacy 
on rivals (such as Verata) to dominant traditional powerholders of the 
country (Lau and Bau) is perhaps not insignificant. Nor the fact that the 
myth was cobbled together in the late 19th century by missionaries and 
ethnographers and later embellished with the notion that Fijians were 
a lost tribe of Israel that had arrived in Fiji via East Africa. Today, these 
stories remain enmeshed in the struggles of chiefs to reclaim heritage or 
status lost during the great remaking of Fiji under colonialism and in their 
desire to make Fijians a singular people.7
That remaking began before the arrival of Europeans, being most marked 
in south-eastern Viti Levu as the tiny island Bau gradually dominated over 
its hinterland and, in particular, Verata.8 Europeans, however, provided 
fresh opportunities to exploit during these ongoing struggles. Bau’s 
military chief or vunivalu quickly used access to European beachcombers 
to gain weapons to resolve its conflict with Verata more expeditiously. 
European plantation owners similarly created opportunities to silence 
opponents. A later vunivalu, Ratu Seru Cakobau, sold Ovalau’s Lovoni 
6  T Mar, ‘A village based eco-tourism venture: A case study of Tai village’, in R Robertson (ed.), 
Livelihoods and Identity in Fiji. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2006, pp. 35–56.
7  Steven Ratuva claims that ‘myths of common ancestry, origin, migration and history’ are an 
important ‘basis for constructing an ethnic ideology’ to ‘justify certain claims’ (‘Politics of ethno-
national identity in a post-colonial communal democracy: The case of Fiji’, Identity & Belongingness 
in Fiji, 18 June 2008, ecreanfriends.wordpress.com/2008/06/18/politics-of-ethno-national-identity-
in-a-post-colonial-communal-democracy-the-case-of-Fiji).
8  See David Routledge, Matanitu: The Struggle for Power in Early Fiji. Suva: University of the 
South Pacific, 1985; and Peter France, The Charter of the Land: Custom & Colonization in Fiji. 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1969.
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people to planters in 1871 when they challenged his control over 
Lomaiviti. The same fate awaited vanua in Colo five years later after 
a series of unsuccessful attempts to establish Bauan dominance. 
Christianity provided another tool for ambition. Cakobau converted 
to  Christianity to ensure Tongan support for his next struggle on Viti 
Levu against Verata’s neighbour, Rewa. The already Christianised Tonga 
was always something of a wild card in these struggles. Bau feared that 
it might try to usurp its authority. Indeed, Tonga sent a member of its 
ruling family to the Lau islands in eastern Fiji to consolidate Tongan 
influence there and, after a series of attempts, Ma’afu established the 
Tovata confederacy linking Lau with Cakaudrove, Macuata and Bua on 
Vanua Levu. Bau responded with its own Kubuna confederacy, but this 
soon found itself under pressure from the United States for a 20-year-
old, dubiously inflated debt. The debt was paid, but by a commercial 
company in return for land. Settlers soon followed in 1871 and Cakobau 
sought to retain control by forming a Fijian kingdom with European 
advisors, hoping to gain recognition from foreign powers. It failed 
and, in desperation, Cakobau tried once more to cede Fiji to Britain, 
hoping again to maintain authority in the face of growing internal and 
external pressures.
Historian Alumita Durutalo argues that Christianity also helped chiefs 
to extend their power in other ways; certainly the translation of the Bible 
into the Bauan dialect extended Bauan authority and laid the foundation 
for a neotraditional order under colonialism.9 Christianity destroyed 
the primacy of local gods; so too the power held by their priests or bete. 
The elaborate separation of gender and caste to stabilise population 
and maintain tribal hierarchies also disappeared from Fijian society. 
Missionaries demanded that husbands and wives live as nuclear families. 
Villages were transformed. Unexpectedly, in the midst of this revolution, 
came a great pestilence. In 1875, measles swept the land, wiping out 
nearly one quarter of the population.10 Among the Tai warriors, a complex 
hierarchy of villages collapsed and the survivors huddled together for 
the first time within a single village. Thus weakened, Fijians made easier 
pickings for colonial land grabbers. 
9  Alumita Durutalo, ‘Of roots & offshoots: Fijian political thinking, dissent & the formation of 
political parties, 1960–1999’. PhD Thesis, The Australian National University. Canberra, 2005, p. 61.
10  The true demographic impact may never be known, but official estimates in 1879 place the 
death rate at 27 per cent of the 150,000 population (Andrew D Cliff & Peter Haggett, The Spread 
of Measles in Fiji & the Pacific. Canberra: The Australian National University, 1985, p. 35).
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The colonial heritage
Historian Mike Davis once argued that underdevelopment – in his view 
the hallmark of most Third World countries on the eve of independence – 
had its origins in colonialism.11 In Fiji, we can glimpse something of that 
origin in the way that the colonial desire for stability reduced the capacity 
of ordinary Fijians to engage with the modern economy, although reality 
was never as straightforward as Davis suggested. Colonial demands for raw 
materials, in particular sugar, also gave shape to an economy lacking the 
intersectoral linkages needed to capitalise on the creative potential of its 
people. An economy with such characteristics is not uniquely colonial but, 
under colonialism, development meant explicitly creating the conditions 
necessary to establish and maintain a viable export industry beneficial to 
the colonising power or its empire. Colonialism did not exist to benefit 
the colonised. Swiss sociologist Gilbert Rist argues that this approach to 
development cost colonialism any chance of success.12 It was not inclusive. 
It could not win the hearts and minds of its subjects, no matter how much 
it pretended. Nonetheless, in the interim, it transformed societies like Fiji 
and created new dynamics that ultimately it could not control. By the 
early to mid-20th century, most colonies were under challenge internally, 
even before the Second World War and its aftermath swept away the 
international environment that had spawned it. 
The modern era of colonialism began with the European arrival in the 
Americas in the late 15th century and the subsequent globalisation of 
trade routes. Colonies began to fulfil new economic functions, such as the 
production of tobacco, sugar and, later, coffee, tea and opium. Opium 
financed the British conquest of India and enabled it to control much of 
China’s foreign trade by the late 19th century. Indian cotton fed British 
mills. The Pacific islands were incorporated for similar purposes. By the 
early 19th century, whalers plied the seas. Traders arrived for sandalwood 
and bêche de mer to sell to the Chinese. In the early 1860s, planters 
entered Fiji to capitalise on the American Civil War’s impact on cotton 
supply. Cotton, already the world’s most important crop, drove the 
mercantilist fortunes of the British East India Company and encouraged 
the use of slaves trafficked from Africa for American plantations. In Fiji, 
11  M Davis, ‘The origins of the Third World’, in S Chari & S Corbridge (eds), The Development 
Reader. Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 14–30.
12  G Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith. London & New York: 
Zed Books, 1997, p. 58.
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blackbirded Pacific islanders provided the necessary plantation labour. 
But, most importantly, cotton drove Britain’s industrialisation, earning it 
wealth and power of a magnitude never before imagined. The surpluses 
that Britain drew from India and China enabled it to sustain deficits with 
its self-governing dominions and new industrial rivals.13 In addition, 
India became an important market for British products.
Industrialisation changed the nature of global dynamics and offered 
societies very different futures, but only if they appreciated the threat that 
industrialisation posed to their autonomy should they fail to respond. 
In the North Pacific, Japan appreciated that threat and, after 1868, began 
a development program to strengthen its already impressively commercial 
state through modernisation and industrialisation. This meant adapting 
what had been successful in existing industrialised countries, particularly 
Britain. And, if colonies were regarded as an important key to Britain’s 
success, then countries that wished to emulate that success also sought 
colonies. This kind of thinking was all pervasive and long-lasting. When 
Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1940, he declared: ‘What India is for 
England, the territories of Russia will be for us.’14 In this way, colonies 
served the age-old zero-sum perceptions then held of development and 
change. Land and peoples were monopolised for the exclusive benefit 
of the coloniser. The exclusions and the inequalities they generated 
were justified  as the reward for the coloniser’s fitness and superiority. 
Progress possessed no universal application.
Societies unable, unwilling or unaware of the need to respond urgently to 
the industrial era became colonies, robbed of autonomy and incorporated 
into the economies of industrialising nations to supply raw materials and 
cheap labour. The experience was often brutal and harsh. Often, existing 
systems of governance were refashioned to disempower the very subjects 
that colonisers claimed they sought to civilise. The result was a process of 
dissolution and conservation that trapped future generations in legacies 
of disadvantage and bitterness.15 It mattered little that these consequences 
contradicted the mission promoted by most colonising countries 
13  Davis, ‘The origins of the Third World’, 2008, pp. 24–27.
14  A Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. London: Penguin, 1962, p. 656.
15  C Bettelheim, ‘Theoretical comments’, in A Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the 
Imperialism of Trade. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, pp. 293–99. Bettelheim argued that, 
in conserving those parts of social formations deemed functional in practice, colonialism made 
them seem separate from its other institutions. This appearance of isolation gave rise to the notion 
of duality.
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to justify their actions to their own people. In the end, empire sustained 
national pride and made nations appear great. Conquering lesser peoples 
fulfilled their historic destiny. Lesser peoples were not their equal. 
They did not possess the same rights; certainly not the right to develop 
similarly, create democratic institutions or engage with the wider, more 
globalised world on their own terms. Those possibilities could only occur 
after independence. Until then colonialism induced deep psychological 
barriers between colonised and coloniser that perpetuated distrust and 
violence. Such impacts often continued long after the colonial period had 
ended wherever local collaborators sought to inherit the colonial state. 
It gave birth to a form of neocolonialism in which the social divisions 
that promoted or sustained colonialism simply continued, invariably with 
destabilising consequences. Colonial experiences also generated deep 
suspicions of the motives of former colonial powers, affecting reactions 
to development advice after the 1950s and encouraging many former 
colonies to pursue disastrous separate development strategies.
Many of these features of colonialism were found in Fiji and made their 
way into the language of revolt that was demonstrated during times 
of upheaval long after colonialism had ended. So, too, the struggle for 
supremacy between Fiji’s leading chiefs that had played such a vital role 
in the decision of Cakobau, the vunivalu of Bau, to cede Fiji to Britain 
in 1874. Cession provided a means to deal with the outside world now 
rapidly crowding in, while giving scope to preserve existing structures of 
power. The ageing vunivalu provocatively styled himself Tui Viti or King 
of Fiji and vainly hoped that the negotiated cession might consolidate his 
claims to paramountcy. It was not to be, but the title he claimed and his 
rivalry with the Tongan Ma’afu, who laid claim to eastern Fiji, continue 
to resonate through Fijian politics today, in part because the colonial 
settlement preserved the semblance of power held by high chiefs. At least 
some Fijians were far from passive recipients of colonialism; from the start 
they collaborated and benefited, finding in their state within a state a new 
means to exert authority and continue old rivalries.
From a security perspective, indirect rule made immediate sense. The first 
governor of Fiji, Sir Arthur Gordon, established what became known as 
the Native Administration or Matanitu iTaukei, a hierarchy of control 
that began at the remodelled village level (koro) and moved through to 
the district (tikina) and province (yasana). At its apex was an assembly 
of high chiefs, all from the victorious eastern sections of Fiji, known as 
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the Bose Vaka Turaga or Council of Chiefs which advised the governor.16 
As  historian Brij Lal aptly records, Gordon also ‘imposed a  uniform, 
inflexible set of land laws on a people whose traditional patterns of 
landownership showed kaleidoscopic variety and fluidity’.17 They were 
laws derived largely from eastern Fiji.
This neotraditional orthodoxy became both a means of control and 
a focal point for dissent, in ways that Gordon never anticipated. He 
sought to maintain chiefly support and domestic peace, and avoid the 
costly war that colonialism had caused in New Zealand. And, in Fiji, 
colonialism did present risks. Not only were colonisers (around 2,600) 
vastly outnumbered by Fijians (possibly 140,000),18 but cession brought 
revolt from Colo tribes in central and western Viti Levu. Bau joined 
with Britain to suppress Colo and gain advantage. This ‘Little War of 
Viti Levu’ (1875–76) left a legacy of dissent, in part borne from Colo’s 
cultural distance from maritime Fiji and historical antipathy to Bau, but 
also from its continued neglect and relative poverty. It would find voice 
in anti-colonial and anti-Bauan movements such as the Tuka (led by 
Dugumoi or Navosavakadua), the Luveniwai in the 1880s and 1890s, and 
in Apolosi Ranawai’s anti-colonial and anti-chiefly Viti Kabani movement 
of the early 20th century.19 That all these movements adopted protective 
millennial or commercial forms should not detract from their intent. Not 
until independence would Fijians be permitted a political voice, but the 
dissent that was first demonstrated during the early decades of colonialism 
continued to echo in many of the small anti-establishment political 
parties formed in the late 20th century, in the victory of the Fiji Labour 
Party in 1987, and in the involvement of the Colo province Naitasiri in 
the 2000 coup, which also saw descendants of the Cakobau clan pitted 
against the Mara clan, the successors to Ma’afu and Tovata’s 20th-century 
16  This later became known as the Bose Levu Vaka Turaga or the Great Council of Chiefs.
17  B Lal, Broken Waves: A History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century. Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1992, p. 15. Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi makes a similar point: ‘Fijians were only united 
with the coming of the British colonisers’ (Madraiwiwi, ‘Ethnic tensions and the law’, 2004).
18  The Fijian population declined from approximately 140,000 in 1881 to 86,000 in 1904. 
Europeans (half of whom derived from Australia, New Zealand or England) grew slowly in number 
from 2,671 in 1881 to 3,707 in 1911 (Peter Robinson, ‘The Crown Colony Government & the 
regulation of relations between settlers & Fijians, 1880–1910’. Master of Letters Thesis, Oxford 
University, 1984, pp. 122, 137).
19  The best work on anticolonial resistance in Fiji is Robert Nicole’s Disturbing History: Resistance 
in Early Colonial Fiji (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011). See also Timothy J McNaught, 
The Fijian Colonial Experience: A Study of the Neo-Traditional Order under British Colonial Rule prior 
to World War II. Canberra: The Australian National University, 1982.
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resurgence under Ratu Sukuna. It would find echoes also in the marijuana 
plantations that, for much of the 2000s, provided the most viable cash 
crop for the isolated and impoverished but still defiant Colo region.
Gordon left another legacy that would prove equally long lasting in its 
impact. In order to make the new colony pay for itself, he imported 
Indian indentured labourers (61,000 between 1879 and 1916) to work 
on sugar cane fields that were eventually managed by the Australian 
Colonial Sugar Refinery Company (CSR). The use of CSR avoided the 
presence of British settlers who might demand rights similar to those 
enjoyed by settlers and their descendants in self-governing colonies like 
Australia and New Zealand.20 The use of indentured Indians ensured the 
availability of cheap labour that would not disrupt the Fijian economy, 
as the withdrawal of Fijian labour would most certainly have done, 
and provoke anti-colonial agitation.
Fijians would later claim that the creation of the sugar industry excluded 
them from economic participation and marginalised them. The claim 
made use of notions of dualism, of a dichotomy between the tradition 
of the Fijian way of life and the modernity of the new economy, to 
assert postcolonial inequality and disadvantage, which are hallmarks of 
underdevelopment. This assertion became the central justification for 
Fijian paramountcy during the coups of 1987 and 2000. Many writers, 
including the political economist William Sutherland, have demonstrated 
that this is incorrect, or at best a gross simplification. Certainly Fijians 
had only marginal involvement in the sugar industry to start with, but 
they were never excluded from the colonial economy. Many Fijians 
worked as wage labourers; during the 1880s possibly one quarter of 
the Fijian workforce laboured in copra plantations. By the end of the 
1930s many were also working in the Vatukoula goldmines. In addition, 
Fijians were forced to contribute indirectly to the new economy in other 
ways. Communal tax-in-kind made up 30 per cent of state revenue in 
20  Nonetheless, settlers in Fiji still pressed for direct representation in government 
(their birthright), demanded Fiji’s incorporation into a federated Australasia in the 1880s and with 
New Zealand in 1900, and pressed for access to more land, even though they never utilised more 
than a fraction of the land they already held. Fiji’s colonial government briefly flirted with a political 
agitators ordinance to prevent colonists undermining Fijian support for the communal system, but 
eventually agreed to the representation of colonists (six) and Fijians (two) in a Legislative Council 
dominated by government appointees (10) (Robinson, ‘The Crown Colony Government’, 1984, 
pp. 16, 60–88, 95, 109–10). See also France, The Charter of the Land, 1969, pp. 149–75.
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the 1870s21 and the cost of Fijian labour set the national benchmark for 
wages. Fijians were not excluded from the colonial economy, but they 
were integrated differently from Europeans and Indians, and it was this 
difference that always ensured that labour possessed a racial dimension 
within Fiji.22 
Rigid segmented labour markets were by no means unique to colonialism 
in Fiji. But, without doubt, its combination with other forms of 
separateness (social, political and educational) encouraged the divisions 
and stereotyping that would later haunt Fiji’s political and economic 
development. Writers in the 1980s, like the sociologist Simione Durutalo, 
saw all this as grist to the mill for colonialism, but for those colonised 
it helped foster a victim mentality.
During the greater part of British rule knowledge except that provided 
in carefully limited doses by the missionaries, was disdained. The people 
were discouraged from thinking for themselves; a thirst for knowledge 
was considered dangerous and subversive. Trained to obey and follow, 
and mindful of the misfortunes that befell the poor ‘native’ who, using 
his or her reason, questioned however timidly the decisions of someone 
in authority, the people later transformed this training and fear into 
a conviction that one should allow one’s social and economic superiors 
to do the thinking for the community. One’s betters eventually included, 
besides the British officials and white missionaries, those members of the 
local elite who were by then benefitting from colonial rule. This passivity 
was gradually transformed and glorified as tradition.23
In divesting its subjects of their humanity, colonialism created a sense 
of inferiority, and fostered a victim mentality. Above all it encouraged 
the idea that only colonisers were dynamic and capable of leadership and 
innovation. That idea – a form of cultural cringe – took some undoing.
21  If anything, the tax burden increased on Fijians because the amount in kind to be paid was 
never adjusted after 1881 to take into account the dramatic fall in the Fijian population (Robinson, 
‘The Crown Colony Government’, 1984, p. 100).
22  W Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race. An Alternative History of Fiji to 1992. Canberra: 
The Australian National University, 1992, pp. 28–29.
23  S Durutalo, ‘The liberation of the Pacific Island intellectual’, Review, 4, September 1983, 
SSED, University of the South Pacific, p. 14. 
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Creating a plural society
The colonial approach to development and its failure to empower its 
subjects ultimately cost it any chance of success. It was challenged, not 
least because colonialism transformed societies and created dynamics that 
colonialists could not control.
The importation of Indian labour is a case in point. It gave labour a new 
racial dimension: Indian, Fijian, European, part European, Chinese, Pacific 
Islander and Rotuman. As Sutherland notes, however, such appearances 
can be deceptive.24 Most indentured labourers (girmitiya) came initially 
from Hindi-speaking Uttar Pradesh in north India, but a large minority 
later came also from the Tamil- and Telugu-speaking south.25 Southerners 
found fitting into a predominantly North Indian settler society difficult, 
partly because northerners were more established in Fiji at the time of 
their arrival, but partly also because of religious, linguistic and ethnic 
discrimination. Indians were never a singular community. 
They arrived on five-year contacts to desperate conditions26 in an industry 
dominated by a single company extracting even greater profits than its 
Australian operations were able to muster and paying wages seven times 
lower. According to economist Wadan Narsey, between 1883 and 1913, 
CSR profits in Fiji rose 600 per cent, despite a 53 per cent fall in sugar 
prices.27 The colonial government saw no reason to interfere; indeed 
for many years the state’s courts were employed to routinely discipline 
indentured labourers. Over time the position of Indians improved, 
especially once CSR ended plantation farming and leased land to free 
Indians as small farmers, who not unexpectedly now also carried most of 
the risks previously borne by the company. The indenture system ended 
by 1920 but, after a generation of harrowing experiences, post-indentured 
farmers became decidedly more assertive. Lal notes:
24  Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race, 1992, pp. 50–54.
25  See Brij V Lal, ‘Girmitiyas: The Origins of the Fiji Indians’. Canberra: Journal of Pacific 
History, 1983.
26  V Naidu, Violence of Indenture in Fiji. Lautoka: Fiji Institute of Applied Studies, 2004. See also 
KL Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants – A History to the End of Indenture in 1920. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1963.
27  W Narsey, ‘Monopoly, capital, white racism and superprofits in Fiji’, Journal of Pacific Studies, 
5, 1979, pp. 66–146.
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Indenture had taught its lessons well. The Fiji-born were more on their 
own, more individually oriented, more conscious of and sensitive to the 
relative deprivation they experienced in the larger society. India did not 
loom large in their consciousness, as it had perhaps done in the lives of the 
girmitiya, including my grandfather, who even in old age still hoped to die 
in his janmabhumi ‘motherland’. In contrast Fiji was the only home the 
new generation had, and they did not shy away from pursuing the rights 
and opportunities they thought were properly theirs.28
That assertiveness was most marked in a series of strikes in 1921, 1943 
and 1960 over the cost of living and it was assisted also by a new but small 
class of Indian professionals and businessmen who migrated to Fiji, most 
notably after the First World War, especially from the Punjab and Gujarat. 
They added further to the linguistic and religious diversity of the Indian 
‘community’ and also to the tensions within it over work, religion and 
political representation.
One recent migrant was a teacher from North India who had temporarily 
become a cane farmer in the early 1930s. Ayodhya Prasad formed the 
Kisan Sangh or Farmers Association in 1937 to negotiate on behalf of 
farmers with the CSR to reduce the huge impact of rising costs on their 
livelihoods. The CSR kept tight control over what farmers could do on its 
land, even restricting private gardens and animals, and its contracts with 
farmers often left them at the mercy of moneylenders and shopkeepers. 
The Kisan Sangh’s goals were popular with farmers, and it eventually 
succeeded in influencing the terms of a new farmer’s contract with the 
CSR. But its focus on debt reduction and farmer cooperatives, which 
released pressure on the CSR, potentially threatened the livelihoods 
of shopkeepers, many of whom were Gujaratis or Punjabis.
In 1941, Gujarati lawyer AD Patel formed a rival Maha Sangh devoted 
to  the interests of the much discriminated South Indians, who were 
mostly  employed directly by the CSR and less inclined to see the 
commonality of interests with the CSR that the Kisan Sangh projected. 
Increasingly they saw the Kisan Sangh as a North Indian association. Thus 
divided, cane farmers entered a period of great uncertainty. War increased 
inflation and hardship for farmers. A cane strike over conditions in 1943 
saw the two associations assume diametrically opposed positions with 
disastrous consequences for farmers. Although the issues faced by the 
28  Lal, Broken Waves, 1992, p. 75.
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farmers would not be resolved until the dying days of colonialism, farmers 
had organised and stood up to the autocracy of both the CSR and the 
colonial government.29
Sutherland argues that, in Fiji’s highly racialised atmosphere, it was all too 
easy for the class nature of farmers’ struggles to be obscured by ethnicity, 
either that of North and South Indians or of Indians in general.30 
Sometimes it was in the interests of the state and farmer leaders to present 
issues in diversionary ethnic terms. Even during the political turmoil 
of 1987 and 2000, cane farmer issues and access to land were similarly 
presented. But, in the early 20th century, there were other struggles 
underway in Fiji – again the unintended consequences of colonialism – 
and they too were portrayed as racial. Among the most significant were 
those concerning chiefs.
Fijian chiefs, particularly those among the dominant eastern clans, had 
done well from the post-cession settlement but, with the Colo peoples 
under control, colonial authorities considered encouraging Fijian 
individualism by promoting the movement of Fijians from villages and 
relaxing communal obligations. To that end they sought to give Fijians 
more opportunity to break away from the confines of their villages 
and, during the 1920s, they downgraded the role of chiefs in native 
administration. But their efforts were always somewhat ambivalent; 
certainly following Ranawai’s launch of the subversive western Fijian Viti 
Kabani in 1913, the state rediscovered the value of chiefs. Apolosi formed 
his Fijian Company as a cooperative to monopolise Fijian commerce 
and unite Fijians against colonial and chiefly control. For his pains he 
would spend much of his final 30 years in exile within and outside of 
Fiji. The colonial authorities should have welcomed him as a model 
enterprising commoner Fijian but his activities potentially threatened 
European traders. He also challenged the authority of the state and its 
Native Administration and raised the ire of chiefs, whom he blamed for 
the problems facing his people. Chiefs like the Tui Lau, Ratu Lala Sukuna, 
gradually convinced authorities of the importance of chiefly authority for 
maintaining law and order, particularly as more Fijians moved from their 
traditional places of residence. ‘Whatever his real merits as a leader, or 
29  B Lal, A Vision for Change: AD Patel and the Politics of Fiji. Canberra: National Centre for 
Development Studies, The Australian National University, 1997, pp. 64–80.
30  Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race, 1992, pp. 57–58.
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failings as a demagogue,’ one historian writes, ‘Apolosi had become the 
Fijian bogeyman who served the authorities as the negative example to 
the good natives, chiefly and loyal civil servants like Ratu Sukuna.’31
The Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) took the lead, encouraging the 
formation of a Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) in 1940 to oversee 
the  leasing of Fijian land, and mobilising many of its young men 
(in  contrast to Indians) for war service. Loyalty eventually won Fijians 
a Fijian Administration in 1944, which re-established many of the old 
features of Fijian communal life that consolidated chiefly authority. 
Additionally, it assisted to paper over historic divisions and create the 
mythology of Fijians as one people, indivisible and united under their 
chiefs, with interests diametrically opposed to those of Indians. It survived 
until the eve of independence. Thereafter, many Fijians made its recreation 
an essential element in the assertion of Fijianness. Ironically it would also 
feature strongly in the Fijian military backlash in 2006, but for opposite 
reasons.
The increased assertiveness of Indians and apparent defensiveness of 
Fijians  grew in part from demographic changes. Indians comprised 
29  per  cent of the population in 1911 (which totalled 140,000), 
43  per  cent in 1936 (160,000) and 50 per cent by 1946 (200,000). 
The change made electoral representation more difficult, minimal though 
it was in reality. By the late 1930s the advisory Legislative Council 
continued to be dominated by officials, with representation from subjects 
communalised and unproportional. Only half the European and Indian 
representatives were elected; Fijians were nominated by the GCC.32 
Efforts by Indians to achieve more democratic forms of governance were 
met by European claims that the Deed of Cession necessitated European 
dominance to protect Fijian interests. Exaggerated though they were, such 
31  Some 17 per cent of Fijians had left their villages by 1946; see J Heartfield, ‘You are not 
a white woman: Apolosi Nawai, the Fiji Produce Agency and the trial of Stella Spencer in Fiji, 1915’, 
Journal of Pacific History, 38: 1, 2003, p. 82. See also Nicole, Disturbing History, 2011, pp. 70–97; 
and McNaught, The Fijian Colonial Experience, 1982.
32  Indians were permitted only one member nominated by the governor in 1916; Fijian chiefs, 
two; and Europeans, seven. The remaining 11 members were nominated officials. Agitation for change 
had little impact; in 1929 European representation fell to six, and Indians and Fijians were permitted 
three members each. Indian representatives called for a common roll rather than communal voting, 
but received little support either from chiefs opposed to democracy or from Europeans fearful of 
Indian demographic supremacy. In 1937, a revision produced a 31-member council of 16 officials, 
three elected and three nominated Indians, three elected and three nominated Europeans, and 
five Fijians nominated indirectly by the GCC. Local government representation produced similar 
distortions and arguments, with the state maintaining control through a preponderance of officials.
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claims sent a powerful signal of support to the Fijian elite. Consequently, 
a new constitution prior to independence in 1970 rewarded Europeans 
with an equally exaggerated proportion of seats, effectively giving them 
the balance of power. 
Colonial apartheid, represented by separate communal schools, 
separate suburbs, separate working environments and separate political 
representation marked the extremities of pluralism, a term increasingly 
used by social scientists after the 1930s to describe the mutually exclusive 
social, cultural and structural features of colonies or former colonies. 
Lacking any national binding, these predominantly tropical societies 
could only be held together by force, not consensus, or so they said.33 
Political scientists and historians echoed such views. They described two 
homogenous blocs confronting each other, with conflict the inevitable 
result. Guyanan academic Ralph Premdas believed that ‘left to themselves 
these ethnic groups [in Fiji] would probably opt for separate states’.34 
‘The  different social groupings are divided from each other in every 
respect,’ claimed historian Deryck Scarr, ‘the only common link is that 
they live in the same country.’35
Politicians and ethno-nationalists similarly echoed these views. Rebel 
George Speight argued in 2000 that differences between Fijians and 
Indians were immutable: ‘They have their own religion; they don’t dress 
the same; they don’t speak the same language; they don’t smell the same.’36 
Joji Banuve, an assistant Minister for Education, later suggested that racial 
characteristics could be inferred from how people combed their hair. Fijian 
women combed their hair outwards, demonstrating how Fijians reached 
out to people to help them. Indian women combed their hair inwards, 
signifying that they only cared for themselves, not others.37 Similarly, 
Banuve’s contemporary, Adi Asenaca Caucau – Minister for Women and 
Social Welfare – described Indians as ‘weeds’: ‘pushy, inconsiderate and 
always demanding’.38 Her Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase, described 
33  See JS Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy. Cambridge University Press, 
1939; L Kuper & MG Smith (eds), Pluralism in Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
34  R Premdas, ‘The foundations of political conflict in Fiji’, Suva, mimeo, 1986.
35  D Scarr, Fiji, Politics of Illusion: The Military Coups in Fiji. Sydney: NSW University Press, 
1988, p. 16.
36  fijilive, 23 May 2000.
37  fijilive, 14 April 2002. Banuve neglected to note that not all Fijian women wore the traditional 
buiniga hairstyle, and that those of Polynesian descent often had straight hair.
38  Fiji Times, 10 August 2002.
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Fijians as ‘the rarest breed of people in the world’.39 ‘The past is too much 
with us and cannot be wished away easily’, Vice President Ratu Joni 
Madraiwiwi, noted at the time: ‘While one may decry communalism, it is 
a difficult beast to subdue.’40 
When anthropologist Alexander Mamak applied the plural analysis 
to Fiji’s  capital, Suva, during the 1970s, he wanted to know exactly 
how mutually exclusive communities had become and whether 
a tipping point existed after which a nation fell beyond redemption, its 
communities having achieved such separate autonomy that any process 
of de-pluralisation became impossible. Instead he found that internal 
divisions among Indians and Fijians created ‘bases for cross-cutting 
alliances between sections previously unrelated’. Hence de-pluralisation 
was a real possibility because most Indians and Fijians shared low pay and 
low status employment.41 Thus class could play a role in breaking down 
rigidities and providing space for the development of national goals and 
interests. Of course this did not explain why communities came to see 
their interests as so divergent in the first place. Could leaders gain in some 
way from promoting conflict pluralism? Could this explain the longevity 
of race as an organisational concept in countries like Fiji? 
Political scientist Stephanie Lawson sees the overwhelming focus on race 
in Fiji as mistaking ‘the social myth for reality and [giving] it both a force 
and a form that is not necessarily warranted’. Such focus distorts the 
nature of race relations and obscures other explanatory factors.42 By using 
race, culture or religion as a way to define societies, we accept at face 
value the criteria by which groups define themselves. Harold Wolpe once 
argued with respect to South Africa that this kind of thinking reflected 
the internalisation of colonial attitudes. Internal colonialism, he argued, 
treats racial groups as distinct essentialised entities. It takes appearances for 
39  fijilive, 12 March 2003.
40  To these opening remarks at the Fiji National Consultations on a Global Partnership for the 
Prevention of Armed Conflict, Pacific Theological College, Suva, Madraiwiwi added: ‘In the heat of 
political confrontation, the electorate takes refuge in the familiar and eschews difference’. In such 
situations ‘it is critical that one engages the political actors whatever their beliefs’ (‘Building the 
peace’, Fiji Times, 17 March 2005).
41  A Mamak, Colour, Culture & Conflict: A Study of Pluralism in Fiji. Sydney: Pergamon Press, 
1978, pp. 5–6, 178.
42  S Lawson, The Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 39. 
Steven Ratuva (‘Politics of ethno-national identity’, 2008) argues instead for a more ‘complex inter-
relationship of opposition and accommodation taking place between political and cultural discourses’.
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granted. It glosses over internal differences within groups. It accepts the 
notion of separateness and that race drives social and political processes.43 
Wolpe argued for critical analysis instead.
Of course conflict pluralists also contrasted the diversity of developing 
societies with the presumed homogeneity of developed countries, 
where common norms and values enabled consensus not conflict. Such 
convenient simplifications flowed easily in the postwar period. Economist 
Walt Rostow maintained that modernisation produced homogeneity 
and the kind of society that the United States had become. Political 
scientist Samuel Huntington added a caveat: where homogeneity 
existed only within conflicting ethnic blocs, national consensus for 
stability and growth would be frustrated.44 Neither acknowledged that 
the perceived homogeneity of developed countries emanated from long 
processes of social and economic change that gradually made states 
fiscally accountable and democratic. In other words, the transcendence 
of ethnic or other identities derived from political processes; it did not 
derive from a fixed inherited or natural condition. No similar process 
occurred with Third World countries. Colonialism never developed 
similar institutions of accountability or public goods like education and 
communications. Rather, it frustrated changes that might have created 
a sense of nationhood.45 Hence only exceptional political leadership and 
prosperity could overcome the lack of cohesion and consensus and many 
newly independent states experienced neither.
43  H Wolpe, ‘The theory of internal colonisation: The South African case’, in I Oxaal, T Barnett 
& D Booth (eds), Beyond the Sociology of Development. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, 
p. 283. More recently Paul Collier notes the near convergence of pluralism with the long-held views 
of late 19th-century urban middle-class romantic nationalists who retrospectively imagined ‘the sense 
of a common ethnic origin blended to the national soil’ (Wars, Guns & Votes: Democracy in Dangerous 
Places. London: The Bodley Head, 2009, p. 169). 
44  WW Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge 
University Press, 1960; S Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968. Of course, this conveniently overlooks issues such as segregation, which was 
then prevalent within the United States.
45  Something of the same argument can be found in John D Kelly & Martha Kaplan’s Represented 
Communities: Fiji & World Colonization (University of Chicago Press, 2001): communities are never 
imagined but derive from colonial divide and rule legacies and decolonisation negotiations. Such 





Pluralism was one way to account for the state of colonies. But, in the 
postwar period, the end of colonialism coincided with a remarkable 
period of global economic introspection that deeply influenced the 
strategies adopted by developing countries to overcome colonial legacies. 
The origins of new thinking on development lay in the Great Depression 
of the 1930s and in the return to long-run theorising about development 
led by the British economist Maynard Keynes. His stress on state stimulus 
packages would dominate political responses to recessions well into the 
next century. They also deeply influenced responses to postwar recovery. 
The 1947 Marshall Plan and the consolidation of welfare states in Europe 
are classic examples of this way of thinking. Keynesianism, together with 
state-driven economic development, shaped the immediate postwar 
decades, assisted in large measure by a long-lasting postwar boom.
Nonetheless, the Depression weakened faith in market capitalism. 
Together with the illusion of successful Soviet planning in the 1930s, 
it popularised the idea that development could be centrally planned. 
National security demands in the 1930s and 1940s also ensured that state 
directives took precedence over market signals. The Depression and its 
aftermath seemed to suggest that only governments could rationally and 
equitably ration scarce resources and allocate them to ensure national 
growth in domestic goods, industry and infrastructure. India chose state 
planning after independence and its decision influenced many politicians 
in newly independent African and Asian countries also. But, with 
a closed economy, strong state controls and heavy industry as the motor 
for growth, India struggled over the next two decades to achieve more 
than 1.9 per cent annual growth. In part this was because state planning 
in India dealt with a less wealthy and skilled population. By failing to 
democratise its economy, India also constrained popular participation in 
its economy. Western Europe redistributed wealth instead.
National industry was the basis for growth in modernising countries 
during  the 19th and early 20th centuries, and colonies drew on that 
feature with one significant difference. The successful early industrialisers 
had used  growing surpluses in agriculture to invest in industry; but, 
in many newly independent countries, no improved agricultural 
productivity existed to tap into. Instead taxes on food and import tariffs 
were used to raise the funds needed for industrial investment and for 
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sustaining uncompetitive national enterprises. Struggling farmers soon 
got the message. They fled the induced poverty of the countryside for the 
supposed wealth that would come from temporary encampment in urban 
slums, but there was never enough work and – not unexpectedly – never 
enough food.46 
We might ask whether this form of industrialisation was still an 
appropriate goal in the mid and late 20th century when economies 
were becoming more globalised, more service-oriented, and a new set of 
international institutions existed to regulate the global economy and assist 
with development? To be fair the changed nature of world economies 
was not obvious to many leaders, and international institutions rarely 
extended to Third World countries the social and economic privileges 
increasingly enjoyed by the First World. In part this failure resulted also 
from entrenched core–periphery ways of thinking, the legacy of decades 
of imperialism, and it created a crippling global divide that weakened 
the postwar order. Consequently, struggles for independence, national 
weaknesses and the exigencies of the Cold War made the state an obvious 
emphasis for almost all postcolonial governments. 
Latin American countries, in contrast, were mostly independent but, 
like many colonies, their focus on primary export production left them 
dependent on industrialised countries for markets. The Depression 
destroyed the value of their products and demonstrated the extent to 
which terms of trade worked against primary production and reduced 
their capacity to respond. Raúl Prebisch, head of the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America in the 1950s, believed this downward 
trend in demand for primary products unlikely to reverse. He argued that 
the best solution for the Third World lay in breaking colonial ties and 
pursuing import substitution industrialisation (ISI), using high tariffs to 
protect local industry from the anarchy of the marketplace. In the long 
term, this patriotic strategy increased the economic role of the state, which 
began to set domestic prices and wages, grant subsidies and nationalise 
industries. As a postcolonial strategy, however, ISI did not necessarily 
encourage economic or political democratisation; if anything it was in 
tune with the wishes of those who sought to inherit the colonial state 
46  A Beattie, False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World. London: Viking, 2009, 
pp. 48–50. Beattie uses the example of Zambia.
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or, in the case of South America, those who already controlled the state 
and preferred ‘cosy, safe monopolies protected by government fiat and 
regulation to the brutal riskiness of competition’.47
ISI was a global response to the new postwar environment, not simply 
a  Third World one. All countries sought to protect their national 
industries and many rounds of international negotiations would occur 
before leading industrial countries gradually reduced barriers to trade late 
in the century. Technological change also made it possible to restructure 
industry and commerce globally. But, until then, ISI remained attractive 
to countries seeking to reduce forms of colonial dependence. Prebisch 
went on to launch the first UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in 1964, which successfully negotiated the general system of 
preferences that granted Third World countries duty-free access for some 
manufactured goods into the First World.
Such postcolonial global developments generated optimism during 
the early postcolonial period. Real development might not only be 
possible but could also be achieved quickly. Indeed, the United Nations 
declared the 1960s the Development Decade, as if 10 years alone would 
be sufficient as long as the hearts and minds of people were captured. 
But this was also a period of Cold War, and winning hearts and minds 
served ideological purposes. Within the United States a broad school of 
development thought emerged known as Modernisation. State driven, it 
focused on social and political modernisation as well as economic growth, 
and held that the transition from tradition to modernity could be achieved 
by adopting a scientific outlook or Protestant work ethic. No consensus 
emerged, however, as to the means to achieve such a transition. Samuel 
Huntington believed that dictatorship could be a precondition for growth 
and democracy,48 thereby justifying American interests in authoritarian 
countries like South Vietnam and Iran. Most modernisationists saw the 
United States as the model of modernity and were comfortable with the 
notion that development equalled Americanisation. Hence, Third World 
failures to modernise were due principally to internal factors such as the 
persistence of tradition, the plurality of societies, or cultural resistance to 
change.49 An external agent of change could, however, help offset these 
internal factors. 
47  Beattie, False Economy, 2009, pp. 12–13.
48  Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968.
49  For example, see Lawrence Harrison, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. 
New York: Basic Books, 2000.
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If countries lacked sufficient savings to invest in growth, they might seek 
foreign capital or aid, which of course added to the mythology of the West 
as the only dynamic and modern site – the only model for development. 
But such aid could not be extended to traditional sectors; they were 
regarded as static and beyond redemption. In fact, this was an inaccurate 
perception. Modern sectors tended to feed off so-called traditional sectors 
because they kept costs low and reduced pressures for political change. 
Appearances of separateness could easily mask its opposite – integration – 
albeit in a subservient fashion, just as colonialism had recreated traditional 
systems for purposes of control.50
If modernisation theories owed much to colonial thinking, then the 
group of ideas that briefly challenged it in the 1960s were aligned more 
directly to struggles for independence. They too captured a single idea, 
not of tradition as the stumbling block but of external relations first 
established under imperialism. American economist Paul Baran argued 
in 1957 that Western capital deliberately kept the Third World backward 
in order to maintain markets for its surplus production.51 Hence the Third 
World came to be systematically underdeveloped, as Andre Gunder Frank 
expressed it, rather than developed.52 Dependency theories held that 
core–periphery relationships deliberately generated underdevelopment in 
the periphery and that modernity was possible only if those relationships 
were broken. Thus underdevelopment was not generated internally, 
as modernisationists claimed, but externally by imperialism, surplus 
extraction and unequal exchange. The solution lay in cutting old links with 
the global economy, fostering self-reliance through state-led initiatives 
such as ISI, and developing new and more equal relationships with the 
global economy. For political leaders of newly independent countries this 
approach appealed more than that offered by Modernisationists because 
it shifted responsibility for the condition of their countries away from 
internal factors such as class, investment and inequalities to external 
relationships, both past and present. That it also signified an ahistorical, 
static and homogenised universal view of societies added to its appeal; 
it underpinned Third World solidarity.
50  Bettelheim (1977) called this process ‘dissolution-conservation’ and saw the origins of inequality 
in its impact on productive capabilities. His view contrasted with those who believed disadvantage 
derived from exchange relations.
51  P Baran, The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957.
52  AG Frank, ‘The development of underdevelopment’, in S Chew & R Denemark (eds), 




Inevitably, the costs of self-reliance were high, resulting in inefficient 
uncompetitive industries isolated from technological innovation and 
with little emphasis on service and quality, and regimes that paid little 
attention to democratisation. North Korea’s self-reliant hermit state is one 
of the few surviving examples today. But, for most countries, the result 
became increased debt, neglected exports and – despite all the rhetoric to 
the contrary – the penetration of national boundaries by subsidiaries of 
transnational corporations (TNCs). Nor did preferential agreements that 
attempted to address the legacies of unequal exchange always assist; instead 
they confirmed existing economic foci and postponed diversification 
and other reforms, as Fiji experienced with its sugar trade concessions. 
Preferential agreements could also become a form of rent-seeking, a Third 
World entitlement captured by elites with little development to show.
Dependency theories grew out of inevitable postcolonial suspicions 
of international markets, and former colonial actors, and fears of 
neocolonialism or renewed subservience. They were allied with postcolonial 
desires for alternative development that sprung from long-suppressed 
native energies rather than the dictates of former colonial masters. 
A natural good now had an opportunity to triumph over an obvious evil. 
That national isolation or protectionism might stymie growth seemed 
as inconceivable as capital being simultaneously both progressive and 
regressive in different places. British communist Bill Warren punctured 
the dependency bubble in 1980 when he declared underdevelopment the 
result of imperialism, not capitalism. Certainly colonialism generated path 
dependencies and class distortions, but decolonisation – he argued – now 
gave capital the potential to move into the periphery.53 No better example 
existed than that of newly industrialised countries (NICs) such as South 
Korea and Brazil, whose industrial success by the 1980s demonstrated 
that the Third World was far from homogeneous or fated to mediocrity. 
By the end of the century, China and India’s divergence would finally 
consume what remained of Dependency rhetoric.
By the 1980s, all theories were open to challenge, in part because of their 
inconsistencies but also because of experience. When postwar economic 
expansion finally faltered in the 1970s, recovery as a much more globalised 
world made nationalist solutions more problematic than they had once 
53  B Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism. London: Verso, 1980.
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seemed. Third World solidarity proved weak and new approaches to 
development emerged that relied less on statist directions than on human 
agency. Once more, democratisation entered the development lexicon.
The case of the missing national bourgeoisie
A transition to independence invariably implied some form of 
democratisation. It marked the difference between colonialism and 
postcolonialism in terms of development goals. In Fiji the colonial state 
consistently refused to discipline the CSR, even when its officials privately 
conceded that its actions badly harmed the welfare of the country’s 
farmers.  AD Patel pleaded in vain to the Shephard Commission of 
Inquiry into the sugar industry in 1943 to recognise: 
We growers are also human beings. We also have to meet our social, 
economic and religious obligations … We have as much right to be 
prosperous and happy as anybody in the world, with decent housing and 
better comforts.54 
But,  on  the eve of independence, the state took a different stance, 
accepting a new award that gave greater weight to the needs of its farmers.55 
For the CSR, the writing was on the wall. A government elected by and 
responsible to its citizens must have different objectives and priorities than 
a non-elected colonial administration. CSR decided to leave Fiji rather 
than adapt and, in 1973, its assets were effectively nationalised. But  to 
whom exactly was the new Fiji Government responsible and to what 
extent did that responsibility translate into a radically different direction 
for Fiji’s economy?
We noted earlier that, after the Second World War, Fiji’s eastern chiefs 
succeeded in creating a new bureaucracy to service the needs of Fijians, 
but their success did little to raise the welfare of ordinary Fijians. The same 
might be said of the colonial state. Its postwar drive to restructure the 
economy benefited Europeans with resources to invest in tourism. 
A declining proportion of state loans went to agriculture (40 per cent in 
1960, 25 per cent in 1969), with most agricultural and industrial loans 
54  Farmers’ petition to the governor, 16 November 1943, quoted in Lal, Broken Waves, 1992, 
p. 130. 
55  The Denning Award changed returns to farmers from 57.75 per cent of gross proceeds to 
65 per cent. In 1975, this was altered again to 70 per cent to growers.
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going to Europeans (52 per cent) and Indians (34 per cent).56 Rural Fijians 
missed out. This created a dilemma for the Fijian elite. It had survived 
because of the powerful support gained from European businesses, 
eager for allies in their struggle against competing Indian enterprises 
and for state support to develop a secure future in tourism. Increasingly 
during the 1960s, the Fijian elite came to believe that the answer lay in 
controlling the postcolonial state to facilitate the development of a new 
Fijian capitalist class, the equal to that possessed by Europeans and 
Indians. But doing that meant sacrificing, in part, the strategies that were 
crucial to chiefly success in the past, namely the old racist ideology of the 
colonial era. At the very least it had to be de-emphasised. The reason was 
simple: most state resources would continue to come from the export 
sugar sector. If these were not to be jeopardised, thereby preventing the 
state financing its Fijian business project, rapprochement with Indians 
was necessary. Hence the introduction of a new ideology of multiracialism 
and the new state’s symbolic but necessary decision to back cane farmers 
rather than the CSR in negotiations for a new cane award for the 1970s.
Colonies became independent but economies remained largely neocolonial 
and dependent. Their states promised the growth of strong local economies 
to give meaning to independence, a sign that they were moving towards 
equality with the First World. Yet, despite promising to develop their 
national capitalists, they were helpless to effect autonomous growth. Few 
linkages existed between the modern economy and the subsistence activities 
of the bulk of their population. State policies that funded industrial growth 
from rural taxes did not help. Taxes simply prevented new businesses from 
using poor peasants as a market, forcing them instead to focus on export 
activities that did little to generate internal growth and local participation, 
or provide for the welfare of the millions that urbanised in anticipation of 
that growth. Consequently, foreign capital still exerted tremendous sway, 
despite state rhetoric to the contrary. Herein lay sources for state weakness. 
Policies that excluded local participation bred instability, with less powerful 
classes eager for a higher national profile seeking compensation for their 
weakness by appealing to ethnic, tribal, religious or regional support. 
Where states found mediating between conflicting interest groups difficult, 
authoritarianism always loomed as a solution. Such temptation could only 
be avoided with inclusive social and economic change.57
56  Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race, 1992, pp. 114–15.
57  W Ziemann & M Lanzendorfer, ‘The state in peripheral societies’, The Socialist Register 1977. 
London: Merlin Press, 1977, pp. 143–77. 
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For many analysts in the immediate postcolonial period it seemed beyond 
doubt that a central feature of any well-developed economy lay in its 
ability to act in a self-generating manner. For some that meant not just the 
establishment of a strong national group of capitalists but also the removal 
of traditional practices that made impossible the development of integrated 
economies. But were these unrealistic goals? Could national capital actually 
represent the national interest? Was the notion of a progressive national 
bourgeoisie still relevant in a world of internationalised capital?58
For two decades scholars pored over contradictory evidence, particularly 
as  it emerged in Africa. Colin Leys argued in 1975 that new Kenyan 
capitalists had emerged but were still dependent on foreign capital and were 
unlikely to secure an independent future.59 Three years later he adjusted 
his views to provide more scope for the growth of an independent business 
class, particularly if it continued to receive state protection.60 But protection 
for what purpose? To nurture ultimately competitive infant industries or 
to provide a guaranteed source of wealth for new elites? In 1980, Nicola 
Swainson also saw possibilities for expansion in association with the 
state, but still regarded local capitalists as weak and dependent on foreign 
capital.61 In the same year, Raphie Kaplinsky argued that no real change 
had occurred in the Kenyan economy and that what growth had occurred 
had been due to temporarily high coffee prices, large balance of payments 
deficits and the movement of international capital out of distribution 
and into manufacturing and tourism.62 In 1982, Martin Godfrey agreed: 
high population growth, an overemphasis on cash crops at the expense of 
food, a failure to redistribute land and the lack of linkages between import 
substitution policies and the majority of people prevented any possibility 
of national economic autonomy. As a result, the Kenyan state in the 1980s 
looked outside its own borders to fuel growth, but this export focus was 
hampered by the collapse of the East African community, war in Uganda, 
competition from Zimbabwe and lack of access to European markets.63
58  A Phillips, ‘The concept of development’, Review of African Political Economy, 8, 1977, pp. 11–19. 
59  Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism. London: 
Heinemann, 1975.
60  C Leys, ‘Capital accumulation, class formation, and dependency – the significance of the 
Kenyan case’, The Socialist Register 1978. London: Merlin Press, 1978.
61  N Swainson, The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918–1977. London: 
Heinemann, 1980.
62  R Kaplinsky, ‘Capitalist accumulation in the periphery – the Kenyan case re-examined’, Review 
of African Political Economy, 16, 1980.
63  M Godfrey, ‘Kenya: African capitalism or simple dependency?’, in M Bienefeld & M Godfrey 
(eds), The Struggle for Development: National Strategies in an International Context. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1982.
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By the start of the 1990s, a generation after independence, researchers 
concluded that local capitalists were expanding in former colonies but 
were not yet capable of accumulating and investing capital independently. 
But  they did gain greater control over the resources of local, foreign-
owned enterprises because of shareholdings and directorships. And they 
did influence state decision-making, even though they were weak and 
heavily reliant on state assistance (for example, tariffs and monopolies) for 
survival. Hence their need to exploit internal social differences to garner a 
stronger political and economic base and thereby secure continued access 
to the state and its resources. 
The size and autonomy of national capital were not the only factors 
impacting on postcolonial growth. As we have noted, if a state tried to 
increase revenue to develop industry by raising taxes on its most productive 
sector, agriculture, it could potentially reduce the very local market needed 
to expand local commerce and consume industrial products. Both sectors 
would then be forced to rely on external markets to feed growth, thereby 
reducing intersectoral linkages and fostering unbalanced development. 
Favouring capital-intensive industries over small-scale labour-intensive 
industries could have the same impact. Similarly, encouraging public 
servants to enter business (with superannuation schemes that matured 
at 55  years) could also burden the very market their new businesses 
would depend on to be successful. Clearly, goals of development could be 
frustrated by the methods used to implement them, as political economist 
Gavin Williams argued in 1977. They increased foreign control or social 
inequalities, or both.64 
In addition, states often squandered their limited resources on luxury 
consumption for leaders, costly militaries and vanity monuments. 
Sometimes these activities were paid for by debt, which eventually needed 
to be serviced and repaid by later generations. Looking back on the 
first two decades of postcolonialism in Africa, political scientist Martin 
Doornbos wondered:
whether the stress on nation-building and national unity at the time [of 
independence] reflected a genuine desire to create a new ‘national’ society 
or whether it constituted the beginnings of an ideological defence of the 
colonial heritage which had become the state system.65 
64  G Williams, ‘Class relations in a neo-colony: The case of Nigeria’, in P Gutkind & P Waterman 
(eds), African Social Studies, A Radical Reader. London: Heinemann, 1977, pp. 284–94.
65  M Doornbos, ‘The African state in academic debate: Retrospect and prospect’, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, 28: 2, 1990, p. 196.
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But,  of  course, no  single outcome was fated. Already signs existed that 
strong entrepreneurial and middle classes, together with civil institutions, 
could democratise the state. Whether this meant an insular as opposed to 
an open outcome remained uncertain.
The postcolonial heritage
Independence in Fiji in 1970 promised a new beginning for all its peoples. 
Multiracialism, designed to overcome colonial blockages to the joint 
venture in nation-building, most symbolised that change. As a postcolonial 
strategy for Fiji, however, it very quickly came undone, although – as we 
shall see – the fires of race and indigenous paramountcy that quickly 
ignited after independence obscured its failure. Neither corruption nor 
extravagance were the cause of this great undoing; rather it was prompted 
by a fundamental flaw in the country’s approach to multiracialism. 
Multiracialism sought to respect communal differences rather than 
transcend them. To that end, Britain accepted a racially based constitution 
in 1970 as its parting gift to the country. Indians and Fijians were given 
22  seats each in a lower house of parliament, with a General Elector 
grouping of others (including Europeans)66 holding the balance of power 
with eight seats, the price for Fijian chiefly acceptance of independence. 
The exaggerated weighting for this small minority guaranteed Fijian 
control of any future parliament and denied the Indian demand for 
a common roll.67 Thus Fiji’s independence parliament comprised a lower 
house of 27 communal seats (12 each for Fijians and Indians, three for 
General Electors) and 25 general or open seats. Only general seats enabled 
cross-voting but for a defined number of communal representatives 
(10 Fijians, 10 Indians, and five General Electors).68 
66  General Electors included Europeans, ‘Part-Europeans’, and Chinese. The 1970 Constitution 
gave 5 per cent of the population control over 15 per cent of lower house seats.
67  In 1970, Fiji’s population stood at 530,000, 50.2 per cent being Indian and 45.7 per cent 
Fijian, Rotuman & Pacific islanders. Under the 1970 Constitution, the remainder – composed of 
Europeans, Part-Europeans, Chinese and Others – 4.1 per cent of the population, gained 15 per cent 
of lower house seats.
68  Fijians dominated the 22 members of the appointed Senate or upper house, of whom eight 
were appointed by the GCC, one by the Council of Rotuma, seven by the Prime Minister and six 




While cross-voting represented an improvement on colonial 
irreconcilability, the concept of multiracialism that underpinned it could 
only be sustained if all communities believed they shared equally in the 
prosperity that independence brought. If prosperity failed to materialise 
or came unevenly, communal difference dictated a competitive zero-sum 
response, effectively a return to the logic of colonial pluralism. Yet, in Fiji’s 
case, communal competition did not explain the events that unfolded. 
It was an outcome not a cause. Instead the answer lay within the deliberate 
failure of Fijian leaders to democratise their own community. In short, 
they reasserted policies that had already failed to improve the lot of 
ordinary Fijians and would continue to fail with disastrous consequences 
for the whole country over the next three decades.
In many respects multiracialism was a charade. Colonialism had locked 
Fiji’s two main communities in political combat and only the threat 
of independence in the early 1960s forced their respective leaders to 
reconsider communal configurations. Few changes were anticipated. The 
farmer organisation, the Maha Sangh, now the dominant partner in the 
umbrella Federation of Cane Growers Association, lent its support to 
an Indian-based Federation Party after the 1960 cane strike. In 1965, 
its now weaker rival and opponent till the end, the Kisan Sangh (which 
had abandoned the strike in 1960), formed a National Congress of 
Fiji. A chiefly dominated Fijian Association, formed in 1956 to oppose 
democratic reform, quickly reorganised once legislative council elections 
were scheduled in 1963 to give Fijians the vote for the first time. In 1966, 
the association became the dominant Fijian arm of an Alliance Party, with 
support also from a smaller General Electors Association and the Indian 
Alliance, the latter derived from the National Congress. This multiracial 
appearance had two primary goals: to ensure that any new constitution 
maintained communalism and to uphold chiefly control over Fijians. 
In those goals it succeeded; in fresh council elections in 1966, the Alliance 
Party won 23 seats to the Federation Party’s nine and was poised to gain 
control of the postcolonial state to facilitate its very conservative agenda.69 
Thus a Fijian party, which mirrored the Fijian Administration in makeup, 
emerged to unite all Fijians within a new expression of the neotraditional 
orthodoxy.70
69  A 1965 constitutional conference altered the makeup of the legislative council to enable a form 
of self-government prior to independence. Fijians had 14 seats, Indians 12 and General Electors 10.
70  Durutalo, ‘Of roots & offshoots’, 2005, pp. 146–48.
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The Federation Party attempted its own multiracial appearance, joining 
forces with western Viti Levu Fijian dissidents (the National Democratic 
Party) in 1968 to form the National Federation Party (NFP) and push 
for a common roll and an elected Fijian head of state. It failed, finally 
accepting the communal 1970 Constitution on the understanding that it 
would be reviewed after the first election held under the new Constitution 
in 1972. 
The creation of democratic politics generated a new dynamic within 
Fiji, and Fijian society in particular, enabling for the first time legitimate 
political expressions of dissent and hostility to the eastern chiefly elite. 
Some of this discontent focused on the nature of the postcolonial 
settlement. Thus trade unionist Apisai Tora’s Western Democratic Party 
sought in 1963 to have Britain shape independence as a simple revocation 
of cession (i.e. return Fiji to chiefly control) but with western Fiji’s rights 
fully restored. He joined forces with Isikeli Nadala’s Fijian Nationalist 
Party in 1966 to form the National Democratic Party. The mercurial Tora 
was a survivor and, over the next four decades, he shaped Fijian and west-
Fijian dissent, sometimes siding with his eastern opponents, sometimes 
going it alone. But, in a sense, he would never be alone. As Alumita 
Durutalo relates, democracy gave postcolonial dissidents the space that 
Navosavakadua and Ranawai never enjoyed, and they would use it to 
bring down the postcolonial order that the country’s chiefly elite had so 
carefully constructed in order to maintain their state within a state, the 
edifice that enabled them to claim to be both multiracial and pro-Fijian.71 
None of this seemed possible in the heady early days of independence 
in 1970. Given the size of its sugar and tourism industries, its growth 
in services during the final decades of colonialism and the production 
of a  small range of consumer products,72 Fiji gained independence in 
much better shape than many other colonies. At the same time as Rabuka 
entered the Royal Fiji Military Forces as a trainee officer in 1968, Fiji’s per 
capita GDP of US$1,200 equalled or bettered that of other small states 
such as Malta (US$1,400) or Mauritius (US$270). It performed better 
than many Asian countries such as Thailand (US$330) and Malaysia 
(US$790), even giants such as India and China (US$105). In fact, Fiji had 
71  Durutalo, ‘Of roots & offshoots’, 2005, p. 308.
72  B Knapman, in his ‘Afterword: The economic consequences of the coups’ (R Robertson & 
A Tamanisau, Fiji: Shattered Coups. Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988, pp. 161–62), lists these as beef, pork, 
beer, cigarettes, rice, cement and paint.
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much to celebrate after independence and, during the next 17 years 
under Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara’s Alliance government, Fiji experienced 
greater change than it had under colonialism after the Second World 
War. The economy grew on average 5.6 per cent during the 1970s, with 
domestic investment comfortably at 20 per cent of GDP. Manufacturing 
expanded 7 per cent per annum, and tourism’s proportion of foreign 
exchange earnings doubled to an average 34 per cent, almost the same 
as sugar (down from 60 per cent in the early 1960s), enabling Fiji for 
the first time to end its dependence on one main product. Actually, 
tourism’s contribution to GDP rose from just 3.5 per cent in 1970 to 
nearly 14 per cent by the end of the decade.73 One of Fiji’s undoubted 
economic strengths also derived from its capacity to use local savings, 
generated principally through its Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF), to 
underwrite government deficits. This meant that, although debt was often 
high (over 40 per cent of GDP), its domestication sheltered government 
from external currency and interest changes. The downside, however, 
lay in depleting resources for productive investment in the economy.
Postcolonial governments clearly had different priorities from colonial 
ones. A new highway linked the western sugar port Lautoka and the 
airport town Nadi with the eastern capital Suva, opening up new markets 
for farmers and new prospects for tourism.74 A new hydro scheme in Viti 
Levu’s centre at Monasavu – once the heartland of old Colo – reduced 
Fiji’s reliance on costly imported fuels. In the western highlands the 
Vaturu dam provided water to the dry west. New schools and health 
facilities were developed, and the regional University of the South Pacific 
(USP) began producing the country’s skilled and professional workforce. 
Agricultural projects increased the production of sugar (particularly at 
Seaqaqa on Vanua Levu), poultry, corn, tobacco, milk, rice, ginger and 
timber. Assembly, packaging and small-scale manufacturing plants sprung 
up to capitalise on new import-substitution policies and a growing urban 
market. The architecture for postcolonialism had, of necessity, to be 
different from that required by colonialism.
73  S Britton, Tourism & Underdevelopment in Fiji. Canberra, The Australian National University, 
1983, pp. 157–59.
74  This section draws on ‘Shadows of war and revolution’ in R Robertson, Multiculturalism & 
Reconciliation in an Indulgent Republic. Fiji after the Coups: 1987–1998. Suva: Fiji Institute of Applied 
Studies, 1998, pp. 13–14.
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It had to be, for development now also entailed coping with an unstable 
external world. Diversification became a necessary component of Fiji’s 
struggle for survival in a new climate of inflation, price fluctuations and 
trade uncertainties, yet in Fiji diversification began slowly. Instead Fiji 
focused on expanding existing activities, often in ways that contradicted 
its postcolonial desire to generate new national business leaders. Expansion 
came with foreign capital, against which small local businesses could not 
compete. Tourism, forestry and poultry industries were all successful 
examples of expansion that succumbed to the large-scale, centralised and 
more efficient operations of foreign capital, often in collaboration with the 
investment companies of the chiefly elite. Where the state did intervene 
to assist local businesses, to reduce the impact of price fluctuations 
and to assist with marketing, it created local monopolies; for example, 
in telecommunications, rice and flour milling and dairy processing, which 
increased business and consumer costs and took money from government 
coffers that could have been better employed. 
The rhetoric of import substitution was understandable in a newly 
independent economy, but it raised unrealistic expectations. Fiji’s 
economy was too small to develop a wide range of competitive industries, 
and protectionism was least likely to generate competitiveness.75 Instead 
tariffs protected producers for the local market from import competition. 
At the same time, a high exchange rate and taxes penalised exporters. 
Hence, little  export diversification occurred. Instead recipients treated 
tariff largesse not as infant protection but as a cow to be milked for as 
long as it lasted. When it came to exports, it was always easier to expand 
sugar production rather than invest in new horticulture ventures. An 
obvious reason lay in the European Community’s Lomé Convention 
(1976), which paid above world prices for a guaranteed proportion of 
Fiji’s sugar. At least increasing sugar production did not necessitate new 
and expensive supportive infrastructure. And Fiji’s sugar production 
increased from 361,000 tonnes in 1970 to an all-time record of 502,000 
tonnes in 1985. Thus, its share of domestic exports rose over 10 per cent 
to 80 per cent, providing an undoubted boost to the economy, enabling it 
to benefit from high sugar prices in 1975 and 1981, protecting it initially 
from a global recession in the early 1980s and possibly enabling greater 
domestic stability than might otherwise have been the case. Sugar also 
75  R Cole & H Hughes, The Fiji Economy May 1987: Problems & Prospects. Canberra: National 
Centre for Development studies, The Australian National University, 1988.
The GeneRAl’s Goose
42
absorbed 40 per cent of all new entrants to the labour market between 
1976 and 1980. Thus the labour intensive industry could employ 22 
per cent of Fiji’s labour force while contributing 16 per cent of GDP.76 
There were costs, however: an overuse of chemicals, the degradation of 
hilly and marginal lands brought into production, a risk of flooding 
from increasingly silted rivers, a reluctance to invest as much energy into 
diversifying agricultural production and providing linkages with other 
sectors of the economy, and perhaps a false sense of security. Sugar’s 
temporary success made it easier to overlook its associated environmental, 
social and economic problems.
Other local industries fared less well. Rice production suffered because 
the  state paid poor prices to its farmers and closed down many small 
but efficient local rice mills. Rewa Milk never met market demand, 
cocoa production collapsed because of the high margins government 
marketers demanded, and beef production tended to be poorly managed. 
Citrus production likewise withered. Targets were often unrealistic, 
service provision poor, and semi-subsistence farmers unskilled.77 
The development of a clothing export industry became the only exception 
to this record in the mid-1980s. Modest early success (86 per cent growth 
throughout 1980–86) built on opportunities provided by Australia and 
New Zealand in their 1981 SPARTECA78 trade agreement, which reduced 
their then-high tariffs on a limited range of goods produced in the Pacific. 
Some economists believe that these popular postcolonial trade initiatives 
– sold as helping to address uneven development – actually disadvantaged 
developing countries, being bureaucratic and costly to exploit. Fiji 
might have been better off reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
and seeking to become a specialised supplier of competitive goods in 
niche markets.79 
76  Lomé provided Fiji a market for 172,000 tonnes of sugar at the same price received by European 
farmers for sugar beet under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. In 1982, this provided $370 per 
tonne compared with $192 on the world market; see HC Brookfield, F Ellis & RG Ward, Land, Cane 
& Coconuts: Papers on the Rural Economy of Fiji. Canberra: The Australian National University, 1985, 
pp. 72–74, 79. All currencies referred to hereafter are in Fiji dollars unless otherwise specified.
77  P Barbour & A McGregor, ‘The Fiji agricultural sector’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 13: 2, 
November 1998, pp. 68–70.
78  South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA). 
Fiji exported $1 million under SPARTECA in 1985 and $2 million in 1986; see R Chandra, 
‘Manufacturing in Fiji: Mixed results’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 11: 1, May 1996, p. 47.
79  Cole & Hughes, The Fiji Economy May 1987, 1988, p. 67.
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There were, however, political reasons why Fiji’s leaders did not encourage 
manufacturing. Already the nature of employment in the country had 
changed since colonial days, most specifically in agriculture. In 1963, 
41 per cent of the workforce engaged in agricultural pursuits; by 1984 
only 19 per cent were so employed. Much of the difference came from 
the rise in services provided by government. Its employment proportions 
rose from 14 per cent to 22 per cent during the same period. This shift 
posed difficulties for a government heavily reliant on rural support. 
Did it really want to encourage the growth of an urban working class, 
potentially disconnected from traditional mechanisms of control and 
susceptible to union influence? An early example of the impact of such 
a class was provided in 1959 when a multiracial Wholesale and Retail 
Workers Union led by Tora and Jim Anthony initiated a wages strike for 
oil workers in Suva that turned riotous and prompted a renewed effort by 
Fijian leaders to ensure the racial demarcation of unions. By 1986 some 
47 per cent of Fijian wage earners were employed in the public sector, 
which carried all sorts of risks for a government that regarded unions as 
harbingers of unwanted class politics or the creatures of Indian politicians. 
In addition, the shift from agriculture also signalled a small rise in the 
urban population (from 33 per cent in 1966 to 39 per cent by 1986),80 
which further heightened concerns about employment prospects and 
rising levels of poverty. 
The Alliance government might have handled this new urban pressure 
well if it had been able to demonstrate rural success. However, urban 
restlessness grew from rural failure. There was nothing new in this respect. 
Colonial authorities long struggled to provide some mechanism for 
change in Fijian communities, but had been stymied by Fijian leaders, 
who feared the impact of change on their authority.81 Consequently, 
colonial planners diverted their attention to the needs of urban centres 
or the sugar industry. A postcolonial government could not do this so 
easily, at least not one dependent on rural Fijian votes. It toyed with the 
idea of an export processing zone in Lautoka in 1981 but, when that 
received lukewarm donor support, it focused instead on a number of 
programs designed to raise rural incomes, diversify agricultural output, 
increase self-sufficiency and reduce urban migration. These were all 
80  Walsh, Fiji, 2006, p. 76.
81  Several early governors (and many colonists) believed that the native system made Fijians lazy, 
but were wary of change that might spark instability (Robinson, ‘The Crown Colony Government’, 
1984, pp. 43, 57, 99).
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noble objectives, and – as historian Asinate Mausio notes in her study 
of rural development – the Alliance Party could easily have embraced 
modernity and multiracialism with land and local government reforms, 
and integrated rural Fijians into the modern economy.82 But it refused 
to do so.
In a sense, the Alliance Party still wanted to demonstrate that early 
colonial critics of the traditional Fijian way of life, such as Alan Burns 
and Oskar Spate or Fiji’s own Rusiate Nayacakalou,83 were wrong. Fijians 
could modernise in their own unique fashion. This, after all, was what 
Mara’s postcolonial Pacific Way championed.84 With heavy government 
support, the Alliance increased assistance to cocoa projects, cattle and 
sheep farming, ginger, lime, tea, coffee and fruit processing as a way of 
diversifying agricultural production. It established a new monopolist, 
the National Marketing Authority, in 1971 to stabilise market prices for 
producers and subsidise freight rates. It proposed developing 33 regional 
growth centres that would overcome regional disparities and provide new 
rural centres for growth. They all failed.
Undoubtedly a principal cause for failure lay in the Alliance Party’s belief 
that communalism and commercialism could coexist without disruptive 
tensions. In the case of the 1978 Yalavou beef cattle scheme in the Sigatoka 
Valley, free Fijian farmers (i.e. non-village-based or ‘free’ Fijians – galala) 
were settled on 98 200-hectare farms, but local chiefs were given roles 
on its executive, and eventually they drained the program of resources. 
Says Mausio, it sought galala but embraced tradition. The principle cause 
for failure, however, derived elsewhere. Australia funded the scheme 
but repatriated as much as 60 per cent of the value of its aid to pay for 
experts or technology. The Fiji Government did not make up the shortfall. 
82  A Mausio, ‘Boomerangs & the Fijian dilemma: Australian aid for rural development 1971–1987’. 
PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2006, pp. 196–205.
83  OHK Spate, The Fijian People: Economic Problems & Prospects. Suva: Legislative Council of Fiji, 
1959; AAC Burns, Fiji. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1963; RR Nayacakalou, Tradition & 
Change in the Fijian Village. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1978; RR Nayacakalou, Leadership 
in Fiji. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1975.
84  Mara championed the Pacific Way after the foundation of the regional Pacific Forum 
organisation in 1971. Graeme Dobell has argued that, in one sense, it described a way by which 
Pacific elites could ‘focus on conversation and consensus, respect for sovereignty and non interference 
in the internal affairs of neighbours’. ‘Characteristically’, he added, ‘Mara didn’t devote much effort 
to actually defining The Way. The Ratu often didn’t see the need to explain things. After all, defining 
custom too exactly can limit a chief ’s ability to appeal to “tradition” to deal with a specific problem’ 
(‘The Pacific Way wanes’, The Canberra Column, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, Sydney, 8 August 
2008, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/pacific-way-wanes).
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Consequently, farmers received insufficient establishment assistance and 
incentives. Additionally, the scheme was poorly planned and managed, 
remote and gained little marketing assistance. It possessed no linkages 
with the wider Sigatoka community.85
In contrast, the proposed Vunidawa rural growth centre in Naitasiri 
sought more specifically to work directly from within existing communal 
settings, without resort to galala. Vunidawa planned to link some 100 
villages to supply taro, bananas and yaqona (kava) and provide social, 
commercial and physical infrastructure for a region that included 
Monasavu. But the scheme never got off the ground, in part because of 
rivalry between Upper and Lower Naitasiri. According to Mausio, there 
was also a  major contradiction in the way the government delegated 
responsibility. It wanted to strengthen traditional networks, but did not 
trust its Fijian provincial councils to engage with villagers or control 
funding. Instead it used its public service district officers, who did not 
enjoy the same close working relationship with villages as the provincial 
councils.86 Fiji’s colonial inheritance of a dual system of governance made 
all development schemes bureaucratic and ultimately worked against the 
effective delivery of development assistance. Urban infrastructure projects 
were always better administered because they possessed no delivery gap. 
Hence they became more popular with foreign donors. Vunidawa’s 
failure, however, contributed to Naitasiri’s lack of infrastructure, and 
would become a major cause for political tension during and after the 
2000 coup.87 
Mausio argues that the Alliance Party deliberately exploited rural–urban 
and regional gaps to mask its ethnic preference and desire to promote 
traditionalism. In doing so, it widened disparities further and produced 
a spate of failed rural projects. Communal land ownership and village 
settings restricted profitability and productivity. Because projects were not 
meant to be disruptive of traditional life, they denied villagers the kind 
of infrastructure that might have raised living standards and generated 
economic vibrancy.88 Most projects were about crop diversification rather 
than diversifying export processing and, even if successful, would not 
have addressed Fiji’s declining terms of trade. Additionally, they often 
85  Mausio, ‘Boomerangs & the Fijian dilemma’, 2006, pp. 186–220, 344.
86  Mausio, ‘Boomerangs & the Fijian dilemma’, 2006, pp. 222–56.
87  Mausio, ‘Boomerangs & the Fijian dilemma’, 2006, pp. 327, 348.
88  Mausio, ‘Boomerangs & the Fijian dilemma’, 2006, pp. 58–59.
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focused on semi-subsistence and marginally profitable crops that could 
in no way deliver the same benefits sugar did to its many Indian farmers. 
The government would have done better focusing on better paying crops, 
on plantation production and galala participation. But its desire to 
preserve Fijian orthodoxy as the basis for elite Fijian control undermined 
its initiatives. 
The most successful rural projects were always those that were multiracial 
and commercial, the best example being Seaqaqa in Vanua Levu. 
As a rural growth centre, it had the potential to link also with centres at 
Nabouwalu and Dreketi, the latter being the site of a successful venture 
that assisted Fiji (with the help of tariff protection) reach 75 per cent rice 
sufficiency by 1985. Seaqaqa sought to overcome falling sugar production 
and, from the start, its 837 farmers dealt with a crop that produced 
better returns. Furthermore, like Dreketi, it involved both Fijians and 
Indians. Multi-ethnic programs helped expose Fijian farmers to the work 
ethic and business acumen of Indian counterparts. This is probably the 
most important benefit of diversity in any society; it widens the pool 
for skills and knowledge. In low-income countries, however, there are 
fewer opportunities for gaining from that pool than in higher income 
countries that are more dependent on skills and knowledge.89 And less 
still if governments are fearful of what impact those opportunities might 
have on their power base. Nonetheless, these schemes demonstrated – 
to paraphrase Mausio – that the path to sustainable rural development 
lay in unlocking the economic potential of the rural vanua through 
democratisation and increased integration with the modern economy.90 
Nothing else worked.
The Alliance Party’s failure to diversify economic activities had a number 
of political consequences, as we shall see, but in the first instance, it shifted 
attention to the role of foreign investment in both fuelling economic 
expansion and stymieing local growth. In 1979, a USP report revealed 
that up to 65 per cent of Fiji’s annual economic turnover was controlled 
by foreign corporations. Foreign corporations dominated banking and 
financial services, insurance, distribution, tourism, gold production and 
manufacturing.91 Within a short while, they would also dominate timber, 
tobacco, chicken, soft drinks and beer production. 
89  Collier, Wars, Guns & Votes, 2009, p. 61.
90  Collier, Wars, Guns & Votes, 2009, pp. 81, 331, 334.
91  R Carstairs & R Prasad, Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on the Fiji Economy. Suva: Centre 
for Applied Studies in Development, University of the South Pacific, 1981.
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The chicken industry demonstrated the dangers. Between 1977 and 1986 
over $1.6 million had been loaned by the Fiji Development Bank (FDB) 
to chicken farmers, averaging $20,000 per farmer, as part of a strategy for 
self-reliance and to expand farming, particularly for Fijians. The results 
were impressive: poultry meat and egg production doubled and imports 
fell, as they were intended to do. Unfortunately, the dramatic rise in 
interest rates during the 1980s crippled many farmers, particularly as 
it coincided with a near doubling of feed costs. Returns on meat and 
eggs failed to keep pace. When General Foods monopolised the more 
profitable poultry-processing and feed-production sides of the business, 
it squeezed farmer returns further. Many farmers went to the wall.92 
Transnationals also dominated components of the local pine industry 
in western Viti Levu when the forests that were first planted in the 
1950s began to mature. By 1983 there were over 20,600 hectares of 
hardwood and pine plantations and 10 forestry stations, but conflicts 
developed between mataqali seeking to maximise local Fijian business 
and employment opportunities (i.e. a more active role in resource 
development) and the Alliance Party’s preference for foreign capital and 
expertise to create a consolidated efficient industry in which landowners 
played an essentially passive role. A partnership of eastern chiefs with 
British Petroleum suggested to many western Fijians a very different 
motive. For comparable reasons, foreign involvement in tourism, again 
mostly in western Viti Levu, produced a similar outcome. The majority 
of tourist shops (91 per cent) were Indian-owned, but foreign businesses 
took in 72 per cent of all shopping revenue. Similarly, Fijians dominated 
handicraft outlets (70 per cent) but received only 2 per cent of tourist 
receipts.93
This crowding out of employment opportunities was not felt everywhere. 
The Australian food and trading company, Burns Philp, gave up copra 
processing and some of its retail businesses in the 1980s. Similarly, the 
Australian Carpenter group of companies abandoned manufacturing 
and contracted work out to cheaper independent local workshops. These 
changes encouraged a small group of retailers such as RB Patel, Motibhai, 
Tappoo, GB Hari and Vinod Patel to expand into hardware, clothing, 
92  M Chung, ‘Ethnic politics and small business: The case of the Fiji poultry industry’, Pacific 
Viewpoint, 30: 2, October 1989, pp. 192–206.
93  Carstairs & Prasad, Impact of Foreign Direct Investment, 1981.
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manufacturing, motion picture and tourism sectors, in some cases assisted 
by the government through contracts to supply equipment or control 
airport duty-free outlets. By 1986, local businesses were responsible for 
65 per cent of manufacturing output and 64 per cent of value added.94 
Despite this growth, Fiji’s economy remained small, resource-scarce 
and dominated by foreign capital. What local capital existed was 
itself dominated by Gujarati businesses that could defend themselves 
economically and through political patronage. But they were dependent 
also on an economy that no longer expanded. Undoubtedly, sudden rises 
in oil prices, falling commodity returns and natural disasters were partly 
responsible, but the Alliance Party’s failure to generate a balanced economy, 
to ensure intersectoral connectivity, and provide for the country’s growing 
population contributed also. Its linkages with transnational and Gujarati 
businesses did not always help either, particularly in the highly racialised 
and expectant atmosphere it had done much to encourage. Critics 
easily accused it of doing little to increase space for popular economic 
participation. After all, the economically active population increased 
by 40 per cent between 1976 and 1986, but employment grew only 
12 per cent, which was an effective decline of 8 per cent in the proportion 
of the economically active population employed.95 No matter how well 
it managed the macroeconomic parameters, kept inflation down or 
managed Fiji’s balance of payments, the government’s failure to sustain 
growth would bear political costs.
The costs of failure
Those political costs first emerged in the mid-1970s after a period of 
relatively  high inflation (14.4 per cent in 1974) and global recession 
following the first oil shock. The high rates of economic growth 
experienced  immediately after independence (6 per cent in 1970, 
12.7 per cent in 1974) quickly evaporated and the Alliance government 
found itself increasingly under attack from Fijians for not doing enough 
to assist rural Fijians. Western Fijians expressed concern over proposals 
94  R Chandra, ‘The political crisis and the manufacturing sector in Fiji’, Pacific Viewpoint, 30: 2, 
October 1989, p. 173.
95  RV Cole, ‘The Fiji economy: From go to woe’, Pacific Viewpoint, 30: 2, October 1989, p. 155. 
The economically active population increased from 175,785 to 241,160 while employment grew 
from 70,174 to 79,854.
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for the management of pine resources. In part this was a matter of 
expectations, but it reflected also the lack of clear leadership in many 
villages, as John Overton and Gerard Ward noted in 1989 when 
describing the implications of rural change.
Chiefly hierarchies remained and were respected but this often conflicted 
with economic realities. Chiefs, large and small, were caught in a dilemma: 
they wanted to maintain their old power, yet were drawn by the attraction 
of commercialism (on the land and off) and land rents (which they could 
pocket). In these non-traditional spheres, they were less bound to share 
their income with the commoner kin. Commercial agriculture, whether 
with sugar, rice, beef cattle or copra, touched every corner of village Fiji 
and the effects included greater materialism and individualism. There is 
evidence of individual accumulation of land and consequent inequalities 
... For the majority of villagers, education, cash cropping, and non-farm 
employment promised much but usually failed to deliver, and as the gulf 
between living standards in the towns and the non-sugar countryside 
began to widen, frustration mounted – frustrations sometimes directed 
at the chiefly elite but much more commonly at Indians, town dwellers 
or shopkeepers.96
Sakeasi Butadroka best illustrated this transformation. A frustrated small 
businessman from Rewa and a junior minister in the government in 1972, 
he criticised its record on assisting Fijians. This was both personal and 
parochial. His Rewan bus company could not survive competition from 
established Indian companies. When the Alliance Party chose a Lauan 
candidate above a local for a by-election in Rewa, he campaigned against 
his own party and was expelled in 1973, but not silenced.97 From his seat 
in parliament he continued to attack, pointedly calling for the expulsion 
of Indians from Fiji, and launched his own rival Fijian Nationalist Party 
(FNP) in 1975. Butadroka articulated Fijian discontent, but he did so in 
zero-sum racial terms. He attacked Indians (not economic failure) as the 
cause of Fijian ‘disadvantage’ or ‘backwardness’. Butadroka articulated 
a form of populist nativism, reflecting the continued appeal of divisions 
and identities that were once fostered by colonialism. But beneath his 
racial focus lay a less immediately articulated hostility towards eastern 
96  J Overton & RG Ward, ‘The coups in retrospect: The new political geography of Fiji’, Pacific 
Viewpoint, 30: 2 October 1989, pp. 210–11.
97  Durutalo, ‘Of roots & offshoots’, 2005, pp. 172–74.
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chiefs and the dominance of Tovata under Prime Minister Mara, the man 
chosen by Sukuna to succeed him and who had been dutifully accepted by 
colonial authorities as a future Fiji leader and sent overseas for training.98 
Butadroka’s racial assault resonated, as he knew it would. ‘Telling Indians 
to get out of Fiji was just a political tactic to stir Fijian feelings,’ he later 
conceded disingenuously, ‘and so force Ratu Mara to do something about 
the poverty in Fijian settlements here.’99 Many Fijians were disenchanted 
with their inability to benefit from the proceeds of independence. Indians 
were an easy target for their frustration. After all, Indians dominated 
the highly visible retail and transport sectors, they held the greatest 
proportion of white-collar jobs (58 per cent compared with 31 per cent 
for Fijians), and they dominated professional and managerial positions 
(70 per cent compared with 17 per cent).100 This visibility hid the fact that 
the vast majority of Indians were only marginally better off than Fijians, 
but that did not matter. Stereotypes fed off what people wanted to see. 
For Butadroka, the solution was simple: remove Indians and Fijians could 
fill their places. And that solution had not occurred because the Alliance 
government connived with Indians through its policy of multiracialism.
In the April 1977 elections, many Fijians responded to Butadroka 
by failing to vote: a protest by default. Compared with 1972, Fijian 
participation rates fell 23 per cent to 65 per cent. But an unprecedented 
20 per cent also voted for Butadroka’s FNP. Alliance support fell 19 per 
cent. It was enough to unseat the government and, ironically, provide the 
NFP – with a narrow two-seat majority – an opportunity to demonstrate 
its leadership credentials. Unfortunately, it too had been damaged by the 
race debate. Its leader, Siddiq Koya, seen by many in his party as too 
close to Mara, had been injured by the Alliance Party’s refusal to accept 
the recommendations of a Royal Commission to reduce the communal 
emphasis of the Constitution.101 In any case many of his colleagues were 
all too comfortable with the guarantees communalism offered them and 
98  Butadroka’s antipathy towards Lauans like Mara would grow and, in time, he would argue for 
Viti Levu’s independence from the GCC and the creation of its own council of chiefs. Mara concluded 
that Butadroka believed only Fijians from Viti Levu should determine what happens on Viti Levu, and 
that all other Fijians should be declared foreigners like IndoFijians (fijilive, 16 October 2000).
99  Fiji Sun, 26 December 1986.
100  Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race, 1992, pp. 151–59.
101  The Royal Commission recommended maintaining ethnic representation at current proportions 
but sought to make all seats national.
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were more concerned that the leader of a Muslim minority now headed 
a Hindu majority.102 A common roll would make campaigning more 
difficult. 
Divisions within the NFP also widened over the duration of land leases 
and the system for measuring land value permitted in a new Agricultural 
Landlord and Tenant Act. These issues greatly concerned all cane farmers 
who feared the changes would cost them dearly and discourage investment 
in land. Population pressures on land added further weight to the issue. 
Additionally, many Indians regarded inequality, in terms of restricted 
access to public service occupations or to education scholarships, as 
evidence of their continued status as second-class citizens. They had 
begun calling themselves IndoFijians during the 1970s to stress their 
belonging, but IndoFijianness could not fill the void created by the failure 
of the postcolonial state to foster a national identity or even to recognise 
the state of IndoFijianness. 
When the NFP met after the elections to confirm its leader, dissidents used 
the opportunity to test Koya’s support within the party. In the interim, the 
Governor-General used the long delay to conduct a constitutional coup, 
appointing Mara to head a minority government and lead the country 
to fresh elections five months later. The tactic worked. By September the 
NFP had split into two hostile factions, and the Alliance Party had won 
back its Fijian base by stealing the thunder of the FNP, imprisoning its 
leader for inciting unrest, and reminding voters that if they did not unite 
around it this time, ‘the foreigners’ would take over. Thus the Alliance 
won a massive majority (in large part because of NFP division), and Fiji 
returned to ‘normal’.
But the real lesson of 1977 was not learned. No changes in economic 
policy resulted and the potential for Fijian dissatisfaction remained 
as trade deficits, inflation and unemployment grew, poverty became 
more visible, and a collapse in international commodity prices caused 
the economy to shrink in the early 1980s. The Alliance had increased 
educational scholarships to Fijians since the early 1970s, as well as soft 
loans for business activities through the FDB. It had also established 
new business ventures through the NLTB’s commercial arm, the Native 
Land Development Corporation. But these activities hardly addressed 
102  Durutalo, ‘Of roots & offshoots’, 2005, pp. 178–79.
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the gap between rhetoric and reality. The proportion of FDB loans for 
rural activities fell dramatically in the early 1980s, as did the proportion 
of loans going to Fijians.103 
If the Alliance Party thought the race card would enable it to see off 
any future threat to its political dominance, the 1982 election provided 
another shock. The NFP had reunited under Jai Ram Reddy and joined 
forces with a Fijian party based in western Viti Levu, the Western United 
Front (WUF) led by Nadroga’s Ratu Osea Gavidi. It contested the Alliance 
Party’s interference in the nascent pine industry and articulated western 
concerns at the dominance of the eastern chiefly elite. Fijians wanted to 
be economically involved, but the nature of Fijian administration made 
this impossible. Land rentals were considered too low and, in any case, 
were distributed in such a fashion that they could not form the basis for 
investment. The NLTB took a massive 25 per cent for administrative costs, 
30 per cent went to chiefs, with the remainder distributed to individual 
mataqali members, sometimes numbered in the hundreds if not thousands. 
To offset this disadvantage, Gavidi had earlier proposed that landowners 
become partners in a joint venture to exploit their timber resources, but 
the Alliance denied the proposal, even banning the head of the American 
company that Gavidi hoped to deal with from entering the country. 
Gavidi’s province rallied behind him and, standing as an independent for 
Nadroga–Navosa in both 1977 elections, he defeated the Alliance. Other 
western chiefs soon lent Gavidi their support after a falling-out over the 
Alliance’s costly refit of Bau ahead of a royal visit in 1982. Bau, the Alliance 
declared, represented ‘the whole fabric of Fijian society’. As Durutalo 
notes, democracy made it much harder for the eastern elite to dismiss 
troublesome subjects whether those in the west or in Rewa.104 
The 1982 election was close; the Alliance’s 16-seat majority fell to four and 
the WUF gained two seats. The fallout was swift: Mara accused the NFP 
of gaining secret funding from Russia, and the GCC called for permanent 
Fijian political paramountcy. In the heat of parliamentary debate Reddy 
resigned and the divisive Koya returned as party leader, with shocking 
consequences for his party, just as its Alliance opponent demonstrated 
103  The proportion of FDB loans to rural activities fell from one half to one quarter over 1980–85, 
while loans to Fijians fell from 80 per cent of total value in 1975 to 27 per cent 1980 and to 8 per cent 
1985; see Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race, 1992, p. 143.
104  Durutalo, ‘Of roots & offshoots’, 2005, pp. 189–96; see also S Durutalo, ‘Internal colonialism 
& unequal regional development: The case of western Viti Levu, Fiji’. MA Thesis, University of the 
South Pacific. Suva, 1985, pp. 469–70.
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an inability to handle difficult economic circumstances. Mara meanwhile 
began to shore up the position of chiefs within rural Fiji by reintroducing 
elements of the old Fijian Administration, including proposals for 
separate village courts. The defection of Tora to the Alliance camp in 
1982 gave him an opportunity to tackle the disaffection of western Fiji 
by proposing major rural development projects in the Sigatoka valley and 
by rebuilding his party machinery in the west. Mara’s efforts to heal the 
rift with western Fijians were not helped, however, by his government’s 
rejection of a Fijian-owned plywood processing company in favour of 
a joint venture between an Australian company and an eastern Bau–
Kubuna company, nor by the allegations of corruption that hung over his 
wife’s dealing with a mataqali that managed royalties from the large Fijian 
Hotel near Sigatoka.105 Additionally, in the manner of eastern chiefs, his 
strategy involved wooing western chiefs back into the Alliance fold, but 
this strategy brought no guarantee that their more egalitarian subjects 
would follow them. Indeed, he failed to appreciate that the next challenge 
to Alliance authority would be of a completely different order and that 
it would cut across the racial lines he had so successfully reasserted after 
1977. The origins of that challenge lay in a sudden deterioration in the 
state of Fiji’s economy and Mara’s response to it.
A double whammy hit Fiji after 1981. After a brief boom at the start 
of the decade, sugar prices collapsed. This coincided with high inflation 
brought on by a renewed global energy crisis that plunged many 
economies into recession. Fiji’s inflation stood at 14 per cent in 1981 and 
remained at 7 per cent two years later. Five cyclones and a drought added 
to the pain of recession in 1983. A harsh budget in 1984 increased tariffs 
and introduced new taxes. But talk of a possible wage freeze alienated 
the labour movement, which had been painfully negotiating wage 
increases since 1982. Strike threats now hovered at the same time that 
unemployment rose, a teachers’ college in Nasinu closed, and graduating 
education students were denied employment by a polarising Minister for 
Education, Ahmed Ali. Nonetheless the Fiji Public Service Association 
(FPSA) successfully pursued its case for wage adjustments at the Tripartite 
Forum, an organisation of government, business and labour formerly 
much praised as an example of Pacific consensus-making. No longer; 
105  An excellent account of this election and its fallout can be found in Lal, Broken Waves, 1992, 
pp. 245–50. See also Michael C Howard’s detailed account of pre-1987 political manoeuvrings in 




the government struck back with an immediate wage freeze in late 1984. 
The unions left the forum and threatened a general strike. Two cyclones 
in January 1985 put paid to that tactic, but unions were beginning to 
cooperate on a scale unprecedented since 1959. Two ethnically divided 
teachers’ unions joined forces to challenge government efforts to employ 
graduate students on subsistence wages. A Confederation of Public 
Sector Unions came into existence in April. The government struck back, 
supporting a Confederation of Blue Collar Workers Unions in mid-
1985 and, a year later, gave support to a possible Fijian civil servants’ 
association. By then it had also withdrawn recognition of the Fiji Trades 
Union Congress, the main labour umbrella organisation. It was too late. 
In July 1985, the union movement created its own political party.
If Fiji’s politicians were growing comfortable with the manipulation of 
race, they were distinctly uncomfortable with the idea of class. While class 
was un-Pacific and potentially critical of traditional alignments it was 
also, above all, damaging to the neat racial compartments they had grown 
accustomed to working with. Those compartments were themselves social 
constructions. Clan and provincial loyalties still influenced Fijian thinking, 
despite colonial and postcolonial pressures to mould a less divisive Fijian 
identity. Indian experiences of indenture and post-indenture racism 
combined with the novelty of freedom from continental poverty and 
prejudice to create IndoFijians, but they too were haunted by religious 
and linguistic fractures. For both communities facing uncertain change, 
identity was something to be cherished and never surrendered or lost. 
The formation of a Labour Party did not mean that race was out, but it did 
mean that, for the first time, a political party began to imagine new political 
alignments that could – no matter how weakly and imperfectly – cut across 
lines that many people thought were set in stone. To some extent these 
new alignments reflected changes in postcolonial Fiji: a more urbanised 
society with an expanding and well-educated middle class. It reflected also 
an emerging consciousness on the part of some of that class that a focus 
on race simply failed to address the issues that most affected Fijians and 
IndoFijians in their everyday lives, particularly the rural and urban poor 
of both communities who found accessing government services difficult 
and were the principal victims of low economic growth.106 Race also failed 
106  Cole & Hughes, The Fiji Economy May 1987, 1988, p. 22.
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to  acknowledge that, contrary to political rhetoric, both communities 
were remarkably accommodating and harmonious towards each other, 
sharing musical traditions and cuisine, and often intermarrying. 
We might surmise then that, at some stage, the basic premises of race 
politics would always be challenged, particularly given that, historically, 
the most important conflict of interest between the two communities 
concerned access to land on which increasingly larger and larger 
proportions of both communities no longer directly depended. Similarly, 
urbanisation reduced the strict isolation of communities from each other 
and made possible the development of new relationships at schools 
and workplaces, and new shared activities around food, entertainment 
and  sport. Of course urbanisation also enabled old distinctions to be 
reinforced in new forms through schools, clubs, religious practices and 
political mobilisation. And nothing could immediately offset the colonial 
legacy of land ownership, which had driven IndoFijians into professions, 
businesses and skilled employment at a far greater rate than Fijians, 
whose monopoly of land meant that they rarely faced the same urgency 
to transform. 
Change then was never complete or tidy in its consequences. The modern 
economy created scope for change but, equally, it provided the setting 
for new forms of ethnic competition, especially around education, 
employment  and access to state assistance.107 Nonetheless, postcolonial 
changes created space for new ways of thinking and action, and nothing 
demonstrated these possibilities better than the labour movement, 
in particular unions like the FPSA, which represented all communities in 
the expanding civil service and helped grow new national and international 
linkages.108
Alliance government responses to the economic challenges of the 1980s 
placed it on a collision course with unions, which were increasingly 
concerned at its authoritarianism, its political interference within the 
public service and its impact on worker welfare. Not surprisingly, given 
its bruising confrontation over wage increases, the FPSA took a lead role 
in the formation of the Fiji Labour Party (FLP). President Timoci Bavadra 
107  Collier, Wars, Guns & Votes, 2009, pp. 178–79.
108  See Jacqueline Leckie’s comprehensive history of the FPSA, To Labour with the State: The Fiji 
Public Service Association (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1997).
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and General Secretary Mahendra Chaudhry assumed the same positions 
in the new political party. Historian Jacqui Leckie notes the importance 
of the networks that Labour brought to its new political struggle:
The FLP was not just representative of organised labour and public sector 
workers … [M]any of the leaders and members of these unions had other 
networks which drew them to the FLP, such as peace, church and women’s 
groups. The links Chaudhry and Bavadra had formed between urban and 
rural workers helped to lay the basis for a Coalition being formed between 
the FLP and the NFP. They both had direct kin connections with the 
‘western side’ of Fiji. Bavadra had served as a medical officer in many 
rural, as well as urban areas. Chaudhry’s strong following in the Western 
Division drew on FPSA and National Farmers’ Union support. Bavadra 
… as an empathetic and easy going doctor had the support and loyalty of 
different ethnic communities. When the FLP hit the election campaign 
trail, Bavadra and Chaudhry brought to it years of working together … 
Behind these personalities was the energy of numerous supporters and 
rural/urban, village/white collar connections reproduced among many 
FLP members.109
This was no Fijian Nationalist Party or WUF, defined in the first instance 
by the peculiar nature of provincial dissent. The Labour Party had the 
potential for mass appeal and it possessed the organising capacity to reach 
where no opposition party had previously reached. Would that be enough 
to break the communalist cage that had constrained political development 
since independence? Early indications seemed promising.
The Labour Party arrived on the scene at the very moment that both 
the Alliance Party and the NFP were at their lowest ebb. Five cyclones 
had devastated the country in 1983 in the midst of its economic crisis. 
Hospital services were under pressure, roads deteriorating, crime rates 
and unemployment rising and, everywhere, the realities of poverty 
were becoming more stark. One in every eight Suva residents lived in 
26 squatter settlements, subject to unhealthy crowded living conditions 
and with no access to utilities.110 The NFP remained too mired in factional 
fighting to notice, and the government seemed suddenly unable to 
manage: education slipped from crisis to crisis, housing funds for the poor 
disappeared, bus fares increased and minimum wages for textile workers 
were denied. A  World Bank report in 1986 argued that no significant 
109  Leckie, To Labour with the State, 1997, pp. 116–17.
110  Fiji Sun, 14 September 1986.
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income disparities existed between IndoFijians and Fijians,  and  that 
IndoFijians made up the largest component of unemployed and 
squatters.111 Labour and the moment were one. It denied zero-sum racial 
analyses and directly attacked the class bias of the Alliance government, 
promising a more equitable distribution of wealth. This attack on issues 
caught the Alliance Party off guard. 
Bavadra told an audience in Lautoka that ‘the people who have suffered 
most under the Alliance government are the very people this government 
purports to champion, the native Fijians’, while its leaders ‘have amassed 
huge personal wealth’. No more; the time had come to democratise Fijian 
institutions like the NLTB:
The Fijian people therefore should question whether they can continue to 
entrust their future in such leadership. In a small nation such as ours the 
country can only progress if all sections work together.112
He declared that all Fiji people be called Fijians: ‘in spite of our cultural 
differences and religions backgrounds, we are but one nation’.113 
The Alliance Party hit back, claiming that Labour wanted to take away 
Fijian constitutional rights and privileges: ‘Without a chief, there is no 
Fijian society’, it declared.114 Alliance stalwart Ratu David Toganivalu 
declared chiefs ‘a force for moderation, balance and fair play … the 
protectors of the rights of Indians and General Electors in Fiji’.115
Alliance leaders were worried. Labour seemed embarked on unfamiliar 
territory. Its attacks on Fijian leadership resonated and could potentially win 
it support from disgruntled Fijians. Journalist Jo Nata (later a participant 
in the 2000 coup against Labour) set the ball rolling with an article 
aimed directly at Mara’s millionaire status, which had been consolidated 
since entering office. Mara and members of his family owned shares in 
a wide number of prominent businesses, farms and islands.116 Labour 
drew attention to Mara’s involvement with Marella House, a building 
leased by his family company to the Education Ministry on very generous 
terms. Labour also attacked the Alliance’s close ties with big business, 
particularly its failure to assist Nasomo people whose land had been used 
111  Fiji Times, 23 June 1986.
112  Fiji Sun, 17 November 1986.
113  Fiji Sun, 18 February 1986.
114  Fiji Sun, 2 October 1986.
115  Fiji Times, 9 March 1987.
116  Fiji Sun, 2 August 1985.
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by Emperor Gold Mining at Vatukoula without compensation. It also 
claimed that Tovata political dominance was responsible for privileging 
Lau for education funding. Lau, with 14,000 Fijians, received $1.3 million 
over three years, the bulk of it directed around Mara’s village of Tubou. 
Ba, with 59,000 Fijians, received only $400,000.117 ‘Under the Alliance, 
the elite have feathered their own nests,’ Labour advertisements intoned, 
‘while conditions for the rest, particularly the poor and disadvantaged, 
have got steadily worse.’118 
Despite being labelled socialist or communist, Labour was essentially 
reformist. It focused on issues of immediate popular concern: poverty, 
price rises, the wage freeze, bus fares, garment workers, women’s rights, 
youth and crime. Its proposals for democratising Fijian institutions 
responded directly to abuses by a privileged few. Its education policies 
sought to lighten financial burdens on families and develop curricula to 
produce a more integrated, cooperative and enterprising nation. At  the 
time, local journalist Akosita Tamanisau and I wrote that its ‘policies 
responded with exacting precision to the actual problems confronting 
a multiracial society still to break free from colonial and postcolonial 
perceptions of itself and yet desperately searching for a way out of the 
economic and social straitjacket it found itself confined to’.119 For these 
reasons, Labour became an overnight success and quickly assumed the 
mantel of Opposition, highlighting the plight of workers, the dangers 
of high levels of poverty and unemployment, and the relationship 
between Fijian marginalisation and Fijian elite wealth. Hence it sought 
true multiracialism, a better distribution of the fruits of development, 
and a more transparent, open and responsible government.
Local body elections confirmed the party’s immediate impact but 
a parliamentary by-election at the end of 1985 quickly brought Labour 
back to earth. A three-way struggle cost it the chance of success and raised 
the spectre of the Alliance Party – unused to facing an alert and assertive 
opposition – winning in the next elections by default and reaping revenge 
on the upstart labour movement. Koya seemed equally unrepentant and 
communal. In early 1986, he told a NFP gathering that ‘Indians would 
be finished if they remained disunited’.120 But Koya’s days were numbered 
117  Fiji Sun, 30 March 1987.
118  Fiji Sun, 2 April 1987.
119  R Robertson & A Tamanisau, Fiji: Shattered Coups. Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988, p. 39.
120  Fiji Times, 16 March 1986.
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and, in May, he was replaced by party president, Harish Sharma. Still, the 
NFP remained divided; in November its former general secretary Sharda 
Nand accused Labour of trying ‘to remove Indian leadership and their 
special position from Fiji politics’.121 Three NFP MPs left the party and 
joined Labour.
Nonetheless, against the advice of members, who cherished its multiracial 
character and feared the impact of NFP internal divisions, Labour leaders 
formed a coalition with the demoralised NFP in November 1986, but on 
terms that made it the senior partner. Only three sitting NFP members of 
parliament were endorsed as candidates. The old NFP rump was furious, 
but its appeals to IndoFijian communal support gave greater weight to 
Labour’s claim that only radical change could create true multiculturalism. 
Bavadra called them ‘Indian Butadrokas’.122 The Alliance Party now 
declared Labour an Indian party, a description that would haunt it in 
coming years.
The year 1986 should have been good for the Alliance Party. A record cane 
harvest and new construction and building activities finally enabled the 
economy to rebound 9 per cent but, after a long period of extremely low 
economic growth, 1981 to 1985 marked the worst period of economic 
growth in Fiji’s postcolonial history. Average shrinkage of 1.3 per cent 
represented a far cry from the 9.7 per cent growth experienced for the 
same five-year period only a decade before. Per-capita income fared worse, 
declining by 3.1 per cent.123 In fact, by 1987, average per-capita income 
stood only 21 per cent higher than in 1970.124 
Undoubtedly, the shock of the early 1980s contributed to the Alliance 
Party’s paralysis before the unexpected strength of Labour. It did itself 
no service with the myriad of scandals and abuses of office, which 
now inconveniently surfaced during election campaigning in March 
1987: urban crown land distributed to mates, debts of ministers paid 
off, donations from businesses to influence policies, the early release 
of convicted but well-connected felons and rorts over taxi licenses. 
The list of exposed scandals dragged on unrelentingly. The Alliance was 
121  Fiji Sun, 12 November 1986.
122  Interview, Viseisei, 20 September 1987.
123  BC Prasad & S Kumar, ‘Fiji’s economic woes: A nation in search of development progress’, 
Pacific Economic Bulletin, 17: 1, May 2002, p. 2.
124  S Chand, ‘Coups, cyclones & recovery: The Fiji experience’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 15: 2, 
November 2000, p. 122.
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unprepared for a campaign fought on issues and not the communal 
battles of the past. And it was unprepared for Labour’s well-targeted 
advertising that responded daily to new issues as they arose. There had 
never been a campaign like it in Fiji’s history. Unfortunately, there never 
would be again. 
When the results of the elections emerged on 12 April 1987, both the extent 
of Labour’s achievement and its limitations were apparent. Communal 
seats fell into their all too familiar pattern, although around 10 per cent 
of Fijians had voted for the Labour–NFP Coalition – a big swing but 
one that had no impact on communal outcomes. More significantly 
many voters had chosen to use their three national votes in ways that 
contradicted their communal vote. Hence, four crucial Suva-based 
national seats, a region with the largest and most visible concentration 
of both industrial and unemployed workers, urban youths and squatters 
swung to the Coalition, largely on the basis of Fijian votes.125 IndoFijian 
disenchantment probably helped also. Although it retained 15 per cent 
of the IndoFijian vote overall, the Alliance Party’s South Indian base had 
been weakened, leaving only Muslims and IndoFijian business leaders to 
promote the Alliance cause. Crucially, against the wishes of its Indian 
Alliance, it placed the NFP defector Mrs Irene Jai Narayan as a candidate 
in the Suva Indian National constituency.126 Given also the shift in urban 
Fijian votes, these national seats fell, providing the Coalition a majority 
of four seats in a new parliament. 
The Alliance government, in power for the 17 years since independence, 
had been banished to the Opposition benches. Mara, its undisputed leader, 
had been defeated by a political party that he earlier claimed to be a power 
crazy gang of amateurs who had never run anything, not even a bingo 
party.127 Fiji’s racial politics had been breached, its colonial inheritance 
challenged, its postcolonial order shaken. A new era now dawned, but not 
the one Labour envisaged. It would not be Bavadra who would give shape 
to that era, but a hitherto unknown Sitiveni Rabuka.
125  Overall voter turnout in 1987 stood at 70 per cent compared with 85 per cent in 1982. 
In Suva-based Indian communal seats, turnout plummeted as low as 60 per cent compared with 
up to 70 per cent in comparable Fijian seats. Sutherland argues that the low Indian turnout should 
have favoured the Alliance; the Coalition’s win suggests instead considerable Fijian support. The two 
constituencies with the highest Coalition margins in fact possessed more Fijian voters (Sutherland, 
Beyond the Politics of Race, 1992, p. 180). 
126  Lal, Broken Waves, 1992, pp. 265–66; BV Lal, Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji. 
Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006, pp. 68–71.
127  Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Radio Fiji Address, 10 April 1987.
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The great turning
Burning down the house
The new Labour Coalition survived its first test. It did not disintegrate 
into warring factions as the National Federation Party (NFP) had in 
1977. Instead it moved quickly to form the country’s most ethnically 
representative cabinet. Dejected Alliance members retired to nurse 
their wounded egos, lamenting their loss of free ministerial homes 
and ministerial salaries.1 Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, bitter at his loss of 
leadership, felt rejected by both Fijians and IndoFijians. ‘If only the 
Indian community had kept faith with me,’ he reflected, ‘Fiji would have 
run more smoothly and made greater progress socially, economically and 
politically.’2 He hinted that, with the change in government, ‘matters of 
race and religion in Fiji might assume new emphasis over the democratic 
process’.3 He was right. 
Immediately a faction of Alliance members and supporters formed 
a shadowy Taukei Movement to test (in their words) ‘how Dr Bavadra’s 
Coalition could handle the situation when in power’ and ‘to force a change 
in government’.4 Its leaders included Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, a former 
head of the Bible Society, Alliance campaign manager in Cakaudrove and 
originator of the movement’s name;5 Alliance secretary Jone Veisamasama, 
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also from Cakaudrove, who famously declared that the movement shared 
the same dedication to its people as Nazis had to Germans;6 and Mara’s 
son, Ratu Finau. 
The Taukei Movement organised roadblocks, rallies and meetings in mid-
April and early May, and gathered a petition calling on the governor-
general to change the Constitution and protect Fijian leadership. ‘National 
politics and the traditional status of both the Prime Minister and the 
[Governor-General] cannot be separated,’ Kubuabola argued: ‘They 
are inseparable in the Fijian tradition.’7 Multiracialism had been wrong 
because it did not give Fijians the predominance they were entitled to as 
indigenous people. Fijian paramountcy had always been the unwritten 
agreement since independence: 
We … took the process of 1970 as an understanding that our special 
political position and status would be permitted to prevail and we would 
be allowed to govern our heritage. That understanding was discarded in 
April 1987 … hence the need for us to reassert ourselves and regain what 
must remain ours.8
Apisai Tora, now firmly in the ranks of the Taukeists, agreed: ‘Upon us is 
imposed a new colonialism, not from outside but from within our own 
country by those who arrived here with no rights and were given full 
rights by us, the Taukei.’9
When its tactics failed to rally widespread support, the Taukei Movement 
began a firebombing campaign to destabilise the new government. It too 
failed and the momentum appeared to swing away from the terrorists. 
The new government coped. But, from the very start, Kubuabola had 
developed an alternative strategy in the person of Lieutenant Colonel 
Sitiveni Rabuka, the 38-year-old Cakaudrove-born Staff Officer for 
Operations and Training for the Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF), 
a man desperately in need of a new purpose in life. 
6  Auckland Star, 24 August 1987.
7  Fiji Times, 11 April 1991.
8  Fiji Times, 27 September 1989.
9  Fiji Sun, 21 & 22 April 1987.
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Since independence, the 2,600-strong RFMF had grown from 
a  symbolic  force of 200 soldiers10 into a predominantly Fijian force, 
devoted to international peacekeeping duties and nationally useful both 
as an employer and trainer of otherwise idle Fijian labour and as a foreign 
currency earner. Fiji’s military had grown in tandem with UN peacekeeping 
duties, first in Lebanon from 1978 and later in Sinai. By 1987, half of the 
RFMF served in two infantry battalions overseas. In addition, it possessed 
5,000 reservists. Rabuka entered the RFMF as a trainee officer in 1968, 
and – despite problems with women and managing money – established 
himself as a potential leader on the eve of the force’s rapid growth.11 
That  potential bore fruit after 1978 when he served in Lebanon and 
received an OBE for his service as a commanding officer and, later, the 
French Legion of Honour. Then came his first setback. Notwithstanding 
promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1982, he lost his acting role as chief 
of staff to Jim Sanday. Both men joined the military at the same time. 
A  second setback came in 1985 while Rabuka commanded Fiji troops 
in the Sinai. Instead of returning in glory, he faced possible disciplinary 
action for disobeying orders.12 The incident put his future in doubt; his 
chances of succeeding the Bauan chief, Brigadier General Ratu Epeli 
Nailatikau, as commander or replacing his immediate senior, Chief of 
Staff Col Jim Sanday, now seemed remote. As  a  commoner he might 
always play second fiddle to a chief and his record of insubordination 
could be held against him. Against the advice of his protector, Ratu Penaia 
Ganilau – both the governor-general and Rabuka’s high chief – Rabuka 
cast around for civil service positions, and  even sought to be Police 
Commissioner in early 1987. Kubuabola’s offer created an opportunity he 
could not resist. He immediately began secretly training some 60 soldiers 
for ‘close-quarter combat’.13
10  Britain generally only stationed troops in its colonies (except India) if they were required to 
suppress resistance. Military forces – like Fiji’s – were usually small in size, poorly equipped and led 
by colonial officers. 
11  Sharpham, Rabuka of Fiji, 2000, pp. 46–55.
12  Islands Business, May 1988. He permitted Major Ratu George Kadavulevu Cakobau to return 
to Fiji for his father’s funeral against the army’s wishes. Sharpham suggests that Rabuka had been 
a contender for RFMF Commander, but Mara chose his son-in-law and chief, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, 
instead (Rabuka of Fiji, 2000, pp. 79–81).
13  E Dean & S Ritova, Rabuka: No Other Way. Sydney: Doubleday, 1988, p. 51; see also Sharpham, 
Rabuka of Fiji, 2000, pp. 73–87, 94–106.
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While awaiting the final word from the Taukeists, Rabuka arranged 
a meeting with Mara on a golf course, coming away convinced of his 
support.14 With his Commander overseas during the second week of 
May, Rabuka prepared to arrest all government ministers and MPs at 
the parliament. Early on Thursday morning, 14 May, he drew up an 
operations order for the ‘Neutralisation of the Coalition Government of 
Fiji’, declaring that ‘Our mission is to overthrow the government and 
install a new regime that will ensure that the RFMF and national interests 
are protected’.15 Rabuka had been told by the Taukei Movement leaders 
that the Coalition planned a wholesale restructuring of the public service 
and diplomatic corps, and that it would move sideways all senior Alliance-
appointed officials. In addition to this radical attack on the Fijian elite, 
the Coalition intended to adopt a socialist foreign policy, aligning Fiji 
with Russia, Libya and Cuba, ending the RFMF’s roles in UN missions 
in West Asia, and transforming the military into a multiracial institution. 
Whether Rabuka believed all this did not really matter; it provided 
welcome ammunition that could be used nationally and internationally 
to garner support or weaken opposition. In any case, Rabuka had 
long distrusted India because of its close links with Russia. Would an 
IndoFijian-dominated government in Fiji be any different? Conveniently, 
Rabuka did not think so.16 
Later that morning Rabuka discreetly entered the parliamentary chamber 
in civilian clothes. To prevent complications at military headquarters 
during the next couple of hours, he had sent his immediate superior, 
Sanday, to an unscheduled meeting with Governor-General Ganilau, well 
away from the Queen Elizabeth Barracks (QEB) in Nabua. As Rabuka 
took a seat in the public gallery, former waterside worker union boss, 
member of the Taukei Movement and new Alliance MP, Taniela Veitata, 
neared the end of his repetition of a long statement that he had used in 
14  Sharpham, Rabuka of Fiji, 2000, pp. 105–06. Mara always denied this interpretation of their 
meeting but sometimes sent conflicting messages. He praised Rabuka, telling an Australian journalist: 
‘I must take my hat off to him, to the courage of the man, I would never have done it myself if I was 
a soldier. Because I would think I know many of the complications that perhaps will flow. I am 
thinking of the sugar markets I have established in various parts of the world, the economy built over 
20 years and more, and the peace and stability that I built’ (Bulletin, 26 May 1987). Rabuka also 
claimed that, on the eve of the coup, Ratu Finau travelled to the Fijian Hotel outside Sigatoka to warn 
his father of the impending coup (Daily Post, 27 December 1991).
15  Dean & Ritova, Rabuka, 1988, pp. 60–63.
16  Sharpham, Rabuka of Fiji, 2000, p. 74. Long confined within ethnocentric institutions (Queen 
Victoria School and the RFMF), Rabuka retained a highly dichotomised view of Fiji, despite his 
military training in Australia, New Zealand and India, and his service in West Asia.
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the past to advertise his views. As long as chiefs were in control, he told 
his fellow parliamentarians in the only novel section of his address, 
power would never grow from the barrel of a gun. Precisely at 10 am, 
Ratu Finau opened the chamber doors to a squad of 10 armed and 
masked soldiers. A  back-up team stood outside in the corridor. Other 
teams fanned out across the city to seize control of telecommunication 
and power authorities, media outlets and the Government Buildings. 
Government House, with Sanday and Ganilau deep in conversation, was 
also secured. By the time Rabuka addressed the media in the afternoon 
to say that the coup had been designed to prevent the Taukei Movement 
causing bloodshed,17 he was confident it had succeeded. All Coalition 
ministers and MPs in the parliament were arrested and detained at the 
RFMF’s QEB. True, the governor-general – while privately accepting of 
the situation – initially refused on the advice of Chief Justice Sir Timoci 
Tuivaga, to endorse the coup publically. Nonetheless, as that public 
response hit the evening news, Rabuka had already replaced the senior 
police leadership with officers loyal to him, gained the support of most 
Alliance politicians, and learned that over 1,000 reservists had arrived at 
the QEB following a preplanned general call out. And, in the early hours 
of the next morning, Mara – attending a conference in Sigatoka – agreed 
to join a Council of Ministers, later telling his fellow chiefs that ‘with my 
house on fire’ he had no choice.18 Everything was going according to plan 
… well, nearly everything.
The military spectre
Part of Rabuka’s confidence lay in the precision of his operation. He had 
achieved a bloodless coup. A coup d’état is, by its nature, a surgical strike 
and, therefore, a cheap and potentially decisive way to overthrow the 
government of a state. This is not to suggest that a coup comes without 
cost. Economist Paul Collier has estimated that, on average, coups 
immediately result in a 7 per cent annual loss in national income19 and 
Fiji’s coup just surpassed that proportion. There would be other ongoing 
costs but, compared with rebellions or civil war, coups have a decidedly 
strategic, let alone economic and social advantage.
17  Fiji Times, 15 May 1987.
18  Islands Business, June 1987.
19  Collier, Wars, Guns & Votes, 2009, p. 143.
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Coups or putsches have a long history around the world, and famous 
examples during the past 200 years exist in European countries as diverse 
as France, Germany, Russia and Turkey. However, since the Second World 
War, the vast majority have occurred in developing countries, a shift that 
has prompted greater attention to their causes. During the 1960s, when 
Sub-Saharan Africa joined North Africa, West Asia and Latin America as 
the leading centres for coups, many modernisationists argued that coups 
should be regarded positively. This was a time when the United States 
belatedly sought to justify its support for the military takeover of South 
Vietnam, then its shining example of modernisation. Of course coups 
were entirely undemocratic, but it was possible – they argued – that by 
imposing order and efficiency on chaotic societies the military could in 
fact make democracy more possible in the future. After all, as disciplined 
neutral institutions that looked askance at corrupt or ineffective civilian 
administrations, militaries were prime examples of modernity.20 The 
modernising Young Turks and Kemal Atatürk, who eventually prevented 
the dismemberment of Turkey after the First World War, were an obvious 
early example, and that image they carefully nurtured and used to good 
effect in at least four subsequent coups. 
But, for reviewers like Nicole Ball, these arguments left many questions 
unanswered. Who actually makes the decision that the military should 
intervene? The military themselves, or are strings pulled by other social 
forces, as we noted in Fiji’s first coup? The answer to those questions might 
vary from country to country; certainly in the case of Turkey the military 
has been politicised ever since it founded the republic and has portrayed 
itself as its country’s guardian and constitutional guarantor. But strong 
militaries rarely act alone, as has been demonstrated in recent coups in 
Thailand, where urban forces allied with the royal family have been the 
principal beneficiaries of military intervention.21 
We should also question whether militaries deserve to be labelled modern 
and efficient. In all likelihood we would never know their effectiveness 
until they are put to the test in battle, the role they are principally 
trained and equipped to undertake. Defeat in the Falklands War in 
1982 certainly doomed Argentina’s junta. Fiji’s military prided itself on 
20  This argument is well analysed in N Ball, ‘The military in politics: Who benefits & how?’, 
World Development, 9: 6, 1981, pp. 569–82; see also N Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World. 
Princeton University Press, 1988.
21  ‘A right royal mess’, Economist, 4 December 2008.
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its professionalism, derived in large part from its engagement in trouble 
spots across West Asia. This was no idle army, poorly paid and brawling 
drunkenly in public, as occasionally happened in the Philippines or West 
Africa. But, then again, 1987 was not a war but an unbalanced exercise 
in might. 
Africa provides an interesting comparison. Like Fiji’s military, its forces 
at the time of independence were colonial in origin, small and poorly 
equipped, dominated by what colonial authorities referred to as ‘martial’ 
tribes, with few commissioned officers, and invariably treated with 
suspicion by independence leaders. Independence necessitated that they 
be nationalised, and the political intervention this dictated came to be 
deeply resented. One Kenyan military officer wrote:
As the military was struggling to attain a national character in order to 
gain national acceptance, the politicians were becoming more self-seeking, 
power-hungry and ambitious. Some were out seeking instant wealth 
for themselves, their friends and relatives. Nepotism became rampant, 
commonplace and a norm. Others were out experimenting on new and 
foreign ideologies in the name of African socialism. These were ideologies 
that had no bearing or relevance to the improvement of the lives of 
the ordinary man. Some of these governments started openly courting 
the Eastern bloc for advice and guidance. It did not take the ordinary 
citizens long to realise that these so-called progressive governments 
were not delivering the goods fast enough. Corruption had become an 
accepted way of life. Mismanagement of the economy coupled with sheer 
incompetence had led to runaway inflation and unaffordable prices. 
Unemployment and crime rates were on the increase. Yet the greedy 
get-rich-quick politicians continued getting richer … In the majority of 
the coups that have occurred, the military has deemed it a national and 
patriotic obligation to rescue the country from total collapse and thereby 
restore lost national prestige.22 
Major Jimmi Wangome’s account above suggests a number of common 
causes for coups and these too have been examined in detail by Collier 
and other economists. Economic causes are, in many respects, the most 
important factors contributing to unease within societies, especially 
during immediate postcolonial years. Where standards of living and 
growth rates are both low, the likelihood of coups increases. With regard 
22  J Wangome, ‘The African “neocolonialism” that is self-inflicted’. MA Thesis, Marine Corps 




to living standards, Collier believes that the threshold is US$2,700 annual 
per capita income, roughly US$7 per day. Fiji today has a per capita GDP 
of around US$5,500 but, in 1987, its position was similar in real terms. 
Growth rates for the 1980s only averaged 1.7 per cent until 1987.23 Fiji 
was clearly at risk on the basis of these indices. Contentiously, Collier 
argues that the distribution of wealth is not a factor, at least not in Africa;24 
nor the nature of governments affected. Democracies and autocracies are 
all susceptible, with anocracies (chaotic autocratic democracies) most 
susceptible. 
It is low growth and low incomes that are the stand-out features enabling 
coups to become ‘proxies for lack of opportunity other than control of 
the state’. It is poverty that makes the wealth that can be extracted from 
minerals and other natural resources (including forests and land) or aid so 
attractive.25 Fear that the Coalition would exclude former Alliance cronies 
from the state trough certainly influenced the thinking of many coup 
plotters, although Fiji had none of the huge natural resource riches that 
coup plotters in Africa found so attractive. Nor was Fiji heavily reliant 
on aid, which in Africa could provide the same attraction as diamonds 
and make government a target for greed. Aid often comprises as much as 
9.9 per cent of African national income, indirectly contributing as much 
as 40 per cent to all military spending26 and one third of government 
expenditures. In Fiji, aid comprised only 4 per cent of GDP in 1986. 
Access to natural resource wealth and aid enables governments to avoid 
taxing their citizens. Taxed incomes in many African countries are as 
low as 12 per cent of GDP, which has the unfortunate consequence 
of being ‘too low to provoke citizens into demanding accountability’, 
an  essential component for establishing democracy and a state capable 
23  Fiji’s per capita GDP stood at US$1,606 in 1986. When adjusted by purchasing power parity, 
its GDP per capita has averaged from US$6,642 in 1990 to US$8,236 in 2016.
24  This contrasts with D Acemoglu, D Ticchi & A Vindigni in ‘A theory of military dictatorships’, 
(American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2: 1, January 2010, pp. 1–42, www.voxeu.org/index.
php?q=node/1227). They argue that ‘[g]reater inequality increases the conflict between the elite and 
the citizens and encourages oligarchic regimes to maintain power by using stronger militaries’.
25  P Collier & A Hoeffler, ‘Coup traps: Why does Africa have so many coups d’état?’, paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman 
Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, 1 September 2005, p. 19, ora.ox.ac.
uk/objects/uuid:49097086-8505-4eb2-8174-314ce1aa3ebb.
26  P Collier & A Hoeffler, ‘Grand extortion: Coup risk & the military as a protection racket’, 
Paper presented at the Second Workshop on Political Institutions, Development And a Domestic 
Civil Peace (PIDDCP), 19–20 June 2006, ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ff727e54-408e-4288-a202-
cf46a61d7187.
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of supplying much needed public goods.27 Fiji, it should be noted, did 
possess reasonably well-managed accounts, and taxation represented over 
20 per cent of GDP in 1986.28 Its supply of public goods had extended 
considerably since 1970. It is worth remembering, also, that Fiji was 
not so vulnerable that it succumbed to a coup culture immediately after 
independence.
Nonetheless, there is one important feature that Fiji shared with many 
African countries: ethnic diversity trumped national identity. Sub-Saharan 
Africa possesses some 2,000 ethnicities and, while diversity in itself is not 
a problem, it can be where states have been unable to develop the checks 
and balances required for a functioning democracy and to foster strong 
loyalty to the nation among its citizens. Ethnic politics simply deprives 
electoral competition of its potential to hold governments to account 
and ensure that governments deliver the national public goods that their 
citizens desire.29 Ethnic politics also deprives governments of legitimacy 
in the eyes of those citizens who are not part of the ethnic community 
that captures power. And, once in power, governments need only play to 
their own community in order to survive; thus the nation is weakened 
further and democracy made ineffective, even dangerous if its outcome 
is greater confrontation. In fact, from this point, it is only a small step to 
dictatorship, with the same patronage base and the same temptation to 
retain power by transferring increasing amounts of wealth to that base.30
As Wangome notes, the transference of power to dictators changed 
nothing: ‘more often than not, military regimes have turned out to be 
more corrupt, oppressive and downright inefficient than the civilian 
governments they deposed’.31 Herein lay the real test of modernisationist 
arguments. Did regime change have positive economic, social and 
democratic consequences? Except perhaps in the case of the less polarised 
Costa Rica, where rebels seized power after contested elections in 1948, 
enacted a democratic constitution and abolished the military, the vast 
majority of military interventions have been far from benign in their 
27  Collier, Wars, Guns & Votes, 2009, pp. 179, 182.
28  W Narsey (‘Just wages & coup impacts’, Fiji Times, 15 April 2009) claims taxes now comprise 
27 per cent of GDP.
29  Collier, Wars, Guns & Votes, 2009, p. 73.
30  Collier, Wars, Guns & Votes, 2009, p. 61.
31  Wangome, ‘The African “neocolonialism”’, 1985.
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consequences.32 In Fiji’s case, the military coup set the country on a new 
postcolonial trajectory, although how radical that transformation would 
be was not immediately apparent, in part because it cloaked itself in Fijian 
conservatism.
Undoubtedly the most radical and obvious innovation of Fiji’s May 1987 
coup was the insertion of a new, non-political and non-traditional actor 
into the political process. The military had not prepared for this role, 
hence it did not seek to dominate the political process it had transformed, 
at least not at first. Even when it later did, it could never overcome its own 
administrative and leadership deficiencies. Consequently, for five years 
after the first coup, Fiji endured an uneasy standoff between the army and 
the Fijian elite, who had most benefited from the coup. That standoff ended 
only when Rabuka seized control of the political process and ruled in his 
own right. The following eight years of Rabuka government demonstrated 
once more the dangers of ethnic politics. A tale of electoral manipulation 
and patronage politics quickly followed, robbing Fiji of transparent and 
accountable governance and leaving the majority of its people poorer, 
even those that it claimed held special privileges as indigenous people. 
Fiji didn’t collapse; it simply surrendered to impoverishment in the widest 
sense of the word.
The insertion of the military into Fiji’s politics also had other consequences. 
It sought financial independence, attempting to model itself on Suharto’s 
Indonesian forces. Economic planners began a fresh push to establish 
a new urban–industrial base by boosting the infant clothing industry, 
the success of which depended wholly on preferential access to foreign 
markets. But, of equal importance for reformers riding an indigenous 
‘revolution’, multiracialism had to go. Affirmative action became the 
new mantra, but it heralded no revolutionary approach to perceived gaps 
between Fijians and IndoFijians. Rather, it reinforced the failed strategies 
of the past – the promotion of a Fijian business class and the reassertion 
of chiefly control. 
32  Many coups were conducted under the influence also of the Cold War, such as Park Chung-
hee’s 1961 coup in South Korea. Unusually for a military-backed leader, Park successfully grew South 
Korea’s economy and, in time, the military withdrew in favour of civilian rule.
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There were, however, some differences. Sociologist Steven Ratuva 
argues that, for Fijians, a focus on specifically commercial activities now 
increasingly took precedence over communal resource exploitation.33 
Avowedly Fijian post-coup regimes desperately needed to create a sense 
of difference in order to demonstrate legitimacy and the programs they 
pursued had of urgent necessity to demonstrate rapid success. Their goose 
would deliver the golden eggs. With few instruments of accountability 
untainted by the ‘revolution’, all the ingredients for economic disaster and 
frustrated ambitions were being rapidly assembled for future consumption. 
There were other unpleasant legacies also. The abuse of human rights, 
which occurred shockingly during and after the coup, put any return 
to normality out of reach for a long time. The wounds of 1987 would 
take a decade to heal and, even then, some wounds continued to fester. 
Certainly  they ended the lingering dream harboured by some citizens 
of creating a nation out of Fiji. Not surprisingly, increasing numbers 
of citizens, particularly IndoFijians, emigrated to countries where 
multiculturalism more effectively provided security and a future. They 
did not, as Sakeasi Butadroka urged, return to the land of their ancestors. 
Instead they journeyed to Australia, North America and New Zealand, 
no doubt where relatives already lived and could provide support. 
A comparative trickle of a 1,000 emigrants per year in the 1970s settled 
into a standard 5,000 during the 1990s.34 In the longer term, emigration 
profoundly transformed Fiji such that, by 2005, 148,355 citizens or former 
citizens – 17.5 per cent of its population – lived abroad.35 Undoubtedly, 
emigration slowed population growth, helping to minimise some of the 
more disastrous economic impacts of 1987. But it also drained the country 
of much needed skills and capital,36 and ensured that Fiji’s bourgeoisie 
were not so much missing as living elsewhere. 
33  S Ratuva, ‘Addressing inequality? Economic affirmative action and communal capitalism in 
post-coup Fiji’, in H Akram-Lodhi (ed.), Confronting Fiji Futures. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2000, 
pp. 227, 234.
34  These averages disguise considerable spikes: 18,359 emigrants in 1987 and 10,674 in 1988 
(D Forsyth, ‘Fiji at the crossroads’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 11: 1, May 1996).
35  D Ratha & Z Xu (eds), Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008. Washington: World Bank, 
2008, siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/Fiji.pdf.
36  Between 1987 and 1992, Fiji lost 9 per cent of its professional stock, 24 per cent of its 
administrators and managers, and 11 per cent of its clerical workers of whom 72 per cent were 
IndoFijians (Walsh, Fiji, 2006, p. 56).
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The long-term impact of emigration also had political consequences. 
Dramatically falling IndoFijian proportions meant that the threat of 
IndoFijian dominance, which Fijian nationalists had exploited to great 
effect, no longer carried the same weight as before. IndoFijian proportions 
peaked in 1976 and, by 1986, they were well on their way to losing their 
near majority status. The coup hastened the process: 48.7 per cent of the 
population in 1986 became 37.5 per cent by 2007.37 And, as hundreds of 
poor IndoFijian farmers lost land leases and flocked to urban settlements, 
another nationalist myth also crumbled visibly, the myth of Indian wealth. 
Thus, in the space of a single generation, Fiji moved from a racially diverse 
or plural society to one fast comprising a single dominant ethnicity. 
The dynamics of politics began to shift accordingly, subtly at first because 
the political behaviour of past generations continued as if nothing had 
changed. But, by 2006, the shift could no longer be concealed, even 
if political denial continued.
There is one final legacy to be referred to as a guide to reading post-1987 
events: successful military coups invariably result in higher spending on 
military forces. In 1986, the RFMF received $16 million as its operating 
budget; by 1995, this had increased to $41 million. Admittedly, the 
military had grown 74 per cent in size by 1995, but the comparison 
with the $25 million meted out to the police in that year is stark. And it 
did not take into account the military’s failure to live within its budget. 
In fact, between 1986 and 1996, it annually overspent its budget by an 
average $23.5 million.38 Such excessive expenditure impacted on the 
state’s provision of public goods, on state indebtedness and most assuredly 
on economic growth. Together they contributed to further discontent 
and instability, with damaging human consequences, although just how 
damaging would not become apparent in Fiji’s case until much later. 
Three long-term consequences of Fiji’s troubled postcolonial development 
strategies give some indication exactly where dangers lay. First, Fiji’s failure 
to break free of racialised and elite-oriented economic strategies meant 
that it increasingly possessed a large pool of disaffected youth. In 1986 
youth (15 to 24 years) comprised 8 per cent of the population; by 2007 
19 per cent.39 Why were they disaffected? Wadan Narsey provides one 
37  Walsh, Fiji, 2006, p. 101; www.statsfiji.gov.fj/.
38  Fiji Times, 30 October 1996. The military expanded from 2,100 troops to 3,650 during this 
period.
39  Fiji Bureau of Statistics, 2007 and 2009 Population Census of Fiji. Suva:  Fiji Island Bureau 
of Statistics, June 2012.
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possible answer. Child dependency ratios are much higher for Fijians than 
for IndoFijians; only 4 per cent higher in 1976, but 62 per cent higher by 
2007. Larger families mean, among other things, a poorer lifestyle, fewer 
resources for education per child, higher school dropout rates and fewer 
skilled entrants into the workforce.40 
Second, under-employment and unemployment – especially in long-
neglected rural areas – resulted in unprecedented urbanisation (from 
39 per cent in 1986 to 51 per cent by 2007), much of it centred on the 
capital, Suva, where there were also insufficient jobs and houses to go 
around. This created a new political risk which Alan Beattie sees as a direct 
consequence of urbanisation:
When it comes to exerting political power, those within rioting distance 
of [government] have a better means of making their grievances known 
than do equally disgruntled peasantry muttering into their gruel as they 
go about their miserable rural lives … miles from the capital.41
At 24 per cent, Suva’s proportion of the country’s population was no more 
than that of many other capital cities, but it is growing rapidly and as it 
does ‘the incentive for rural flight towards the city increases, and so does 
the political imperative to keep the urbanites happy’.42 
The third consequence derived specifically from the politicisation of the 
military. Having engaged in a coup once, the military could more easily 
take the step on subsequent occasions; first blood, as it were. Indeed, the 
successful outcome of a first strike might well create the expectation that 
future strikes would produce similar responses. In other words, the nature 
of the first political response to military action sets the scene for future 
action. Importantly when those political reactions are favourable, they 
essentially legitimise violence as a means for change, with consequences 
that go far beyond the military, especially if political violence is civilianised 
among growing numbers of disaffected urban youth. This is the coup trap 
and its reality hit Fiji very quickly after the overthrow of the Bavadra 
government. 
40  W Narsey, ‘Fiji’s far reaching population revolution’, 21 March 2010, www.usp.ac.fj/fileadmin/
files/schools/ssed/economics/Wadan_Narsey/Media_articles/2010_C____Fiji_s_population_
revolution.pdf.
41  Beattie, False Economy, 2009, pp. 50–51.
42  Beattie, False Economy, 2009, pp. 50–51. By 2007, Greater Suva encompassed one third of Fiji’s 
population and by 2016 produced 40 per cent of Fiji’s GDP, according to the Asian Development 




After 14 May 1987 the army became the obvious elephant in Fiji’s political 
space, although it was not seen this way at first. Rabuka’s coup appeared 
less a military coup than an elite coup and, very quickly, the governor-
general tried to put his own stamp on it. He was not going to accept 
whatever Rabuka instructed him to do. This was the start of a remarkable 
showdown between the old elite and the new faction within politics. 
The  showdown would continue for the next five years until Rabuka 
emerged triumphant as leader of a new establishment party endorsed by 
the chiefs. 
Rabuka delivered the governor-general a list of mostly Alliance personnel 
who would form a Council of Ministers. Ganilau appeared to accept this, 
and swore in Rabuka as head of government on the Sunday after the coup, 
but changed his mind on the advice of the Chief Justice. Rabuka attempted 
unsuccessfully to prevent further meetings between the governor-
general and the justices, and retreated to his barracks to rally his troops. 
He released his Coalition hostages. But the governor-general was only one 
man; on Tuesday 19 May, the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) met to 
deliberate on the political crisis facing the country. The Taukei Movement 
organised a riot during its second day of deliberations, using waterside 
workers to demonstrate ‘Fijian’ anger at the governor-general’s position. 
In fact, sporadic acts of violence continued during much of the week; 
buildings were burnt, homes broken into and people assaulted. On  the 
third day, the movement presented a petition to the GCC calling for 
Fijian political paramountcy or the declaration of a republic.43 As Ganilau 
arrived to address the GCC, crowds outside the Civic Centre booed. It was 
not an auspicious moment for the governor-general, who had come with 
a compromise: he would provide amnesty for the coup makers, dissolve 
parliament, select a council of advisors, investigate constitutional change, 
and take the country back to elections. The GCC agreed. 
Rabuka told the crowds, ‘I will not accept any solution to the political 
problems facing the country that will destroy the aim of the coup’. Later 
he told journalists, ‘I will remain in control so as to stop rioting, the very 
thing I tried to avoid by staging the coup’. The governor-general ‘will be 
serving my purpose if he remains in office although he is powerless to 
43  Draft, ‘Portions of the Constitution to be amended’, GCC submission.
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enforce his office’.44 The 19 members of the new Council of Advisors were 
mostly from the Alliance Party but nine were also members of the Taukei 
Movement.45 Ganilau was in an invidious position and Brij Lal argues, 
‘Had he resisted the pressure to endorse the coup, he might have been 
isolated, his candidature for the title of Tui Cakau [the highest title within 
the Tovata confederacy] placed in jeopardy, and the Fijian polity possibly 
split. This was the price of loyalty to the Crown, and Ganilau was not 
prepared to pay it’.46
Ganilau now took Fiji on an uncertain journey. While its economy 
sharply contracted and trade sanctions bit hard, the military and the 
Taukei Movement ran amok. Ganilau had promoted Rabuka to colonel 
at the same time that he assumed authority, but the reward brought 
no compliance from the army. Rabuka claimed to possess his own 
‘revolutionary’ committee and promised to declare a republic if he did not 
get his way.47 He developed a new relationship with sympathisers within 
the Methodist Church hierarchy, certain that they could provide a wider 
support base than the Taukei Movement if such support was needed in 
the future. 
The RFMF now also rapidly expanded; Rabuka aspired to build an 
8,000-strong standing force.48 He sent officers overseas to seek new 
training facilities and to purchase weapons and helicopters. Two patrol 
boats were purchased for the naval squadron and key military personnel 
entered senior positions within the public service. A campaign of arrests 
harassed political opponents and unionists, and intimidated the populace. 
The entire staff of Morris Hedstrom, a large department store in Suva’s 
CBD, was threatened with arrest when the wife of the new Police 
Commissioner complained of discrimination when given a smaller plastic 
bag (they were being rationed) for her purchases than other customers. 
The intimidation coincided with a massive increase in crime. Gangs of 
youths terrorised families and isolated communities. Shops and homes 
were looted, sometimes by thieves dressed as military personnel. Such 
44  Fiji Times, 22 May 1987.
45  It also included three civil servants, one former military commander, one IndoFijian Methodist, 
and Bavadra and his deputy. The last three refused to join.
46  Lal, Broken Waves, 1992, p. 278. A journalist later argued that Ganilau’s initial resistance nearly 
caused a rebellion in Cakaudrove (Evening Post, Wellington, 19 May 1988).
47  Fiji Times, 13 June 1987.




incidents became increasingly violent. A 10-year-old girl had her arm 
partially severed when she was attacked with a machete outside her school. 
A Lautoka shopkeeper was stabbed to death during a robbery. Soldiers 
beat a detained man unconscious at their barracks and, after two weeks in 
a coma, he had to be sent to New Zealand for urgent treatment.
Fiji’s season of madness continued unabated until August, by which time 
economic realities demanded more reasoned responses. Hotel occupancy 
rates fell to 20 per cent. Garment exports lay on the wharves, the industry 
crippled by trade bans enforced by Australasian unions. Cane farmers 
protested by delaying the harvest. The Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) called 
their bluff and shut all mills until mid-July. In late June, the Fiji dollar 
devalued 17.75 per cent. Government departments were directed to cut 
expenditure by 20 per cent and civil servants received a 15 per cent salary 
cut, although the military ignored the rulings. By August its expenditure 
already exceeded its budget by 42 per cent and it laid plans to develop its 
own farms, to fish, and to engage in inter-island trade. It would become 
self-reliant.
Post-coup politics were equally challenging. The GCC met again in July 
and flexed its muscles. It rejected Mara’s proposal for minimal changes to 
the Constitution, arguing instead for a parliament dominated by Fijians 
(at least 56 per cent of seats), with all Fijian seats filled by nominees of 
provincial councils. By the time a Constitutional Review Committee 
reported in August, this proposal had been amended to allow Fijians the 
vote, but only on the basis of provincial constituencies. There would be no 
urban constituencies for Fijians, a move that appeared to deny the Taukei 
Movement future influence. They protested, threatening to burn Suva 
and declare a republic. Unexpectedly, Rabuka rebuked them.49 The path 
he trod had suddenly become more unpredictable. Political hostility to 
the coup increased. Newspapers became more daring in their opposition 
to the chaos generated by both the military and the Taukei Movement. 
The Coalition, partially recovered from the shock of May, began an 
improbable campaign to win the hearts and minds of Fijian villagers in 
Viti Levu.50 
49  Fiji Sun, 20 July 1987.
50  Labour stalwart Simione Durutalo observed of Labour’s Operation Sunrise: ‘Indigenous 
Fijians are not fooled by such gimmicks’. Its very existence is ‘an unspoken admission that the party 
sponsoring them treats commoner Fijian interests and aspirations as merely an appendix to their main 
concern elsewhere’ (Fiji Times, 9 February 1992). 
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The real game changer, however, came with a High Court ruling in August. 
It agreed that the governor-general’s dismissal of parliament might be 
illegal and declared that the matter be heard in court. In response, Ganilau 
announced that he would form a new caretaker government and urged the 
Alliance Party and Coalition to reach accommodation. Talks were held for 
three weeks during September, amidst a Taukeist firebombing campaign in 
Suva that ended with the mass breakout of prisoners from Naboro prison. 
The Coalition knew that court action might not ultimately produce the 
political outcome it wanted. The Alliance, for its part, feared losing control 
to extremists. Compromise now seemed the best way forward for the two 
political parties. A final meeting was held, safely outside of Suva at Deuba 
(Pacific Harbour) on 23 September 1987, which decided on a caretaker 
government, derived equally from the two parties and led by Ganilau. The 
ensuing Deuba Accord intended for the government to tackle both the 
economic crisis and constitutional review in the spirit of bipartisanship 
and begin a process of national reconciliation. 
On the eve of the accord’s implementation, Rabuka decided ‘to resume 
executive authority’. His second coup on 25 September overthrew the 
governor-general and established a military government composed 
largely of Taukeists and nationalists. To prevent legal complexities, he 
declared Fiji a republic on 7 October and sacked the judiciary. To deny 
his opponents a forum, he closed all media outlets (except Radio Fiji). 
To consolidate his support among Methodists, he introduced a Sunday 
Observance Decree which banned sport and trading on Sundays. To help 
with security he introduced a night curfew. Precision is the hallmark of 
a military leader and Rabuka prided himself on his organisational skills. 
But, as Mara had noted earlier, Rabuka always had a tendency to overlook 
the long-term consequences of his actions. He had told the governor-
general that he would support the Deuba compromise,51 but fell under 
the sway of the Taukeists who had set up their own intelligence operation 
in the Ministry of Information. His exclusion from the Deuba talks 
annoyed him and its outcome mocked his coup. Having done the deed 
for a second time, however, Rabuka wavered. He wanted the chiefs on 
side again. The  Taukeists found it difficult to get Rabuka to focus on 
a republic.52 
51  P Thomson, Kava in the Blood: A Personal & Political Memoir from the Heart of Fiji. Auckland: 
Tandem Press, 1999, p. 179.
52  Robbie Robertson, Interview with Ratu Meli Vesikula, Melbourne, 9 August 1989.
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The second coup was psychologically more difficult for Rabuka. His first 
coup had been against what he saw as foreign control of the country by 
people who did not respect Fijian custom. ‘I am a commoner and to see 
my high chief being accused of corruption with no proof,’ he complained 
in May: ‘[T]he language used against [Mara] I will never accept nor would 
any right thinking Fijian.’53 By October his views were more tempered. 
‘A lot of people say that chiefs should not participate in politics because 
in politics you might be subjected to some adverse comments that are 
unbecoming to your status,’ he now argued: ‘This is the same sort of thing 
here.’54 Better to have commoners ruling; he could speak with them on 
the same level. 
Nonetheless, Rabuka was no revolutionary. It disturbed him that few chiefs 
had congratulated him on his second coup. They had always opposed 
breaking links with the Crown, even if the Taukeists, who dominated the 
reformed GCC, sometimes swayed them otherwise. As a result, Rabuka 
tried once more to get Ganilau and Mara on side. He met with the Deuba 
parties to get their agreement, but Timoci Bavadra refused to play ball. 
Mara disagreed with Rabuka’s assessment of the role of chiefs. Chiefs 
have always been involved in politics, he argued; they could not remain 
aloof from it.55 Mara flew to England to have the Queen sanction 
his and  Ganilau’s continued role, hoping this might be sufficient to 
pull Fiji back from the abyss, but without success. He was denied an 
audience with  the Queen and, to make matters worse, against his own 
advice, Ganilau gave up the fight and resigned his office just as the 
Commonwealth  met. No reason now existed for the Commonwealth 
not to suspend Fiji’s membership. The chiefs had lost control, twice in 
the space of one year. Mara’s wife had called Rabuka their ‘brave hearted 
champion’;56 no longer. They saw themselves as moderates; they regarded 
their self-interest as altruism. When Ratu Meli Vesikula, an ex–British army 
major from Verata who served as spokesperson for the Taukei Movement, 
had delivered copies of his Movement’s constitutional proposals to Mara 
and Ganilau, they looked on him with contempt and said there was no 
way he was going to get away with such a proposal.57 Now it looked like 
he might.
53  NZ Herald, 19 May 1987.
54  Islands Business, October 1987.
55  Fiji Times, 3 October 1991.
56  Fiji Times, 2 November 1995.
57  Robertson, Interview with Vesikula, 9 August 1989.
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Rabuka formed his own Council of Ministers in which 17 of its 24 
ministers were from the Taukei Movement. Vesikula was one of them. 
He  had served in Ireland and Cyprus and had firm ideas about what 
needed to be done: ‘What we have to do is apply a force that will 
stun the people … That force will have to be applied by the military 
or a hardline civilian government. In my experience the military option 
is nearly always the best … That is the set piece I hope to have played 
out in Fiji.’58 The abolition of trade union rights marked a first step in 
this direction. Butadroka was also there as Minister for Lands, a ghost 
from Mara’s past, wanting above all to make up for lost time. Crown land 
would immediately return to Fijians and Fijians would receive first option 
on the sale of freehold land. If such radicalism helped doom the Council 
of Ministers, then its inability to turn the country around economically 
sealed its fate. The economy continued its spiral downwards: a further 
devaluation (15.25 per cent), looming bans on flights to Fiji, and even 
threats to deny Fiji sugar export rights.
Rabuka had left the positions of president and prime minister vacant, 
claiming he would withdraw once the positions were filled.59 Some 
on the Council, like Butadroka and Vesikula, were suspicious of his 
intentions and objected to Mara’s return; but Rabuka insisted that Mara 
would restore Tovata’s prominence.60 Rabuka began to undo the more 
draconian aspects of his military government, restoring union rights, 
allowing newspapers to operate freely, ending the curfew, re-establishing 
a judiciary, and promising to reduce the size of his forces. The scene was 
set for fresh meetings with Mara and Ganilau and, on 5 December, the 
now self-promoted Brigadier Rabuka returned power to them as prime 
minister and president respectively. 
In effect, Rabuka restored the Alliance government but in a very different 
and potentially unstable form. Had its leaders learned wisely from the 
events of the past year? Had they finally understood that, for all the anti-
IndoFijian venom of their supporters, they actually faced a people deeply 
unhappy with the consequences of development for them under Alliance 
rule, a people now perhaps with a new champion in the military? Rabuka 
later argued that ‘Fiji had not become a fully independent country 
between 1970 and 1987 … until I took over the government, declared Fiji 
58  Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 October 1987.
59  NZ Herald, 14 November 1987.
60  Robertson, Interview with Vesikula, 9 August 1989.
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a Republic and handed the leadership over to the Bose Levu Vakaturaga 
(Great Council of Chiefs)’.61 How would post-coup Fiji differentiate 
itself from the immediate postcolonial era that had ended so suddenly 
and sharply?
A new trajectory for Fiji?
In February 1990, Navitalai Naisoro, one of the self proclaimed ‘New 
Fijian’ economic managers appointed after the coups, told students at the 
University of the South Pacific: ‘My hope is that one day instead of seeing 
the greenery of sugar cane fields, we see the greenery of well-engineered 
factory complexes.’62 As permanent secretary for trade and commerce, 
Naisoro was the public face of a self-declared radical redirection in Fiji’s 
economic policies. Given the rapid contraction in Fiji’s economy (nearly 
8 per cent in 1987), Naisoro understood that Fiji had to do something 
dramatic to attract the attention of foreign investors: ‘We realised that 
if we were to survive in the long term, the solution lay with the export 
sector.’63 That signal came in December 1987 in the form of tax free 
zones (TFZs), a policy lifted from the Alliance Party’s aborted Ninth 
Development Plan (1986–90).
The idea had been mooted first in 1981 but, with the rise in garment 
production during the 1980s from small local tailoring businesses that 
tapped into the protected home market and survived on the basis of family 
labour and low wages, it quickly developed traction.64 By the mid-1980s, 
standards of production had improved sufficiently for garment producers 
to attract the interest of Australasian distributors. Fiji’s lower wages 
provided Australasian manufacturers who were prepared to move offshore 
or contract work out an opportunity to compete with Asian exporters who 
now entered their formerly protected markets. Australasian governments 
were determined to make manufacturing internationally competitive, 
and slashing import duties or ending import licensing became important 
61  Fiji Times, 28 April 1992.
62  ‘Reflecting on the Fiji experience and USP’, University of the South Pacific Bulletin, 23: 4, 
2 March 1990, p. 2. This section draws in part on R Robertson, ‘“The greenery of well-engineered 
factory complexes”: Fiji’s garment-led export industrialization strategy’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars, 25: 2, 1993, pp. 31–41.
63  R Callick, ‘Fiji grasps for a bonanza’, Australian Financial Review, 30 November 1988, p. 13.
64  Chandra, ‘The political crisis and the manufacturing sector in Fiji’, 1989,’ p. 48; production 
rose 81 per cent during 1986 alone.
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means to that end. Fiji’s wages were not low compared with most Asian 
wages, but Fiji’s advantage lay in its ability to gain duty-free entry into 
Australia and New Zealand through the South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA). Australia had also 
created a special sampling quota for the Pacific during the early 1980s 
and, in 1991, added an Import Credit Scheme that enabled Australian 
companies to source textiles from Asia, dye and print them in Australia, 
export the cloth to Fiji to be assembled into finished clothing, reimport 
them duty free, and then use the import credits gained to finance more 
purchases from China.65 Protectionism was not yet dead. 
During 1986 the garment industry employed 1,500 workers, twice as 
many as during the previous decade, which comprised 11 per cent of all 
manufacturing workers, although only 2 per cent of the national work 
force. Exports were worth nearly $5 million, only 1.6 per cent of all 
exports, but growth had been achieved rapidly. Nonetheless, the garment 
sector remained difficult for the government to promote, particularly in 
the run-up to an election. It generated controversy because of its poor 
conditions of employment. Wages, at an average of 74 cents an hour, 
were half those in other manufacturing industries.66 Employers warned 
that higher wages would cripple the industry before it could expand. 
The government agreed. It twice lowered the minimum wage for garment 
workers. During the 1987 election campaign, Labour had alleged that 
garment manufacturers made donations to the Alliance Party to secure 
the enforcement of these lower-than-minimum wages.67 The post-coup 
government, desperate to make a difference, promoted the industry with 
much greater vigour. 
Since TFZs were costly to introduce and could not be established quickly, 
the government permitted individual workshops to be declared tax-free 
factories (TFFs). Workshops that exported 95 per cent of their production 
(later reduced to 70 per cent) received 13-year exemptions from company 
tax, as well as duty-free entry of raw materials and equipment. The results 
were impressive. By early 1991, 104 TFFs employed 9,327 persons 
(10 per cent of total paid employment), 78 per cent being in garment 
65  P Cawthorne, ‘Fiji’s garment export industry: An economic and political analysis of its long 
term viability’, Faculty of Economics & Business Working Paper, University of Sydney, 2000, p. 4.
66  C Slatter, ‘Women factory workers in Fiji: The “half a loaf syndrome”’, Journal of Pacific 
Studies, 13, 1987, pp. 55–56; W Narsey, ‘What’s the plight of women garment workers’, Fiji Sun, 
10 November 1985.
67  Fiji Times, 27 March 1987.
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and footwear factories, the remainder in food and related industries. 
Garments alone earned $130 million in 1991 and, at 20 per cent of 
exports, became the second highest earner of foreign exchange after sugar, 
representing over 7 per cent of GDP. Little wonder Naisoro described the 
rate of change as ‘breathless’: 
Now people are thinking of takeoff again. But the really important 
ingredient is devaluation plus the fact that we don’t have a democratic 
government … Businessmen don’t care about the voting structure.68
Devaluation, deregulation, privatisation and foreign investment quickly 
became the catchwords of the post-coup regime. According to the 
new Minister for Finance, former Native Land Trust Board (NLTB)-
technocrat Josevata Kamikamica, Fiji had become too reliant on state-
oriented development. The coups permitted Fiji to ‘sever the apron 
strings which tied us to inherited colonial characteristics’.69 By means of 
the corporatisation of selected government enterprises (pine, fisheries, 
shipping, shipyards, post and telecommunications), the abolition of 
import licensing, tariff and excise reductions, and the expansion in TFFs, 
Kamikamica hoped to transform Fiji into a new entrepôt, the South 
Pacific’s version of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. 
Such hope was never based on realities. The success of East Asia’s 
‘little tigers’, in particular South Korea and Taiwan, grew out of the 
experiences of war. They suffered unprecedented destruction, including 
that of their traditional leadership structures. This opened the way for 
stronger states, reformed bureaucracies, and for change that was fuelled 
in large part by massive Cold War military expenditures and aid that 
continued for more than two decades. In their wake came Japanese 
investment. Thus South Korea and Taiwan were able to sustain growth 
rates of 10 to 12 per cent during the 1960s and 1970s and, by the 1980s, 
begin investing their surpluses into the regional economies of East Asia. 
Much of the wealth generated also came to be reinvested back into 
communities, resulting in growth with equity, sustained over several 
decades and boosting the capacity of East Asia’s economies to plan and 
develop.70 Growth with equity is democratisation. It channels resources 
into infrastructure, education and health. It enables greater popular 
participation in economic growth, and it raises the quality of life for its 
68  Islands Business, February 1989.
69  Fiji Times, 3 June 1989.
70  R Stubbs, Rethinking Asia’s Economic Miracle. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
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citizens. This democratisation began to spill over into the political sphere 
by the end of the 1980s, perhaps demonstrating economist Amartya Sen’s 
claim that democratisation represented the most important universal 
commitment of the 20th century, the only way to widen circles of social 
capital, bridge divides, and develop modern societies.71 
Nothing similar happened in Fiji. The ‘Fijian revolution’ by ‘New Fijians’72 
did not place Fiji on such a trajectory. It did not mark a fundamental 
break with colonial or postcolonial characteristics. Despite all the hype 
of heralding a new era of prosperity, TFFs offered labour little more than 
poor wages under less-than-perfect working conditions. The government 
refused to pressure employers to provide greater national benefits from 
its hastily prepared scheme. Since no local value-added preconditions 
were stipulated and little in the way of local raw materials utilised, much-
needed linkages back into economy were never developed. No  textile 
industry emerged to stimulate growth, as happened in Mauritius. 
Certainly it provided many women, the bulk of the workforce, an 
alternative to domestic employment, but its poor remuneration ensured 
that few benefits spilt over into the community beyond the injection of 
subsistence wages. While the government created a special training school 
to up-skill garment workers, it gave insufficient funds for it to be effective. 
Consequently many employers simply imported skilled Asian labour 
instead, which came, at one time, to comprise over 10 per cent of the 
garment labour force.
Accordingly, TFF success needs to be highly qualified. It managed 
to continue expanding for most of the 1990s, using temporary access 
to  US and European markets to reduce its overwhelming dependence 
on Australasia. By 2000, garment exports had risen to $333 million, 
an astonishing 33 per cent of exports and nearly 12 per cent of GDP. 
The industry employed close to 20,000 employees. But Fiji possessed none 
of the aid or market access advantages that proved so important for East 
Asian growth. Neither was it as galvanised by external threat and domestic 
transformation. TFFs were highly market vulnerable. Access depended 
on preferential agreements that were constantly revised as countries like 
Australia and New Zealand ended import licensing and reduced tariffs 
71  A Sen, Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1999.
72  Islands Business, February 1989.
The GeneRAl’s Goose
84
while seeking ways to soften the blow for its own manufacturers.73 
As tariffs fell, so did Fiji’s cost advantage against cheaper and more 
competitive Asian countries. Its factories were comparatively small and 
lacked the scale economies of its competitors. Its less productive labour 
force remained largely unskilled and, as a consequence, poorly paid. 
Thus Fiji neglected the very base required for moving into better paying, 
high-end niche markets based on design and brand, and – as we shall 
see later – neglected opportunities to exploit the international linkages 
tourism brought, as Fiji Water did so successfully after 1997. The garment 
industry never became anything more than an export industry designed 
to soak up surplus labour.
Part of the problem also lay in the nature of investment within the industry. 
In 1999, Pamela Cawthorne found that 64 per cent of 110 garment 
factories were partially or wholly foreign owned.74 Of them, 21 per cent 
were owned by Asian companies that came to Fiji simply to get around 
American quota restrictions on their own countries. They were highly 
mobile minimalist operators, often bringing their own labour with them, 
and demonstrated little interest in diversification or establishing linkages 
with the rest of the economy. Australian and New Zealand producers made 
up 34 per cent of foreign ownership, and set up in Fiji also only as long as 
trade preferences made it worthwhile. The majority of foreign producers 
brought no sophisticated technology with them. If anything, SPARTECA 
discouraged such investment, first because its 50 per cent rule of origin 
forced manufacturers to source capital goods and raw materials from 
Australasia rather than from cheaper Asian suppliers and, second, because 
its 50 per cent local content rule could only be met by maximising labour 
costs. It made no sense to become more technologically efficient. Thus the 
very scheme designed to assist Pacific countries to grow manufacturing 
capacity conspired to frustrate its development within the Fiji economy. 
It never escaped its dependency on trade preferences and, to Cawthorne, 
bore all the hallmarks of maquiladora industries along the US–Mexican 
border. Without investment in new technology, productivity remained 
low, wages failed to rise, living standards stagnated or declined, and 
73  Thus, SPARTECA could be seen as a strategy more for the benefit of Australasian manufacturers 
than for Pacific producers. In this respect, SPARTECA is similar to the EU Lomé Convention’s Sugar 
Protocol, created in 1975 to ensure a steady supply of sugar to Tate & Lyle’s refineries in Britain 
(R Grynberg, ‘The WTO incompatibility of the Lomé Convention trade provisions’, Working Paper 
98/3. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 1998, p. 13).
74  Cawthorne, ‘Fiji’s garment export industry’, 2000, pp. 5–14; this section draws heavily on 
Cawthorne’s analysis.
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a  rejuvenated manufacturing sector within Fiji failed to burn brightly. 
With changes to SPARTECA and an end to quota access into the United 
States early in the next century, the garment flame dimmed. 
TFFs may have replaced the postcolonial emphasis on import substitution 
but, as enclaves within the domestic economy, they shared features all too 
similar with colonial strategies. Both sheltered and protected industries 
linked with export demand and both frustrated value-adding capabilities 
and industrial sophistication. With an education system reeling from 
cutbacks and with a growth strategy intent on denying skills and creativity, 
Fiji seemed stubbornly intent on excluding long-term growth factors such 
as human capital. In addition, labour-intensive industrialisation failed to 
promote capital-intensive growth. Not surprisingly, Fiji’s leaders divided 
on the value of TFFs. Apisai Tora reportedly bragged to an Australian 
businessman at the start of the strategy, ‘This place is ripe for carpetbaggers. 
You had better get your guys over here if you want a slice of the action’.75 
Some members of the Fijian elite did invest in garment factories, but others 
were less enthusiastic. Rabuka worried about its political consequences. 
‘Who needs overseas investors?’ he quipped in 1993.76 Foreign investment 
of this kind invariably meant greater urbanisation and expanding working 
classes. These classes were less trusted after the 1987 elections. They and 
the capitalism they drew strength from created loyalties and aspirations 
that did not coincide with those of traditionalists. ‘The political logic,’ 
economist Roman Grynberg wrote, ‘is that a nation of barmen and 
chambermaids is to be preferred over that of factory workers.’77
Something of the same logic applied also to new economic strategies for 
Fijians although, in the post-coup atmosphere, they were never so described. 
Fijian development strategies had been largely passive, replicating existing 
lines of authority, and using communal activities to raise funds invested in 
provincial companies controlled by chiefs. Sociologist Steven Ratuva has 
described this as communal capitalism, and it drained rural communities 
of valuable resources for which there were no returns at the community 
level. The beneficiaries were chiefs and the bureaucrats who staffed Fijian 
institutions.78 One might have thought that, after 1987, this disconnect 
75  SL Malcomson, Tuturani: A Political Journey in the Pacific Islands. New York: Poseidon Press, 
1990, p. 129.
76  Fiji Times, 3 June 1993.
77  Fiji Times, 27 August 1994.
78  Ratuva, ‘Addressing inequality?’, 2000, pp. 230–31, 245.
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with communities would have been better appreciated. It was not, with 
the result that the only change after 1987 lay in the intensification of 
a strategy already found wanting.
Ordinary Fijians might have expected more. After all, the coups had been 
launched in their name, and perceived socio-economic disparities were 
always high on the list of official justifications. Indeed, the post-coup 
regimes did seek to create the impression that they were now addressing 
disadvantage with both urgency and determination. Affirmative action 
became the new mantra and, in 1988, a Fijian Initiative Group comprised 
of senior Fijian technocrats (including the head of the Fiji Development 
Bank (FDB) and future prime minister, Laisenia Qarase) released a nine-
point plan for advancing Fijian economic development. But, instead of 
addressing disadvantage directly, the plan proposed revitalising communal 
capitalism and its associated Fijian bourgeoisie. It proposed loaning 
$20  million to Fijian Holdings Company Ltd (FHL), an investment 
company begun in 1984 to invest provincial and Fijian institutional 
funds into established companies such as Basic Industries (a cement 
manufacturer), Carlton Brewery, and Burns Philp. The plan also proposed 
a unit trust and a  compulsory savings scheme for Fijians. It  called for 
enhanced government concessions to Fijian businesses (21 years tax 
free), minimum levels of Fijian ownership in resource-based industries 
and Fijian  ownership of a daily newspaper. It requested administrative 
reform and innovation within the Fijian Affairs Board (FAB), which was 
responsible to the GCC for the performance of the Ministry of Fijian 
Affairs.79 Aside from the establishment of a Unit Trust, a management 
advisory service within the FAB, and government ownership of the 
Daily Post newspaper, the most dramatic outcome of the nine-point plan 
concerned FHL.
From the FAB, FHL received $20 million of government funds as an 
interest-free loan, enabling it to massively increase its investments in Fiji-
based companies such as the Merchant Bank of Fiji, the Denarau tourist 
project outside Nadi, Fiji Sugar Corporation, Motibhai (a duty-free 
retailer), Goodman Fielder Watties (food producers principally involved 
with chicken production), and the Suva Stock Exchange. Total assets 
increased from around $5 million in 1987 to over $36 million in 1994, 
by which time the company paid dividends of up to 20 per cent from 
79  Fijian Initiative Group, Nine Points Plan. Suva, 1988.
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annual profits of $3 million. As Ratuva argues, FHL performed well by 
any stretch of the imagination but, at the end of 1991, it became a private 
company with the ability to manage funds from private Fijian investors.80 
That change was not publicised until allegations were made in 1993 
that some 26 well-placed bureaucrats and their business associates 
possessed more shares than institutional investors. Some of those shares 
had been purchased with government-subsidised loans from the FDB. 
Accusations of insider trading flew furiously,81 perhaps unfairly, but the 
contrast between private and institutional beneficiaries was unavoidable. 
Of course, unlike private investors, Fijians who contributed to provincial 
investments did not benefit directly from institutional investments. 
Most earnings went to pay for provincial bureaucracies. Ratuva notes:
The change in status of the [FHL] was primarily a result of lobbying by 
the ethnic Fijian elite who dominate its private company share ownership, 
and who want greater control over their investment and the dividends it 
paid. Moreover, this emerging ethnic Fijian bourgeois class had found 
a new ally: with the foreign and local non ethnic Fijian bourgeoisie in 
whose companies the [FHL] had purchased equity. Thus, the new 
ethnic Fijian bourgeoisie has been able to use affirmative action policies 
in order to promote its own interests through state subsidised capital 
accumulation.82
Success outside the FHL was harder to gauge. Smaller investment companies 
like the Suva-based Gaunavou Investments tried with less success and 
capital to emulate the FHL. The FDB began a soft-loan scheme for Fijians 
in 1989 that, over the next four years, increased funds available to Fijians 
by over 300 per cent. Unfortunately, Fijians were often encouraged to 
invest in areas where competition from established companies was stiffest. 
A classic example was the FDB’s attempt to organise small-scale Fijian 
retail activity through its Equity Investment and Management Company 
Limited or EIMCOL, which established nine small supermarkets after 
80  Ratuva, ‘Addressing inequality?’, 2000, pp. 240–41. By 2017 the FHL Group held assets 
worth $492 million, its pre-tax profits stood at $19.4 million, and it returned 0.35 cents per share 
to its investors. Its star performers were Basic Industries, Pacific Cement and the RB Patel Group 
(Fiji Times, 1 February 2017).
81  Fiji Times, 19 May 1993; 22 May 1993.
82  Ratuva, ‘Addressing inequality?’, 2000, p. 246.
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1989. All had collapsed by the end of 1993, due in large part to poor 
location (often close to established supermarkets), inadequate feasibility 
studies and inappropriate management training.83 
Investment in taxis produced a similar outcome. Most prime taxi sites 
were already allocated, leaving only the less profitable outer urban sites 
available for Fijian operators. The government attempted to get around 
these difficulties by denying new permits to IndoFijians, but even this 
could not prevent unacceptably high arrears on loan repayments. In 1995, 
funding for taxis ended. At the small business level, where institutional 
support might have helped most, affirmative action failed Fijians. This 
complaint had been common before 1987; even Rabuka had argued in 
1988 that the FDB only helped well-off people.84
The problem with the nine-point plan lay not in its ambition to extend 
Fijian participation in business but that it was presented as something that 
would benefit all Fijians when, clearly, it could not. Part of the problem 
lay with government’s refusal to debate policy. Provincial councils 
never publically complained when government decisions impacted on 
their businesses or on large employers in their districts as, for example, 
when Air Pacific shifted its head office from Suva to Nadi or when the 
government deregulated the dairy industry, cut beef tariffs, and granted 
licenses for imported chickens. Wadan Narsey lamented a public culture 
of silence.85 Few government ministers appreciated that, if the culture of 
silence extended also to institutions defending Fijian rights, there was little 
chance of popular decision-making or accountability in development. 
Reliance on modern bureaucratic versions of the Fijian vanua as solutions 
proved equally as deceptive as the nine-point plan. Rabuka believed 
bureaucracies would lay ‘the golden egg’ for Fijians but, instead, they 
seemed only to promote dependence and empty shells. Rabuka attempted 
to create his own ‘golden egg’ in late 1987 by making the Army Auxiliary 
Unit a supplier of essential commodities and a monopoly marketing agent 
for producers in the outer islands. He seized four Marine Department 
and two Fisheries vessels (the latter donated by Japan) for the purpose. 
He claimed that Fijians could not compete without such infrastructure. 
But the unit did nothing to alter the pattern of trade for outer islanders. 
83  Fiji Times, 13 November 1992.
84  Fiji Times, 25 November 1988.
85  Fiji Times, 6 May 1997; 24 December 1996.
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Khaki capitalism effectively only substituted one group of traders for 
another and, in the process, restricted local initiative further. The unit’s 
agricultural activities had a similar effect, undercutting the value of goods 
produced by villagers for sale in urban markets. Eventually this thinly 
veiled attempt to develop an independent economic base for the military 
collapsed under the weight of corruption and incompetence, having 
achieved little for the people it championed.86 Rabuka went back to 
raiding government coffers instead.
The NLTB, perhaps the most important Fijian institution, encapsulated 
the  bureaucratic mentality after 1987 as much as it had before. 
It centralised control of all Fijian land and, for the privilege, the 250-strong 
bureaucracy earned 25 per cent of all rentals (reduced to 15 per cent in 
2001), 10 per cent of royalties, as well as regular contributions from 
government towards a wages bill it never seemed able to constrain. 
Additionally, it found managing its vast estate (30,000 leases on 42,000 
hectares for 16,000 mataqali) and transaction records difficult. It failed 
to publish annual reports for most of the 1990s, and eventually conceded 
in 1998 that, with accumulated losses of $4.3 million, it was close to 
bankruptcy.87 
Part of the NLTB’s problem was the near divine status that many Fijian 
leaders bestowed on the goose. ‘To abolish the NLTB,’ declared its former 
manager Jo Kamikamica, ‘would mean the demise of Fijian society and 
the basic stability we enjoy today.’88 Yet many mataqali members were 
dissatisfied with the service they received, in large part due to their 
inability to mobilise rental proceeds for development purposes. The shares 
that chiefs received were sometimes utilised for mataqali and village 
development, but often they also became the basis for clashes between 
mataqali over claims to highly lucrative chiefly titles. 
Land as a resource bears some similarities with natural resources in 
terms of its impact on communities. Mataqali members were not the 
only ones who regarded it as their golden egg; increasingly the guardian 
NLTB leased land or approved logging without consulting land owners. 
Members of mataqali in the catchment area of the Monasavu dam spent 
86  Robertson, Multiculturalism & Reconciliation, 1998, p. 161. Its Commander, Esala Teleni, 
would figure prominently again after 2006. See Schumpeter, ‘Khaki capitalism’ (Economist, 
3 December 2011) for an analysis of similar military activities globally.
87  Robertson, Multiculturalism & Reconciliation, 1998, p. 165.
88  Fiji Times, 17 June 1992.
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years seeking compensation for the loss of their land and its resources, 
and eventually resorted to blocking access to the power station in 1998 to 
get the government to begin negotiations. This was old Colo, the ‘bush 
constituency’ that Rabuka reportedly considered too demeaning to visit 
during a by-election the previous year.89 Its anger would be felt in future 
years but, for many Fijians, such outcomes epitomised the downside 
of bureaucratic development. It transferred few skills, it removed 
responsibility and often all knowledge of development, and it denied 
people direct access to resources or involvement with their investments. 
Above all it prevented local initiative and produced powerlessness. 
Some Fijians sought consolation in religion. By the mid-1990s, 15 per cent 
of Fijians belonged to Pentecostal religions and cults such as the New 
Life Centre, the Assemblies of God, the Christian Mission Fellowship 
and the Apostles Gospel Outreach Fellowship International. At Kalabu, 
the Kelekeletabua cult collected $25 and a tabua from members and 
promised them six containers of cash in return. In Ba, the one-time rebels 
of the 1960s, the Bula Tale or Dra ni Lami, maintained a commune of 
300 people dedicated to peace, non-violence and non-competition, and 
survived by operating small businesses in the west. Other groups like the 
Spiritual Congregation of the Poor and the Fiji in Every Home movement 
sought to reconcile people to their poverty.90
Frustration also encouraged the ideological quick fix that was promised 
by  ethno-nationalists. Scapegoating IndoFijians received new impetus 
during the late 1990s as nearly 3,300 of some 11,000 30-year sugar 
cane leases negotiated under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act 
(ALTA) in 1977 came up for renewal. It provided an ideal opportunity 
for the NLTB to direct attention away from itself by claiming that Fijians 
would receive more satisfactory returns if IndoFijian farmers paid higher 
rents on shorter leases. Rents normally comprised up to 6 per cent of 
the unimproved capital value of the land, but the actual amount varied 
according to the quality of the land in question. A review in 2001 quoted 
rents at $54 per hectare for marginal land and $480 per hectare for 
class I land. This equated to an average 3.4 per cent of the gross value 
of production, which the NLTB claimed was inadequate and far below 
89  Review, July 1997.
90  Robertson, Multiculturalism & Reconciliation, 1998, p. 166; Sangharsh (Suva), October 1995; 
Fiji Times, 5 March 1996; Daily Post, 5 June 1993.
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international norms.91 To drive home the point, it advocated that leases 
not be renewed, hoping to force government to introduce new legislation 
in its favour. In 2000, it introduced a fee for considering new leases, and 
encouraged landowners to charge goodwill for new leases equivalent to 
one year’s rent,92 perhaps as a way of increasing mataqali returns without 
impacting on its own income. Journalist Jo Nata argued in 1997 that 
the goodwill of Fijians had not been recognised in the past and that the 
time had come to share as much as 50 per cent of farmer income with 
landowners.93 
At some point reality had to sink in. Rents were low because much of 
the land farmed was of low quality, but rents still represented an average 
45 per cent of net returns. On high quality land, rents comprised 23 to 
27 per cent of net returns. Furthermore, once goodwill payments were 
accounted for, the real average rent was more like 10 to 14 per cent of 
the gross value of production, a proportion similar to that in Europe, 
South Africa, and Australia,94 although not the high 60 per cent in 
parts of India that was sometimes quoted approvingly by critics who 
conveniently overlooked its impact on Indian productivity and farmer 
welfare. But, then again, feudalism might have been precisely the intent.
Vitogo villagers near Lautoka rented out 400 hectares for $30,000 but 
they believed that the land earned $540,000 and in 1997 decided that the 
time had come to engage in farming themselves.95 The desire to become 
commercial farmers or to extend communal gardens to accommodate 
village populations undoubtedly impacted on decisions not to renew 
leases. Between 1997 and 1999 only 26 per cent of leases were actually 
renewed to sitting tenants. But the realities of farming were often 
forgotten in the heat of debate. Economists Padma Lal and Mahendra 
Reddy demonstrated that the average net return to sugar cane farmers in 
2001 was $842 per hectare, in total $3,500 per annum, below Fiji’s then 
average $3,889 per capita income.96 However, economics did not decide 
the issue. 
91  P Lal, H Lim-Applegate & M Reddy, ‘Fijian landowners and IndoFijian tenants have their cake 
and eat it too’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 16: 1, November 2001, pp. 109–10.
92  P Lal & M Reddy, ‘Old wine in a new bottle: Proposed sugar industry restructuring and land 
conflict in Fiji’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 18: 1, May 2003, pp. 82–85.
93  Fiji Times, 28 January 1997.
94  Lal, Lim-Applegate & Reddy, ‘Fijian landowners and IndoFijian tenants’, 2001, pp. 111, 114.
95  Fiji Times, 20 January 1996.
96  Lal & Reddy, ‘Old wine in a new bottle’, 2003, p. 85.
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Back in 1997 the general consensus had politics driving decision-making. 
There were suggestions that chiefs, not commoners, were ‘instigating 
the non-renewal of leases’ in order to take the opportunity to regain 
control over land.97 Mara had equated land ownership with economic 
power in 1991 and suggested that only the flexing of economic muscle 
would sustain political power.98 Similarly, the then Minister for Primary 
Industries, Koresi Matatolu, argued in 1993 that ‘to ignore the relationship 
between tenancy and political power would be to misunderstand the 1987 
Fiji coup’. He wanted Fijians to take over the sugar industry completely 
by 2000.99
The NLTB drove responses to these pressures after 1987 and created 
a special taskforce to examine leases under Marika Qarikau, who would 
later become its general manager. In 1996, he declared that sugar cane 
farmers should be prepared to lose their leases, but no government 
before 1999 seriously considered what to do with farmers who lost 
their livelihoods, or what might happen to the land no longer leased to 
farmers. The NLTB thought farms should be restructured for Fijians and 
the industry mechanised to enable large-scale farming, but believed no 
decision was yet needed since most leases did not expire until the next 
century.100 Forward planning was not the NLTB’s strength. It did not 
seem to consider that rents should be used effectively to provide capital 
for rural Fijians to launch themselves into new commercial activities. 
Nor did it think the expertise of existing tenants might assist the industry 
in the future. Instead it envisaged another bureaucracy to train landowners 
and plan large-scale cane farming. In any case, an indecisive government 
provided little assistance. Although prepared to let individual mataqali 
decide future land use, it left them tied to the demands of the NLTB.
Such uncertainty had tremendous consequences for the sugar industry. 
Listening to the comments of Fijian politicians and bureaucrats, you 
could easily be excused for not appreciating that this was an industry 
that in 1989 comprised 35 per cent of all merchandise exports by value, 
contributed 12 per cent of GDP, employed over 23,000 cane growers, 
directly impacted on the livelihood of at least a quarter of the population, 
and – because most inputs into the industry were domestic – possessed 
97  Fiji Times, 3 & 6 March 1997.
98  Pacific Islands Monthly, December 1991.
99  Fiji Times, 15 May 1993; Review, November 1994.
100  Fiji Times, 20 January 1996; 26 February 1997.
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a multiplier effect greater than most other sectors. Despite fluctuating 
world prices, the higher EU prices for fixed quotas (often 2.5 times world 
prices for half Fiji’s production or 200,000 tonnes of sugar, the equivalent 
of 5 per cent of GDP) provided the Fiji economy a degree of certainty that 
it would otherwise have lacked. 
Certainly high sugar prices following the coups enabled its economy 
to bounce back much faster than expected, not that this was always 
appreciated. Former senator and Taukeist Jona Qio argued in 1987 
that any collapse in the sugar industry would affect only IndoFijians; 
Fijians could always survive in their villages.101 This was surely prejudice 
masquerading as economic analysis. After all, many Fijians were deeply 
involved in the industry, even as farmers. In short the health of the industry 
affected everyone, directly or indirectly. But such ignorance proved 
powerful nonetheless. It reinforced ethnic separation and it drove neglect 
of an industry that would in any case have faced tremendous challenges, 
not least because a limited waiver of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules for Lomé preferences in the mid-1990s made the future of its 
European market extremely uncertain. Being predominantly labour-
based, a condition perpetuated in order to maximise employment, the 
sugar industry lacked the efficiencies of mechanised farming. Most farms 
were small, on average devoting only 4.2 hectares each for cane-growing, 
of which some 75 per cent was planted with more labour-effective but 
less productive ratoon crops.102 Low farmer morale compounded these 
structural problems. With leases unlikely to be renewed, farmers invested 
less in their land, further reducing productivity. Low investment impacted 
on other sections of the industry also. Rail linkages and milling facilities 
deteriorated. Milling delays added further to  declining sugar quality. 
Drought during 1997 and 1998 reduced output. This was an industry 
now in serious decline.103 By  the end of the decade its contribution to 
GDP had fallen to 7 per cent, its share of exports to 22 per cent.
101  Fiji Sun, 19 July 1987.
102  Lal, Lim-Applegate & Reddy, ‘Fijian landowners and IndoFijian tenants’, 2001, pp. 107–08.
103  Cane sugar content fell 50 per cent during 1970–95 due to cane-burning prior to harvesting, and 
transportation and milling deficiencies. Ageing mills required greater capital outlay than the industry 
could afford. A Catch-22 situation existed: in 1997, for example, 62 per cent of cane was deliberately 
burnt as growers sought priority for milling after a cyclone ravaged the crop. Sugar production 
subsequently fell 24 per cent and cost the industry $40 million in lost earnings. Investment in mills, 
rural road and rail networks, and in farming practices declined (Review, June 1998).
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Much the same circumstances faced agriculture in general with its share 
of GDP falling 6 per cent to 16 per cent between 1988 and 2000, despite 
being the country’s main source of employment. Nearly 6.5 per cent of 
GDP came from subsistence agriculture, which, agricultural economists 
Paul Barbour and Andrew McGregor argued, was a hidden strength, 
helping to keep food imports down.104 Its proportion of agriculture grew 
from 30 per cent to 40 per cent during this period, reflecting also the 
difficulties facing most commercial sectors of agriculture. Deregulation 
clearly impacted on rice, tobacco and meat production, but it also 
forced producers to take more responsibility for what they produced and 
how they produced it, if they wished to meet the increasingly exacting 
standards of importing countries. This was particularly the case for 
horticultural export crops such as ginger, taro, kava and papaya, which 
grew rapidly after 1987. Perhaps in recognition of this potential, the 
government partially reversed deregulation in 1997 with the introduction 
of a commodity development framework to increase capital expenditure 
for agriculture over a four-year period, support failing businesses such as 
Yaqara Beef, upgrade services and research, and subsidise inputs such as 
seeds, fertilisers and tools. Unfortunately, it also proved an attractive way 
to buy votes.
Like sugar cane, agriculture suffered from uncertainty over leases and farm 
sizes that made efficiencies difficult to achieve. Barbour and McGregor 
noted that 60 per cent of farms occupied only 7 per cent of farm land and 
were usually no bigger than three hectares. Fifty per cent were mataqali 
owned. Just 2 per cent of farms occupied 40 per cent of farm land. Many 
of these farms also suffered from land degradation due to overgrazing, 
steep slopes and excessive use of chemicals. Agriculture also suffered from 
underinvestment. Lending to agriculture declined from 19 per cent of 
loans in 1989 to 12 per cent in 1996. Despite tax concessions being offered 
in 1996 for food exporters, few farmers took advantage of them. They 
faced disincentives: a third currency devaluation in 1997 pushed up input 
costs (especially for animal feed), high interest rates discouraged lending, 
and the longstanding poor state of rural education and entrepreneurial 
skills depressed opportunities further.105
104  Barbour & McGregor, ‘The Fiji agricultural sector’, 1998, pp. 65–66. This section derives from 
their analysis.
105  Barbour & McGregor, ‘The Fiji agricultural sector’, 1998, pp. 73–78.
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Agriculture and manufacturing showed no sign of the dynamism that 
coup-makers promised after 1987. No new trajectory emerged to boost 
Fiji’s economic wellbeing or to transform the lives of the very people 
leaders claimed were disadvantaged. Even where opportunities existed 
to redress past unequal arrangements, they were neglected or sabotaged. 
In  late 1987, the military government secretly supported lower gold 
royalties for the Vatukoula mine, thereby surrendering much-needed 
income.106 Although Fiji’s economy appeared to rebound strongly in 1989 
with 12 per cent growth, largely on the back of strong sugar production, 
it never achieved high growth in subsequent years. With poorer sugar 
production and declining world prices, GDP growth managed 5 per cent 
in 1990; in 1991 only 0.4 per cent. New investments in manufacturing 
slowed. Only tourism expanded, with arrivals increasing from 258,000 in 
1986 to 287,000 by 1993, mostly from Australia, the United States and 
New Zealand, but also from Europe, Japan and Korea. This expansion 
continued throughout the 1990s, reaching 410,000 arrivals during 1999. 
Accordingly, its share of export receipts – only 25 per cent in 1980 – 
rose to 30 per cent in 1990 and to 38 per cent in 2001. Its share of 
GDP followed a similar trajectory, rising from 11 per cent in 1980 to 
20 per cent in 1990 and to 25 per cent by 2001.107 
In many respects tourism remained the sole bright spot in the economy, 
absorbing some 40,000 employees, nearly 12 per cent of the labour 
market. Maintaining market share, however, was not easy in a highly 
competitive and volatile market, and seesawing occupancy rates tended 
to discourage much-needed new investment. Only in the late 1990s 
did significant investment begin, particularly in large-scale integrated 
resorts such as Denarau, west of Nadi, although Fiji continued to attract 
a growing number of five-star resorts for holiday-makers willing to pay 
for luxurious exclusion. As we will examine later, however, in terms of 
tourism’s multiplier impact on the economy, its notorious leakage rate 
(approximately 60 per cent) – which no post-coup government seemed 
willing or able to address – significantly reduced its overall economic value 
compared with sugar. Garment manufacturing was similarly inflicted.
106  Gold royalties were limited to 2.5 per cent of adjusted chargeable income rather than 5 per cent 
of actual gold value. This meant, for example, that in 1993 Fiji received only $1.7 million in royalties 
instead of $23 million (Fiji Times, 30 October 1996). 
107  PK Narayan, ‘A tourism demand model for Fiji. 1970–2000’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 17: 2, 
November 2002, pp. 103–04.
The GeneRAl’s Goose
96
Partly because of these difficulties, post-coup governments pushed ahead 
with more liberal economic policies than their predecessors, deregulating 
previously protected industries and reducing tariffs by as much as one 
third by 1995. But strange echoes from the past haunted Fiji’s ‘new 
trajectory’. During 1991 Mara drew up plans for a state-owned oil 
importing company, a Fiji National Petroleum Company, which would 
purchase crude oil directly from Malaysia, rather than through Australian 
oil subsidiaries, and refine it in Singapore. The plan reflected Mara’s 
growing hostility towards Australia since 1987: ‘The Australians and New 
Zealanders … prefer not to understand our minds’ unlike Asians, he 
argued.108 He wished to ‘better control [Fiji’s] principal source of energy 
and also provide potential for further development’.109 Critics thought 
one source might not in fact be better than an existing three in terms 
of security of supply or cost. But Mara seemed determined to return to 
the state monopoly days of the 1970s and to create in the energy sector 
a national monopoly similar to that established for the sugar industry. 
That it could become yet another golden egg for the state (or whoever 
controlled the state) to harvest certainly worried Pacific leaders whose 
countries imported their oil from Fiji.
Tax reform did make it through the political morass, in particular a value 
added tax (VAT) of 10 per cent introduced in mid-1992, but proved 
impotent to rescue Fiji’s economy. Fiji needed investment, but funds 
for investment were in short supply. In the late 1970s, Fiji invested the 
equivalent of one quarter of its GDP, over half of which represented private 
investment, enabling real GDP growth rates over 5 per cent per annum. 
Following the coups in 1987, investment fell considerably, comprising 
only 11.4 per cent of GDP during 1996–99, of which only 38 per cent 
came from private sources. Savings similarly fell from 27 per cent of GDP 
108  Fiji Times, 4 December 1991. 
109  K Mara, The Pacific Way: A Memoir. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997, pp. 222–23. 
He wrote: ‘The oil oligopoly’s contribution to, or involvement in, the Fiji economy, outside its own 
immediate infrastructure, is virtually non-existent. There is not a single blending plant, or even a joint 
move by the oil companies to establish an oil refinery here. It appeared that whatever profits had been 
made over the years have been regularly repatriated out of the country. Developing countries, when 
moving into manufacturing and industry to complement their agriculture, find that control of their 
energy sector becomes more and more crucial in determining the direction and pace of economic 
advancement.’ The scheme, although never implemented, cost Fiji taxpayers some $12 million.
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in 1980 to 10 per cent in 1999. GDP growth rates slumped accordingly, 
growing only 0.2 per cent on average between 1986–90, 0.8 per cent 
1991–95, and 1.5 per cent 1996–2000.110 
It was a miserable result for the new trajectory Fiji’s post-coup mandarins 
had declared would transform Fiji; instead a rapid increase in poverty 
became one of its early consequences. In 1977, 15 per cent of Fiji’s 
population lived in poverty, with rural people recording the highest 
proportion (21.4 per cent). By 1991 the national poverty rate had nearly 
doubled to 29 per cent; by 1997 it had climbed further to 34 per cent. 
In that year, rural households again fared worse at 42 per cent (IndoFijians 
47 per cent, Fijians 39 per cent) compared with 24 per cent for urban 
households (IndoFijians 26 per cent, Fijians 23 per cent).111 
Fiji’s economy failed to grow and poverty escalated. What caused this 
outcome? Certainly Fiji’s economy remained externally dependent as 
before, although its sources of dependence were more diversified than 
before, and the potential remained to grow more value-added forms of 
production. Fiji’s relatively high levels of education, its use of English as a 
working language, and its central position in the Pacific served to reinforce 
these potentials. Yet this did not happen. Mauritius, whose per-capita 
GDP had been slightly less than Fiji’s in 1980, had more than doubled its 
per-capita GDP 20 years later; Fiji’s increased by only 11 per cent.112 Only 
two factors accounted for this difference – political instability and the 
corruption it generated. For this, the coups were almost entirely to blame.
110  Prasad & Kumar, ‘Fiji’s economic woes’, 2002, pp. 2, 13; W. Narsey, ‘The struggle for just wages 
in Fiji: Lessons from the 2009 wages councils and the continuing coups’, the Rev. Paula Niukula 
Lecture, University of the South Pacific, 15 April 2009, p. 8.
111  BC Prasad & J Asafu-Adjay, ‘Macroeconomic policy & poverty in Fiji’, Pacific Economic 
Bulletin, 13: 1, May 1998, pp. 50–51; W Narsey, ‘Truth behind our poverty’, Fiji Times, 10 June 
2007; W Narsey, ‘Incidence of poverty & the poverty gap in Fiji: Unpalatable facts for ethnocentric 
parties’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 23: 2, November 2008, p. 72. Narsey argues that the proportion 
of the population in poverty could have been as high as 36 per cent by 1991 and that rates declined 
marginally in subsequent years.
112  Narsey, ‘The Struggle for Just Wages in Fiji’, 2009, p. 9. Fiji’s real per capita GDP stood 





Mara’s restoration as prime minister at the end of 1987 did not restore the 
status quo ante, nor did it bring stability. This part of Fiji’s history is largely 
forgotten today, overshadowed by more recent events. Undoubtedly Fiji’s 
culture of silence has also meant that these events are effectively lost to 
those born since 1987, nearly half Fiji’s population today. For them, 
Rabuka is the ageing former politician who for most of the past decade 
has stood outside of the political system; impotent, discredited and given 
to repeating shallow apologies. But, in 1987 and in subsequent years, 
he represented something very different, as Ganilau’s then permanent 
secretary Peter Thomson recounted:
 [A] new generation of Fijian leaders … had tasted power after the first coup 
and no doubt saw the Deuba Accord as a scotching of their ambitions; 
it was in the fever of millenarianism that they stood the best chance of 
advancing their careers. This younger generation had now sat around the 
same executive tables as the Fijian leaders whom they had previously held 
in awe, and saw that they could foot it with them. A  changing of the 
guard was underway.113
Of course, Rabuka represented a lot more than just a younger generation; 
he represented the insertion of a new actor into the political scene – 
the military. Often during this period, there were similarities with his 
later status – the reflective outsider looking in – but the big difference 
after 1987 lay in his belief that he was now the ultimate king-maker. 
This belief both  shaped and shook Fiji politics for five long years and 
delivered prolonged instability. It ended only when he decided to assume 
the crown himself.
Mara’s so-called ‘interim’ regime faced instability from the start. This 
derived from both the military and remnants of the Taukei Movement. 
Little over a month after assuming office, Mara faced his first test. Three 
Taukeists seized Radio Fiji on 22 January 1988 in expectation that the 
military would help them drive out the Tovata leaders (Mara and Ganilau) 
and install Bauans instead. Rabuka – a subject of Tovata – not surprisingly 
declined the invitation but, in February, his officers were again approached 
by Taukeists unhappy with his decision to return power to Mara. Rabuka, 
now brigadier general, had attached conditions to his handover, the most 
113  Thomson, Kava in the Blood, 1999, p. 179.
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important being the adoption of a new constitution. To that end the 
military had proposed a 67-seat parliament with 36 Fijian seats, reserved 
posts for Fijians, and continued observance of new Sunday laws. Once in 
office, however, Mara seemed unwilling to acknowledge these demands. 
Instead he announced plans to reduce the size of the GCC,114 to make the 
British (and former Fiji) Queen the Tui Viti (the Kubuna title first claimed 
by Cakobau as part of Bau’s designs on the whole of Fiji), and to review 
the Sunday ban. On Sunday 12 March, Rabuka’s soldiers occupied Suva, 
ostensibly to enforce the ban but, in reality, to demonstrate displeasure 
at Mara’s proposals. In late March, senior military officers wrote to Mara 
and Ganilau that they were deeply concerned at the delay in producing 
a new constitution. The ‘two elderly gentlemen’ had failed to honour their 
agreement at the time of the handover. ‘The only factor left now between 
the indigenous Fijians and oblivion is the FMF [Fiji Military Forces],’ 
they declared, calling on the chiefs to step aside and allow the military to 
introduce its preferred constitutional changes.115 The Taukei Movement 
leaked the document to the press, forcing Rabuka to abort his behind the 
scenes pressure and publicly pledge full military support for the interim 
administration.116
A more potent means to influence the course of events fell into Rabuka’s 
lap in May 1988 when Sydney customs officers discovered a container 
holding 12 tonnes of weapons awaiting shipment to Lautoka. The 
shipment had been organised by Mohammed Kahan, a Fiji-born British 
citizen whose contradictory and implausible explanations variously 
implicated the Coalition, the Taukei Movement, Mara and even Rabuka 
in his conspiracy. The discovery of an earlier shipment of weapons that 
actually reached Lautoka undetected in April allowed Rabuka to declare 
‘a foreign sponsored attempt to destabilise the country’ and demand 
from the government an Internal Security Decree (ISD) with sweeping 
powers of search and arrest.117 The decree ended any hopes to which 
Fiji’s citizens might have clung that a return to civilian government 
would restore respect for legal process. Already since the start of 1988, 
critics such as Bavadra’s former spokesperson Richard Naidu and lawyer 
John Cameron had been ordered out of the country; so had this author. 
114  The plan was to reduce the GCC from 154 members to a more manageable 56.
115  Unsigned Military Document, OPS FMF, 30 March 1988, pp. 2, 6.
116  Fiji Times, 22 April 1988.
117  Age, 2 June 1988; Fiji Times editor Vijendra Kumar was regularly hosted at the Nabua barracks. 
For more details on this section, see Robertson, Multiculturalism & Reconciliation, 1998, pp. 43–70.
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In Suva, protestors at the anniversary of the first coup were arrested and 
gassed in their cell. When newspapers highlighted police treatment of the 
‘Democracy 18’, they were threatened with closure. In fact journalists and 
editors regularly found themselves ‘questioned’ in the early hours of the 
morning, as did several university academics. Literature academic Som 
Prakash was assaulted and tortured for 15 days for critically reviewing 
Rabuka’s biography, published earlier that year.118
The ISD now permitted far worse. Raids were conducted on farms and 
homes in the west to search for missing weapons, often on the basis of 
anonymous opportunistic tip-offs. Over 40 homes in Suva were raided in 
August, and supermarkets were also targeted because the military assumed 
that ‘wealthy’ IndoFijians had sponsored the arms shipments. Lawyers 
who protested the treatment of their clients were similarly harassed. 
Soldiers badly beat an Australian tourist passing the Nabua barracks for 
acting ‘suspiciously’. They detained an accountant from the Ministry 
of Finance who queried army expenses. 
The increasing and bizarre responses of the military accompanied a new 
wave of attacks on IndoFijians. Temples were burnt or vandalised, 
homes stoned and vehicles belonging to IndoFijian unionists and former 
politicians attacked. Many of these attacks were organised by the Taukei 
Movement, which by this time had split into two factions, one supportive 
of the Mara government, the other keen to promote communal tensions 
in order to precipitate another military coup. That latter faction now 
imploded, literally. One of its prominent members, Jone Veisamasama, 
a former Alliance general secretary (ironically also a foundation member 
of the Labour Party), fatally shot himself, by accident, with a pen pistol, 
one of a number of Lebanese imports circulating among members of his 
faction. His death resulted in the arrest of colleagues for arms violations 
and a saga that would continue to resonate for more than five years, 
with damaging consequences for Rabuka. Vesikula, the former Taukeist 
spokesperson, chose this moment to renounce the Movement and join 
forces with his former foe, Bavadra.
While conspiracies abounded and the interim government sought to 
limit  human rights abuses, Rabuka became increasingly frustrated. 
In  August 1988, he attacked the government for failing to produce 
118  S Prakash, ‘Return to theatrics’, in S Prasad, Coup & Crisis: Fiji – A Year Later. Melbourne: 
Arena Publications, 1988, pp. 98–104.
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the much-anticipated new constitution. It was ‘getting back to the 
old ways of taking things easy’ and acting as if ‘they were elected into 
government’. ‘I don’t know whether a coup is the answer,’ he mused.119 
But the government  had been discussing a constitution, in fact one 
very similar to the proposal Mara had earlier submitted to the GCC, 
only to see it ungraciously rejected. Additionally, in September, the 
government proposed putting it to a special Constitutional Inquiry 
and Advisory Committee (CIAC) that would also receive public 
representations. Undoubtedly this process would push back even further 
the implementation of a new constitution, but it also had immediate 
implications for the ISD and the military if public meetings were to be 
encouraged to discuss constitutional proposals.
Foreign governments clearly thought the ISD should go. Angered at 
Australasian criticisms, Rabuka refused to meet Australia’s Foreign 
Minister, Gareth Evans, in October 1988 and warned that he would close 
Australian banks in Fiji if Canberra kept ‘poking its nose in our affairs’.120 
Equally worrying to the interim government was Rabuka’s attack on the 
FDB for failing to do enough for ordinary Fijians. Rabuka drove home 
his point by sending troops to occupy a chicken farm whose nationalist 
Fijian owner faced eviction for loan arrears to the FDB. He even visited 
striking workers at Tropik Woods in the west, although he offered no 
support. The President sought to placate Rabuka, promoting him to 
major general, while the cabinet decided that the time had come to 
confront Rabuka and relax the ISD. An angry Rabuka told his troops 
on ‘Republic Day’ that he could not afford to demobilise them until the 
government stabilised; to others he hinted that another coup might be 
forthcoming. On 17 November, the interim government finally called his 
bluff and suspended the ISD. In protest, Rabuka brought 300 soldiers in 
full combat gear to conduct ‘normal security operations’ around Suva’s 
Government Buildings.
In practical terms the ISD achieved little. Few illegal weapons were 
collected, and those found were old and in poor condition. In all 
likelihood Kahan’s shadowy militia was a figment of his imagination121 
119  Fiji Times, 11 August 1988.
120  Australian, 12 & 18 October 1988. 
121  In total, 21 people were arrested and all were either cleared by the courts or discharged after 
pleading guilty to possessing weapons without a licence. Kahan was arrested in London but escaped 
extradition because his offence was deemed to be political rather criminal and because he could not 
be guaranteed a fair trial in Fiji. 
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but the events convinced the military that, at the very least, it had to 
improve port security. More importantly, the ISD provided the military 
with an opportunity to remind the people of Fiji that they should never 
forget the coups of 1987. It also demonstrated that Rabuka’s struggle with 
the interim government was far from over, although for now it seemed 
to have the upper hand and sensed that the time was right to pursue 
constitutional reform through a process of its own choosing. 
The cabinet proposed a 71-member single house of parliament, with 
four members appointed by the Prime Minister, eight nominated by the 
GCC and the remainder elected from strictly communal constituencies. 
Its recommendation, which described Fiji as ‘a sovereign democratic 
republic’ dedicated to the teachings of Jesus Christ, went in November 
to the CIAC chaired by a former RFMF Commander, Col Paul Manueli. 
Over the next few months Manueli’s committee received 588 submissions 
on the cabinet proposal, but the outcome was far from certain. Mara had 
already told his own Lau Provincial Council that if the process failed, 
the military would take over.122 In May the following year, Rabuka and 
his chief of staff, Colonel Jioji Konrote, presented Mara and Ganilau 
a 44-page document recommending a military resumption of power once 
the interim government’s two-year term ended. Konrote allegedly told 
the leaders, ‘This is our country and we are not going to compromise nor 
settle for anything less than absolute political domination’.123 
When the CIAC released its recommendations in August 1989, it had 
clearly departed from the cabinet’s proposal. It restored a bicameral 
parliament, giving the House of Representatives 69 seats: 37 for Fijians 
(30 provincial, seven urban), 27 for IndoFijians, one for Rotumans and 
four for General Electors). The President would appoint a 34-member 
Senate (24 chiefs, one Rotuman, nine others). In March 1990, the 
GCC reduced the urban Fijian vote to five seats and took one seat from 
the western Ba  province, giving the three freed-up seats to the eastern 
strongholds of Lau, Cakaudrove and Tailevu. In July, these amendments 
were promulgated without further public scrutiny, much to the 
consternation of the International Commission of Jurists, which slammed 
122  Fiji Times, 20 October 1988.
123  Fiji Times, 26 September 1989.
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it as ‘a military constitution … as bad as the apartheid laws in South 
Africa’ and designed to perpetuate rule by an ‘oligarchy of Fiji chiefs and 
their associates’.124 
It worried critics that decisions taken by the Supervisor of Elections could 
not be challenged in court, that a president could suspend the Constitution 
for up to six months and govern under emergency rules, that Fijian 
institutions were no longer subject to scrutiny from the ombudsman and 
that a simple majority of parliament could overturn the Constitution’s 
fundamental freedoms. A Group Against Racial Discrimination (GARD), 
composed mostly of university staff and students, protested at Suva’s 
Howell Road Sangam temple during Diwali on 18 October 1990 by 
burning copies of the Constitution. The interim government declared 
their action treasonous and directed the police to lay charges. But, before 
police could act, five soldiers from the Special Operations Security Unit 
abducted physicist and GARD member Dr Anirudh Singh, tortured and 
beat him for 11 hours, repeatedly smashing his hands with a crowbar.125
Elsewhere, criticisms of the proposed Constitution were surprisingly 
muted. Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke declared it the best that 
could  be hoped for at the moment,126 sentiments that many in Fiji 
endorsed, no matter how reluctantly. The Fiji Times later editorialised that 
‘after the traumatic military coups of 1987, the Constitution offers one 
way out, a path back to parliamentary democracy’.127 Only India protested 
strongly, in part also because Fiji had expelled its ambassador in October 
1989 for questioning whether it was religion or Indianness that motivated 
temple attacks. But parliamentary democracy still seemed a long way 
off to many journalists, especially after Mara’s attack on them as being 
out of control and irresponsible. His Information Minister threatened 
124  Fiji Independent News Service, Fiji Situation Report, Sydney, 13 November 1990.
125  Ultimately, seven protestors, including Singh, were charged with sedition and unlawful 
assembly, but the charges were eventually dropped in December 1992. The soldiers who attacked Singh 
were fined and received 12-month suspended sentences. There were, however, other consequences. 
The soldiers’ leader was forced to return from a stint as a member of a UN observer team in Kuwait 
in 1991 when Singh protested his involvement to the United Nations. In October 2007, the High 
Court awarded Singh nearly $800,000 as compensation for his ordeal. See also Singh’s account 
in Silent Warriors (Suva: FIAS, 1991). 
126  Age, 3 October 1990.
127  Fiji Times, 15 February 1992.
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newspapers with a registration system if they did not toe the line.128 
In fact, even while the CIAC’s recommendations were being considered, 
another coup was in the making, this time within the Methodist Church.
Rabuka had introduced the Sunday Observance Decree as means to draw 
Methodists to his anti-IndoFijian cause and replace the faded Taukei 
Movement.129 His desire to declare Fiji a Christian state served the same 
goal, often expressed after 1987 as hostility to the presence of temples and 
mosques. On 15 October 1989, 17 members of the Lautoka Methodist 
Youth Fellowship, dressed in their Sunday clothes and clutching bibles, 
sang hymns while they firebombed mosques and temples in Lautoka.130 
Members of the cabinet visited Lautoka four days later during a day of 
protest to try and heal wounds, but clearly they were unprepared to tackle 
the religious sentiment that lay behind the attacks. After all, the coups 
had been bathed in religious sentiment. Rev. Tomasi Raikivi had hosted 
the initial Taukei Movement meeting with Rabuka prior to the first coup. 
The secretary of the Bible Society, the Baptist Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, 
acted as the go-between. Rabuka was a lay preacher who, years later, 
still argued that his coups were divinely ordained.131 For these men, the 
Sunday Observance Decree demonstrated a difference around which 
Fijians could rally to protect the objectives of the coups. Thus, when the 
interim government relaxed the decree in May 1988 to permit farm work 
and picnics, Methodists protested in Suva. 
But not all Methodists. The former Methodist communications secretary, 
Rev. Akuila Yabaki, rejected the way in which Taukeists had turned two 
separate issues – Fijian nationalism and the Sunday ban – into a desire 
for ‘Fijian domination in all aspects’.132 The Methodist President, Rev. 
Josateki Koroi, did all he could to prevent church resources being used to 
support the goals of the coups. ‘The Sunday Decree is not Methodist and 
128  Pacific Islands Monthly, February 1990.
129  S Tarte, ‘Fiji: 1989 in review’, Contemporary Pacific, Fall 1990, pp. 358–61. The decree remained 
in force until October 1995.
130  Islands Business, November 1989.
131  Rabuka wrote, ‘for me 14 May was the only convenient day for my plan in 1987. That the day 
coincided with Israel’s Independence Day, and the first arrival of Indian workers into Fiji – I have 
often wondered – whether it really was a coincidence and not divine design. I made the Declaration 
of our Republic at midnight on 6 October 1987 to coincide with the date of the Yom Kippur War 
and for Fiji to start its new journey on October 7, “7” being the number serious students of theology 
and God associate with our Creator’ (S Rabuka, ‘Divine intervention’, Fiji Times, 26 October 2008).
132  A Dropsy, ‘The church & the coup: The Fijian Methodist coup of 1989’, Review 20, September 
1993, p. 50; Islands Business, February 1989.
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is not Christian,’ he declared, ‘and is not scripturally sound.’133 But he 
faced formidable forces within the church led by his own general secretary, 
Rev. Manasa Lasaro, and the Bauan chief, Rev. Ratu Isireli Caucau. 
When the interim government further relaxed the ban in October 1988 
to permit limited taxi and bus services, Lasaro and the old nationalist 
Butadroka organised some 70 road blocks around Suva on 18 December 
in protest. Rabuka intervened and the roadblocks were lifted, but Lasaro 
remained unrepentant. ‘So much has been taken away from us,’ he argued, 
‘and we are now left only with our faith which we will fight to the death 
to keep.’134
Koroi now moved against Lasaro, suspending him from his position 
as secretary general. It made little difference. On Christmas Day, fresh 
roadblocks were erected, but this time police arrested 150 protesters, 
including Lasaro. All were charged with illegal demonstration and 
conditionally discharged. Lasaro turned on Koroi. With the support 
of nearly three quarters of the church’s divisional superintendents, he 
suspended the church’s constitution on 3 February 1989, barred Koroi 
from his office, and replaced him with Caucau. Thrice the High Court 
declared the church’s actions illegal and twice the rebels ignored its ruling. 
‘Any constitution can be amended or added to if there is a need,’ Lasaro’s 
lawyer declared.135 History was on their side; so too the authorities. 
Mara, Ganilau and Rabuka visited Lasaro in April to receive a petition 
protesting the court’s ruling and demanding that the Sunday ban be 
strengthened. Meanwhile church officials plotted their own revenge on 
Koroi, organising ex-prisoners to rape Koroi’s wife in front of her husband 
at their Deuba house. At the last moment, the church social worker 
charged with executing the plan backed out.136
The rebels hoped to legalise their actions at the next Methodist annual 
conference, now only months away. In preparation Lasaro apologised to 
the High Court in mid-April and permitted Koroi to return to his office. 
Lasaro’s next actions, however, nearly prevented him from attending the 
vital conference. In July, he participated in a protest in Labasa against 
Sunday cane-harvesting and milling and earned a jail sentence of six 
months for breaking the terms of his earlier release. Rabuka flew to 
133  Fiji Times, 21 December 1989.
134  Age, 20 December 1988.
135  Fiji Times, 30 March 1989.
136  Review, The News & Business Magazine of Fiji, August 1996.
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Labasa in early August 1989 and released all 57 protestors on compulsory 
supervision orders. Thus Lasaro was able to attend the conference and 
retain his position as general secretary. Caucau became president. 
The Methodist coup had been legitimised.
Rabuka had additional reasons to strengthen his relations with the 
Methodist Taukeists. In April 1989, Mara hinted that he would resign 
at the end of his term as interim prime minister and Rabuka saw this 
opportunity for advancement as his due. ‘I’m not an ordinary commander,’ 
he declared, ‘I’m not an ordinary servant of the government.’137 He saw 
himself in historic terms: he alone had helped Fijians claim their manifest 
destiny and made Fiji truly independent.138 Mara’s announcement now 
promised an end to the uncertainty that had hung over his future since 
1987. His officers quickly drew up a plan for succession, which Rabuka 
passed on to Ganilau and Mara. The military would institute a 15-year 
government based on what they called Fijian Democratic Socialism. 
It would neutralise the Coalition, abolish unions, reintroduce censorship, 
evict Australian businesses and seek alternate Asian markets, close the 
Indian embassy, and replace common law with customary law.139 When 
the press obtained copies of the plan in late September, Ganilau moved 
quickly to quell uncertainty. He requested Mara stay on for a second term, 
but the Prime Minister made it very clear that he would do so only if 
Rabuka agreed to certain conditions: ‘I cannot carry on with him doing 
what he is doing now.’140 Rabuka had to decide whether to return to 
the barracks as a non-political military commander or leave the military 
altogether and become one of two deputy prime ministers. A third option 
existed also – Rabuka could remain in cabinet as military commander but 
would have no responsibility for police and immigration. 
Rabuka chose to leave cabinet and remain Commander. Accordingly, 
Mara reshuffled his cabinet and reduced its military personnel. Rabuka 
smarted at having his hand forced. ‘Power can only be taken from us,’ he 
reminded government in early 1990, ‘when a constitution is approved.’141 
If Mara had thought that taking Rabuka out of cabinet would reduce 
tensions, he was soon disappointed. In late June, the Fiji Nursing 
Association went on strike, demanding night-time transportation for 
137  Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1990.
138  Fiji Times, 28 April 1992.
139  Fiji Times, 26 September 1989.
140  Australian, 29 September 1989.
141  Fiji Times, 23 January 1990.
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members who feared the increased dangers of assault in post-coup Suva. 
The interim government declared the strike illegal and were about to shut 
down their pickets when Rabuka unexpectedly joined them. Jubilant 
public sector unions threatened to broaden the strike nationally, and the 
government backed off, humiliated. A buoyant Rabuka announced his 
desire to be prime minister in order ‘to finally realise the objectives of the 
1987 coups’:
The new constitution lays down the machinery for the attainment of the 
objectives; whether we actually achieve them or not depends on who is 
running that machinery … A lot of people are saying ‘You started this, 
you’ve got to finish it’.142
Labour’s Mahendra Chaudhry, now head of the National Farmers Union 
(NFU), saw an opportunity to expand his union’s influence among cane 
farmers. Unless the government suspended its newly imposed growers’ 
award, his members would refuse to harvest cane. After six weeks of intense 
standoff, the government relented and amended the award, confirming 
the NFU as the new voice of farmers. 
Chaudhry’s success impressed Rabuka; perhaps less hostile relations with 
the unions might gain him advantages. In February 1991, he visited 
Vatukoula, where miners sought recognition for their union from the 
Emperor Gold Mine. He sympathised with their plight and hinted that 
Fiji might not participate in the forthcoming (and ultimately abortive) 
peacekeeping force on Bougainville if Fiji’s workers were similarly treated 
by multinational mining companies.143 Additionally, he supplied tents 
and food to squatters removed from land set aside for Fiji’s new tax-free 
zone.
Union restlessness provided fresh opportunities for Rabuka during 
1991. A national economic summit in May that year proposed sweeping 
changes to industrial laws, including the removal of union immunity 
from prosecution for illegal strikes, raising the basis for recognising unions 
(from 50 to 66 per cent of membership), and abolishing wages councils. 
The NFU sprung into action, urging its members to strike if they did not 
receive the exact sugar price forecast the previous year. This was a ruse, 
designed to force the government to call an election for the Sugar Cane 
Growers Council, a large and expensive consultative body that the NFU 
142  Age, 21 July 1990.
143  Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1991.
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now wished to dominate. Aware that a showdown loomed, Mara sought to 
neutralise those critics who could do him most damage. In mid-April, he 
proposed that Rabuka re-enter the interim government as deputy prime 
minister. Because he wished to weaken further the unpopular Sunday 
Observance Decree, Mara also proposed that Lasaro join as minister for 
youth and sport.
At first Rabuka accepted the offer, but when Lasaro refused he 
reconsidered.  He would only enter if he could remain military 
commander. ‘There is no guarantee in politics … not like the army,’ he 
mused.144 A cabinet proposal to cut the military budget confirmed his 
suspicions. Soldiers around the world are similar, Rabuka had earlier told 
his biographers: ‘We belong to a very exclusive club and we all feel that 
we are just being used by politicians.’145 Now he sent his own ultimatum, 
informing Ganilau that he should either become prime minister or deputy 
prime minister, minister for home affairs and commander. Mara rejected 
both options, and pushed ahead with two anti-union decrees aimed at 
the sugar and gold industries. Chaudhry called for dialogue, but the 
government had already determined its course of action. Ganilau toured 
Labasa cane fields in June 1991 and declared that the army would be 
used to assist with the harvest if a strike went ahead. Rabuka contradicted 
him. His soldiers would not cut cane. ‘This government is made up of 
overpaid people who sit on their laurels and wait for something to happen 
before they react,’ he declared. It should resign. If it failed to, and he 
assumed control again, he would simply be repossessing the authority he 
had bestowed on the two chiefs at the end of 1987. It would not be a third 
coup, merely a restoration.146 To emphasise his seriousness, Rabuka called 
up his army reservists.
An angry Ganilau informed him that the new Constitution now 
superseded any powers he once possessed, and his actions tarnished 
the reputation of the RFMF. Rabuka lost his nerve. Mara and Ganilau, 
both chiefs, refused to melt away, and he – the commoner – did not 
really want another coup. He was simply disillusioned he later told 
a visiting television crew.147 Nonetheless, the actions of its one-time foe 
emboldened the labour movement; it called for a general strike on 16 July. 
144  Fiji Times, 25 May 1991.
145  Dean & Ritova, Rabuka, 1988, p. 83.
146  Fiji Times, 8 June 1991.
147  Fiji Times, 24 June 1991.
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Having defused one crisis, the President had no wish for another to undo 
his work. Ganilau asked Rabuka to rejoin the government. Sensing the 
government’s weakness and seeking to gain from his back down, Rabuka 
publicly committed to leaving the military and joining the government 
but only if the warring parties reconciled. ‘This is not the time for childish 
one-upmanship,’ he declared after arranging for Chaudhry and Ganilau 
to meet.148 
Chaudhry agreed to call off the general strike and the sugar boycott and 
Ganilau promised to suspend the decrees and convene an all-industry 
conference to discuss sugar issues. A reluctant government had little 
choice but to cave in. In the New Year, however, Ganilau was less than 
gracious, condemning unions for pursuing confrontation and threatening 
the economy. ‘They have often ignored the realities of a multicultural 
society and attempted to impose their will by coercion and threats,’ 
he argued with no hint of irony, ‘Their actions serve only to emphasise 
the things that divide us and make no contribution towards solving our 
problems.’149 Behind the scenes, moves were afoot to expel Chaudhry 
from the Fiji Trades Union Congress. Of course, the union movement was 
indelibly associated with the government’s old Coalition foe, which many 
ministers blamed for the mess Fiji was in. Minister for Labour Taniela 
Veitata had earlier slammed every effort by unions to overturn anti-
labour legislation as ‘an act of war’. Now he saw it as ‘direct interference 
in the sovereignty of this nation’. His colleague, Kubuabola, believed the 
labour movement should be treated like a hostile foreign power seeking 
to overthrow a legitimate government.150 Undoubtedly they were angry 
at the power some unions possessed, and were in no mood to assist less 
powerful unions, even those predominantly Fijian in membership. Hence 
the interim government refused to cave in to the Vatukoula strikers and to 
pressure Emperor Gold Mining to attend conciliation talks.
Taukeists were also angry. At a protest march shortly after the back down 
they declared – also with no apparent sense of irony – that Rabuka’s deal 
represented ‘an open invitation for others to break the law of the country 
and seek presidential reprieve and pardon’. Butadroka claimed that ‘the 
only solution to the problems facing the country was the full repatriation 
148  Fiji Times, 12 July 1991.
149  Daily Post, 1 January 1992.
150  Fiji Times, 1 May 1989; 25 June 1991; 5 April 1989.
The GeneRAl’s Goose
110
of Indians to India’.151 But the nationalists and the government were 
powerless. The union movement had won a major victory and in doing so 
protected itself from annihilation. 
Nonetheless, some Coalition members felt uneasy. ‘The FLP will run into 
trouble sooner or later if it treats the General as a strategic ally,’ Simione 
Durutalo warned his colleagues.152 His words proved prophetic but, despite 
the disaster the confrontation seemed to present to the government, it at 
least emerged with a completed road map for elections in the following 
year and Rabuka safely out of the army. This brought the government 
greater security than it had enjoyed since 1987, but only because the road 
map implied that the mantle had already passed to new aspirants and, in 
particular, Rabuka. He had bowed finally to pressure, although in a way 
that saved face and augmented the new image he wished to present, that 
of the man of action concerned for the welfare of the people, no matter 
how much the political instability he generated reduced their wellbeing.
Raiding the nest
Rabuka’s political career now began in earnest. To secure the future he 
felt sure was his due, he had to seize control of the new Fijian party, 
the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), established by the GCC 
in early 1991. Success was by no means assured, in part because Mara 
had other plans. But even Mara misjudged the problems that provincially 
based electorates could create for Fijian politics. He wanted his Finance 
Minister, the former NLTB head Josefata Kamikamica, as his successor. 
To assist his campaign, Kamikamica’s Tailevu province proposed on 
30 October that the former Alliance politician Ratu William Toganivalu 
become president of the SVT. But, at the last moment, Rewa province 
also proposed its paramount chief, Mara’s wife, Ro Lady Lala Mara. 
Between them they inadvertently split the anti-Rabuka vote, allowing 
him to assume the party’s presidency. ‘Those defeated in elections should 
take it in their political stride, accept the defeat and move out gracefully,’ 
he lashed out at his critics.153 This was 1991, not 1987.
151  Fiji Times, 15 July 1991.
152  Fiji Times, 16 August 1991.
153  Fiji Times, 6 November 1991.
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Rabuka had won round one, but Mara still backed Kamikamica as 
his preferred successor and forced Rabuka to step down as a minister, 
claiming that members of political parties were inappropriate in an 
interim  government.154 Rabuka faced a challenging task, recreating 
a unified party for Fijians who were now politically divided into rival 
provinces and aware that the Constitution’s majority guarantees excluded 
the need for Fijian political unity. In many respects he was the right man 
for the job. He was a  commoner. Despite Fijian respect for tradition 
and for chiefly leadership, Fijian society had changed substantially since 
independence. Commoner Fijians no longer believed chiefs automatically 
took precedence, even if many chiefs failed to recognise their shift 
in thinking. The events of 1987 demonstrated the importance of the 
transition. Rabuka led his coups to preserve the predominance of Fijians, 
not just the role of chiefs. He was no radical, but he was a commoner, and 
that in itself spoke volumes for the kind of society emerging in Fiji, one 
potentially more transparent and democratic than in the past. This is what 
made Fiji’s politics so interesting in 1992. The post-coup Constitution 
might have ensured a Fijian majority in parliament, but it did not dictate 
who would govern. Of course an even more important issue loomed: could 
a newly elected government provide Fiji the stability it had lacked since 
1987 and which it desperately needed in order to recover and prosper?
Not surprisingly, the first post-coup election in late May 1992 proved 
very different from earlier elections. The Constitution’s communalisation 
of electorates made politicians unresponsive to popular concerns. 
Communalism effectively meant a separate general election for each 
community, with only one community having the capacity to rule. 
IndoFijians lacked that capacity. No longer united within a coalition, 
they were bitterly divided between Labour and the NFP. In part 
the coups caused this falling-out. The NFP now regarded its former 
coalition with Labour as a mistake. Personnel changes contributed also 
to changing political perspectives. Labour’s affable Fijian leader, Bavadra, 
had died in November 1989 and with him went the party’s emphasis on 
multiculturalism. So too the clarity of focus that Labour displayed during 
the 1980s when popular issues dominated its political agenda. Social 
problems might now be far worse, but they were not subjects on which it 
could challenge the interim government’s likely successors. 
154  This was not entirely personal. Mara asked Apisai Tora to leave in June 1991 when Tora formed 
the western-based All Nationals Congress (ANC), a purportedly multiracial political party designed 
to fight for a separate Fijian western confederacy.
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In fact, communal demarcations minimised such challenges. Without 
national seats requiring cross-voting by different communities, nothing 
existed to make multiracial perspectives politically advantageous. Labour 
would more likely find itself up against the NFP, not the SVT. The SVT 
was indisputably a Fijian party. The NFP regarded itself an IndoFijian 
party, its 1987 multiracial experiment having been a failure.155 Only 
Labour continued to claim a multiracial face; it appointed Bavadra’s 
widow, Adi Kuini Vuikaba, as his successor to emphasise continuities. 
But tensions over leadership and election strategies forced Vuikaba out in 
early 1991. Her replacement, Mahendra Chaudhry, made matters worse. 
Chaudhry transformed Labour into an avowedly IndoFijian party, with 
its base in the rural cane belt. Although they never acknowledged the shift 
in strategy, Chaudhry and his colleagues occasionally let slip their new 
priorities, declaring Labour ‘the representative of the Indian community’. 
They blamed the Constitution for the transformation: ‘In this kind of 
racial electoral system, how else can you operate,’ Chaudhry argued156 
and Labour politician Krishna Datt dismissed Labour’s past strategy as 
a fragile ‘facade of multiracialism’.157 The Constitution made it easy to 
avoid self-examination.
Consumed by the politics of participation, Labour’s transformation was 
not immediately obvious in 1992. Ever since the new Constitution had 
been promulgated, Labour agonised over the message it would send if 
it participated. At first Labour believed it should deny the Constitution 
legitimacy. It would hold its head high and boycott elections.158 
But a boycott could be disastrous if it surrendered the IndoFijian vote to 
the NFP, a party that many Labour members characterised as right wing. 
It would also mean – as the late Simione Durutalo argued – a return to 
‘the pre 1981 era when ethnic based parties dominated politics in Fiji’.159 
Not surprisingly, he and other Fijians in Labour became increasingly 
disenchanted at the direction their leaders were taking and resigned in 
protest at the party’s insistence on a boycott. 
155  Pacific Islands Monthly, March 1991; this was the assessment of Dr Balwant Singh Rakka, 
NFP President.
156  Review, September 1994.
157  Daily Post, 28 January 1994; Review, February 1994.
158  When the NFP announced its intention to participate, Kubuabola declared it ‘tacit recognition 
of the Constitution’ (Fiji Times, 30 July 1991).
159  Fiji Times, 9 February 1992.
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Internal disarray cost Labour dearly. It could easily have accepted both 
perspectives and maintained its boycott but formed political fronts to 
fight the elections on its behalf. Instead Chaudhry took Labour to the 
brink of disintegration before bowing to popular pressure on the eve of 
the elections by suddenly declaring that Labour would conduct its boycott 
from within parliament, not outside it. In the subsequent elections it won 
only 13 seats, all rural NFU strongholds, and lost its urban seats to the 
NFP, which gained the remaining 14 Indian seats, although with narrow 
margins. Labour’s transformation was now fully exposed.
Of course the real focus of the 1992 elections lay on the 37 Fijian seats. 
Here Rabuka’s SVT won 30 seats, with the remainder going to Ratu 
Osea Gavidi’s Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua (STV) in Nadroga–Navosa 
(one seat), Butadroka’s Fijian Nationalist Party (three seats), and two 
independents in Ra.160 Although Rabuka had overwhelming support 
from among his own MPs to claim the prime ministership, he still needed 
coalition partners to secure a parliamentary majority. Behind the scenes, 
Kamikamica (with the support of only nine SVT MPs) managed to 
cobble together enough votes from the NFP and General Voters Party 
(GVP) to mount a serious challenge to Rabuka’s ambitions. Rabuka 
rallied Butadroka’s Nationalists and Gavidi to his cause and used them 
to woo Labour. Chaudhry believed an opportunity now existed to force 
Rabuka to review the Constitution, revoke the labour decrees, scrap the 
VAT and begin discussions on land leases. Success would restore Labour’s 
relevance. Rabuka agreed to consider them.
Rabuka’s last-minute lobbying won him the position he had for so 
long coveted. ‘This time it’s legal,’ he told his supporters and although 
he claimed he was there for all people, not just Fijians, it soon become 
apparent – as he admitted two years later – that he could not deny his 
Fijian heritage and ‘turn on the universal prime minister picture’.161 
‘Rabuka overthrew democracy violently,’ one magazine noted. ‘He now 
presides over a facade of democracy.’162 Opportunities did exist to move 
beyond authoritarianism but, ironically, it would be Rabuka’s backroom 
manoeuvring that ensured continued political instability. Butadroka 
expected to be rewarded for his efforts on Rabuka’s behalf. Chaudhry 
160  The General Voters Party won all five General Elector seats and Paul Manueli the sole Rotuma 
seat. Tora’s ANC won no seats.
161  Islands Business, July 1992; Review, September 1994.
162  Islands Business, July 1992.
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also expected movement on his log of claims, although Rabuka denied 
conceding anything. Rabuka’s problems did not end there. Many of 
his colleagues made constant comparisons between him and Mara and 
continued to regard Kamikamica as the rightful heir, particularly as 
Rabuka quickly stumbled from crisis to crisis and constantly reshuffled 
his cabinet like a deck of cards. 
In part, Rabuka’s difference lay in his commoner status; it enabled 
journalists and parliamentarians to speak more freely than they had under 
Mara. ‘To those who might not appreciate the fact that a commoner is 
now leading the nation,’ Rabuka later remarked, ‘all I can say is that they 
must prepare themselves because in the future there will be more and more 
like me.’163 In fact Rabuka could draw on a long history of commoner 
activity in politics that went back to Apolosi Ranawai. Bavadra had been 
a commoner, Kamikamica also. Fiji’s substantial postcolonial strategy had 
been to create a strong middle class, a goal that potentially conflicted with 
provincialism, tradition and chiefly power, all elements strengthened in 
the new Constitution. But political instability derived more immediately 
from two sources, the first being Fijian disunity. MPs owed their allegiance 
to their province, not their party. To maintain support, Rabuka had 
either to appease provinces or buy off MPs, sometimes both. Hence his 
unprecedented 27-member cabinet, which included three GVP members 
(the price for its support), and two independents. The second source of 
instability derived from Rabuka’s links with the Nationalists. 
Butadroka’s FNP had helped secure Rabuka the crucial numbers for the 
prime ministership. In return it wanted seats in cabinet, but the GVP 
made the Nationalists’ exclusion a condition for its support. Consequently, 
the FNP sought compensation of a different kind. Butadroka’s campaign 
manager, Tony Stephens, had been imprisoned in 1988 for possessing 
pen pistols. He had been a shareholder in Viti Marketing (Fiji) Ltd, the 
company established as the economic arm of the Taukei Movement. 
In  jail, he and former politician Fred Caine planned the creation of 
a vast business in logging and rural banking. By 1991 they had allegedly 
arranged a loan of US$200 million from Kuwait to finance their venture, 
but to obtain it they had first to pay an upfront commission of $980,000. 
Stephens had a longstanding compensation claim for $30 million against 
the government for his arrest, and saw Rabuka’s election as an opportunity 
163  Review, April 1994.
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to fast-track matters. With Butadroka and Gavidi, he pressured Attorney-
General Apaitia Seru, to accept an out-of-court settlement of $980,000 
in cash and $9 million in assets. Rabuka advised his Attorney-General to 
look seriously at the agreement. Seru signed it. Only when the Finance 
Minister, Paul Manueli, learnt of the request, did the deal collapse. Three 
days later, in late September 1992, a copy of the deed fell into the hands 
of the Opposition and, in the uproar that followed, Seru resigned and the 
government appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate the affair.
Rabuka attempted to distract the nation from the debacle by suddenly 
proposing in December the formation of a government of national 
unity. The Nationalists and many chiefs denounced the proposal, as did 
Kamikamica’s faction within the SVT. Even Chaudhry, who had initially 
discussed the plan with Rabuka, went cool on the idea, especially after 
his party lost a by-election to the NFP in May 1993. Chaudhry wrote to 
Rabuka reminding him of his promises immediately after the election. 
When Rabuka did not reply, he led his colleagues out of parliament in 
protest. Labour’s disaffection would have mattered little except it followed 
a cabinet reshuffle designed to reduce its size and drop poorly performing 
ministers. One of those was Ilai Kuli who, as Minister for Information 
and Broadcasting, had failed to resolve longstanding problems associated 
with Fiji Post and Telecommunication’s transition to a public enterprise. 
His province, Naitasiri, promised revenge.
Similar problems confronted the top-heavy Ports Authority, where one 
of the leaders of the Taukei Movement ran the union and convinced 
the Minister for Transport to stop privatising stevedoring. Veitata, the 
former dockworkers’ union boss, parliamentarian, and Taukeist became 
its chairman.164 Equally damaging were revelations in mid-May that, by 
using soft loans from the FDB and the National Bank of Fiji (NBF), 
private Fijian companies owned by cabinet ministers, bank and provincial 
officials, even senior FHL managers, now owned more shares in Fijian 
Holdings Ltd than provincial councils or their tikina, for whom the 
company had originally been established. Government supported 
embourgeoisement, but did not wish to defend a heavily subsidised 
business against allegations of insider trading, especially since it could 
never be a vehicle for empowering the mass of Fijians. 
164  PAF’s accumulated reserves of $10 million in 1989 had morphed into a $22 million deficit 
by the end of 1993.
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The FHL case was not the only Fijian institution to embarrass the post-
coup government. Given the greater emphasis on indigeneity after 1987, 
many part-Fijians sought to change their identity. In some instances there 
were clear political and economic advantages in doing so, as in the case of 
businessman and Rabuka ally, Jim Ah Koy. Many nationalists and others 
disagreed, however, and called for all Fijians to be vetted, effectively for 
purity. In June 1993, a report commissioned by the GCC recommended 
the removal of 36 people from the Fijian land register, the Vola ni Kawa 
Bula (VKB),165 on the basis that they were not Fijian enough. 
Fijians had achieved the paramountcy many of their leaders had for so 
long craved and now, under the leadership of one of the architects of that 
paramountcy, they seemed suddenly to lack any clear strategy as to how they 
might achieve their vision of prosperity. If anything paramountcy under 
Rabuka brought only disgrace and disunity. Butadroka wanted all Fiji’s 
resources on land and sea to be distributed to ordinary Fijians (tauvanua), 
not the state, and he wanted the abolition of all colonial bureaucracies, 
including the NLTB.166 He proposed a new Viti Levu Council of Chiefs 
to offset the influence of Lau and Cakaudrove. The release in July 1993 of 
the report167 by former Supreme Court justice, Sir Ronald Kermode, into 
the Tony Stephens scandal added further to Rabuka’s woes. It condemned 
ministerial conduct and concluded that, on the basis of available 
evidence, the Prime Minister among others had committed criminal 
offences. But, with the Taukei Movement still hovering in the background 
and the Methodist Church openly supporting Rabuka, opponents felt 
uncomfortable using issues of propriety to confront his government. 
Instead they chose the 1994 budget, which did little to compensate 
producers for lower tariffs, raised government debt, and reduced Fiji’s 
capacity to invest. Dissident backbenchers led by Kamikamica saw their 
opportunity to bring down the government and joined the opposition to 
vote against the budget. It was a grave miscalculation.
165  The 1990 Constitution restricted the use of ‘Fijian’ to people enrolled on the VKB, a colonial 
register begun in the early 20th century to record land ownership by patrilineal means. In many 
respects the use of this register contradicted the more flexible practices adopted by mataqali or 
yavusa when dealing with vasu (those with maternal ties). Traditionally ancestry had little to do with 
determining Fijianness. Fijians tended to be very receptive people. Nonetheless, the VKB continues 
to record the letter ‘B’ for ‘bastard’ alongside the names of children born out of wedlock (Fiji Sun, 
7 December 2016).
166  Pacific Islands Monthly, April 1993.
167  ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deed of Settlement dated 17.09.92 between 
Anthony Frederick Stephens and the Attorney General of Fiji’, Parliamentary Paper 45. Suva: 
Government Printer, 1993.
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Kamikamica thought the President would resolve the issue by appointing 
a new prime minister. Instead Mara, now acting president as a result 
of Ganilau’s terminal illness,168 accepted Rabuka’s advice to dissolve 
parliament and call fresh elections. During the campaign that followed, 
Rabuka portrayed Kamikamica and his supporters as traitors handing 
Fijian rule to the IndoFijian opposition. ‘Are we so lacking in honour and 
integrity … to our community,’ he asked the GCC in December, ‘that 
we are prepared to be giving away that national control of our future and 
destroying that which we now have?’169 Rabuka’s appeal to the objectives 
of 1987 enabled him to contain Kamikamica’s rebellion to two provinces 
and marginally strengthen his hand. Kamikamica’s new party, the Fijian 
Association Party (FAP) won five seats only – in Lau and Naitasiri. 
Kamikamica lost his own Tailevu seat. Gavidi and the Nationalists 
were similarly defeated. Rabuka received 61 per cent of the Fijian vote 
which gave him 31 Fijian seats; with two independents and four GVP 
members he secured a narrow majority. The GVP did well out of Rabuka’s 
dependence on them. As a recognised minority, General Electors gained 
access to FDB soft loans, taxi and chicken-import licences, and assistance 
for small businesses. Their MPs sat in cabinet.
‘A saving grace of what has turned out to be a largely failed constitution,’ 
one magazine speculated, ‘is that it tends to concentrate tensions within 
ethnic communities rather than intensifying strains between them.’170 
Again Labour found itself competing with the NFP for the spoils and, on 
the basis of its failed deals with Rabuka, lost badly, gaining only seven of 
its former 13 seats. A rejuvenated NFP demanded constitutional talks, but 
Rabuka was in no mood for change. ‘Apartheid here in Fiji is a necessary 
evil for the moment to try and gain some semblance of balance,’ Rabuka 
told journalists, ‘I know Fijians are not willing to compromise much 
of what they have written into this Constitution.’171 
But racial compartmentalism also meant that threats to Rabuka’s position 
would always come from Fijians, not marginalised IndoFijians. Victory 
brought Rabuka no respite, as he quickly learned upon announcing a new 
lean cabinet comprising only 12 ministers. Dumped ministers, particularly 
Taukeists disinclined to allow Rabuka sole ownership of 1987, set about 
168  Ganilau died on 16 December 1993. Mara succeeded him in early 1994.
169  Weekender, 17 December 1993.
170  Pacific Islands Monthly, January 1994.
171  Review, April 1994; Age, 1 March 1994.
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to remind him that he was not invincible. In March 1994, Kubuabola 
and five former ministers accused Rabuka of being morally unfit for office 
because he had had an affair with a journalist in late 1993. Again Rabuka 
outsmarted his detractors. At a SVT caucus he offered his resignation, 
which was not accepted. Inevitably news of the confrontation leaked.172 
But, unlike Kamikamica, Kubuabola and his colleagues had no intention 
of bringing down Rabuka’s government; they sought only to bargain for 
a share in the spoils of victory.
Unfortunately, those spoils were little in evidence in the wider 
community. If anything, the lacklustre performance of the government 
worsened. Government debt had increased 25 per cent since Rabuka’s first 
election, most of it raised locally, thereby starving the domestic market of 
investment funds and inflicting low growth and high interest rates on the 
country. Once thriving economic sectors faced stagnation. The potential 
loss of preferential markets threatened Fiji’s highly uncompetitive sugar 
industry.173 Local content regulations restricted garment-industry growth. 
Rabuka did nothing to address these issues, claiming that Fijian issues 
should come first.174 Accordingly, he decided that local chicken growers 
and producers should now compete with US imports licensed only to 
Fijians on a provincial basis. 
A flat economy provided no basis for raising Fijian expectations, or for 
solving problems of crime, unemployment and rapid urbanisation. The 
army’s solution was to extend cadet training to some 20 secondary schools; 
the government’s to establish a rural National Youth Training Scheme 
based at an expensive farm at Navua purchased from the chairman of the 
FDB and FHL;175 and that of Fijian chiefs to reimpose their discipline 
on villages by resurrecting colonial powers abandoned in 1967. Judicial 
apartheid would now be added to economic apartheid. ‘On the one hand 
172  Jo Nata’s Weekender newspaper hinted at morality issues in Rabuka’s cabinet, but gave no names. 
The news and business Review revealed the whole story at the start of April. Not to be outdone, the 
Weekender promised a special issue on the 21 women Rabuka had had affairs with since leaving the 
military. Police Commissioner Isikia Savua and then Electoral Commissioner Qoriniasi Bale spoke 
with Nata and the issue never appeared (Weekender, 2 April 1994; Review, April 1994).
173  Economist Roman Grynberg warned Fiji of the dangers in May 1994. Nearly one third of Fiji’s 
cane farmers produced less than 100 tonnes of cane, and Fiji’s harvesting rate equalled half that of 
Mauritius, and one eighth that of Australia’s prior to mechanisation (Review, June 1994).
174  Fiji Times, 17 September 1994; Review, September 1994.
175  The scheme eventually morphed into VitiCorp, but it fared poorly and required a constant 
injection of government funds. In 2005, it restructured and eventually leased all its land for 
agricultural purposes, its Navua farm to the Fiji National University (Fiji Sun, 1 September 2016).
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government encourages individualism through its business incentives,’ one 
journalist noted, ‘while on the other it attempts to enforce traditionalism 
and collectivism through a legal system.’176 Mara acknowledged that no 
traditional means existed to assist the urban poor; Rabuka, however, 
blamed IndoFijians for imbalances in the distribution of wealth: ‘As long 
as this happens I cannot guarantee … that there will not be another 
coup in this land [or] bloodless like mine.’177 Meanwhile, the largesse of 
the FDB and NBF towards favoured Fijian clients continued until the 
National Bank collapsed in late 1995 owing over $220 million or nearly 
9 per cent of GDP.
The problems facing the NBF were longstanding. Formed in 1976 from 
a savings bank, the NBF almost immediately found itself hostage to the 
fortunes of one of the country’s longstanding trading companies, Stinson 
Pearce Holdings Ltd, when it loaned $2.7 million to the company in 
1978. Not only did the loan lack sufficient security, it breached banking 
regulations that no more than 25 per cent of a bank’s equity be loaned 
to a single borrower. At the time the NBF possessed only $500,000 in 
capital, and the Minister for Finance was none other than the former head 
of the company, Sir Charles Stinson. In 1984, the NBF gained a formal 
regulatory exemption, which it apparently understood applied to any 
subsequent transaction. As Grynberg, Doug Munro and the late Michael 
White note in their outstanding study of the NBF, ‘all the problems of 
nepotism, corruption and appallingly weak public administration that 
developed in Fiji and the NBF after the coups were already there well 
before 14 May 1987’.178 The coups, however, enabled those problems to 
escalate out of control.
It began with the military appointment of Visanti Makrava, the manager 
of a small branch, as the NBF chief manager. He began a massive 
expansion program that saw staff numbers treble to 600 by 1993, market 
share double to 30 per cent, deposits and loans quadruple to $420 million 
and $287  million respectively, and foreign exchange earnings double 
to $3.7  million. By 1993 Makrava had apparently turned a loss of 
176  Fiji Times, September 1994.
177  Fiji Times, July 1994; Australian, 17 June 1994.
178  R Grynberg, D Munro & M White, Crisis: The Collapse of the National Bank of Fiji. Suva: USP 
Book Centre, 2002, p. xxiii. The Stinson debt eventually exceeded $6 million.
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$5.3 million in 1987 into a $2.2 million profit, and was set to embark 
on a new range of financial services in a joint venture with the Malaysian 
National MBf.179 In reality the bank was insolvent.
A Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) report in 1991 estimated that the NBF 
possessed problem loans worth eight times its paid-up capital of 
$9.6 million, not the 50 per cent recommended by the World Bank,180 
and its problems only got worse. In 1993, when the government began 
domesticating foreign debt, many larger depositors like the national 
superannuation scheme (Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF)), shifted 
their funds out of the NBF into higher yielding government bonds. 
The resulting liquidity problem, however, did not prevent the bank 
from increasing its lending and, by 1993, it was wholly dependent on 
overnight borrowing from the RBF to survive. By 1994 its loans totalled 
$332 million, 21 times its paid-up capital of $15.75 million.181 The RBF, 
the Auditor-General and cabinet all knew of the NBF’s difficulties but did 
nothing. ‘If I open my mouth,’ Makrava later said, ‘half the government 
goes, including the leader.’182 In fact, nothing better illustrated Wadan 
Narsey’s ‘culture of silence’, as Grynberg, Munro and White explain:
NBF board members were all government appointees, part of Fiji’s 
‘carousel’ of financial elite that shifted from the board of one statutory 
body to another. These are trusted individuals in a small society with 
a  limited number of individuals able to perform such roles. The trust 
stems from the willingness of these individuals if not to remain silent in 
the face of malfeasance, at the very least to be consistent in erring on the 
side of their patrons. A small society generates only a small number of 
individuals who are technically competent enough to sit on such boards. 
But the number of such posts is almost as large as would be found in 
a large society, and appointments to such positions are determined by 
a handful of politicians. Those unwilling to live by the code of silence 
and compliance towards those in a position to grant such patronage find 
themselves excluded from the lucrative carousel of board positions.183
179  Grynberg, Munro & White, Crisis, 2002. p. 10. The National Mbf MasterCard exposed the 
NBF through its credit-line facility to a debt of $25 million (see Robertson, Multiculturalism & 
Reconciliation, 1998, pp. 139–41).
180  Grynberg, Munro & White, Crisis, 2002, p. 12. The World Bank also recommends that 
problem loans should be no more than 10 per cent of all loans.
181  Grynberg, Munro & White, Crisis, 2002, p. 75.
182  Fiji Times, 2 August 1995.
183  Grynberg, Munro & White, Crisis, 2002, pp. 137–38.
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The scandal became public when an audit of the NBF leaked to the 
press. In fact, the press, particularly the Fiji Times and the Review, were 
pivotal in exposing the scandal. The Review had earlier been threatened 
with deregistration over its publication of Rabuka’s affair in 1994; now 
both papers were threatened with Malaysian-style licensing laws to ensure 
that they remained respectful of Pacific cultural sensitivities and did not 
denigrate Fijian business acumen.184 Makrava did not help. He declared 
that his sole purpose had been to ‘achieve the goals of the coups for 
Fijians and Rotumans’.185 Rabuka remained unrepentant: the media 
had launched a ‘campaign to discredit Fijian leaders, senior Fijian civil 
servants and Fijians in positions of responsibility [in order to] show us 
as incapable of governing our own country with any sense of fair play’.186 
More realistically, the Review noted, ‘The NBF debacle is, if nothing else, 
symbolic of the failure of racism’.187
The repercussions of the NBF collapse were immense and, as a way 
forward, it was split into two banks, with the viable portion eventually 
sold to the Australian Colonial Group for just under $10 million in 1998. 
The bad debts were accumulated into a separate entity and funded by 
the issue of government bonds. Stabilising and restructuring the NBF 
in this way created a sudden contraction in money supply in 1996 and 
a rise in interest rates, which helped precipitate a recession that lasted 
until 1999, in part because it coincided first with drought and later with 
the Asian financial crisis. Government debt increased by 41 per cent as 
a consequence. Most of the funds used in the rescue came from the FNPF, 
which closed time deposits and decreased lending to businesses in order to 
raise its government securities holdings by 23 per cent. 
But the icing on the cake for the government came in 1998 when it 
sold the state’s 49 per cent stake in Fiji’s telecommunications monopoly 
– the Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Ltd (ATHL) – to the FNPF 
for $253  million, nearly four times its estimated commercial value. 
As Grynberg describes the transaction, the FNPF effectively exchanged 
assets then earning 8 per cent per annum for assets returning only 
2 per cent, with the possibility of even lower returns when ATHL lost its 
184  Review, December 1995. The government did review media legislation in 1996, but the 
commissioned report recommended against any restriction on media freedom. For a full account 
of the media and the NBF, see Grynberg, Munro & White, Crisis, 2002, pp. 48–71.
185  Review, January 1996.
186  Fiji Times, 12 December 1995.
187  Review, August 1996.
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monopoly status. The Minister for Finance, responsible also for the FNPF, 
saw no conflict of interest. ATHL was privatised to pay for the NBF debacle 
and Fiji’s pensioners paid the cost. Twenty per cent currency devaluation 
in early 1998 helped lower the cost of public debt further and enabled the 
government to increase public expenditure ahead of a general election in 
the following year.188 The fiasco would cost Rabuka and his SVT party 
dearly, but no one was ever convicted over the affair. The director of 
public prosecutions at the time later conceded that her under-resourced 
office was subject to intimidation and personal attacks.189 Makrava retired 
for the rest of his short life to a new mansion built in Rotuma.
Rabuka might have weathered the storm better had the NBF collapse 
not been accompanied by so many other scandals. The FDB was itself 
under the spotlight, with some 20 per cent of loans unrecoverable. Its 
profit fell 83 per cent in 1996 and required the injection of $120 million 
through promissory notes and bonds. Return on equity remained at 
only 0.72 per cent. Additionally, its EIMCOL supermarket scheme had 
collapsed owing $2.7 million. The RBF lost $18 million in foreign exchange 
earnings in 1995 and allegations of corruption and mismanagement 
at the Housing Authority forced its chief executive to resign. The Fiji 
Broadcasting Commission required an injection of $1.4 million to stay 
afloat. Rumours had the secretive NLTB in debt to the tune of $16 million 
dollars by 1996 while, on the waterfront, a disastrous post-coup decision 
to build a large cruise ship for half its actual cost burdened the government 
with litigation and costs in excess of $12 million. Senior public servants 
overdrew on shares in the Fiji Public Service Credit Union at the same time 
as its travel agency accumulated debts over $1 million. The Public Trustee 
illegally lent over $2 million. The Methodist Church failed to account for 
over $1.5 million received from the Poverty Alleviation Fund for squatter 
resettlement, and itself faced bankruptcy at the start of 1996.190
188  The NBF’s collapse cost taxpayers $615 million in today’s terms (Fiji Sun, 12 July 2017). 
Grynberg, Munro & White, Crisis, 2002, pp. 99–126.
189  High Court Judge Justice Nazhat Shameem; fijilive, 21 March 2007. 
190  Robertson, Multiculturalism & Reconciliation, 1998, pp. 141–43.
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Reset
By 1998 broken shells littered Fiji’s landscape. Fortune seekers were still 
out  there but the eggs they coveted were often damaged or – worse – 
stripped of their contents. Plans were afoot to exploit new resources, a huge 
copper mine in Namosi or wealthy Chinese migrants seeking refuge from 
the Chinese takeover of Hong Kong. Some Fijian politicians coveted land 
as the ultimate nest egg. If IndoFijian leases were not renewed, Fijians 
could completely control the sugar industry. Sociologist Ropate Qalo 
thought Rabuka rode a tiger he could no longer control: ‘Everyone had 
to be paid off and now they are asking for their pay.’191 Grynberg also 
believed that Fiji’s politicians possessed a cargo cult mentality; wealth 
would simply flow in, all Fiji had to do was sit and wait. No restructuring, 
no pain, all gain.192 But, with little to show, the once fiercely Taukeist 
government looked lost. 
The drift had begun early in Rabuka’s second term, well before the 
scandals. Against Methodist protests, Rabuka finally ended the Sunday 
ban on 12 October 1995 and sought greater authority over his cabinet with 
regular reshuffles. ‘Called by God to lead this nation,’ Rabuka brooked no 
dissent but, increasingly, he ruled from a position of weakness.193 Poor 
oversight resulted in the SVT’s Tailevu MP, Adi Samanunu Talakuli, 
being twice disqualified for failing to meet the new Constitution’s 
citizenship laws. Her terminally ill successor was himself disqualified on 
a technicality after election. Increasingly sensitive to criticism, the SVT 
tried unsuccessfully to muzzle an elderly columnist and it still maintained 
a blacklist of persons banned from Fiji. ‘In a situation so politically fluid, 
nothing seems to be moving in Fiji,’ the Review reflected: 
With an economy that is rapidly going to the cleaners: escalating crime, 
rising unemployment compounded by the mass exodus of skilled workers 
and trade union movement looking for a scrap, Fiji is [again] looking 
down the barrel of a gun.194 
Rabuka retreated into religious symbolism. He prayed for forgiveness 
before 4,000 people at the National Gymnasium and again on national 
radio in late 1996. In February 1997, he attended a four-day Festival 
191  Review, March 1996.
192  Fiji Times, 19 January 1995.
193  Australian, 1 August 1995.
194  Review, June 1996.
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of Praise in Suva. It did not save him from criticism. The Review accused 
him of presiding over a ‘Lost Decade’195 during which Malaysia’s per-capita 
GDP had doubled to US$3,890 and South Korea’s trebled to US$9,700. 
Fiji’s rose only 20 per cent to US$2,140 and much of that meagre rise 
came from a statistical aberration caused by the massive outflow of over 
40,000 people, many with the skills needed for economic growth.196 
Indeed, Fiji’s growth strategies seemed bent on denying skills and creativity, 
and its preferential market access for garments, sugar and fish failed to 
generate production efficiencies. Furthermore, poverty escalated with 
urbanisation, but the government remained unwilling to generate urban 
jobs for fear of antagonising its rural provincial political base, yet another 
disastrous consequence of the 1990 Constitution. But it could hardly 
deny the social costs. Forty per cent of housing estates were overcrowded 
and had poor sanitation. Seventeen per cent of families were headed 
by an unemployed person. Crime rates soared but, unlike the military, 
the police force remained constantly constrained for funds. Fiji’s rate of 
diabetes stood at twice the international rate, while the medical system 
groaned under the weight of poor infrastructure and planning and the 
loss of trained staff. Government contributed only 2.9 per cent of GDP to 
health in 1996 and, yet, the Health Department managed to underspend 
its budget. Primary school dropout rates increased more than seven-fold 
during the ‘Lost Decade’, even after 1992 when school education became 
progressively free. The quality of education also declined; suggestions that 
students did better in multicultural environments did not sit easily with 
the message of Taukeism.197
In fact, Taukeism sat uncomfortably with just about every economic 
reality confronting Fiji in the late 1990s. This was no easy conclusion for 
men like Rabuka to concede. Only in 1993 he had told the GCC that 
the 1990 Constitution was the ultimate guarantee of a Fijian future.198 
The economic disasters that had followed now suggested otherwise. 
Perhaps a constitutional review, required by the Constitution, might 
enable multiracial cooperation to stem the economic haemorrhaging, or 
at least buy time. The possibility existed because in March 1995, after 
much delay, a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) – chaired by 
195  The Review declared the post-coup decade a ‘Lost Decade’ in May 1997.
196  Review, April 1997.
197  Robertson, Multiculturalism & Reconciliation, 1998, pp. 153–61.
198  Weekender, 17 December 1993.
125
2 . the GreAt tUrNING
New Zealand’s former governor-general Sir Paul Reeves and comprising 
expatriate academic Brij Lal and former parliamentarian Tomasi Vakatora – 
began its investigations. It toured the country and consulted widely and, 
in September 1996, submitted a lengthy and detailed report calling for 
a return to mixed communal and national parliamentary seats, with twice 
as many national seats.199 There were many reasoned criticisms of the 
report, particularly of its reliance on the Australian alternative vote system 
as a means to promote moderation and cooperation between parties. 
Wadan Narsey, who had earlier written that constitutional racism was 
counterproductive to Fijian interests,200 argued that a list (proportional 
representation) system would most encourage cooperation out of self 
interest: the more votes, the more seats.201 
Rabuka urged caution, but his SVT colleagues were livid. Nonetheless, 
having embarked on the path of reform, it was much more difficult for 
the SVT to reject the Reeves report than it had been for Mara when the 
country’s first Constitution had been reviewed in 1975 following post-
independence growth. The Constitution then was new and the two 
main ethnically based parties were content to maintain the ethnic status 
quo. Rabuka however operated in a climate of decline and the mere 
existence of the CRC raised expectations that something might be done 
to address a constitution that many non-SVT politicians saw as deeply 
flawed. Consequently, when the issue came before a parliamentary select 
committee, it recommended a compromise of sorts: a mix of seats but 
with twice as many communal seats as the CRC recommended. 
Rabuka added his own twist – multi-party government. Parties that 
received more than 10 per cent of the vote would be entitled to proportional 
representation in cabinet. Communalism would still exist but it would be 
tempered by national seats and multi-party government. Possibly only 
the inclusion of the CRC’s social justice and affirmative action provisions 
199  P Reeves, T Vakatora & BV Lal, The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future, Report of the Fiji 
Constitutional Review Commission, Parliamentary Paper 34. Suva: Parliament of Fiji, 1996.
200  These articles were published in the Fiji Times on 29 July, 31 July and 1 August 1995. 
Narsey reminded readers that the 1990 Constitution – with its massive rural bias – discriminated 
against Fijians as much as IndoFijians. Ethnic constituencies and traditional structures discouraged 
ability and decision-making in the national interest. No basis for fears of Indian domination now 
existed. Proportional representation alone would ensure a Fijian majority and avoid international 
condemnation.
201  Fiji Times, 2 November 1996.
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swayed the SVT,202 and Rabuka was keen to downplay the novelty of the 
new Constitution. Fijians were now the country’s majority population; 
they no longer needed racially exclusive constitutional clauses to retain 
power. Such clauses affected Fiji’s international standing and denied it 
membership of the Commonwealth.203 Nonetheless, the GCC tried 
unsuccessfully to reduce the number of national seats further, and baulked 
at the idea of reducing the voting age from 21 to 18. In the end, it could 
only deny Vakatora the opportunity to promote to provincial councils – 
especially those opposing it204 – the new Constitution that would come 
into effect in mid-1998.
Rabuka was in a hurry to create multi-party governance ahead of the 
next election, but the NFP refused to share government under the terms 
of the 1990 Constitution. It accepted, however, the idea of working 
with Rabuka in the future, and its leader, Jai Ram Reddy, sealed the 
accommodation by becoming the first IndoFijian to address the GCC 
in June 1997. He  seconded Rabuka’s bill to amend the Constitution. 
‘We want to convert what [has become] a political culture of confrontation 
into a culture of cooperation,’ he declared.205 The next month, Rabuka’s 
10th cabinet reshuffle created a multi-party cabinet of sorts, with 
members of the FAP rejoining, albeit briefly.206 It was not quite what 
Rabuka had wanted, but it added to the atmosphere of change and the 
expectation of economic benefits that he hoped would offset his party’s 
dismal performance in office. 
But Fiji was in no shape to reap an immediate economic dividend from its 
constitutional amendments. It had dawdled for too long on many fronts, 
especially land. The onset of the Asian economic meltdown in mid-1997 
and a long dry summer exacerbated the pain. Drought destroyed one third 
of the cane belt and reduced sugar production by 45 per cent, wiping 
202  Fiji Times, 4 July 1997. This was the view at least of journalist Sophie Foster. The Constitution 
included a Bill of Rights, a Human Rights Commission, Freedom of Information legislation and 
a Compact of Understanding incorporating indigenous rights. It provided women equal citizenship 
rights for the first time and made sexual discrimination illegal. In addition, future parliaments would 
now contain sector standing committees to provide a form of backbench check on executive power.
203  Fiji Times, 15 May 1997.
204  Eight of the 14 provinces opposed the new Constitution.
205  Australian, 11 June 1997.
206  Kamikamica saw the opportunity to secure stronger representation for the FAP by standing in 
opposition to the SVT. Hence he ordered his members out of cabinet, but his Lauan members refused 
to leave. Provincial representation made unity hard to maintain for all Fijian parties. Kamikamica 
died shortly after in August 1998.
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2.5 per cent from Fiji’s GDP. Tourists abandoned Fiji for cheaper Asian 
destinations; so too did Australasian garment importers. Twenty per cent 
devaluation in early 1998 to lower the cost of debt received little support, 
even from tourist operators and garment manufacturers.
Dissident Fijian politicians planned to scuttle Rabuka’s new era. Apisai 
Tora formed a Party of National Unity (PANU) to fight the SVT in Ba 
province. In Vanua Levu, Lasaro’s Methodists formed the Veitokani ni 
Leweni Vanua Vakaristo Party (VLV) to reintroduce the Sunday ban and 
declare Fiji a Christian state. A worried Rabuka had his cabinet declare 
loyalty to the SVT, but ministers remained deeply troubled by the prospect 
of a new political landscape in 1999. A multi-party cabinet threatened 
greater competition for cabinet posts and preaching multiculturalism 
meant surrendering the racial card to Butadroka’s nationalists or the VLV. 
Had Rabuka taken the country down a false path in 1987? On the eve 
of new elections, he could hardly concede as much. ‘I have never had 
any regrets,’ he declared.207 If fault existed, it lay in the divisive 1970 
Constitution or in the Alliance’s failure to address Fijian issues after 
1977.208 He still believed in communalism, and used support for multi-
party governance as a device to provide the semblance of power sharing 
while maintaining Fijian communal power. Reddy recognised the 
limitations. ‘My great fear here is that we could all again polarise into our 
separate racial groups,’ he cautioned.209 Timoci Bavadra had recognised 
the problem in the mid-1980s:
Our future political stability rests … on how well our present past 
and future leaders lead, accountable to the modern world, not relying 
on tradition and culture to make their race an exception to the laws of 
political logic or economic gravity.210
The great turning in Fijian politics after 1987 had been ephemeral. 
In its wake came a new wave of seekers for the golden eggs they believed 
their birthright and, this time, Rabuka would become one of their early 
victims.
207  Fiji Times, 14 May 1998.
208  Fiji Times, 14 May 1997.
209  Fiji Times, 24 August 1998.
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Redux: The season for coups
The 1997 Constitution could have presented Fiji with the opportunity 
to determine for itself a very different future. Indeed, Sitiveni Rabuka 
introduced it by declaring that ‘It is not enough that we should accept our 
collective presence in Fiji as simply one of coexistence. We should accept 
each other as belonging together as one people and one nation’.1 
Beyond the level of rhetoric, however, little changed. Fiji’s citizens did 
indeed gain a new national name; they were to be known as Fiji Islanders 
after the new name for the country. The term ‘islander’ held a different 
meaning for many people on Viti Levu (i.e. non-mainlanders) and was 
not widely accepted. Others believed its sole purpose was to sidestep the 
reality that one constructed ethnicity – Fijians – still held for itself the 
name of the country. Hence Fiji remained ‘a nation of separate identities’, 
sociologist Satendra Prasad argued, its political structures and institutions 
emphasising and feeding off ‘the separateness of those identities’.2 
The Constitution, however, did restore some measure of equality to 
the country’s IndoFijians, perhaps the only sign of change to emerge 
from Fiji’s  long post-coup decade. There were now 25 open seats in 
which candidates and voters were not demarcated along ethnic lines. 
Unfortunately, these seats represented only 35 per cent of the total lower 
house seats available compared with 48 per cent before 1987, with the 
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majority still strictly divided along communal lines (23 Fijian, 19 Indian, 
one Rotuman and three General Electors). In addition, the political 
parties that contested the May 1999 election remained stubbornly 
divided along communal lines and the size of electorates perpetuated 
longstanding patterns of inequality. Fijian communal electorates held on 
average nearly 8,500 voters, IndoFijian electorates 10,500, and general 
electorates 4,600. Within the Fijian and IndoFijian electorates there 
were also huge variations. Urban Fijians, for example, comprised some 
45 per cent of all Fijians in 1999, but received only 26 per cent of Fijian 
seats. Provincially based open seats were more evenly distributed but, 
with an average 17,500 voters, they vastly exceeded the size of communal 
seats.3 Fiji’s revised democracy still did not enable votes of equal value.
This should not have surprised; Rabuka never intended Fiji’s return to 
multiracialism to be revolutionary. He wanted only for his proposed 
alliance with the National Federation Party (NFP) to demonstrate to all 
Fiji Islanders a transformed polity and thereby restore the Fijian Soqosoqo 
ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) as the country’s natural rulers in the 
1999 general election. But many Fijians did regard the Constitution as 
revolutionary. Rabuka had dramatically overturned one of the important 
goals of his 1987 coups, namely the primacy of Fijian communalism, 
and they abandoned his party in droves. Sixty-two per cent of Fijians 
voted instead for Fijian minor parties like the Veitokani ni Leweni Vanua 
Vakaristo Party (VLV), Party of National Unity (PANU), the Fijian 
Association Party (FAP) and Butadroka’s reformed Nationalist Vanua 
Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP), some of which, like the VLV and the NVTLP, 
opposed the new Constitution and power sharing, and called for the 
reinstatement of Fijian paramountcy.
The Constitution also introduced a new way to record people’s voting 
intentions. Voters were told that preferential voting would encourage 
parties to cooperate before elections. The SVT’s alliance with the NFP 
signalled such cooperation and so, too, did the Fiji Labour Party’s 
(FLP) coalition with PANU. But preferential voting also introduced 
distortions. Voters had two choices. They could either vote for a party’s 
choice of candidates (above the line) or independently select their own 
preferences (below the line). The second option presented unfamiliar 
difficulties. The  long list of candidates for each electorate so confused 
3  C Walsh, Fiji, 2006, pp. 360–63.
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many voters that nearly 9 per cent of all votes in the 1999 election were 
invalid. Additionally, because most voters chose the simpler above-the-
line voting option and accepted the preference deals that parties had 
worked out, outcomes were heavily dependent on how well parties had 
thought through the implications of their preference allocations. Many 
had not; some minor Fijian parties were so estranged from the SVT that 
they put Rabuka’s party last, fragmenting the Fijian vote and denying 
the SVT its goal of representing and maintaining Fijian unity. The FLP 
more strategically swapped preferences to exclude its rivals, privileging the 
nationalists and VLV ahead of the SVT and especially the NFP, which it 
still regarded as its chief rival for the IndoFijian vote. 
Had results been determined by proportional representation, a new era 
might well have come into being. Instead preferential voting condemned 
the SVT to only eight seats instead of 15, and the NFP to the indignity 
of losing all its seats instead of gaining 10. This cost Fiji the opportunity 
to develop a meaningful and strong multi-ethnic Opposition. Instead 
Labour – which focused its campaign on cost-of-living issues rather than 
constitutional nirvana – won the election with 37 seats. Proportional 
representation would have awarded it only 24 seats. The parties with which 
it formed a People’s Coalition similarly benefited from the distortions 
wrought by preferential voting. PANU won four seats instead of two and 
the FAP 11 instead of seven, although the VLV picked up three when it 
could have gained seven under a more representative system of voting.4 
Nonetheless, the persistence of post-1990 intra-communal rivalries, 
not electoral flaws, now most impacted on Fiji. Four days after the 
elections, Mahendra Chaudhry told Radio Navtarang talkback listeners 
that ‘the  NFP was the biggest enemy of the FLP and it was only fair 
that enemies be treated with contempt’.5 Not surprisingly, the new 
constitutional era quickly became mired in the same destructive politics 
that had doomed Fiji’s postcolonial development. Within seven years, it 
would be gone, swept away by yet another military intervention, and this 
time Rabuka would be little more than an ineffectual bystander.
4  Walsh, Fiji, 2006, p. 362.




Constitutionally, the SVT had the right to cabinet places, as it passed 
the 10 per cent threshold for power sharing. But Fiji’s political parties 
were in no mood to be conciliatory, especially Rabuka’s SVT, whose 
share of the Fijian vote had collapsed from its high of 66 per cent in 
1992 to 34 per cent in 1999, leaving it with only eight seats in the 71-
seat parliament. Fijians still dominated the legislature but were now 
members of rival parties, many of whom joined the People’s Coalition 
government as a demonstration of their opposition to the SVT. Never in 
Fiji’s postcolonial history had an establishment party been so devastated 
in an election.6 Nonetheless, the SVT wanted more than just its three 
constitutionally guaranteed cabinet seats; it demanded four specific posts. 
Chaudhry refused to negotiate and denied the SVT any role in cabinet. 
It proved a costly mistake. Including the SVT within government might 
have calmed the political climate and strengthened support for the new 
Constitution. Instead Chaudhry encouraged his opponents to resurrect 
the very politics of ethnicity that Labour had long sought to overcome. 
Nor did Rabuka challenge his decision. Instead he declared his party the 
official opposition and retired from politics to chair the Great Council 
of Chiefs (GCC).7 
His successor, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, one of the founders of the Taukei 
Movement in 1987, reportedly told the SVT’s management board that 
‘people must be prepared to shed blood and die to get rid of the Chaudhry 
government’.8 His strategy to woo disaffected members of rival Fijian 
parties into a grand alliance proved, however, to be less confronting. 
At first it seemed to have much going for it. Although PANU appeared 
a natural ally for the Labour Party given that members of both had a long 
association with western Fiji and its struggle against marginalisation 
orchestrated by eastern chiefs, PANU’s leader, Apisai Tora, lost his seat 
because Labour ran a candidate against him and later denied him a seat 
in the Senate. Similarly, the VLV and FAP’s rationale for cooperation 
with Labour evaporated with Rabuka’s departure from the political scene. 
6  This section draws on the chapter ‘Mayhem and mutiny’ in R Robertson & W Sutherland, 
Government by the Gun: The Unfinished Business of Fiji’s 2000 Coup (Sydney: Pluto Press, 2001, 
pp. 1–49).
7  Alternatively known as the Bose Levu Vakaturaga or BLV.
8  Jone Dakuvula statement, www.fijihosting.com/pcgov/docs_o/jd_defending_speight.htm, 
2 November 2000.
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Within the FAP, this change soon saw members of the eastern Tailevu 
province seeking control of the party from Adi Kuini Vuikaba, both the 
widow of Labour’s 1987 Prime Minister, Timoci Bavadra, and a former 
Labour leader. But the grand coalition was not to be. The VLV wanted 
the SVT to admit its past mistakes, particularly its failure to declare Fiji 
a Christian state and retain the Sunday ban.9 And the FAP dissidents 
procrastinated. Hence the SVT’s political manoeuvring came to nought. 
Instead Labour’s incompetence drove opposition to assume new forms 
outside the political arena.
Chaudhry was much to blame for this. From the very beginning of 
his prime ministership he fell out with the media, especially the major 
English daily, the Fiji Times, whose expatriate editor he tried to deny 
a work permit. When the newspaper responded with stories critical of 
government policies, Chaudhry overreacted and threatened to license 
the media into reporting more favourably. Despite having relished anti-
government press during its years in opposition, Labour seemed suddenly 
to have morphed into the very authoritarian master it had long railed 
against. As one commentator later noted, Chaudhry’s behaviour diverted 
public attention from Labour’s laudable attempts to reduce the cost of 
living: ‘Every condescending smirk in response to even perfectly reasonable 
questions were duly recorded and broadcast on the 6pm [television] 
news.’10 It did not help that he also made questionable appointments; 
his son became his personal secretary and an inexperienced politician his 
information deputy. Neither had the skills nor the temperament to woo 
the media, and both became issues of controversy themselves.
Nor did it not help that Labour had inherited a declining economy, with 
30 per cent of Fiji’s people living in poverty, 20 per cent of its children 
malnourished, and cities congested with over 50,000 squatters.11 Labour 
wanted to create a more caring state, to introduce a social wage with 
improved social services and infrastructure, and to halt the process of 
privatisation begun after the 1987 coups. It also wished to reverse the 
decline in rural infrastructure, to improve roads and upgrade educational 
facilities for all Fiji’s citizens. Thirteen years after Bavadra, it still officially 
regarded itself as a multiracial party. Above all, it saw itself as a people’s 
9  Review, February 2000, p. 14.
10  Nesian, ‘The forces coalesce’, Croz Walsh’s Blog – Fiji the Way it Was and Can Be, crosbiew.
blogspot.com.au, 31 January 2010. The website is operated by Crosbie Walsh, a former professor 
of Development Studies at the University of the South Pacific.
11  Review, December 1999, p. 28.
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party, not a party for elites. And it was the first opposition party to have 
survived beyond the formation of government. Hence its belief that 
criticism, particularly from the press, so early within its term of office was 
misplaced. 
Nonetheless, Labour’s critics believed it ‘tackled too many well entrenched 
interests too quickly’.12 Its attack on privatisation upset Fijian corporate 
interests who regarded it as an important avenue for Fijianisation. 
Its welfare measures were similarly received. Reducing interest rates 
from 11 per cent to 6 per cent for low-income homebuyers financially 
compromised the Housing Authority. Other commentators wished for 
more debate, believing that the removal of consumption tax (VAT) from 
medicine and food, instead of introducing specifically targeted poverty-
reduction programs, advantaged the well off more than the poor. They 
saw a government bulldozing its way ahead rather than seeking to build 
consensus. 
Indeed, many changes did needlessly engender resentment. Labour’s 
attack on expatriates in the name of localisation challenged vested foreign 
interests for little gain. Similarly flawed was its axing of Fiji’s Intelligence 
Service and its refusal to renew Police Commissioner Isikia Savua’s 
contract beyond two years. Decisions about the mahogany industry also 
created resentments. At stake were some 52,000 hectares of rare plantation 
mahogany – variously valued at between $136 million and $500 million. 
Unlike the less valuable, fire-prone and poorer quality pine forests in 
western and northern Fiji, these high-quality stands lay in Viti Levu’s 
damp central and eastern provinces of Tailevu, Namosi and Naitisiri. 
Like the Alliance Party in its dealings with western landowners over pine 
20 years before, Labour antagonised their chiefs by not consulting with 
them on a preferred partner for mahogany milling. More dangerously 
it upset a  plan by Fijian businessmen to profit from their links with 
one processing tenderer. The controversies engendered by these issues, 
together with allegations about the misuse of ministerial entitlements and 
the treatment of some Fijians in the public service, began to take their 
toll politically. Labour had clear goals but it found communicating them 
12  Rowan Callick, ‘No ready way out of Speight’s big hole’, Australian Financial Review, 
24 July 2000.
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difficult and it did poorly in municipal elections in late 1999. ‘If we are 
not careful with the little things we’re doing,’ conceded Deputy Prime 
Minister Tupeni Baba, ‘it will blow up in our faces.’13
In the end, the land issue most damaged the Coalition in the eyes of 
its opponents. Rabuka’s government had failed to resolve what would 
happen when some 40 per cent of the country’s farm leases began expiring 
(one third of these before 2005). Many Fijian landowners wanted their 
land back. They had expanding families to accommodate or they wanted 
to farm themselves. Some believed that they did not benefit sufficiently 
from leasing land to warrant tying themselves to a new round of 30-year 
leases. If leases were to continue, they wanted them based on the market 
value of the land rather than its unimproved value and the lease period 
reduced. Neither response addressed the issue of land degradation, which 
was encouraged by short-term leases, nor the difficulties that Fijians faced 
obtaining loans for farm development. 
But land always involved more than landowner demands. It also involved 
thousands of tenant farmers, most of them IndoFijians, who might at 
any time find themselves landless and unemployed. And it involved Fiji’s 
collective economic welfare. Whatever happened to leases, Fiji had to 
ensure that it continued to earn vital foreign exchange from the productive 
use of its land. Any government would find these issues difficult to resolve. 
For this reason, President Kamisese Mara – while endorsing Labour’s 
manifesto as good for Fijians – warned Chaudhry to give himself at least 
two years to win the confidence of Fijians before tackling the thorny issue 
of land.14
Instead, Labour immediately proposed extending existing 30-year 
farm leases and establishing a land use commission with a broad brief 
to address, among other things, the poor state of rural infrastructure. 
The Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), which administered all leased 
Fijian land, bitterly objected to losing its monopoly. Its officials began 
a campaign at provincial and village levels to frustrate the government’s 
goals. It portrayed the Land Use Commission as ‘a Trojan horse for a land 
grab and for emasculating the NLTB’ and demanded that the NLTB be 
privatised to remove it from government interference.15 Labour’s failure to 
13  Fiji Times, 20 December 1999.
14  fijilive, 30 April 2001.
15  Dakuvula, pcgovt.org.fj, accessed 2 November 2000; Fiji Times, 2 November 2000, p. 1.
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build consensus now weakened its belated efforts to depoliticise the issue. 
The NLTB’s counter strategy amounted to nothing less than a ‘scorched 
earth campaign against Chaudhry’.16 It did not help that Labour’s public 
relations efforts focused almost exclusively on an English print media 
that it simultaneously argued was part of an orchestrated destabilisation 
campaign.17 Unfortunately for the Coalition, the land issue exploded at 
the very moment it introduced constitutional amendments, most of which 
derived from changes that the SVT had failed to enact in 1998. This 
convergence handed the SVT a new weapon to destroy the Coalition – 
a civil disobedience campaign against Labour’s attempts to weaken Fijian 
institutions by mounting what it purported to be an Indian takeover.18 
Pressure on the Coalition now assumed new forms.19 In April 2000, Tora 
announced the resurrection of the Taukei Movement to fight against the 
Coalition’s land schemes and reforms. Its first rally in Lautoka on 20 April 
drew few protestors but, in Suva eight days later, 8,000 supporters turned 
out. This time a wider number of Fijian parties helped in the organisation, 
including a new Indigenous Foundation headed by FAP politician Ratu 
Timoci Silatolu. The development alarmed Tora’s brother-in-law, Savua. 
The government should listen to the grievances of the Taukei Movement, 
he warned. The police may not be able to cope with more protest. 
Chaudhry dismissed his concerns and told him not to interfere in politics.
The sudden escalation in tension, together with the re-emergence of the 
Taukei Movement, sent shock waves through Fiji. Both the Australian 
High Commissioner and the US ambassador urged Chaudhry to act 
16  Dakuvula believed that the NLTB had no interest in resettling evicted farmers or ensuring that 
farming continued. Its objective was simply to return land to Fijians regardless of the cost (Dakuvula, 
‘More land gossip from the grassroots’, Citizens’ Constitutional Forum, ccf.org.fj, 2 May 2001). Some 
Coalition members later alleged that the NLTB hatched the coup in conjunction with Fijian Holdings 
Ltd, one of whose senior executives planned to be its public face (pcgovt.org.fj, accessed 18 May 2000).
17  Minister for National Planning, Ganesh Chand quoted, Fiji Times, 21 December 1999, p. 3.
18  Dakuvula, pcgovt.org.fj, accessed 2 November 2000.
19  Behind the scenes, this might always have been the case. Commodore Bainimarama, the new 
RFMF Commander, claimed the old nationalist – Sakeasi Butadroka – demanded on the day after 
Labour assumed government that he launch a coup. Coup plotter Maciu Navakasuasua claimed that 
at the same time two Fijian businessmen, one heavily involved in the 1987 coups, and some Fijian 
politicians drew up a plan to shut down the Lami power station and use a mob to force a military 
intervention led by Colonel Filipo Tarakinikini. Fiji’s future deputy prosecutor, Peter Ridgway, argued 
that plans had been drawn up for a coup in April 2000 based on a similar scenario of a breakdown 
in law and order. They did not go ahead because the plotters were unable to access the explosives 
and weapons required (Graham Davis, ‘Fiji – democracy by the gun’, Sunday, 7 May 2006, Nine 
Network; Fiji Times, 19 February 2003, and Fiji Sun, 12 January 2006).
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cautiously. So, too, did many Labour sympathisers. It made more sense to 
create an atmosphere of stability and to address issues such as poverty and 
education rather than inflame ethnic tensions.20
But Chaudhry ploughed on regardless and his second deputy, Vuikaba, 
came to his defence. ‘Decisions of the nation’s leaders should be 
respected,’ she argued: ‘Leaders should be left to implement what they 
thought was right.’21 This was not what many less autocratically inclined 
Labour members wished to hear. David Pickering, Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition, suggested an alternative solution: ‘replace Chaudhry with 
his deputy [Baba] and do the whole country a favour’.22 Some members 
of the Coalition came to the same conclusion. They were alarmed at 
Chaudhry’s casual disregard of the dangers facing his government. When 
the NVLT, now led by the political outsider Iliesa Duvuloco, announced 
a rally in Suva on 19 May to petition the President to dismiss the Labour 
government, abrogate the Constitution and return all freehold land to 
Fijian ownership,23 Home Affairs Minister Joji Uluinakauvadra promptly 
proclaimed a ban on further protest marches. Unfortunately Chaudhry 
overruled him, prompting Coalition dissidents to escalate their plans for 
his removal.24
Kubuabola also finalised an end game. The SVT plotted a motion of no 
confidence with FAP dissidents Silatolu and Ratu Tu’uakitau Cakanauto, 
the man tipped to replace Vuikaba as leader of the FAP. Whether an 
attempt to regenerate a Grand Fijian Alliance or, more simply, to 
prompt Coalition dissidents to move rapidly towards their goal, the 
SVT’s strategy heightened a growing sense of crisis. Kubuabola later 
insisted that he had no interest ‘in overthrowing a government that was 
20  See comments of Dr Anirudh Singh (Fiji Sun, 4 May 2000), constitutional lawyer Yash Ghai on 
the Social Justice and Affirmative Action Bill, and journalist Tamarisi Digitaki (‘Dangerous tinkering’, 
Review, April 2000, p. 17).
21  Fiji Times, 10 February 2000.
22  Fiji Times, 4 May 2000.
23  The petition also called for the country’s official name ‘Fiji Islands’ to revert to Fiji (Fiji Times, 
1 February 2003).
24  Chaudhry would be permitted to celebrate one year in office until 20 May but would be 
replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Tupeni Baba in the following week. This theory was forwarded by 
FAP’s Viliame Volavola, the Coalition’s Minister for Urban Development and Housing (Fiji Times, 
23 May 2000) and Australian High Commissioner Sue Boyd (New Zealand Herald Online, 21 August 
2000). The later interim prime minister, Lai Qarase, also claimed to know of ‘rumblings within 
the Coalition’ and thought that a planned vote of no confidence had a good chance of succeeding 
(Review, August 2000, p. 11). Other Labour Party officials denied the rumour (Fiji Times, 23 August 
2000, p. 3). Chaudhry approved the march on 26 April 2000.
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self-destructing,’25 but  it was clear that, by mid-May, there were many 
overlapping conspiracies afoot, so many in fact that it became difficult to 
distinguish them. Within these kava-infused wheels within wheels, coup 
whispers gained volume.
Indeed, FAP research officer Inoke Sikivou became so alarmed at what 
he heard that he started holding regular meetings with Special Branch 
officers.26 Third Battalion (3FIR) Commanding Officer Lt Col Viliame 
Seruvakula, who had sent intelligence operatives into the field after 
the elections, began regular briefings on the political situation with 
military HQ in late 1999. By May 2000 intelligence reports suggested 
an imminent coup, but Seruvakula lacked firm details and names, and 
sometimes suspected he was deliberately being fed false information.27 
Undoubtedly the patchwork of ad hoc and loosely connected conspiracies 
and their fluid membership also made detection difficult. Yet, if Fiji’s 
military leaders were awake to the possibility of political disruption, who 
among them took the lead? Not military commander Voreqe (Frank) 
Bainimarama who, on the eve of his departure on 12 May to a UN 
peacekeeping conference in Oslo, appeared relaxed about possible threats. 
‘Well, you guys had better be prepared,’ he warned his officers.28 But the 
military were anything but prepared. In this they were not alone.
25  Review, June 2000, p. 11.
26  Inoke Sikivou, interview, RFMF Board of Inquiry Report into the Involvement of the First 
Meridian Squadron in the Illegal Takeover of Parliament on 19 May 2000 and the Subsequent Holding 
of Hostages until 13 July 2000 (BoI), 24 October 2000, p. T654. The Board of Inquiry was held 
in the months immediately prior to the November mutiny, but its report never became public. 
Subsequently, 3FIR Commander Tevita Mara leaked the report after he fell out with Bainimarama 
and fled to Tonga in 2010. He alleged that Bainimarama refused to speak to the board and ordered 
all copies of its report destroyed. The report is posted on his web site at www.truthforfiji.com/
uploads/8/4/2/3/8423704/1st_meridian_report_rfmf_opt2.pdf. It is divided into two parts, each 
numbered separately. To identify the separate sections referred to here, page references for the 
Findings are preceded with an F, Transcripts of interviews with a T.
27  BoI, pp. T938–T939. 
28  BoI, p. T944; testimony of Lt Col Viliame Seruvakula. Ratu Tevita Mara later alleged that 
Bainimarama knew about the coup but took no steps. The President had questioned the wisdom of 
departing Fiji at such an unsettled time, but Bainimarama insisted in order to distance himself from it 
(‘Fiji’s dictator Frank Bainimarama’s truth revealed’, www.truthforfiji.com/uploads/8/4/2/3/8423704/
fijis_dictator_frank_bainimarama_revealed.pdf, 17 December 2011, p. 3). Tarakinikini made 
a similar claim in an affidavit in 2005 (Fiji Times, 16 April 2005). These views are based solely on the 
‘convenience’ of his absence or on his role as commander (he was responsible; he must have known). 
Seruvakula, however, who claimed that Rabuka seemed at the time to be the one most aligned with 
Ligairi, harboured no such suspicions about Bainimarama. It is unlikely that he would have protected 
Bainimarama from the rebels on his return to Fiji if he believed Bainimarama was in cahoots with 
them (BoI, pp. T939–940). Later in 2005 he claimed that the colonels Jone Baledrokadroka and 
Tarakinikini were among the senior officers behind the coup (Fiji Times, 2 March 2005).
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Fracturing the postcolonial state
In fact the key to the events that unfolded lay very much with the military, 
and demonstrated the dangers inherent in the highly bureaucratic and 
centralised colonial-heritage state that Mara and later Rabuka had both 
done so much to construct but could do little to prevent unravelling. 
In the end both would suffer personally as a result.
Indeed, the attempted coup, which took place on Friday 19 May 2000, 
drew heavily on Rabuka’s first coup for inspiration. But this copycat coup 
had two striking features that set it apart: first, it was poorly planned 
and, second, it stunned Fiji’s main ruling institutions, which responded 
in confused ways. 
Undoubtedly, the initial ‘coup de farce’ would have collapsed but for 
the later improvisations of two very important recruits, former British 
Special Air Service (SAS) Warrant Officer Ilisoni Ligairi, and the man 
who unintentionally became the public face of the coup attempt, 
George Speight. 
Ligairi joined the British Army in the early 1960s and served in Ireland, 
Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Oman as a member of the SAS. He retired to 
Fiji in 1984 where, some three years later, he served as Rabuka’s security 
advisor before becoming founding Commander of a 70-man antiterrorist 
Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRWU)29 that Rabuka established 
as a palace guard to protect his 1987 coups. It was a spectacular promotion 
for a man who had only ever been a non-commissioned officer and had 
never received officer training. 
Regarded as a specialist elite, nearly half the CRWU’s personnel were 
drawn from Ligairi’s (and Rabuka’s) Vanua Levu, a reflection of its origins 
following the 1987 re-establishment of Tovata political dominance. 
It  trained apart from the rest of the army and jealously retained its 
guardianship ethos. During the 1990s it allegedly engaged in covert 
operations, spying on politicians such as Vuikaba as well as unionists, 
cane farmers, business people, NGOs and diplomats. It even spied on 
NZ military forces engaged in joint exercises with the Republic of Fiji 
29  The CRWU was renamed the First Meridian Squadron in 1999 and placed under the command 
of Lt Penaia Baleinamau. It was later claimed that the CRWU had never been gazetted as a unit within 
the RFMF; in all probability was an illegal entity (Fiji Times, 31 July 2003).
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Military Forces  (RFMF) in 1996.30 The 60-year-old Major Ligairi 
fostered its guardianship role. Every year members of the unit trained on 
Rabuka’s Valavala estate on Vanua Levu, 73 kilometres north of Savusavu 
and celebrated the 1987 coup anniversary with him. Although the unit 
underwent changes after Ligairi’s retirement in 1997, it possessed no clear 
organisational structure or standard operational procedures. Intelligence 
operatives, who rarely trained with the rest of the unit and remained 
close to Ligairi, dominated its leadership. Ligairi officially answered 
to the RFMF Commander but, in reality, he headed what amounted 
to a private army ‘with its own agenda’. It was doubtful, the RFMF’s 
subsequent board of inquiry into the events noted, if the Commander was 
ever privy to any CRWU activity.31 In all probability, Ligairi and his close 
intelligence operatives alone planned the simple repeat of Rabuka’s May 
1987 coup, a task made all the easier when Bainimarama brought Ligairi 
back at the end of April 2000 as a training advisor to assist the CRWU 
protect international delegates at the forthcoming African Caribbean 
Pacific (ACP) conference in Suva.32 The unit’s training officer, Captain 
Shane Stevens, later told the RFMF’s board of inquiry that, had Ligairi 
not been there, the CRWU would not have launched the coup.33 The 
board agreed, but rooted home most of the blame for the coup to the 
RFMF for allowing one man so much power, especially one it considered 
so ill-equipped to be a director and planner.34
One of the CRWU’s intelligence operatives was 36-year-old Sergeant 
Vilimoni Tikotani. Described to the board of inquiry as arrogant and 
boastful, ‘Commander Bill’ Tikotani bragged to journalists soon after the 
start of the coup of his own role in its planning.35 Fired up from his visit 
to Rabuka’s estate and the following celebratory yaqona (kava) session on 
Sunday 14 May, he ‘saw the opportunity to execute the coup when the 
30  These charges were made by the prosecution during the court martial of CRWU soldiers 
(Fiji Times, 30 & 31 July 2003).
31  BoI, pp. F37, F47.
32  BoI, p. T876; testimony of Lt Col Filipo Tarakinikini. The African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) 
grouping came into existence at the same time as the ACP–EU Lomé Convention in 1975 and existed 
to strengthen the voices of otherwise disparate former colonies in their dealings with the European 
Union (EU). Its Suva conference was charged with producing a successor agreement to the Lomé 
Convention.
33  BoI, p. T1002. Baleinamau also regarded Ligairi’s role as pivotal (p. T64).
34  BoI, p. F47.
35  Mary-Louise O’Callaghan & Christopher Dore, ‘Shadowy figures thicken the plot’, Australian, 
24 May 2000; Dore wrote of Tikotani ‘madly waving his cocked handgun around at reporters with 
a deranged smile on his face, exclaiming his prowess and detailing the planning that went into the 
coup’ (‘Just another day in paradise’, Australian, 27–28 May 2000, p. 24).
141
3 . redUx: the SeASoN for CoUPS
nationalist protest march was approved’. As NVTLP President Viliame 
Savu later acknowledged, ‘all attention by the security forces would be on 
the march while there would hardly be any focus placed in Parliament’.36 
Thus, on his return to Suva the very next day, Tikotani contacted the 
NVTLP’s Peceli Vuniwai and provided the one crucial element that 
all the various conspiratorial groups lacked, confirmation of military 
involvement. Said Savu, ‘we assigned Navakasuasua and Peceli Vuniwai 
to work with them’ in order to hastily prepare an indigenous fight-back 
against the policies of the Labour government.37 Clearly the initiative was 
not entirely Tikotani’s, Ligairi was the special ingredient. ‘When they told 
me this thing is set, I just asked, “Who’s this? Who’s that?”’ Ligairi later 
disingenuously recalled: ‘And then I say, “OK, go ahead”.’38 
On the Tuesday, Ligairi informed some of his officers to be on standby 
for the Friday march,39 in what capacity they were not told. Even the 
conspirators seemed uncertain. At a meeting in Colo-i-Suva the next day, 
Tikotani, Vuniwai and Maciu Navakasuasua, a mining-explosives expert 
and participant in earlier abortive post-election conspiracies to bring 
down Labour,40 discussed assassinating Chaudhry but decided, instead, 
for the event that would coincide with Duvuloco’s NLTV march on 
Friday 19 May. On the 18th, a small cache of weapons was smuggled into 
parliament and hidden in the FAP photocopy room in preparation. Other 
weapons were smuggled out also on the Thursday.41 Selected CRWU 
soldiers were told they were to protect VIPs if the march turned violent; 
others were purposely kept in the dark.
36  This proved all too true. The police, however, were also totally unprepared for the march’s 
descent into rioting. Its Riot Squad, based in Nasinu, could not attend the crisis, allegedly because 
its bus had been diverted to pick up Police Commissioner Savua’s son from Yat-Sen School (Fiji Sun, 
2 September 2004).
37  Fiji Sun, 22 September 2005.
38  ‘Cyclone George’, ABC, 15 November 2000, www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s198296.htm.
39  BoI, p. T449; testimony of Lt Charles Dakuliga.
40  Davis, ‘Fiji – democracy by the gun’, 2006.
41  BoI, pp. T451–2. Dakuliga and others were concerned at the instructions they were given and 
returned their weapons to camp. 
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Navakasuasua also drafted the media-savvy Speight to be their 
spokesperson.42 The 44-year-old would-be corporate star, son of a senator 
and closely ally of the businessman and former SVT politician Jim Ah 
Koy, had spent most of his early life overseas, studying in the United 
States and working in Australia. His political and business connections in 
Fiji promised a privileged future after he returned in 1998. In little over a 
year he became one of Fiji’s most senior forestry executives, poised to reap 
lucrative rewards from processing plantation mahogany. But that world 
crashed when the Rabuka-led government lost office. His chairmanship 
of Fiji Hardwood Corporation Ltd and other directorships ended and he 
was charged with currency offences. In the weeks prior to the coup the 
frustrated Speight held discussions with Duvuloco and lobbied the FAP 
to overthrow the Coalition government, even joining in on discussions 
at its parliamentary rooms.43 At 8.45 am on Friday 19 May he met up 
with Tikotani and Ligairi, allegedly for the first time, at the School of 
Maritime Studies in Laucala Bay.44 Together they agreed to proceed with 
their coup that day, although how exactly still remained fluid. According 
to Savu, the CRWU soldiers wanted to ‘shoot to kill’ if necessary but 
were convinced instead to focus on taking hostages.45 Navakasuasua also 
alleges that Speight wanted first to seize Mara, but a quick phone call that 
42  Although termed a ‘Part-European’, George Speight had Fijian family and a Fijian name, 
Ilikimi Naitini, which he rarely used. Later attempts to shroud Speight’s actions in Fijian mythology 
claimed his surname meant ‘the coming of the end’ (Jone Luvenitoga, ‘The vision’, Sunday Post, 
14 March 2004). But Fiji’s rigid racial compartmentalism could work against him. Thus Rabuka’s 
public mocking of Speight’s claims to be a champion of indigenous rights: ‘I am still waiting for him 
to make his announcement in Fijian’ (fijilive, 21 May 2000). However, ‘Few thought to question 
George Speight’s origins’, according to Madraiwiwi, ‘or his new found commitment to the indigenous 
cause’. Instead they were persuaded by the rhetoric and vision that he would restore to them control 
of their destiny (Madraiwiwi, ‘Ethnic tensions and the law’, 2004).
43  BoI, pp. F24; T654, testimony of Sikivou. Allegedly Speight also met with Police Commissioner 
Savua and Rabuka at JJ’s Restaurant in downtown Suva on 18 May (fijilive, 19 December 2002). On 
the same day, Speight and Savu allegedly also met with members of the NLTV, FAP, the Taukei 
Movement and the SVT, including Jo Nata and Silatolu, in the SVT office as they were discussing the 
march and finalising the petition. They informed the group of the coup. A further briefing was held 
at 6 pm (Fiji Times, 5 December 2002, 9 & 19 February 2003).
44  Tikotani claims he met Speight for the first time on Wednesday 17 May (Dore, ‘Just another 
day in paradise’, Australian, 27–28 May 2000, p. 24), although Navakasuasua seems to suggest 
it may have been the Thursday when they lunched or dined at Duvuloco’s home (Fiji Sun, 20 & 
21 September 2005).
45  Fiji Sun, 22 September 2005. Savu claims that Jim Speight wanted to oust Mara at the same 
time as Chaudhry (fijilive, 19 July 2004).
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morning to the Presidential Palace soon established Mara’s unavailability. 
His private secretary, Joe Browne, would receive the marchers’ petition 
instead.46
Back in the parliamentary complex, other FAP conspirators were busy 
working the phones. At 8.45 am Sikivou overheard Silatolu claiming that 
he would be prime minister by the end of the day.47 Fifteen minutes later 
at CRWU headquarters, Lt Penaia Baleinamau briefed his unit to prepare 
for a VIP protection exercise and then left for the School of Maritime 
Studies. Speight’s brother, Jim, an Australian citizen, took additional 
weapons from the CRWU armoury in his vehicle. By 10.30  am the 
two Speights, Tikotani, Navakasuasua and three CRWU soldiers were 
preparing to enter parliament while Ligairi headed for the RFMF camp to 
rally the troops. All were confident that the military would back them;48 
so confident in fact that the small group was woefully unprepared. They 
possessed few weapons, inadequate plastic ties to secure their targets, 
and no food and refreshments. No detailed plan had been drawn up, no 
rehearsals undertaken, no duty rosters produced and, once the small team 
burst into parliament and declared their intentions at 10.45 am, they 
seemed not to know what to do next.49 They constrained an IndoFijian 
cleaner mistaking him for Chaudhry’s bodyguard, who wisely used the 
confusion to slip out of parliament with a group of visiting students.50 
Observers witnessed no clear command structure. They believed the 
unidentified men were waiting for instructions from someone; who that 
46  Fiji Sun, 27 October 2005. Browne claims that a member of the NVTLP approached him on 
the Thursday, requesting a written undertaking that Mara would receive the petition in person (fijilive, 
3 June 2001). Fiji still technically refers to the former colonial governors’ building as Government 
House. But it has become the Presidential Palace in all but name since 1987. 
47  BoI, p. T655.
48  BoI, pp. F24; T655, testimony of Sikivou; T397, testimony of Speight; Bainimarama statement 
(Fiji Sun, 22 March 2006). Savu argues instead that there were seven CRWU soldiers and five NVTLP 
members who entered parliament (Fiji Sun, 20 September 2005).
49  BoI, p. T919, testimony of Adi Kikau.
50  BoI, p. F41.
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might have been produced much press speculation.51 Poseci Bune, leader 
of the VLV and the man who had dashed Speight’s corporate aspirations, 
recalled Speight telling his captives between phone calls (to Duvuloco, 
then leading his 50,000 strong march to the Presidential Palace)52 that ‘we 
would be surprised’ when the real leader arrived. Finally, at the end of one 
call, he suddenly turned and said, ‘I think he is going to be late. Well, I’ll 
have to take over from here’.53
Between them, Ligairi and Speight would recast this hastily planned 
and clumsy coup into a revolution designed to send shock waves 
through the very community it purported to serve. Indigenous Fijians, 
they argued, were  weary of marginalisation by Indians, one of whose 
sons – for the first time in Fiji’s history – now headed the country’s 
government. Consequently, Ligairi assumed that Fijians would readily 
accept Chaudhry’s departure from office. But, after Ligairi arrived at the 
Queen Elizabeth Barracks (QEB) in Nabua to rally support, he quickly 
discovered that assumption flawed. 
51  Police Commissioner Isikia Savua became the favourite (fijilive, 24 August 2000), in part 
because he was deemed missing in action at the time and because the police had developed no action 
plan for the rally. Wadan Narsey later reported a would-be prime minister backing out prior to the 
swearing in of the new rebel government when his brother rang to say, ‘Get the hell out of there; the 
army is no longer with you’. He reportedly told the Speight group he was going home to freshen up 
and never returned (‘Fiji’s cancerous conspiracies of silence’, narseyonfiji.wordpress.com/2012/03/18/
fijis-cancerous-conspiracies-of-silence-5-november-2011-on-blogs/, 5 November 2011). After Savua 
resigned in 2003 to become Fiji’s ambassador to the United Nations, his successor, Andrew Hughes, 
believed he had enough evidence to charge Savua with treason (Fiji Times, 8 June 2004). No charges 
were ever laid. Chief Justice Tuivaga investigated Savua’s involvement later in the year and cleared 
him. But the report was never made public. A letter from Speight to that inquiry did surface; in it 
he denied Savua’s involvement (fijilive, 17 May 2001). Navakasuasua claimed instead that former 
Col Savenaca Draunidalo, then Public Service Commissioner, had been the intended leader and 
was waiting in the nearby Holiday Inn but backed out after the march degenerated into looting 
(Graham Davis, ‘The camera doesn’t lie’, 15 June 2011, www.grubsheet.com.au/the-camera-doesnt-
lie/). Lt Col Meli Saubulinayau told the board of inquiry that Draunidalo had warned Tarakinikini of 
the coup the night before it occurred (which perhaps accounts for the latter’s unexplained frantic calls 
to the CRWU the next morning). Draunidalo rang the acting commander, Col Alfred Tuatoko, the 
next day to say that he was returning to the RFMF barracks. Tuatoko ordered the gates shut, fearing 
that Draunidalo might try to assume command (BoI, p. T889).
52  Vodafone later revealed that Speight was in constant contact with journalist and FAP member 
Jo Nata and Silatolu on 19 May (Fiji Times, 12 December 2002). Prosecutor Peter Ridgway claimed 
Speight called Duvuloco, Nata and Silatolu constantly from the early hours of 19 May, and frantically 
used his mobile in the final 10 minutes before 11 am (fijilive, 11 March 2003).
53  scoop.co.nz (NZ parliamentary website), 18 Aug 2000. According to Savu, at this point the 
whole scenario changed. Speight made the mistake of taking control and deviated from the plan. 
At this stage they still believed that they had full military backing (Fiji Sun, 20 September 2005).
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To begin with, most senior officers who met with him did not understand 
what had happened. They suggested using the CRWU to put down the 
coup, but Ligairi told the Land Force Commander and acting RFMF 
Commander, Col Alfred Tuatoko, ‘We are there’. 
‘What do you mean, “We are there?”’ Tuatoko responded. 
‘I and some of the boys’, Ligairi replied. 
‘The sad thing was,’ Tuatoko’s chief of staff Lt Col Samueli Raduva later 
recalled, ‘the very unit that was planned to take the counter security 
measures [necessary for such an eventuality] … was the unit that carried 
out or used the events of May 19th’.54 
Ligairi had now to buy time. ‘We don’t want a confrontation,’ he stressed, 
telling Tuatoko that he had only intervened two hours earlier to control 
the situation. And he quickly volunteered to accompany Tuatoko to brief 
President Mara, who obligingly directed them not to escalate the situation 
with confrontation.55 But, by then, the situation itself had escalated. 
Duvuloco’s march had morphed into a $30 million orgy of looting and 
violence in downtown Suva in the early afternoon. On his return from 
visiting the President, Tuatoko briefed his officers: ‘These are the pillars 
that we are going to work on: no confrontation, no bloodshed, everything 
within the law, solidarity for the RFMF.’56 
But the pillars provided little guidance for officers wanting to know if 
the CRWU should be allowed to continue drawing on weapons and food 
from the barracks, or indeed whether CRWU troops should be allowed 
to join their colleagues in the parliament. Tuatoko clearly did not want 
the military to turn on itself. Yet, from the very beginning, it did. On the 
evening of 19 May, at the same time as Mara declared a state of emergency, 
Seruvakula intervened to prevent soldiers burning down the CRWU HQ. 
And he worked with Captain Shane Stevens to hide the remaining CRWU 
weapons and set up checkpoints around their complex. But his efforts to 
cordon off the parliament on 20 May in preparation for a counterattack 
were frustrated. During an emergency meeting of senior officers that same 
day, Lt Col Filipo Tarakinikini – the Logistics Unit’s chief staff officer – 
and Raduva ‘lectured’ him about the plight of Fijians and told him that 
54  BoI, p. T846.
55  BoI, p. T935, testimony of Tuatoko.
56  BoI, p. T847, testimony of Raduva.
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regarding the crisis as a hostage situation was a Western perspective.57 
Such views echoed those held by the rebels for obvious reasons. Lt Col 
Metuisela Mua, formerly head of the Fiji Intelligence Service, told the 
board of inquiry that the army relied on imported principles. It sought to 
apply a military solution to a political problem. He believed it should have 
used Fiji’s indigenous protocols, which he called the best reconciliation 
system in the world.58 Obviously Tuatoko’s pillars could not hold for long, 
but they held long enough for Ligairi and Speight – now bereft of military 
support – to re-engineer their coup into a very different beast, one which 
sought to remove Fijian leaders whose preparedness to deal with Indians 
as equals had – they believed – cost Fijians political leadership. 
What began as a simple copy of Rabuka’s first coup59 also had a second 
striking feature: the stunned and confused responses of Fiji’s main ruling 
institutions. Many of Fiji’s leaders were deeply implicated in various plots 
to bring down the new Labour Prime Minister following his election or 
at least sympathised with that goal. In addition, the President, the GCC, 
and the Fiji military forces, among others, were all willing participants in 
and beneficiaries of the 1987 coups. Having acquiesced once, their hands 
were tied. ‘We approve of the cause, but not the means,’ they nervously 
and frequently intoned,60 a mantra that all too often implied support. Col 
Savenaca Draunidalo certainly believed so, telling the board of inquiry 
that, when the Commander said ‘We support the cause’, he meant that 
the military should develop strategies to make it happen.61 So too Speight: 
the military would say ‘we support what you have done, we support the 
reason but we can’t say much about the method; apart from that we are 
behind you’.62 
57  BoI, p. T946, testimony of Seruvakula. At his later court martial, Stevens claimed that Tuatoko, 
Raduva and Tarakinikini had permitted the continued transfer of CRWU weapons and ammunition 
to parliament on 19 May. When Bainimarama returned, he directed that they be brought back. 
Altogether 309 weapons went to parliament (fijilive, 26 September 2002).
58  BoI, p. T376, testimony of Mua.
59  When Rabuka arrived at parliament on 19 May hoping to act as a mediator, he asked Speight 
why he did it. Speight responded, ‘What do you mean asking me that question; only two people here 
did this thing, only you and me. You did not complete it; I will complete it’ (BoI, p. T739, testimony 
of Volavola).
60  This section draws on R Robertson, ‘A house built on sand’, Time (Sydney), 24 July 2000, p. 16; 
and Robertson & Sutherland, Government by the Gun, 2001, pp. 1–4. The latter contains a detailed 
account of the coup in ‘Mayhem & mutiny – the 2000 crisis’, pp. 1–49.
61  BoI, p. T862.
62  BoI, p. T402.
147
3 . redUx: the SeASoN for CoUPS
In May 1987, Rabuka had launched his coup to remove ‘an Indian 
dominated’ Labour government that had won office from the long-
serving Ratu Mara just one month before. Mara rushed immediately to 
Rabuka’s side and was restored – eventually – to the prime ministership. 
Fijian paramountcy returned and with it the dominance of an eastern 
chiefly elite.  Thirteen years on, the 80-year-old Mara was halfway 
through his second five-year term as president. Rabuka, the commoner 
who had succeeded him as prime minister for seven years until defeated 
by Chaudhry, now headed the GCC, ostensibly in order to maintain 
control.63 This supreme Fijian institution had also rushed to endorse 
Rabuka’s coups in 1987, bestowing on the commoner life membership 
of the chiefly council. In return a new Constitution in 1990 bestowed on 
the GCC the power to appoint members of the Senate and to choose Fiji’s 
president. Later it was rewarded with a secretariat of its own. In addition, 
the Council’s main investment company, Fijian Holdings Ltd, profited 
greatly from Rabuka’s affirmative action policies, as did many of its 
individual shareholders.
Rabuka’s own former institution, the military, also benefited from the 
coups. Its official size had nearly doubled since 198764 and, during 
most of the 1990s, the country’s leaders turned a blind eye to successive 
blowouts in the annual military budget. Now members of one of its 
more highly politicised units were holed up in parliament with over 
43 hostages. Thus compromised, the military found it difficult to resolve 
the situation decisively. It did not storm parliament; nor did it cordon 
parliament off. ‘Let us not use the universal template of the army coming 
in to restore order,’ Rabuka advised: ‘There are friends and relatives in 
there. The army would think twice about going in.’65 Draunidalo warned 
the officers’ think tank advising the Commander that even setting up 
checkpoints around the parliament could endanger life. That its officers 
may not have supported either the Chaudhry government or Speight 
counted for little when there was no one prepared to take control and 
end the situation.66 This generated an ‘atmosphere of distrust’ in which 
63  BoI, p. T954, testimony of Rabuka.
64  Stewart Firth and Jon Fraenkel note that, by 2005, the RFMF comprised 3,137 staff and 767 
reservists, the latter down from nearly 2,000 prior to the 1987 coups (‘The Fiji military and ethno-
nationalism: analysing the paradox’, in J Fraenkel, S Firth & BV Lal (eds), The 2006 Military Takeover 
in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009, p. 120).
65  Age (Melbourne), 23 May 2000, p. 14.
66  BoI, pp. T952–3, testimony of Rabuka. 
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many soldiers found it useful ‘to hedge their bets’, as Tarakinikini put it.67 
Thus officers who proposed action were often viewed with suspicion, an 
outcome not lost on the rebels holed up in parliament. They constantly 
rang them at the QEB, offering inducements for their support or threats 
if it failed to be forthcoming. And they sought to divide the military. 
Tarakinikini (a founding officer of the CRWU) and Col Ulaiasi Vatu 
(Strategic HQ) – both supportive of the cause but not the method – 
were publically promoted as new heads of the RFMF by the rebels and 
found their loyalties suspected as a consequence. In the long term, their 
military careers suffered.68 Lt Col Jone Baledrokadroka, chief staff officer 
Operations at Land Force Command, believed that, had Speight alone 
headed the coup, there might have been less contention and military 
uncertainty. He was seen as a nobody, a part-European businessperson 
and beneficiary of Rabuka’s cronyism. But the military had no such doubts 
about Ligairi and, if alleged backers such as Draunidalo had actually come 
forward, the coup would have gained much more credibility.69
A kind of psychological warfare now began, its goal to divide and paralyse 
the RFMF, and its effects on trust between officers would be long-lasting. 
The ambitious and frustrated Tarakinikini became an easy target. His 
efforts to promote the reorganisation of the RFMF in the 1990s had 
achieved little. Bainimarama had denied him leadership of the CRWU 
in 1999 and of security for the ACP conference in 2000. He was on leave 
and sitting an MBA exam at the University of the South Pacific (USP) 
when the coup took place, but quickly volunteered to act as a negotiator. 
‘I could see through these guys,’ Tarakinikini told the board of inquiry, 
‘I could see the lies they were spinning in the name of the indigenous 
Fijian cause and especially George Speight when he came on, I could see 
the line he was coming on, I had to match him … if I did not step in … 
the situation was going to deteriorate not by design but by inactions.’ 
As a spokesperson for the RFMF, the highly personable and articulate 
67  Fiji Times, 16 April 2005.
68  Fiji Times, 16 April 2006. In 2003, the military claimed that Tarakinikini met with the Police 
Commissioner and a senator at a Nadi eatery one month before the coup (fijilive, 9 February 2003). 
During the later mutiny trial, one CRWU soldier claimed the Naitasiri chief and future senator, Ratu 
Inoke Takiveikata, believed that both Tarakinikini and Baledrokadroka had been assigned tasks by 
the rebels on 19 May that they had not executed (Evidence of Sgt Manoa Bonafasio, fijilive, 4 July 
2003). Col Vatu died in 2004, still distressed at the aspersions cast on his character. Tarakinikini, who 
resigned from the military in 2001 and left Fiji with government approval for a UN peacekeeping 
role, never cleared his name. The military declared him a deserter in 2003.
69  Jone Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief: The role of the military in Fiji politics’, 
PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2012, pp. 147–48.
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Tarakinikini proved effective. Although his goal was to establish rapport 
with the rebels in order to prevent bloodshed, he also became dangerously 
effective as an official counter to Speight: ‘I knew all along what they 
were trying to do, they were really trying to undermine me and when 
they knew that it was not going to work then they came out and started 
accusing me of being with them … in order to … pull the rug under my 
feet.’ Once the rebels knew that the army would not support them, ‘their 
tactics then was to try and put in the Trojan horse inside the RFMF to 
try and break us from within’.70 To some extent it worked. Bainimarama 
allegedly told Tuatoko not to trust Tarakinikini and Raduva.71
Complicating matters also were divisions between serving officers and 
reservists. The presence of many reserve officers, particularly Rabuka, 
created discomfort among some serving officers. But this discomfort 
paled in comparison with the army’s physical inability to act. Despite 
Rabuka’s largesse while in office, the RFMF lacked equipment, weapons 
and vehicles to support domestic operations.72 Even the weapons it 
possessed were poorly managed. The CRWU kept its own armoury but 
the RFMF possessed no master register. What records it did keep were 
woefully inadequate.73 When the police belatedly requested its assistance 
to deal with the rioting and looting that broke out in downtown Suva at 
1 pm following the NVTLP march, the military lacked sufficient vehicles 
to send its soldiers into the city. It tried to hire buses, but most of the city’s 
buses were busy taking children from their rapidly closing schools. Hence 
soldiers did not arrive on Suva’s streets until 6 pm, three hours after the 
initial request and well past the time when they could be most effective. 
If  the intention of the riot had been to stretch Fiji’s forces during the 
coup, the rebels did not have to try too hard. 
That both the Commander and chief operations officer were overseas 
probably did not assist the RFMF either, but without contingency 
planning and training to deal with a national crisis, it is doubtful that 
their presence could have made much difference.74 Of course many officers 
70  BoI, pp. T869–871, testimony of Tarakinikini.
71  BoI, p. T1003, testimony of Captain Shane Stevens.
72  BoI, p. F51.
73  BoI, p. F58. This probably accounts for the discrepancy between RFMF records of weapons 
missing after the coup and CRWU claims. The CRWU claimed it took 131 weapons from its armoury 
and returned them. The RFMF maintained that 25 were missing, but it is possible that the CRWU 
never possessed these weapons; the difference being explained by poor records (BoI, pp. F58, 67). By 
2002 the number of weapons missing had been officially reduced to 13 (Fiji Times, 14 March 2002).
74  BoI, p. T886, testimony of Lt Col Meli Saubulinayau.
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had long been aware of the RFMF’s deficiencies but felt constrained by 
the vision of their leaders. Plans to reorganise the institution had lain 
dormant for years with the result that its many parts such as HQ FMF, HQ 
Land Force and Strategic HQ were disconnected, although restructuring 
in late 1998 brought these together as Strategic HQ and Land Forces 
HQ.75 Additionally, too many rapid promotions in the past conspired to 
create tensions over how the institution was run, and much of this came 
to the fore after 19 May76 and focused on the Commander himself.
Commodore Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama had served with the Fiji Naval 
Squadron since its inception in 1975 and replaced Ratu Epeli Ganilau 
as commander in March 1999, when the latter left – unsuccessfully – to 
enter politics as part of Mara’s VLV challenge to the SVT. Many senior 
officers, perhaps feeling that they were more deserving, resented that 
their commander was a naval officer; moreover an officer who lacked 
the combat experience and Sandhurst training of the colonels. One even 
argued, ‘That  is where the whole thing starts’.77 Bainimarama had not 
taken kindly to this reception and posted perceived dissidents to the 
military’s Strategic Headquarters in Suva, away from the QEB in Nabua 
suburb.78 ‘We now operate [more] like a gang than a military force,’ 
Tarakinikini told the board of inquiry. 
Rent by internal division and constrained by its ethnic identity, the 
RFMF dithered as the coup evolved. Many of its officers refused to 
commit, leaving their troops confused.79 Fijians confronted Fijians as 
never before. Their leaders no longer acted as a united political force. 
Mara and Rabuka had never trusted each other and their differences 
75  A Defence white paper proposed restructuring in 1997 but, with the SVT in turmoil, in its final 
year and the Labour Party disinterested once in office, little came of it (Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king 
and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 92–94). 
76  BoI, pp. T833–4, testimony of Co JM Waqanisau; T875, testimony of Tarakinikini.
77  BoI, p. T834, testimony of Waqanisau. Baledrokadroka suggests that the Tovata Ganilau sought 
a malleable commander not linked with the rival Bauan dynasty such as Colonel Administration 
Quartermaster, Lt Ratu George Kadavulevu (Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, 
pp. 229–30), who Col Dr Senilagakali claimed had approached him two months before the coup 
to ask Mara to step down as President (BoI, p. T839). Lt Col Etueni Caucau claimed that there 
were rumours of an internal coup against Bainimarama in April 2000, resulting in his security being 
strengthened (BoI, p. T898).
78  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, p. 247.
79  BoI, p. T946, testimony of Seruvakula.
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now  resurfaced.80 Given how quickly events unfolded, Mara possibly 
believed that the military’s slow reaction meant that it was colluding with 
the coup-makers.81 Certainly, many provincial chiefs saw the attempted 
coup as an opportunity to redress long-perceived inequalities within the 
community; others saw it as a chance to consolidate a new and more 
radicalised Fijian leadership. Ligairi played to all these divisions. 
Hundreds of supporters flocked to the parliament to act as human shields 
in case the military decided to attack. Ligairi organised them into fighting 
units. By threatening to stir the rumblings of commoners, Ligairi sent 
a strong message to all chiefs: commoners would take over if necessary. 
Ligairi’s transformation of the forces within the parliamentary complex, 
however, created tensions that he found difficult to control, although this 
was not always obvious to outsiders at the time. He headed the military 
wing, which – with the addition of more CRWU soldiers and reservists 
– soon comprised over 56 soldiers. By the end of May he had established 
an intelligence and operations centre, a logistics cell, as well as duty and 
weapons rosters. 
Speight headed the political wing, a fluid group that grew strongly due to 
the army’s failure to blockade the parliament. Politicians, former soldiers, 
public servants, Methodist ministers82 and chiefs assembled at the 
parliament, ostensibly to find out what was happening but in many cases 
to participate in what they undoubtedly viewed as a transformative event. 
The former intelligence chief, Metuisela Mua, provides a useful example. 
He went into parliament within hours of the coup, joined in an early 
80  In April 2001, Mara somewhat belatedly revealed that he found Rabuka’s 1987 coups 
‘disgusting’. He added that in his seven years in government, Rabuka showed that ‘he couldn’t run 
an office’ (Mara, interview, Closeup, Fiji TV, unofficial transcript on pcgovt.org.fj, accessed 29 April 
2001). Sir Vijay Singh later revealed that Mara had told him both Rabuka and Savua were behind the 
coup (fijivillage, 18 August 2006). It did not help that when Rabuka first visited Mara on 19 May, 
he requested that Mara appoint him as commander (Fiji Times, 8 July 2004).
81  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 148–49.
82  Methodist President Rev. Tomasi Kanailagi wrote to Speight on 16 June: ‘we must not let 
Fijians fight among themselves or the Indians will have the last laugh’. He promised them a divine 
pardon for their actions (Fiji Times, 20 June 2004).
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meeting, and eventually became part of Speight’s team.83 Negotiations 
were a key activity for this wing and a special negotiating room was 
established alongside the ops room, symbolically located above where the 
bulk of hostages were held.84 
But the key innovation remained the vanua wing; its formation was 
a direct result of military inaction, in particular its failure to storm 
parliament during the first weekend of the crisis. That failure enabled the 
rebels to encourage hundreds of ordinary Fijians to flock to parliament 
and organise them loosely into provincial groups that provided a veneer 
of traditional legitimacy. Such groups were publicly marched around 
the parliamentary complex and sometimes sent out to attack police or 
soldiers. Ligairi bragged that his new soldiers would soon be better than 
the military.85 They got one opportunity to prove themselves on Sunday 
28 May. Led by CRWU soldiers, over 500 rebels slipped into Suva, 
firing at the Presidential Palace en route. There they trashed the offices 
of Fiji TV, which had aired a program ridiculing the rebels, in particular 
Speight and Duvuloco. During the rampage, a ricocheting bullet killed 
a police officer. A security officer also died from heart failure. Both deaths 
destroyed the notion that the rebels opposed confrontation. Indeed, they 
secretly plotted to escalate violence by destroying both the Presidential 
Palace and Suva in order ‘to show Ratu Mara that even though he was the 
head of government and in total command of the Army, Police and Civil 
Service … the vanua was much stronger than him’. A group of hymn-
singing women would lead the vanua and rebel soldiers on a destructive 
march to the capital. However, rain thwarted their plans.86 But the events 
of 27 May were not the first foray outside parliament. 
83  BoI, p. T370, testimony of Mua. Others, like Simione Kaitani, would later claim that they 
were only volunteering their skills to assist Fiji in a difficult situation. Kaitani claimed his skills lay in 
conflict management (Wansolwara, August 2005) although, in 2003 on FTV’s Closeup, he admitted 
sedition and inciting people with hate speech (Thakar Ranjit Singh, ‘Shame on our banana republic’, 
Fiji Sun, 18 April 2006). Many others would make similar claims when later charged. The future Tui 
Cakau, Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, used his chiefly status to justify his presence at the rebel takeover 
of the Sukanaivalu Barracks in Labasa while Ratu Josefa Dimuri claimed he wanted only to facilitate 
talks between rebels and loyalists (Fiji Times, 29 January 2005).
84  BoI, p. T754, testimony of Lt Ratu George Cakobau.
85  BoI, p. T754, testimony of Lt Col VS Volavola.
86  BoI, pp. T736, T738, testimony of Volavola. Maika Qarikau, the NLTB head who shortly 
began circulating a ‘Deed of Sovereignty’ to entrust Fiji to the rebels, allegedly concocted the plan.
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Early Sunday morning, 21 May, CRWU personnel in two vehicles 
journeyed across Viti Levu on the Queens Road to snatch Bainimarama 
as he returned from Norway. Alert to their intentions, Seruvakula sent 
30 troops to meet their commander and they prevented the would-be 
kidnappers gaining access to Nadi airport, quickly spiriting Bainimarama 
along the longer northern and eastern Kings Road route to Suva instead.87 
On Friday 26 May, Speight and 20 armed men strode out of parliament 
and confronted troops who had replaced police outside the parliamentary 
complex. The next day 200 rebels and supporters challenged 10 soldiers 
in a shootout at a checkpoint that injured three soldiers, one rebel and 
a British journalist.88
The rebels’ descent into violence and death made many CRWU soldiers 
uneasy; some even contemplated returning to their barracks.89 But the 
vanua felt emboldened. They demanded their own weapons and swore 
at Ligairi when he refused.90 Leadership of the vanua now became 
difficult. Speight and Duvuloco clashed over who should head it; Speight 
wanted only chiefs in such a role, Duvuloco believed he was best suited.91 
Difficulties over vanua leadership, Silatolu claimed, ‘distracted us from 
resolving the issue with the military’.92 Those difficulties, however, went 
far beyond leadership. The vanua was unruly. Looting, drunken parties, 
gang rapes and orgies conflicted with the disciplined order Ligairi wished 
to project.93 But it had its uses also; across Fiji, isolated IndoFijian 
communities were terrorised or their homes looted and razed. The military 
‘won’t rise up against its own people’, Speight taunted.94
Speight played his part, too, holding court in the parliamentary complex 
with his supporters and engaging with international and local media. 
Unlike most politicians in Fiji and the rarely seen Commander, he was 
articulate and comfortable with the media – too comfortable, according 
to some journalists. They felt that their presence ‘aided the rebel leader’s 
87  BoI, pp. T940, T888, testimony of Seruvakula and Saubulinayau.
88  fijilive, 09 February 2003; Tikotani was tried in 2003 for the shooting. 
89  BoI, p. T467, testimony of Warrant Officer A. Waqaniboro.
90  BoI, p. T852, testimony of Raduva.
91  BoI, p. T395, testimony of Speight. There were other divisions among the rebels. Navakasuasua 
claims that Nata was never trusted because he was Lauan. The coup was by and for Viti Levu. Hence 
their later support for Samanunu as prime minister rather than Qarase (fijilive, 7 March 2003). 
Of course this view disregards Ligairi’s central role and goals.
92  BoI, p. T392.
93  BoI, p. T736, testimony of Volavola.
94  Fiji Times, 2 June 2000.
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propaganda fire … gave him political fuel’.95 They were not alone. Many 
Fijian leaders who flocked to parliament were concerned to promote 
their particular Fijian brand; none wished victory to accrue solely to the 
political outsider. 
Rabuka, ever eager to demonstrate that he was still the man for the 
moment, called for a meeting of the GCC on 23 May, hoping to seek 
independent resolution of the crisis. He had not supported the rebels as they 
hoped, but at least seemed prepared to negotiate, and negotiations kept the 
situation fluid. Hence the nervous rebels released 11 of their hostages 
hoping to maintain the initiative and reduce the risk that Bainimarama 
might launch an attack. They were buoyed by the independent visits of 
GCC members and their messages of support. An emboldened Speight 
declared Bauan chief Ratu Jope Seniloli president, with Silatolu his prime 
minister, and swore in a raft of ministers.96 On Ligairi’s recommendation, 
he mischievously selected Vatu as his military commander and Tarakinikini 
his chief of staff. When the GCC met, it clearly wished to side with Speight 
but could not overlook Mara’s opposition. As a compromise it endorsed 
Mara as president but called for an advisory council of rebel leaders and 
chiefs to oversee constitutional changes. Rabuka’s attempt at a resolution 
through the GCC had failed.97 ‘Democracy, we have always stated, [is] 
a foreign flower,’ Rabuka reflected. It should be amended to suit local 
circumstances.98 The rhetoric of 1987, however, did not now sit well with 
the remade statesman. Although he had never fully apologised for his 
coups, he began to find comparisons between his and Speight’s actions 
difficult to stomach. Rebel confidante Simione Kaitani declared that they 
95  David Robie, ‘Coup Coup Land: The press and the putsch in Fiji’, paper presented to the 
Journalism Education Association Conference, Queensland, 5–8 December 2000, p. 9. Some even 
wondered ‘how much of the coup and its twists and turns was the product of the media itself ’ 
(Michael Field, ‘Farewell to Coup-Coup Land’, Fiji Times, 8 August 2000).
96  Speight contacted Seniloli at 4 am on 19 May and invited him to watch the action from the 
parliamentary gallery. He didn’t but, the next day, Speight invited him to be president (Fiji Times, 
8 July 2004). Ratu Tua’akitau Cakanauto advised his FAP colleagues not to accept these cabinet posts 
because the ‘whole thing’s illegal’. ‘I will not lead you down the road that I can’t lead you out of,’ 
he told them to no avail (Fiji Times, 1 July 2004).
97  Robert Norton believes that Rabuka’s hand may have been weakened by his need to keep 
Deputy Chair Adi Litia Cakobau – a strong Speight supporter – onside (‘The changing role of the 
Great Council of Chiefs’, in Fraenkel, Firth & Lal, The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji, 2009, p. 105).
98  fijilive, 25 May 2000.
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wanted immunity from prosecution ‘like Rabuka got in 1987’. ‘There is 
no other way,’ Speight mocked.99 ‘It is unfortunate, but … the present 
[coup], just as mine, can probably never be justified,’ Rabuka admitted.100
Mara quickly acted on the GCC’s recommendations, dismissing both the 
Coalition government and parliament, but refused to place any rebels 
on a council of advisors or discuss amnesty until all hostages had been 
released and weapons returned.101 Speight immediately upped the ante, 
calling for both Mara and the Constitution to go. He was buoyed by 
the arrival of a small group of reservists under Major Joseva Savua, the 
Police Commissioner’s brother. Other soldiers continued to slip into 
the parliamentary complex to lend their support to the soldiers already 
there.102 Speight felt more confident than at any time during the previous 
weeks; hence the forays outside the complex and the traditional Fijian 
welcome given to the GCC’s negotiating delegation. Its leader, Ratu Epeli 
Kanaimawi, told the rebels:
From now on, Fiji should be ours; we should lead so that other races can 
be safeguarded. [S]urely they will be happy. But Leadership should be in 
the hands of indigenous Fijians; [there’s] no difference from what you 
have done from what the Council desires.103
It was a different story when the Military Advisory Group’s Col Jeremaia 
Waqanisau arrived in parliament as part of a military vanua ‘to cool 
things down’ and prepare for negotiations to release the hostages. At that 
meeting Kanaimawi allegedly took the opportunity to berate the army.104 
Not surprisingly these early discussions went nowhere. Despite initially 
agreeing to the GCC’s compromise, the rebels denied they had done so 
when they next met formally with the military. ‘I have never seen people 
who can lie in your face,’ Tarakinikini observed; ‘it is unbelievable.’105 
Speight’s attack on the Presidential Palace that weekend clearly 
demonstrated where his focus now lay. That he held Mara’s daughter, 
Adi Koila Nailatikau, as a hostage added to the pressure he felt able to 
99  Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, ‘Rabuka legacy: Rule by the gun’, Australian, 26 May 2000, p. 1. 
No Other Way was the title of Rabuka’s 1988 biography.
100  Interview with Jana Wendt, Dateline, SBS, 31 May 2000.
101  fijilive, 28 May 2000.
102  The board of inquiry estimated that at least 67 soldiers were stationed in the parliamentary 
complex (BoI, p. F66).
103  Fiji TV, 18 December 2006.
104  BoI, p. T827, testimony of Col Waqanisau; pp. T879–880, testimony of Tarakinikini.
105  BoI, p. T879.
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exert. And he announced a new march on the Palace. The military feared 
inaction. With the situation rapidly deteriorating, a mob poised to storm 
the Presidential Palace and capture the President, and negotiations going 
nowhere, it desperately needed to force Speight to release the hostages and 
return its weapons. It feared anarchy. ‘Our role changed when the then 
Commissioner of Police declared that the police could no longer contain 
the upheaval,’ Bainimarama later argued.106 Necessity now demanded 
that the military produce a ‘situation-saving’ device107 to replace ‘non-
confrontation’ with ‘tightening the noose’ in order to ‘unhinge’ the 
rebels.108
That device proved also to be the military’s default position – a coup. 
On Monday 29 May at 9 am, Mara held a meeting with Ganilau, Rabuka, 
Bainimarama and Special Branch Director Berenado Daveta (standing 
in  for Savua) to discuss who might act as prime minister in a council 
of advisors.109 The lack of adequate security at the Presidential Palace 
deeply troubled Mara’s secretary Joe Browne. He rang Seruvakula and 
they discussed an option to take Mara to safety on a naval vessel in Walu 
Bay. Only the next day did Browne learn that, shortly after his hasty 
evacuation, Mara had been visited by another delegation comprising 
Bainimarama, Rabuka, Ganilau and Savua. They asked him to step aside 
as president in order to allow the military to assume control. Mara felt 
betrayed. The military were meant to support him. He informed them 
that he would never return as president.110 The military eventually took 
him to his Lakeba home in the Lau islands, although not before rebels 
106  Fiji Times, 1 February 2004. In 2006, Bainimarama restated the importance of Savua’s position: 
‘when the coup happened, the police were helpless and could not do much. And that was when the 
military stepped in to take over’ (Fiji Times, 4 December 2006).
107  BoI, p. T849, testimony of Raduva.
108  BoI, p. T862, testimony of Draunidalo. Tarakinikini regarded the military takeover as a way to 
‘unhinge’ the Speight Group (BoI, p. T872). On 29 May, he was part of a delegation that told Speight 
that since the military had now ‘fulfilled what we want’, the hostages should be released (BoI, p. T349)
109  Fiji Times, 16 November 2006. Browne claims that Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi had been offered 
the position but refused to accept an unelected position. Rabuka volunteered to be prime minister 
instead. Dr Senilagakali also claims to have been approached for the role but recommended Qarase 
(fijivillage, 7 December 2006).
110  Joe Browne, interview, fijilive, 1 May 2001. Sir Vijay Singh later wrote that Mara confided 
in him that he stepped down from office for fear of the fate of his daughter if he did not (fijilive, 
17 August 2006). Family members believe that Mara’s health deteriorated after his removal. Both he 
and his wife died within three months of each other in 2004. 
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allegedly attempted to assassinate him on the vessel.111 Later that evening, 
Bainimarama told the nation he had taken over and abrogated the 
Constitution because it did not permit a framework to resolve the crisis 
and encourage Speight to release the hostages. The subsequent board of 
inquiry thought this action wrong. The RFMF had again failed in its 
role and mission to preserve the sovereignty and stability of Fiji.112 The 
future Attorney-General, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, later observed that the 
military’s ‘erroneous’ belief that removing the President temporarily could 
help it re-establish law and order led to the tragic departure of ‘one of the 
very few people who could have provided true national leadership’.113
Many senior officers concurred. The military’s sudden takeover did not 
prevent hundreds of supporters continuing to stream into parliament or 
members of the rebel vanua committing random acts of violence with 
impunity. Nor did Bainimarama’s promise to include rebels in an interim 
government win Speight’s endorsement.114 He wanted his own Taukei 
civilian government in power instead. In desperation Bainimarama sent 
a large army delegation to parliament buildings on 31 May to explain his 
intentions. But the very next day, when he met Speight for the first time, 
he compromised. The GCC would decide if the government should be 
a military one or Speight’s. When Bainimarama told his officers what he 
111  There remains much confusion over this event. Ratu George Kadavulevu claims that initially 
Rabuka was sent to advise Mara of the military plans and request that he not accept the plan in order 
to save face (BoI, p. T857). Saubulinayau claims that Mara feared he was under arrest when he was 
moved to the vessel (BoI, p. T890, testimony of Saubulinayau). Later, confronting Bainimarama, 
Savua and Rabuka, Mara told them that they had just given Speight what he wanted (pcgovt.org.fj, 
accessed 1 May 2000). At the board of inquiry Tikotani denied leading an assassination attempt (BoI, 
p. T339) and Mua alleged that Special Branch invented the threat to Mara and his family in order to 
give the military an excuse to remove them (BoI, p. T380).
112  BoI, p. F51. Tarakinikini claims that they should have got better advice (BoI, p. T879), advice 
that apparently came from Alipate Qetaki, according to the director of the Army Legal Service, Lt Col 
Etueni Caucau (BoI, p. T896). But two judges and Chief Justice Sir Timoci Tuivaga drafted the decree 
that abrogated the Constitution. Col Dr Jona Senilagakali believed the military should have invoked 
the Public Emergency Regulations instead and put the Constitution aside (BoI, p. T842). 
113  A Sayed-Khaiyum, ‘Political support and the law’, Fiji Times, 13 January 2005. Sayed-Khaiyum 
argued that the military action did not amount to treason. The President agreed to step aside and did 
not formally resign until 15 December 2000. Although the Commander had no authority to abrogate 
the Constitution (it was formally reinstated) and the legal advice he received was unsound, the courts 
accepted that other military actions were justified in law and that it had acted solely to preserve national 
security. As Justice Gates argued on 15 November 2000, Mara did not resign on 29 May and the 
Constitution stayed in place. Bainimarama had acted on the basis of the doctrine of necessity to secure 
the safety of the state but had no genuine desire to remove the Constitution. Hence the decree abrogating 
it was unconstitutional (Verenaisi Raicola, ‘Doctrine of necessity’, Fiji Times, 29 March 2006).
114  ‘I’m telling the military to back off,’ Speight retorted, ‘The military came in at the twelfth hour. 
They have effectively performed a coup and I find that quite ironic’ (bbc.co.uk, 31 May 2000).
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had done, they objected. They were not prepared to place the country’s 
future in the hands of an institution already tainted by close links with 
Speight. They would not surrender the military’s role as guardian of the 
nation and they would not give in to a terrorist.115 ‘What is now happening 
to us is a moral recession,’ Tarakinikini told the nation that evening, ‘the 
very core of our existence is being challenged.’ The rebels ‘will threaten 
and they will try and destabilise and fragment our community so that we 
become vulnerable, and we will play into their hands if we succumb to 
tactics of fear’.116
Intervention by the colonels, however, did not produce the certainty 
they craved. If anything it confirmed to the rebels the success of their 
tactics. After increasingly violent vanua attacks on both the military and 
civilians in early June, and with IndoFijian refugees fleeing marauding 
gangs roaming across Tailevu and Naitasiri, former intelligence boss, 
Metuisela Mua, warned that they had plans to target the military across 
the country if it did not cave in.117 Support for the rebels seemed to be 
building; the President of the Methodist church even assured them of 
a divine pardon.118 
A desperate and disillusioned military now accepted an offer by Ratu 
Josefa Iloilo, the Tui Vuda and Mara’s former Vice President, to host 
talks between the rebels and the military at his Muanikau suburban 
residence. But the talks dragged on, with the rebels constantly changing 
their demands. An initial agreement collapsed when they demanded they 
keep their weapons for future protection. Not surprisingly, the army 
wearied but, short of launching an attack on parliament, could do little. 
‘The  paucity of leadership in the country is staggering,’ the Australian 
journalist Christopher Dore observed. Mara had vanished, Rabuka 
sulked in his office, and Bainimarama had not spoken publically for two 
weeks. His  Military Council, dominated by two former commanders 
115  BoI, pp. T829–830, testimony of Waqanisau. The colonel believed that these negotiations were 
not well handled. The army had no fall-back position and gave too much away. And Bainimarama 
should not have been directly involved. Ratu Tevita Mara later alleged that Bainimarama only 
changed his stance when Waqanisau challenged him at the meeting and called Speight a terrorist. The 
officers present clapped (Mara, ‘Fiji’s dictator Frank Bainimarama’s truth revealed’, 2011, p. 14).
116  Murray Mottram, ‘Speight meets his match’, Age, 5 June 2000, p. 15.
117  David Hardaker, interview, 7.30 Report, ABC, 12 June 2000. That police vehicles were allegedly 
used to transport cattle and produce from IndoFijian farms at Muaniweni, Nausori, further weakened 
public faith in its police.
118  Rev. Tomasi Kanailagi wrote on 16 June 2000: ‘we must not let Fijians fight among themselves 
or the Indians will have the last laugh’, Fiji Times, 20 June 2004.
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(Rabuka and Ganilau) had ‘never emerged from the shadows’. Even the 
GCC seemed to have vanished from sight, its liaison committee mired 
in conspiracies with the rebels. And, in the parliament, the scheming 
continued, with rebel leaders bickering over ‘whose coup it really is’. 
‘No-one in Fiji,’ Dore wrote, ‘has the slightest clue about how to end the 
political crisis.’119 
But all was not as it seemed. Behind the scenes Bainimarama attempted 
to regain the confidence of his officers. On Tuesday 4 July, he announced 
the formation of a new interim government headed by the former senator, 
CEO of the Fiji Development Bank and managing director of the 
Merchant Bank, the 59-year-old Lauan Laisenia Qarase.120 He and a new 
18-member, all-male cabinet would introduce a new constitution together 
with a new deal for Fijians, amend land leases along lines favoured by 
the NLTB, and return Fiji to elections within two years. The message to 
the rebels was clear; the Fijian bureaucratic establishment was once more 
in charge. It was a message they read, however, as a declaration of war. 
These people never ‘fought for the cause of the takeover’, Ligairi declared. 
They had failed Fiji in the past and would do so again.121 ‘We didn’t carry 
out the coup to provide an opportunity for the military to come in and 
run the government,’ Speight pronounced: ‘[T]hat’s not the objective 
of the coup and they don’t seem to accept that.’122 As if to drive home 
their point, 80 rebel soldiers under the command of Ligairi’s grandson, 
Lt Rupeni Vosayaco, and 500 supporters seized control of the Sukanaivalu 
Barracks outside Labasa, the capital of Vanua Levu. Two hours later in 
Suva, 200 rebels and soldiers clashed outside parliament. One rebel died. 
119  Australian, 29 June 2000, p. 10. The Military Council comprised Rabuka, Ganilau, Tuatoko, 
Vatu and Major-General Jioji Konrote. 
120  Baledrokadroka claims that this outcome was forced on a reluctant Bainimarama by the colonels, 
in particular Tarakinikini. The Military Council had wanted the former governor of the Reserve Bank 
and vice chancellor of USP, Savenaca Siwatibau to be prime minister, with Nailatikau as his deputy, 
but Siwatibau refused. Consequently the Military Council chose Qarase (rawfijinews.wordpress.com, 
17 April 2009). In an interview in 2007, Bainimarama claimed Qarase’s appointment had been an 
impulsive decision: ‘I was busy with George Speight’s issues one particular morning in 2000, then 
somebody asked me whether I was looking for a pm. They said they have Qarase, I said OK. Well, 
who is Qarase, he was a banker; so let’s go for him … We made a hell of a mistake back then’ (fijilive, 
18 September 2007). In 2006, Dr Senilagakali claimed he had been approached to head an interim 
government but advised Bainimarama to appoint Qarase instead (fijivillage, 7 December 2006).
121  Fiji Times, 6 December 2000.
122  fijilive, 4 July 2000. Allegedly on the same day Rabuka urged Seruvakula to remove Bainimarama 
as commander. Seruvakula refused (Fiji Times, 16 November 2006).
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The next day, when the army responded by finally imposing an exclusion 
zone around the parliamentary complex, Speight taunted its leadership. 
Chiefs will call on Fijians to leave the military and ‘As that takes place 
over the next few days, I’m sure Commander Bainimarama will find 
himself in command of an army that has no men’.123 These were not idle 
words. On Thursday 6 July, some 400 Naitasiri villagers marched on the 
military barracks at Nabua amid rumours of an uprising. In the Naitasiri 
highlands, rebels drugged soldiers guarding the Monasavu power station 
and cut power to Suva. The soldiers were taken hostage. Macuata chiefs 
in Vanua Levu demanded Bainimarama step down, and the paramount 
chief of Naitasiri – Ratu Inoke Takiveikata – demanded a president 
elected by the GCC who would choose his own interim administration. 
The military caved in, finally signing the Muanikau Accord on Sunday 
9 July at Iloilo’s residence in front of 500 hymn-chanting rebel supporters 
and a despondent Bainimarama. ‘We don’t want to shed blood amongst 
ourselves,’ the Naitasiri-born Tarakinikini conceded.124 
Despite promising to ‘surrender’ and release their hostages, the amnestied 
rebels were in no mood to end their campaign of civil disobedience. 
But  they had now to convince the country’s chiefs that Fiji’s future 
lay in their hands. Roadblocks sprang up around Fiji. One hundred 
and fifty rebels led by one CRWU soldier seized Korovou in Tailevu. 
Villagers took over the Savusavu and Seaqaqa police stations in Vanua 
Levu, and Labasa came under attack; so too the Nadi and Vanuabalavu 
airports, the army base in Lautoka, the police station and fish cannery 
in Levuka on Ovalau, tourist resorts on Turtle and Laucala islands, and 
a mineral water plant in Rakiraki. Fiji Telecom workers went on strike. 
Landowners and disgruntled employees occupied Road Transport offices 
in Suva and Lautoka, and prisoners rioted at Naboro prison. The former 
journalist and now rebel Jo Nata bragged, ‘Suva is almost under siege; 
the whole nation is in chaos … is that what you call holding a gun to the 
chiefs’ heads?’125
But not all chiefs required convincing. The deputy chair of the GCC, 
Adi Litia Cakobau, called a special meeting of 200 district and provincial 
chiefs (Bose ni Turaga) prior to the GCC’s deliberations, and her sister, 
Adi  Samanunu Cakobau, Fiji’s ambassador to Malaysia, flew back 
123  SBS, 5 July 2000.
124  fijilive, 7 July 2000.
125  Australian, 13 July 2000, p. 7.
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to chair  it. Designed to increase pressure on the GCC, the meeting 
recommended that Iloilo be president, the rebel ‘President’ Ratu Jope 
Seniloli his vice president, and the leader of the GCC negotiating team 
– Ratu Epeli Kanaimawi – prime minister of a new 22-member cabinet 
containing at least 11 rebels. When the GCC met on 14 July it accepted 
the first two demands but left it to Ratu Iloilo to determine the makeup of 
the new cabinet. Satisfied, the rebels released their remaining hostages. But 
when Iloilo announced the next day that Qarase’s administration would 
remain intact, Ligairi unleashed his ‘dogs of war’ for another round of 
destruction. Iloilo did not turn up to swear in his new cabinet on 19 July. 
Ligairi and Speight took their rebels out of the shattered parliamentary 
complex that had been their home for the past 62 days and moved to 
the Kalabu Fijian School, 12 kilometres from Suva in Naitasiri territory, 
looting on their way. From this base they would fight for lasting influence 
and power.
Ligairi and Takiveikata now pressured Iloilo to accept a new set of demands 
that included replacing Qarase with Adi Samanunu as prime minister. 
Her support for the rebels can be seen as another chapter in the long 
struggle between the Cakobau and Mara families and between Kubuna 
and Tovata for ascendancy within Fiji, a struggle that introduced a useful 
dynamic for the rebels in the already fractious relationship between Fijian 
provinces and between old centres of power. Iloilo agreed to include more 
rebels in the cabinet but, when he met with the rebels, Speight threatened 
further instability if he failed to deliver.126 
With the rebels out of parliament and their hostages released, 
Bainimarama now had more room to manoeuvre. Another initiative of 
the colonels (in particular Tuatoko, Tarakinikini and Baledrokadroka) 
assisted also. They had established a special Force Reserve Unit (FRU) 
or Task Force Group in late June to directly confront the rebel vanua. 
Comprising 3rd Battalion soldiers stationed in Nadi and Lautoka, as well 
as Suva’s Engineers, it made the Engineers HQ at the QEB its base.127 
Securing Naboro prison, where prisoners had taken wardens hostage 
126  Sydney Morning Herald, 27 July 2000. This was a confusing period of claim and counterclaim. 
Four paramount chiefs and one public servant apparently threatened instability if Iloilo failed to 
appoint Samanunu (fijilive, 6 April 2004). Bainimarama later alleged that six politicians met him 
in the FHL boardroom and requested that he overthrow Iloilo (Fiji Times, 25 August 2005). Poseci 
Bune claims that, when Iloilo looked like appointing Samanunu as prime minister, Qarase requested 
Bainimarama remove the President (fijilive, 3 August 2003).
127  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 170–73.
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under instruction from the rebels, became its first successful operation on 
17 July. Thus, a much more confident Bainimarama moved to frustrate 
the Speight group’s political manoeuvres. On 26 July, he rushed to the 
Presidential Palace and told Iloilo to ‘get a prime minister of our choice 
or else lose the army’.128 That same evening, the FRU quietly arrested 
Speight en route to Kalabu. At 6 am the next morning, Day 70 of the 
crisis, the FRU took the rebels at Kalabu by surprise and rounded them 
up. Sporadic outbreaks of violence occurred in retaliation around the 
country, mainly in Vanua Levu, and by the time the FRU recaptured 
Labasa’s Sukanaivalu Barracks at the start of August and swept through 
the Viti Levu highlands around Monasavu, an uneasy calm had descended 
over the country, punctuated only by distrust, fear and loathing. ‘No one 
is the winner here,’ Raduva told the board of inquiry a month or so later, 
‘we are all losers.’129
Nearly 500 rebels and their supporters across the country were arrested, 
many of them resentful at the beatings they received from their captors. 
Most civilian rebels were charged only with minor offences and were 
quickly released on lenient bail terms, but key perpetrators like Duvuloco, 
Speight and Ligairi were quarantined on the small Nukulau Island near 
Suva. Investigations were also begun into the activities of hundreds of 
citizens during the crisis, among them the Police Commissioner, who 
was forced to stand aside pending an investigation by the Chief Justice, 
himself under public scrutiny for advising the military on its seizure of 
power. Tarakinikini lost his post as army spokesperson and soon left, 
disillusioned, to a UN peacekeeping post in New York.130 Bainimarama 
also found himself under attack when he admonished chiefs for instigating 
division and hate among Fijians, and the High Court declared the 
Muanikau amnesty he had negotiated invalid. Stung, Bainimarama hit 
back when President Iloilo left for medical treatment in Sydney. He would 
never accept the rebel Seniloli as acting president and threatened a new 
military takeover.131 In the uproar that followed, Rabuka offered to serve 
as president and the target of loathing shifted again.
128  Tony Parkinson, ‘The rebels had military chief in their sights’, Age, 3 November 2000.
129  BoI, p. T855.
130  After the mutiny Tarakinikini was suspended from duties but no evidence of collusion with the 
mutineers could be found. He resigned in 2001, citing mistreatment from Bainimarama (Fiji Times, 
27 February 2002).
131  Saubulinayau observed that, while the events of 19 May helped bring the army together again, 
suspicions about officer loyalties always lingered, and resurfaced once things cooled down (BoI, 
p. T888).
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At the QEB, the CRWU soldiers smarted at their treatment. They felt 
ostracised; they did not take to their new commanding officer and were 
convinced that the army planned to disband the CRWU, despite the 
fact that most of those remaining (the majority) had stayed away from 
parliament, unlike their intelligence operatives and raw recruits.132 They 
were now placed within the 3rd Battalion, but were permitted to continue 
using CRWU offices and barracks. The rebels among them shared similar 
feelings. ‘We felt betrayed by Bainimarama,’ Serupepeli Dakai declared.133 
Bainimarama claimed to forgive them, but they were still being arrested 
and charged.134 The return of weapons created considerable angst, in part 
because RFMF records were hopelessly inaccurate but also because, when 
soldiers did return weapons, they were promptly charged.135 Yet, in many 
respects given the enormity of what had happened, the RFMF treated 
them leniently. At a special ceremony on 26 October, Captain Shane 
Stevens – now the CRWU’s second in command – formally sought the 
military’s forgiveness. Bainimarama accepted the request, and agreed to 
release the rebel soldiers into the custody of their families until the law 
took its course. A board of inquiry would be held. He even praised them 
for securing the safety of their hostages and containing ‘the rowdy and 
abusive’ vanua.136 But he also confirmed the demise of the CRWU.137 
The  soldiers were stunned. Revenge became the new order of the day. 
They  hid weapons in preparation. Stevens had already been sought 
out twice by Takiveikata, the Naitasiri chief who wanted Bainimarama 
132  BoI, p. T1004, testimony of Stevens.
133  fijilive, 3 November 2000. 
134  BoI, p. T936, testimony of Tuatoko. Other coup conspirators felt the same. Maciu Navakasuasua, 
who ended up incarcerated on Nukulau with Speight, claimed that failed politicians, church ministers 
and corrupt businessmen who ‘talked us into taking part’ in the coup had simply used them ‘to fulfill 
their political agendas’; they accepted positions in the interim government and ‘turned their backs on 
us as we were thrown into jail’ (Fiji Sun, 22 August 2015).
135  BoI, p. T1008, testimony of Stevens. At his court martial Stevens claimed the military 
fabricated the non-return of weapons in order to justify their violence in pacifying rebel areas in 
Kalabu, Monasavu, Ra, Tailevu and Vanua Levu (fijilive, 26 September 2002).
136  scoop.co.nz, 31 October 2000. 
137  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 184–85. Baledrokadroka argues 
that discontent at Bainimarama’s leadership resurfaced with the disbandment of the CRWU. 
Bainimarama had already begun to move officers who potentially threatened his leadership, including 
those in Strategic HQ, out of the QEB. But there was also the simple fact the Bainimarama had come 
from naval ranks and lacked the Sandhurst training of Stevens, Vatu and Tarakinikini. Victor Lal and 
Russell Hunter claim that the mutiny was the CRWU’s revenge for Bainimarama’s betrayal; he had 
ordered them to conduct the coup in the first place (‘Details of the death of CRWU soldier Selesitino 
Kalounivale revealed’, www.coupfourandahalf.com, 19 March 2012). 
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removed for dumping the Muanikau Accord and for the military’s 
treatment of civilian rebels at Kalabu, Monasavu and on Vanua Levu.138 
Now Stevens had grounds for action. Bainimarama later reflected:
I never thought they would be swayed with the lie that the RFMF had 
lost the trust of the vanua and that the vanua only trusted the CRWU 
because of what they stood for in May 2000. And so if the CRWU wanted 
the trust of the vanua to be returned to the RFMF, then they should take 
leadership of the army. Only then would the vanua be there for them.139
One week later, on Thursday, 2 November, the CRWU mutinied.
It was a bloody and confused affair.140 Led by the once loyal Stevens, 
40 CRWU soldiers, many reportedly intoxicated,141 seized weapons and 
took over the Officers Mess, Bainimarama’s office and administration 
complex, the national operations centre and the armoury in the early 
afternoon. They wanted hostages; above all they wanted Bainimarama. 
In the process they executed three unarmed loyal soldiers. Again their 
planning was meagre; the whole operation was designed simply as 
a repeat of 19 May, this time at the QEB on a day when many soldiers 
were out training and at a time when Bainimarama would be lunching 
in the Officers Mess. An unsigned fax ordered Vodafone to shut down 
army mobiles. A  coded message over Radio Fiji told Naitasiri, Tailevu 
and Rewa provincial organisers to get as many human shields into the 
camp as possible. Two hundred men gathered at Takiveikata’s Wailase farm 
in preparation.142 The rebels planned to negotiate for the release of their 
colleagues on Nukulau, establish a Taukei civilian government, and replace 
Bainimarama. 
Within hours the operation collapsed. The mutineers were unable to 
secure ammunition for the weapons they seized and had to make do 
with a more limited range of standard issue weapons. They botched the 
attack on Bainimarama and the senior command. Instead of employing 
stealth, they ‘brazenly assembled at the camp ground, conspicuous in 
138  fijilive, 17 September 2010. This was revealed in Takiveikata’s trial in 2010. He was given a life 
sentence in 2007 but released on appeal in 2008. On retrial in 2010 he received a seven-year sentence.
139  Fiji Times, 14 March 2006.
140  See also ‘Mayhem and mutiny’ in Robertson & Sutherland, Government by the Gun, 2001, 
pp. 40–49
141  Mara, ‘Fiji’s dictator Frank Bainimarama’s truth revealed’, 2011, p. 15. 
142  Evidence presented at Takiveikata’s trial, Fiji Times, 12 & 17 November 2004. At his trial, 
Stevens claimed that Takiveikata gave orders to Tarakinikini and Vatu to ‘secure’ the RFMF HQ on 
2 November (Jone Dakuvula, ‘The unresolved issues at stake over the commander controversy’, Asia-
Pacific Network, 30 January 2004).
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their black T-shirts’ and green pants, and fired ‘warning shots as they 
dispersed towards their targets’.143 Bainimarama and his bodyguards 
narrowly escaped through a nearby cassava patch. Nor did they consider 
how the wider army might be neutralised. In point of fact, elements of 
the Third Fiji Infantry Regiment returned from field exercises in Nadroga 
Province in the late afternoon and joined forces with Baledrokadroka 
who, with Raduva, Lt Col Solomone Raravula (the CO Engineers), and 
Lt Col Silivenusi Waqausa, rallied the FRU at the Engineers complex and 
merged them with raw engineer trainees. When the loyal troops learned 
of Takiveikata’s plot to bus in human shields, they closed the camp gates. 
At dusk they quickly mounted a counter offensive.144
Within two hours the battle for Nabua was over. Eight soldiers lay dead, 
five of them CRWU soldiers arrested in Suva after the mutiny began and 
allegedly beaten to death while detained. In addition, 28 soldiers were 
injured and stray bullets hit two civilians.145
143  Shailendra Singh, ‘The thin line’, Review, December 2000, p. 15.
144  Baledrokadroka provides the best account of the mutiny currently available.
145  One of many unsolved crimes emanating from the 2000 coup, the deaths in custody, continue to 
haunt the military to this day. Immediately after the mutiny, the wife of one dead soldier claimed that 
her husband – who had not participated in the mutiny – had been taken to the barracks after the event. 
In March 2001, the police announced that they were investigating the five deaths as murder. All  the 
dead soldiers had been arrested outside of the QEB and kept at the Central Police Station in Suva. 
They were later taken to the barracks where they died (Fiji Times, 26 March 2001). Nothing came of 
these investigations, although they were reopened again in 2005. Bainimarama has consistently denied 
ordering the deaths (Fiji Times, 8 February 2003), even of knowing about the investigation (Fiji Times, 
2  January 2007). In April 2006, the widow of one soldier won $24,000 in compensation under the 
Workers Compensation Act. During a civil suit against the RFMF in 2007 by three former CRWU soldiers, 
who had been taken by soldiers after surrendering at the Nabua police station and beaten at the Vatuwaqa 
rifle range, Baledrokadroka, then chief of operations, claimed that tensions raised by the mutiny probably 
lay behind the spontaneous assaults (fijilive, 17 October 2007). Bainimarama, who had surrendered one 
of the CRWU soldiers from the naval base to the police, made a similar claim to journalist Graham Davis 
in 2007: ‘I think they were just bashed up by the [loyalist] soldiers because they got pretty peeved. I think 
that is an understatement. You know they’d been part of the RFMF for 10, 20 years and all of a sudden 
one day they turned around and shot people up. Do you expect our guys to go and kiss them on the 
cheek? Let’s be real about the situation … These guys came to kill people. They came out to kill, so if they 
died in the process I’m not going to cry about it’ (Fiji Times, 2 January 2007). In 2011, after escaping Fiji, 
Ratu Tevita Mara claimed that some 60 CRWU soldiers were tortured and held at Korovou prison (‘Fiji’s 
dictator Frank Bainimarama’s truth revealed’, 2011, p. 15). The issue never really died, despite later police 
claims that Bainimarama had been cleared back in 2003 and that the Police Commissioner confirmed 
this in 2004 and sought to mislead people by claiming to reopen the case in 2006 (fijivillage, 15 February 
2007). The issue resurfaced yet again when pictures of the five battered bodies circulated on dissident 
websites after 2012 (www.fijileaks.com/home/bloody-2-november-2000-the-day-bainimarama-wanted-
mutinous-soldiers-punished-some-innocent-thirteen-years-ago-kicked-to-death-police-wanted-to-qu-
estion-him-before-coup). Warning: this website contains graphic images.
In February 2015, Opposition leader Ro Teimumu Kepa tried to reopen the issue by calling on police 
to complete their investigations (Fiji Times, 20 February 2015).
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Military victory over the mutineers brought no peace. Instead it 
intensified recriminations. Rabuka became one of its early victims. Since 
1997 Rabuka had been fêted internationally for bringing Fiji back from 
the abyss he had driven it to. He had been honoured with the Solomon 
Islands dispute to resolve. But the year 2000 proved difficult for Rabuka. 
Each time ‘the Statesman’ inserted himself into the dramas around him, 
he created suspicion, not respect. Mara had accused him of conspiracy; 
Speight and Ligairi of betrayal. Now Bainimarama charged him with 
treachery. During the mutiny he came to the barracks uninvited just as the 
military counterattack began. He threatened to put on his uniform and 
return as commander if the assault team did not withdraw. He criticised 
the Commander’s leadership. He left with one of the rebels in his car. 
Bainimarama suspected Rabuka was trying to buy time until the human 
shields arrived under the cover of darkness. ‘He really confuses the army, 
that man,’ Bainimarama declared.146 
Rabuka told it differently. Having flown in from Savusavu, he was 
lunching  at a function with business executives when his personal 
assistant informed him of the mutiny. At 1.15 pm he first called Colonel 
Seruvakula of the 3FIR, and then Home Affairs before speaking to 
a number of people at the camp. One of the rebels asked him to mediate 
because he disapproved of the mutiny. Rabuka also spoke with one of 
the hostages. At this point he decided that he was needed. But he got 
there too late. Baledrokadroka refused to speak with him. The orders for 
a counterattack had been issued.147
Rabuka denied any part in the mutiny.148 He did not approve of the 
rebels’ goals. ‘We should allow ourselves to evolve into a vibrant society 
of mixed races, [a] multi ethnic, multi racial, multi religious society,’ he 
declared: ‘Those who are trying to drag us back into the era of the dinosaur 
… hopefully will quickly be called to their graves.’ Meanwhile he would 
146  Fiji Times, 9 November 2000; Singh, 2000, p. 15. In 2006, Seruvakula alleged that on 2 
November 2000 Rabuka tried to convince him to remove Bainimarama as commander. Both he and 
Bainimarama also alleged that Rabuka made a similar request earlier in July when the hostage crisis 
ended (Fiji Times, 11 November 2006).
147  fijilive, 7 November 2000; Fiji Times, 3 March 2004.
148  In late 2006, Rabuka was found not guilty of inciting mutiny, but the long police investigation 
cost him his appointment by the Qarase government as Fiji’s ambassador to the United States.
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continue to work for a new Fiji: ‘I cannot let the flame that inspired me to 
work towards the 1997 Constitution … burn out.’149 But the knives were 
out for Rabuka. In March 2001, the GCC dumped him as their chairman.
Bainimarama also came under scrutiny. Although his dramatic retreat 
from  the Battle of Nabua and alleged refuge at the naval base caused 
him to lose face and left him traumatised, he strongly believed that 
everything he had done during the course of 2000 had been designed 
to foster stability and reconciliation among indigenous Fijians.150 He had 
assumed authority on 29 May to protect the President and save Fiji from 
descending into anarchy. He had refused to raid parliament for fear that 
the deaths of innocent or naive Fijians would produce an even greater 
backlash against the army. He had backed Qarase’s interim regime 
because it alone promised Fijians a clearly articulated direction. And he 
had managed to hold the RFMF together, despite its officers’ ideological 
differences and the lack of respect many showed to him as commander 
because of his naval background.
But Bainimarama’s actions did not always accord with international 
conventions, let alone satisfy Fiji’s other communities. IndoFijians in 
particular felt excluded; so, too, did many business people. The new 
Qarase regime planned to reintroduce a Taukeist Constitution, an act that 
potentially threatened international retaliation and the loss of important 
markets for Fiji’s products. Its chaotic approach to land use and its 
support for the Taukeist demands of the NLTB additionally threatened 
Fiji’s agricultural production and a new wave of rural refugees. Yet for 
many people, including Fijians, a sense of déjà vu left most disillusioned. 
Thirteen years of patience and consensus-building had seemingly come 
to nought. Fiji’s politics lay shattered and its economy teetered on the 
abyss. The 2000 coup had cost Fiji well in excess of $1 billion (equivalent 
to the government’s total annual budget) and $300 million in damage 
to infrastructure and lost government revenue alone. The parliamentary 
complex, which Rabuka had built in 1992 to mark a turning point in 
149  Review, October–November 2000, p.17.
150  Baledrokadroka believes that Bainimarama’s bodyguards were sufficiently armed to have 
made a stand at the Officers Mess; instead, by abandoning the Officers Mess, Bainimarama lost 
an opportunity to boost the morale of his troops. His unprepared bodyguards told the later court 
martial, however that they had almost exhausted their ammunition by the time they fled (Daily Post, 
27 February 2002). And Bainimarama did not quit the QEB. He came to the Engineers HQ prior to 
the final assault but was advised to go the Stanley Brown Naval Base for his safety (Baledrokadroka, 
‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 190, 194).
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Fiji’s democracy, lay shattered. Over 10 per cent of the paid workforce 
had lost their jobs as the economy shrank an astonishing 12 per cent. 
Hotel occupancy rates plummeted 80 per cent, while Fiji’s large garment 
industry lost nearly one quarter of its 20,000 workers. According to one 
estimate, 40 per cent more people lived in poverty than when the crisis 
began.151 Fiji’s postcolonial economic transformation – Sutherland noted 
in 2001 – had never been accompanied by the kind of popular economic 
participation that enabled political stability. Now, in the face of sharper 
class and rural–urban inequalities, there was every reason to believe that 
politicians would once more defend themselves by resorting to racial 
scapegoating.152
Reclaiming the goose
Laisenia Qarase presented the grandfatherly face of Fijian nationalism. 
Portrayed as a neutral public servant, he was anything but disinterested. 
After his election as prime minister in late 2001 he boasted of his 
centrality in the development of affirmative action programs for Fijians 
since 1985 when he had returned from a study tour of Malaysia. 
He wanted a 20-year strategic plan for Fijian economic growth, a review 
of Fiji’s Constitution, the transfer of state lands to the NLTB, and Fijian 
ownership of fishing waters. He damned existing land leases as ‘statutory 
fraud’ and claimed Fijians were subsidising the sugar industry through 
unfair rental agreements. His agenda would dominate Fiji politics for the 
next six years, and encourage many former rebels and nationalists to claim 
that Fiji’s bureaucratic elite had at last started to make the 2000 coup 
a  success.153 Yet, instead of driving Fijians towards nirvana, it brought 
them back to where they had been under Rabuka in the mid-1990s, 
fractious and floundering. Fiji’s peoples had to learn how to live together 
and to use their diversity as the basis for united strength. 
For most of his six years in office, Qarase chose to address this need with 
silence, despite the fact that his reassertion of Fijian paramountcy – which 
he presented as the only solution available to Fiji – posed many threats, 
151  fijilive, 23 October 2000; 17 February 2001; Review, August 2000, pp. 19–20; Joseph Veramu, 
Fiji Community Education Association President, scoop.co.nz, 5 February 2001.
152  Robertson & Sutherland, Government by the Gun, 2001, p. 141.
153  This was the view of Tailevu CAMV MP, Samisoni Tikoinasau, Speight’s brother (fijilive, 
16 May 2002).
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not least to Fijians themselves. ‘If Indians are forced to leave Fiji,’ Mara 
told his Lau Provincial Council in late 2000, ‘the next group of people 
will be islanders who have made a living in Viti Levu.’154 Indeed, the more 
Fiji moved towards the kind of traditional vanua politics Mara warned 
of, the more divided the vanua became. Identity has a habit of becoming 
exclusive, while targets of envy shift. Rabuka noted how even moderate 
provincial successes created jealousy in other provinces, and encouraged 
self-pity.155 Fijians really needed to come to terms with their own history 
and their modernity. The past offered no justice or direction to the 
thousands of Fijians who had abandoned the poverty of their villages 
for the poverty of urban slums. Nor did it assist them to come to terms 
with the reality of Fiji’s multiracialism and multiculturalism. It offered no 
guide for the future.
Nor did Qarase’s interim government. Its blueprint for Fijian 
development  advantaged the Fijian middle classes, not the disaffected 
masses that had fuelled the CRWU rebellion. Education, which 
Bainimarama believed essential for Fijian development, received no boost 
in the first Qarase budget. Government grants to secondary schools 
halved and, although it set aside special funding for Fijian education, not 
a cent reached Fijian children if they went to multi-ethnic schools, as so 
many urban Fijians did.156 
Although aware of these divisions, neither Bainimarama nor Qarase 
could suggest anything other than reconciliation to resolve internal Fijian 
divisions that had already created so much strife and misery. But how 
might reconciliation be achieved? Bainimarama conceded that Fijian 
unity existed only during periods of opposition to IndoFijians, but such 
an acknowledgement was hardly a strategy for Fijian reconciliation, 
let alone national healing.157
Nonetheless, Qarase created a Ministry of Reconciliation and launched 
a National Council for Reconciliation and Unity in late November 2000. 
Promisingly, it proposed the educational integration of Fiji’s communities, 
154  fijilive, 16 October 2000.
155  Fiji Times, 2 December 2000.
156  In May 2001, Qarase finally released a blueprint for Fijian education, detailing a much needed 
$8.4 million injection of capital into Fijian educational infrastructure. But it was a technocratic 
response only and did nothing to address the concerns of the Education Commission, whose report 
remained hidden from public scrutiny.
157  Fiji Times, 12 November 2000.
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racial parity in the military, and a new national identity. But no strategy 
ever emerged to deliver such outcomes.158 For the present, Qarase could 
only plead that Fiji’s peoples be more forgiving of each other. ‘One needed 
to forgive unconditionally before attempting reconciliation,’ Qarase told 
the National Tourism Forum in December 2000, ‘because unity was 
impossible without forgiveness.’159 Forgiveness included Speight. ‘There 
are so many people with much worse records who got away free right 
around the world,’ he declared.160 Rabuka agreed. He told the Cakaudrove 
Provincial Council that the courts should consider reconciliation as part of 
the endeavour to unite the people of Fiji and give sentences accordingly.161
Qarase’s permanent secretary for reconciliation, Col Jeremaia Waqanisau, 
who had told the board of inquiry that unity and reconciliation might 
prove illusory,162 declared investigations into the coup an obstacle to 
reconciliation.163 The dropping of charges ‘for lack of evidence’ against 
four  rebel leaders held on Nukulau encouraged this line of action. 
‘If Fiji is to go forward,’ declared one of the freed rebels, ‘the reconciliation 
process must start on Nukulau’ where the rebels’ leaders were quarantined. 
Perhaps for this reason the Suva Magistrates Court permitted Speight 
and Ligairi to register as candidates in the August 2001 election. 
Reconciliation presented itself to the public service too. On the Chief 
Justice’s recommendation, Savua was reinstated as Police Commissioner 
in November. In May 2003, a public service inquiry also cleared Adi 
Samanunu of any wrongdoing. Her sister, Adi Litia Cakobau, told the 
Senate in the following year that all political prisoners must be released. 
‘To criminalise freedom of expression is to criminalise democracy,’ 
158  Fiji Times, 26 February 2001. It also planned a special program in 2002 to prepare young chiefs 
for leadership.
159  Fiji Times, 8 December 2000.
160  Mark Chippendale, ‘Qarase sees a future of affirmative action’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
19 February 2001. 
161  fijilive, 16 November 2000. Reconciliation was presented as a uniquely Fijian response and, 
according to one participant at a workshop convened by the Constitutional Commission in 2012, 
involved spending a lot of money so chiefs could say sorry, even in 2003, for the 1867 killing of 
Christian missionaries in Naitisiri.
162  BoI, p. T836. Waqanisau claimed that ‘I do not think we will achieve any unity, I do not think 
we will achieve any reconciliation, I do not think so if we continue as we are … Whilst there are 
people who actually needed to pay for whatever acts they committed, I think what we need to do 
now is rebuild RFMF and I do not think we can rebuild the RFMF after bashing each other up first’. 
Waqanisau, a former force commander of UN Forces Lebanon, resigned from the army in 1997 to 
become Commissioner Western and, in 2003, became permanent secretary for Home Affairs.
163  fijilive, 8 November 2000.
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she  declared, adding that the blueprint was not enough to correct the 
historic injustices done to Fijians; the 1997 Constitution ‘is a time bomb 
and must be changed before time pulls the trigger’.164
There were dangers in this ethnocentric approach to reconciliation. 
A disillusioned Seruvakula left the command of the Third Fiji Infantry in 
March 2001 and, with three other officers, began service with the New 
Zealand Defence Forces before heading to Afghanistan with the United 
Nations. New Zealand’s High Commissioner, Tia Barrett, publicly 
condemned Fiji’s apparent reluctance to bring to justice ‘those responsible 
for the upheaval … despite the wealth of information available’.165 His 
country offered the director of public prosecutions (DPP) legal assistance 
but he declined the offer. In early December, some of the hostage takers at 
Monasavu received suspended sentences.
Mara warned the Lau Provincial Council that ‘The reconciliation that has 
been undertaken today will be worthless if investigations into the coup do 
not reveal the truth behind [its] staging’.166 Many Fijians agreed, including 
the army’s legal officer, Lt Ilaisa Tagitupou. ‘Justice was necessary,’ he said, 
‘because reconciliation was not appreciated.’167 Interim deputy prime 
minister Ratu Epeli Nailatikau took a more principled stand. 
Unadulterated greed and the unbelievable arrogance as was shamelessly 
displayed by chiefs and people alike on May 19 will not bring about 
paramountcy in this day and age. 
Justice had to come before reconciliation, he declared, contradicting 
Qarase.168 
Nailatikau’s wife – Adi Koila – who had suffered imprisonment in the 
hands of the rebels in parliament, agreed. When in October 2004, 
Qarase attempted to draw a line under reconciliation by having two 
coup participants – Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu and Ratu Jope Seniloli 
– undertake a traditional matanigasau ceremony for forgiveness before 
himself and the President during a special Reconciliation Week, Adi Koila 
declared the exercise pointless given that it was directed at two main 
beneficiaries of the coup, one of whom she accused of having ordered 
164  fijilive, 10 December 2003.
165  scoop.co.nz, 27 November 2000.
166  Fiji Times, 14 December 2000.
167  Fiji Times, 15 January 2001.
168  scoop.co.nz, 20 December 2000.
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the burning of her father’s Seaqaqa cane farm in July 2000. Why had her 
recently deceased parents not been so honoured? They would both be 
still alive were it not for the coup. Why were other coup participants like 
Kubuabola, Rabuka and Savua being honoured with diplomatic posts? 
Like her father before her, she believed reconciliation worthless if no one 
knew who had been behind the coup.169
Because Fijians could not agree on how to resolve the issues dividing 
them, the danger existed that they would simply muddle on without 
substantially changing anything. And that, some Fijians believed, carried 
the even greater risk of endless repetitions, endless violence and endless 
misery. ‘Unless we nip it now,’ one of the authors of the 1997 Constitution 
– Tomasi Vakatora – presciently stated, ‘this mentality will continue.’170
In the wake of Speight and Ligairi, Fijians faced a dilemma that they 
could not resolve. Old ideas concerning paramountcy dictated that 
reconciliation among Fijians came before anything else. But reconciliation 
was never going to be possible until Fijians came to terms with their own 
diversity. And that meant understanding that the old politics of the vanua 
could no longer serve Fiji’s multicultural vanua and the international 
context in which it now existed. It also meant understanding, as the 
former Labour minister Ema Tagicakibau wrote in 2004, that the 2000 
coup ‘did not break the rules of the vanua but of the law. The law must 
take its course, not for vengeance, but to set a high standard of behaviour 
to which everyone must aspire’. This, she believed, was the only way to 
stop Fiji’s coup culture.171
To many chiefs, however, such an understanding amounted to 
capitulation. When they met again in late April 2001, they signalled that 
they wanted more chiefs in a future parliament and the level of debate in 
such a parliament to reflect the status due to them as chiefs. Further, they 
wanted Fijian representation (nominated in the first instance by chiefs) 
restricted to provincial representation.172 The ghost of 1990 was still 
clearly present, but now faced a more fraught environment. Vanua Levu 
169  Fiji Times, 23 October 2004. The former Speaker of the House, Militoni Leweniqila, also 
believed that all the hostages should be compensated (Fiji Times, 6 May 2005). The intention had 
been for the apology to be given also to FLP members but the party refused to attend, fearing ulterior 
political motives (Fiji Sun, 12 February 2005).
170  Fiji Sun, 1 September 2000.
171  ‘The politics of forgiving’, Fiji Times, 23 October 2004.
172  fijilive, 27 April 2001.
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rebel Ratu Jo Dimuri signalled where opposition might lead. Provincial 
councils were captive to the Fijian chiefly elite, he argued. They had 
long suppressed the voices of ordinary Fijians and ‘were to blame for the 
outbursts of Fijians’. Provincial councils should be replaced by mataqali 
(clan) and yavusa (district) meetings instead.173
Qarase, who desperately wanted to plug the gap left by Mara’s departure 
and Rabuka’s loss of power, had no time for such nonsense. Democracy, 
he warned, could be dangerous if it undermined the very communal 
values that defined Fijian identity. Instead he proposed strengthening 
the chiefly system and granted $20 million to make the GCC financially 
independent, drafted constitutional changes to place it under presidential 
rather than parliamentary control, and planned a new administration 
complex for the GCC.174 But his responses came too late. The events 
of 2000 effectively placed the chiefly system on trial and, over the next 
10 years, its political role would be destroyed. 
This was a surprising outcome for those who believed that the events of 
2000 had least reasserted Fijian paramountcy. But paramountcy derived 
from too many interests and too many power manoeuvres to enable 
the emergence of stable political consensus. From the very moment 
of the coup, disunity generated its own self-serving momentum and 
rationalisations. It drove the Chief Justice to accept the army’s abrogation 
of the Constitution and to deny legitimacy to anyone who questioned his 
judgement. It drove the Constitutional Review chairman, Asesela Ravuvu, 
to declare that ‘Politics must come before the law and legalities’. It drove 
Qarase to argue that the treason that succeeds is not treason.175 And it 
drove Bainimarama to defend his abrogation, even when the High Court 
in November 2000 ruled it illegal and called for the reinstatement of the 
dismissed parliament. ‘It’s no use moving towards democracy if we can’t 
settle the security problem,’ he warned.176 But, as Vakatora acknowledged, 
without democracy there is only dictatorship.177 
173  Fiji Times, 4 May 2001. Leweniqila later declared them unelected representatives not qualified 
to speak on politics (Fiji Times, 6 May 2005).
174  Fiji Times, 23 October 2004. Ro Pateresia Vonakua, the paramount chief of Naitasiri’s Waimaro 
district and Ratu Jope Seniloli’s sister-in-law, declared that no one could break the law with impunity, 
regardless of the cause they held dearly or their rank.
175  Charles Sampford, ‘Dare to call it treason’, Overhere.com, May 2001.
176  Singh, 2000, p. 15. In Lautoka, Justice Anthony Gates first declared the abrogation of the 
Constitution illegal, condemned the actions of senior judges who assisted the military commit illegal 
acts, and resisted the Chief Justice’s efforts to transfer constitutional cases to Suva.
177  Fiji Times, 1 September 2000.
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By March 2001 Bainimarama had changed his mind. He accepted the 
High Court’s ruling that his actions in abrogating the Constitution had 
been illegal;178 so too – reluctantly – did a divided GCC. It reappointed 
Iloilo president and advised him to hold fresh elections under the 1997 
Constitution. Having ended the threat of a commoner revolt in 2000, Fiji’s 
elite had no wish to surrender to the old parliament the power it had since 
gained. By one account Bainimarama had not wanted Chaudhry back for 
fear that he might frustrate confirmation of a general amnesty for military 
misdeeds committed during 2000.179 Hence he reluctantly accepted the 
court’s decision, and Iloilo dismissed Chaudhry and his government and 
dissolved parliament. Qarase now returned as caretaker prime minister 
with the same cabinet as before. So too Ravuvu’s Constitutional Review 
Committee, pursuing – according to the Citizens’ Constitutional 
Forum’s (CCF) director, Rev. Akuila Yabaki – the same ‘illegal objective 
of George Speight’.180 Nothing it seemed had changed, except that all 
parties – including Labour – now agreed to an early election.181 Both 
Qarase and Bainimarama urged Fijians to unite behind one party. Only 
by this means could Fijian paramountcy be assured, meaning that the 
Fijian establishment would not lose out as they had in 1999. This concern 
lay behind Qarase’s focus on Fijian reconciliation and unity throughout 
his years in office. ‘Calling for unity only among Fijians makes a mockery 
of national reconciliation and national unity,’ the Catholic Archbishop 
178  At the start of 2001, Bainimarama and Colonel Ratu George Kadavulevu allegedly told Iloilo 
in the presence of Qarase and some of his cabinet that the military would support a government of 
national unity drawn from the former parliament if the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court 
ruling (Fiji Times, 20 January 2001). In March, Qarase told the Court of Appeal that he would 
respect its ruling and help return Fiji to constitutional government, but engineered the GCC decision 
that retained his incumbency (Dakuvula, ‘The unresolved issues’, 2004).
179  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, p. 214. In 2003, Bainimarama declared 
that the military did not reinstate Chaudhry because ‘there would have been physical casualties, 
mayhem and strife; things would have gone straight downhill’ (Sandra Gebhart, ‘The role of the 
military in a democracy: civil–military relations in Fiji’, in Background Paper on the RFMF and Fiji’s 
Defence Policy, CCF papers submitted to the Defence Review Committee, October 2003, p. 63). 
From a defence perspective this is the more likely reason for Bainimarama’s decision. Of course 
Chaudhry had also advised the President to hold fresh elections although not all his party agreed 
with his advice. An amnesty bill was eventually tabled in parliament in 2004 but the government’s 
coalition partner, the Conservative Alliance, refused to ratify it, claiming that the interests of the 
military’s victims also needed protection (Dakuvula, ‘The unresolved issues’, 2004).
180  fijilive, 3 May 2001.
181  Tupeni Baba claims that after the High Court ruling, the Labour Party did want the old 
parliament recalled and Chaudhry knew he no longer had party support as leader. Hence he advised 
the President to dissolve the interim government and hold elections (fijilive, 22 April 2006). 
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Petero Mataca wrote: ‘Instead it speaks loudly and clearly of  Fijian 
nationalism and discrimination against non-Fijians … We need leaders 
who can rise above racial politics and work for the common good of all.’182
Yet, by mid-2001, as Qarase feared, the fallout from the coup left Fiji more 
divided politically than before. Indeed, it appeared as if the divisions of 
1999 were repeating themselves. At the same time that the GCC formally 
abandoned the SVT as its official party, rebel Macuata and Cakaudrove 
supporters split from the SVT to form a new Conservative Alliance 
Matanitu Vanua (CAMV). Poseci Bune left the VLV to join PANU, which 
itself split, with Apisai Tora forming a rival Ba Kei Viti (BKV). In May, 
former Deputy Prime Minister Tupeni Baba left the Labour Party to form 
his own party and join a preference sharing Moderate Fijian Coalition 
with Vuikaba’s FAP faction, Mick Beddoes’ United Generals Party, and 
Rabuka, who had also abandoned the SVT. Even the precocious NVTLP 
split, its rump reuniting with its one-time rival – the New National Party 
– as a Taukei Civilian Forum. Melanesian members deserted the United 
Generals Party, declaring themselves unhappy with their leader’s support 
for the restoration of democracy.
Meanwhile several provinces formed their own parties (Naitasiri offered 
a Citizen’s United Party) or proposed their chiefs as provincial candidates, 
in both instances arguing that no Fijian candidates should challenge 
them. Lau put its weight behind Qarase who, in May, launched his own 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL or People’s United Party), 
backed it was alleged by Fijian Holdings Limited183 and supported by 
the Tailevu faction of the Fijian Association Party. Naitasiri’s Turaga ni 
Qaranivalu, Takiveikata, became its vice president. Certainly 12 caretaker 
ministers and Qarase hoped that the SDL would be their vehicle to 
electoral success. Even before the formation of his party, Qarase was on 
the campaign trail dispensing funds for villages, roads and schools across 
the country. But, like other Fijian leaders, Qarase understood that success 
also depended on how voting preferences were distributed. A government 
analysis of the 1999 election claimed that the SVT would have won if 
Fijian parties had directed preferences to it instead of the Labour Party.184 
Hence the rash of umbrella organisations formed – the Moderate Fijian 
182  P Mataca, ‘Churches must preach unity’, Fiji Times, 9 February 2005.
183  pcgovt.org.fj, accessed 18 May 2001.
184  fijilive, 21 May 2001.
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Coalition, the Nationalists’ Taukei Civilian Forum, and the SVT’s Fijian 
Political Forum. In mid-May, the Methodist Church tried to bring the 
rival coalitions together and have all major Fijian parties share preferences.
Despite efforts to unite all Fijian parties under a single political umbrella, 
Fijians remained deeply divided over the meaning and the legality of 
the events of 2000: ‘We have tried the illegal and unjust route on many 
occasions and we, the indigenous people, continue to pay the price for our 
recklessness,’ lawyer Tupou Draunidalo warned towards the end of 2000. 
The ball, she believed, was now firmly in the hands of the military: ‘Fiji 
will emerge from this mess when the FMF takes its role as the ultimate 
guardian of the State and Constitution more seriously … You reap what 
you sow’.185 The Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF) agreed. In May 
2001, it legally challenged the President’s failure to recall parliament.186 
Qarase dismissed its members as ‘zealots of constitutionality’ and declared 
that ‘the welfare of people come before the rule of law’.187 But the pressure 
told on the Chief Justice and he resigned.
As Sutherland and I noted that year, the August 2001 elections fell too 
much under the shadow of the 2000 coup to enable dispassionate debate on 
strategies and outcomes.188 The Labour Party fought for the restoration of 
its government, the SDL for the continuation of its interim administration 
and policies, and the Conservative Alliance for the legitimisation of 
the 2000 coup. The results reflected that polarisation. Former People’s 
Coalition partners like PANU, FAP and VLV were routed. So too the 
new BKV and the once dominant SVT. Fijians rallied behind Qarase’s 
SDL which won nearly all Fijian seats, except for five in Vanua Levu and 
one in Tailevu (Speight’s) that were taken by the Conservative Alliance.189 
185  Fiji Times, 15 December 2000. Her stepfather, Dr Timoci Bavadra, had been one of the May 
1987 coup’s first victims, while her father – Col Savenaca Draunidalo – had been implicated in the 
2000 coup.
186  Eventually justices Ward and Barker ruled that, while the CCF’s case was valid, the President 
had had no alternative given the Labour Party’s divisions and the lack of a government-in-waiting. 
Elections had already been held. They could not turn back the clock.
187  fijilive, 14 May 2001. The Qarase regime also pressured the CCF by deregistering it as 
a charitable trust (fijilive, 23 April 2001).
188  Robertson & Sutherland, Government by the Gun, 2001, pp. 141–42. The analysis in the next 
five paragraphs also draws on Sutherland’s ‘Postscript’ in that volume.
189  Additionally, the NLUP won two seats, the GVP one, the NFP one (later lost on a recount 
to the FLP), and independents two. Although in custody, Speight was permitted to contest the seat 
in Tailevu but was expelled from parliament for non-attendance in December 2001. He remained 
incarcerated on Nukulau Island. His brother, Samisoni Tikoinasau, assumed his place instead. 
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With 31 seats and 51 per cent of the Fijian vote, Qarase was the clear 
winner and he immediately set about forming government in partnership 
with CAMV. 
By heralding a third period of post-independence Fijian political 
domination and segregated economic development, rather than the start 
of a new era of multiracial cooperation, Qarase – like Mara and Rabuka 
before him – portrayed elite Fijian interests as synonymous with those 
of ordinary Fijians and declared their primacy above all other interests. 
For that reason Sutherland and I concluded our study of the 2000 coup 
and its aftermath by stating that ‘it was too early to forecast an end to 
government by the gun in Fiji in the long term’.190
But we also detailed what we believed Fijians could do to put the 
indigenous question behind them and take Fiji forward.191 First, we argued 
that Fijians needed to understand that the causes of their disaffection 
lay within their own communities. The notion of Fijian paramountcy 
made this task more difficult; it enabled a Fijian elite to dominate on 
their behalf and reject the kind of open environment that might assist 
Fijians to achieve their potential. Unfortunately, pursuing the idea of 
Fijian political unity has always produced its opposite, not to mention 
marginality, victimhood and eventually dictatorship. 
Second, we believed that indigenous identity should not be claimed at 
the expense of national identity; ‘calling everybody by the same name is 
a first step in overcoming legacies of colonialism and moving forward’.192 
We recommended that everyone be accepted as Fijian193 after the name 
of the nation, and that those who up until then had claimed the national 
name for themselves be called the Taukei. But we also recommended 
recognition of people’s multiple identities and heritages as a way of 
discouraging the stereotyping associated with exclusive identities. 
190  Robertson & Sutherland, Government by the Gun, 2001, p. 142.
191  ‘Addressing the indigenous question’ and ‘Building the nation’, Robertson & Sutherland, 
Government by the Gun, 2001, pp. 132–39.
192  Robertson & Sutherland, Government by the Gun, 2001, p.133.
193  Adi Litia Cakobau would clearly not have agreed. In 2003, she attacked IndoFijians at USP 
who used the journal Fijian Studies to include ‘Indian’ matters, calling their action an insidious form 
of ‘ethnic violence’, even ‘an act of ethnocide’ (fijilive, 10 December 2003).
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Third, we urged that indigenous institutions be transparent and 
accountable, that they be democratised and work to empower their 
people, not act like fiefdoms above the law. Such fiefdoms were among 
the root causes of Fiji’s contemporary misadventure. 
Fourth, we contended that affirmative action had done little to assist 
Fijians not already in advantaged positions; had it been otherwise then 
the vanua of 2000 might never have presented as Ligairi’s ‘dogs of war’.
We ended our study by arguing that the challenge facing Fiji was not 
the absence of indigenous paramountcy as so many Fijian nationalists 
asserted. Fijians were politically dominant but such dominance brought 
them neither wealth nor unity.
Similarly, the challenge is not to do with the incompatibility of democracy 
with tradition. Democracy is needed more than ever to ensure indigenous 
wellbeing. Nor is it even the impossibility of harmony in plural societies. 
Pluralism takes many forms and is just as capable of enriching societies 
as creating the basis for division.194
Instead the real challenge lay – as the authors of Fiji’s 1997 Constitution 
had earlier recognised – in citizens understanding ‘that what is good 
for their neighbours must ultimately be good for them as well, when 
difference and diversity are seen not as sources of division and distrust 
but of strength and inspiration’.195 Ligairi and Speight had demonstrated 
for a second time what could happen when that challenge was denied. 
Unfortunately, Qarase would now demonstrate how much harder the 
challenge would become each time it is rejected.
The post-2000 regime of Laisenia Qarase rebuilt the Fijian establishment 
party that both Mara and Rabuka had lost before him and, like the 
government under them, did little for ordinary Fijians. Its much-vaunted 
affirmative action policies in education benefited only Fijians who attended 
Fijian-run schools. For the majority, who increasingly dominated the rolls 
of non Fijian-run primary and secondary schools, there was no assistance.196 
Many of these students were among the most disadvantaged Fijians, 
residing in squatter settlements and poor households. Of course Fijians 
194  Robertson & Sutherland, Government by the Gun, 2001, pp. 138–39.
195  Reeves, Vakatora & Lal, The Fiji Islands, 1996, p. xix.
196  Fiji Times, 22 February 2007. The remainder of this section draws on Robbie Robertson, 
‘Coups & development: the more things change, the more they stay the same’, in BV Lal & G Chand 
(eds), 1987 and All That: Fiji Twenty Years Later. Lautoka: FIAS, 2008, pp. 27–41.
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were not the only ones in this situation. Despite government attempts 
to argue that Fijians represented the most disadvantaged population in 
the country, increased IndoFijian depopulation of the countryside after 
2000, the greater presence of IndoFijian beggars on the main streets of 
urban centres, the growth of IndoFijian peri-urban squatter settlements, 
and official statistics all suggested a more complex story.197 Poverty and 
disadvantage afflicted every community.
Although the maintenance of ethnic forms of discrimination as the 
basis for affirmative action became increasingly tenuous, the rationale 
for all Fijian-first policies pursued since independence never varied. Too 
much had been invested in them for Fijian parties to simply disown 
them, a fact that Speight knew only too well in 2000. ‘I’ve stepped in to 
stop the Indians or any other migrant culture achieving in this country 
what  the  Europeans have achieved in Australia and New Zealand,’ he 
declared.198 Prime Minister Mara had similarly promoted the primacy of 
Fijian interests and employed the racial card. In 1987, he put loyalty to the 
Fijian cause ahead of democracy and the law, and had been reinstated as 
prime minister and gone on to become president as a result. Although in 
2000 he declared that ‘armed intervention and attempted coups are not the 
way to reach political and economic goals,’ his willingness to sack Prime 
Minister Chaudhry said otherwise. This was not lost on many soldiers in 
the RFMF. In July 2000, the Labasa mutineers declared themselves ‘soldiers 
of the vanua first and Government later’.199 The legal support offered to 
both the President and military commander by members of the judiciary 
to circumvent constitutional procedures, and the subsequent actions of 
197  Even the SDL’s Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2007–2011 concedes this; about 36 per 
cent of Indians lived in poverty, 33 per cent of Fijians. The more significant difference lay in the 
nature of employment: 26 per cent of Indians were engaged in subsistence activities compared with 
43 per cent of Fijians (SDL Government Paper to the National Economic Summit. Suva, 2006, pp. 6–7). 
Demographic changes also made sustaining the Indian dominance argument difficult. In 1976, Indians 
made up 49 per cent of the population. In 2006, they most likely comprised only 37 per cent. If current 
emigration trends continued, by 2022 Indians might comprise only 25 per cent of the population.
198  The former Constitutional Review Committee chair, New Zealander Sir Paul Reeves replied: 
‘I keep hearing again and again that they must not allow what happened to the Maori in New Zealand 
to happen to us. My response to that is this. Maori lost land and social structures but at the same 
time the Maori today are showing much more creativity and real effort to rectify their situation than 
I detect what Fijians are doing’ (Fiji Times, 23 September 2000, p. 2).
199  fijilive, 30 January 2003.
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the military all suggested the viability of extra-legal actions for the Fijian 
cause. If institutions do not observe the rule of law, Draunidalo observed, 
‘there is nothing to ground the citizen to observe the rule of law’.200
Chiefs and Christian leaders were similarly swayed by the Fijian cause, 
among them Takiveikata, the paramount chief of Naitasiri, one of two 
provinces that were deeply implicated in both the coup and subsequent 
military mutiny. ‘Fijians do not know much about democracy and free 
living,’ the SDL Vice President declared: ‘They need to work with laws 
and regulations to keep them in order. Fijians would be better off if 
colonial rules were activated. This would keep Fijians in their villages.’201 
Qarase expressed the same sentiments when he laid forth his blueprint 
in July 2000 to revamp the colonial Fijian Administration and to make 
the GCC more independent of government. In the following years, 
he delivered on his promises. By 2006 a massive multimillion-dollar 
headquarters for the GCC took shape on the Nasese foreshore, close 
to the scene of the 2000 coup, and built with funds originally set aside 
for Fijian development projects. Qarase’s assurance that the government 
would henceforth pay the operating costs of the NLTB similarly promised 
more income for the chiefs. His conversion of Rabuka’s earlier $20 million 
loan to Fijian Holdings Ltd into a grant secured the privatised wealth 
of its principal beneficiaries. 
In order to appease the nationalists behind the coup, Qarase (like 
Chaudhry before him in 1999) rejected the constitutional power-sharing 
requirement to bring Labour into a multi-party cabinet (parties with 
over 10 per cent of seats were entitled to a similar proportion of cabinet 
seats). That Labour did not contest his decision probably indicated the 
extent to which both parties saw non-cooperation in the more ethnically 
200  Fiji Times, 15 December 2000, p. 7. The problem, however – as Madraiwiwi later noted – is 
that many Fijians see the rule of law as a foreign concept that subverts their way of life. Hence 
indigenous rights ‘can only be secured by force’; ‘However, the problem with this state of affairs is that 
force and political power are notoriously fickle instruments. They are subject to whim and fancy and 
are dependent on the inclinations of those who wield authority. In comparison the rule of law in its 
reliance on systems, laws and regulations is a far more reliable instrument and shield’ (Madraiwiwi, 
‘Ethnic tensions and the law’, 2004). 
201  Fiji Times, 26 August 2000, p. 2.
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polarised post-coup political environment as in their long-term interest. 
Hence Qarase formed a coalition with the CAMV in 2001, the party that 
supported the coup’s perpetrators and their goals.202 
Qarase’s nationalist credentials were similarly enhanced by determined 
support for ministers charged with criminal offences during the coup,203 
his continued backing of the rebel Seniloli as vice president, by his 
dogged pursuance of a constitutional review twice declared illegal by the 
courts, and by his presentation to parliament in 2005 of a Reconciliation, 
Tolerance and Unity (RTU) Bill that, among other things, held out the 
promise of amnesty for persons involved in the 2000 coup, if not an end 
to all coup prosecutions. In the final year of his first government, Qarase 
introduced a Qoliqoli Bill to enable coastal villagers to earn revenue from 
the sea, just as they did from the land. Later he also promised an indigenous 
claims tribunal and a review of the foundational colonial document, the 
Deed of Cession. Some critics believed that the latter intention amounted 
to a rewriting of history to suit his nationalist agenda.204 
Qarase’s SDL government clearly saw itself as a government working in 
the interests of Fijians rather than that of the whole nation. Its Foreign 
Minister, Kaliopate Tavola, declared in 2002 that ‘Democracy is a foreign 
imposition [that] does not sit well with traditional hierarchies,’205 echoing 
the claim by nationalists in 1987 that democracy was a foreign flower 
unsuited to Fiji’s soils. Democracy here meant a system of transparent 
governance open to the equal participation of all citizens and working in 
the interests of all citizens, as Qarase recognised back in 2000. 
We all welcome democracy in laying importance on the equal rights of 
individuals, their equality before the law, and a system of government and 
leadership based on the consent of the people, and not on divine right or 
status at birth. But in the long run, it will also serve to undermine chiefly 
status and authority in our traditional society. And the collective value 
systems that bind us together.206
202  In early 2006, CAMV was merged into the SDL to better maintain Fijian political unity ahead 
of fresh elections.
203  These included Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, Simione Kaitani, Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure and 
Isireli Leweniqila.
204  S Shameem, ‘The assumption of executive authority on December 5 2006 by Commodore JV 
Bainimarama, Commander of the RFMF: legal, constitutional and human rights issues’, Fiji Human 
Rights Commission, Suva, 3 January 2007, p. 12.
205  Daily Post, 16 August 2002.
206  Fiji Times, 12 October 2000.
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The SDL believed such governance impossible as long as Fijians were 
disadvantaged.207 Disadvantage had generated political and economic 
instability in the past and, until it was addressed, no ‘Western’-type 
democracy could be possible. Rather, government had to be first and 
foremost composed of Fijians because, as Qarase reminded voters ahead 
of the 2006 election, only Fijians could be depended upon to secure Fijian 
interests.208 
But, if Qarase believed that he had inherited the mantle of Mara and 
Rabuka, he was tragically mistaken. The post-coup environment after 
2000 certainly shared many features with that pertaining after 1987. Fijian 
paramountcy had been reasserted. Politically Fijians appeared to be united 
although, until 2006, the SDL’s hold on majority Fijian support remained 
tenuous. But the crucial difference lay with the military and, in particular, 
with its Commander, the importance of which seemed constantly to elude 
the Prime Minister. Given the country’s history of military intervention, 
this response is puzzling but can possibly be explained by Qarase’s belief 
that Bainimarama – lacking Rabuka’s charisma and public profile – would 
be malleable and that, ultimately, his interpretation of Fijian paramountcy 
would make the difference. In the end, however, his faith in paramountcy 
as the primary driver of Fiji politics proved his undoing, just as it had for 
Mara and Rabuka before him. This time the trigger was not an adverse 
electoral result but Bainimarama’s anger at Qarase’s unwavering support 
for individuals involved in the 2000 coup and his clumsy attempts to 
remove the Commander from office in 2003 and after. That anger was 
slow in manifesting itself publicly. Until then, as one journalist noted, 
Bainimarama ‘rarely encroached on the political arena’.209
Some military officers believed that they only ever intended Qarase to lead 
a group of public-spirited individuals until such time as elections could 
be called. Thus Baledrokadroka described the interim government as a 
creature of the military, albeit a military traumatised by and divided over 
207  This view is reflected also in its Strategic Development Plan 2007–2011 (p. 2), and in press 
comments by Qarase and investor Ballu Khan that ‘the widening wealth divide between Indians and 
Fijians had given rise to a coup culture’ (Fiji Times, 25 & 26 February 2007).
208  Such thinking also pervaded his handling of relations with the military later in the year. Qarase 
insisted that his dispute with the military was ‘an indigenous problem’, not a national one, and that it 
should be dealt with by the GCC as the paramount indigenous body (fijilive, 9 November 2006). That 
body promptly claimed it was a Tailevu problem, and unsuccessfully asked Bainimarama’s province to 
deal with it. National issues, Bainimarama argued, should be addressed through proper parliamentary 
and democratic channels, not the Fijian administrative system (fijilive, 1 November 2006).
209  fijilive, 9 April 2003.
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the events of 2000. Nonetheless, the military did provide a mandate to the 
interim government to improve Fijian wellbeing and tied its survival to 
the military as the guarantor of national security.210 Hence Bainimarama 
began to see himself as a kingmaker. By winning an election is his own right, 
however, Qarase believed that he had trumped the power Bainimarama 
held and began acting independently of the military’s goals. In itself this 
was unproblematic but, with former rebels and their supporters having 
charges dropped, given reduced sentences or released early from jail, with 
Qoriniasi Bale – a disbarred lawyer and former senator – now a powerful 
attorney-general, and with revelations emerging of vote-buying from 
Ministry of Agriculture funds during the 2001 election, a cold war – as 
Brij Lal has termed it211 – between Bainimarama and Qarase gradually 
unfolded late in 2001 and became increasingly public, especially between 
2003 and 2006 when many coup prosecutions were finalised and the 
networks of conspiracies that lay behind the 2000 coup were momentarily 
exposed to light.212 
With the exception of Speight, who was sentenced to death in 2002 
but had his sentence immediately commuted to life, most of the coup 
conspirators received light sentences. Stevens also received life but his 
CRWU comrades (including Tikotani) were more fortunate and served 
six years; Nata, Silatolu, Savu, Ligairi and Jim Speight served only three 
years, Vuniwai and Navakasuasua two years, and Duvuloco 1.5 years.213 
Takiveikata went through a number of trials and appeals from 2004 and 
eventually received a seven-year sentence.214 But their fellow travellers 
generated more controversy, particularly those with the political and 
chiefly associations that epitomised the shadowy forces at work behind 
the scenes. They were seemingly protected. Kubuabola and Savua were 
posted overseas. Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure, who had appeared to serve 
210  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 212–13.
211  BV Lal, ‘Anxiety, uncertainty and fear in our land: Fiji’s road to military coup’, in Fraenkel, Firth 
& Lal, The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji, 2009, p. 22. The Agricultural Assistance scam came to light 
in 2002 and involved $25 million used mostly for vote buying. Permanent Secretary for Agriculture 
Peniasi Kunatuba, and three of his staff, were eventually jailed, the former for four years in 2006. 
At his trial Kunatuba claimed that the purpose of the scheme was to assist the interim government 
establish itself as a credible government and gain popular confidence (Fiji Times, 12 October 2006). 
After 2009 he allegedly became Commissioner of Corporate Services as part of a  Yellow Ribbon 
rehabilitation program (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 22 July 2012).
212  In a Legend FM radio interview in late 2007, Bainimarama indicated that he had considered 
a coup against Qarase in 2001 (exactly when he did not say). It did not happen because the military 
decided to give Qarase a chance ‘to mend his ways’ (Fiji Times, 6 December 2007).
213  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 20 February 2002, 19 February 2003.
214  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 25 November 2004.
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as one of Speight’s legal advisors, became Deputy Speaker and remained 
in office until a four-year sentence made his role untenable. Qarase 
pointedly refused also to take action against colleagues such as Lands 
Minister Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu and Sports Minister Isireli Leweniqila 
when they were charged, on the grounds that they were innocent 
until found guilty.215 All  had participated in the parliamentary drama. 
The same reasoning applied to Seniloli, the Vice President, who accepted 
a presidential role under Speight. Although eventually jailed for four years 
in 2004, he remained Vice President. Seniloli had offered to resign, but his 
offer had been refused for fear of weakening the position of Qarase’s other 
ministers. In the end, Seniloli served only three months of his sentence 
before being released for health reasons on a compulsory supervision 
order and allowed to resign.216 Such orders invited suspicion or derision. 
Vakalalabure was similarly released early in 2006. Lalabalavu served 
only 10 days in 2005 and returned to a ministerial post. Kaitani, who 
publically admitted sedition in 2003,217 became Minister for Information 
shortly after. The Methodist Tomasi Kanailagi, who had pledged support 
for the coup, became a senator; so, too, did Apisai Tora, although he was 
jailed for eight months in 2005.
Clearly such leniency helped maintain the SDL and CAMV alliance, but 
it also flowed from Qarase’s belief that forgiveness assisted reconciliation 
between Fijians and would make possible stronger racial unity ahead of 
future elections. His party also held that a blanket pardon would most 
help Fiji move closer to reconciliation with IndoFijians. ‘Let bygones be 
bygones’ became the new mantra.218 Bainimarama opposed such leniency, 
seeing it as a recipe for further instability. ‘Fijians only respond to the 
stick from us,’ he reputedly told the Police Commissioner.219 Aware that 
Bainimarama’s hard line most jeopardised his plans, Qarase looked for ways 
to remove the Bainimarama thorn during 2002. In March, he nominated 
him to become the UN force commander in Kuwait, promoting him 
to rear admiral in order to boost his prospects. But despite a November 
interview in New York, Bainimarama was unsuccessful in being appointed. 
Next Qarase offered him a diplomatic posting but, by now, Bainimarama 
215  fijilive, 12 June 2003.
216  Fiji Times, 23 June 2004. The lawyer and former High Court judge, the Bauan Ratu Joni 
Madraiwiwi, replaced him at the start of 2005.
217  He was later acquitted on a technicality.
218  Dakuvula, ‘The unresolved issues’, 2004.
219  Victor Lal, ‘Bainimarama’s behind-the-scenes backers were in the judiciary’, www.coupfour 
andahalf.com, 24 May 2012.
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had tired of manipulation and resolved to make his concerns public. In 
March 2003, incensed that the Attorney-General had approached the 
President to reduce sentences or pardon CRWU rebels, he very publically 
warned that some politicians wanted to destabilise Fiji.220
The two former allies in the reconstruction of Fiji in 2000 were 
now increasingly determined to pursue contradictory goals. Qarase, 
through his RTU amnesty proposals, planned greater leniency for coup 
perpetrators and their fellow travellers. He and his party saw the RTU 
Bill as a litmus test of their support for indigenous causes.221 Qarase 
believed that customary obligations entangled most Fijians in the events 
of 2000.222 They should not be treated as criminals but as political actors. 
Accordingly, he would create a commission, whose members he would 
appoint, to conduct hearings, sometimes in secret. This commission would 
have power to grant reparations (funded by the state) and recommend 
amnesty to individuals, even if they refused to acknowledge guilt and were 
prepared to reoffend. In addition, an amnesty committee could direct 
courts to end prosecutions and wipe criminal records clean. CCF’s Jone 
Dakuvula believed its sole intent was to allow certain individuals to stand 
for parliament. ‘Deep down, contrary to his words,’ Dakuvula added, ‘the 
PM [Prime Minister] and his colleagues still believe that the overthrow of 
the Coalition government in 2000 was justified.’223 Lawyer Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum declared the proposed RTU Bill unconstitutional. It would 
duplicate the work of the police. It  would strip power from the DPP. 
It was not in Fiji’s long-term political and economic interests. It would 
weaken social stability and national security.224 Graham Leung, President 
of the Fiji Law Society, maintained also that it threatened the rule of law 
and the independence of the judiciary and would undermine military 
discipline. Wadan Narsey added investor confidence to that long list of 
weaknesses in Qarase’s legislation, noting that it would do nothing to 
discourage future crime.225
220  Dakuvula, ‘The unresolved issues’, 2004; Fiji Sun, 14 April 2005.
221  Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, ‘Making the right choices’, keynote address to the 34th Annual Congress 
of the Fiji Institute of Accountants, Sofitel Resort Spa, 23 June 2006. ‘[Is] there any purpose served by 
the Bill in light of the divisions it has caused?’ he asked.
222  Fiji Times, 5 May 2005.
223  Fiji Sun, 28 August 2005.
224  Fiji Times, 1 June 2005.
225  Wadan Narsey, ‘Great concept, bad reality’, Fiji Times, 31 May 2005.
The GeneRAl’s Goose
186
Despite all the jargon about restorative justice and the uniqueness of the 
Fijian condition, Fiji had ample experience of reconciliation and its 
pitfalls, as Edwina Kotoisuva of the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre noted 
in early 2006.
Reconciliation is a great thing and ideally if reconciliation does take place 
the offence should never be repeated. But the reality is that the offence 
is likely to occur again without proper intervention that is targeted at 
changing the man’s behaviour … [R]econciliation, as it exists within the 
cycle of abuse, is almost meaningless because it is supported by most 
people and structures in society who are willing to place the lives of 
women and children on the line for a mythical concept of family life.226
For a patriarchal elite this was a comparison too far, and soon the debate 
degenerated into personal attacks.
Commissioner of Police Andrew Hughes, who had been drafted in 
from the Australian Federal Police to reprofessionalise the police force 
after Savua’s departure in 2003, opposed amnesty on the understandable 
grounds that it would interfere with ongoing police investigations and 
prosecutions. Earlier he called the rebels ‘domestic terrorists’; now he 
wanted his own commission, one that would inquire into their activities. 
‘How can you reconcile something when you don’t know what occurred,’ 
he argued; ‘who do you forgive and what are you forgiving them for?’ 
But Qarase refused. If investigations are ongoing, why have an inquiry?227 
Many of Qarase’s colleagues were blunter. Senator Mitieli Bulanauca 
declared that people who do not want to be part of the reconciliation 
process should leave Fiji.228 When Bainimarama attacked the RTU Bill’s 
amnesty proposals, claiming that they were designed to promote the 
ethnic cleansing of Indians and to garner rural Fijian votes, Tora taunted 
him brutally: step down and let ‘a real army man take over to restore 
military honour’.229 
226  Edwina Kotoisuva, ‘When reconciliation is unjust’, Fiji Times, 11 January 2006.
227  Fiji Sun, 25 August 2004; 25 & 26 August 2006. But, in mid-2005, he made that task more 
difficult by refusing to extend the contract of the expatriate public prosecutor, Peter Ridgway, who 
had been most involved in the post-coup cases.
228  Fiji Times, 23 October 2004. The Minister for Lands expressed similar sentiments on 
introducing the Qoliqoli Bill: if hoteliers did not like it they could invest in another country 
(fijivillage, 13 August 2006).
229  Fiji Sun, 2 July 2005; Fiji Times, 25 August 2005.
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The military spoiler
Bainimarama’s opposition generated increasingly personal attacks. Jioji 
Kotobalavu, the long-serving CEO of the Prime Minister’s office, later 
reminded him that the 2000 coup involved not only the illegal takeover 
of an elected government but the removal of a president. Bainimarama 
concentrated on one aspect of the coup alone, he warned, not ‘total justice’, 
not ‘the illegal abrogation of the Constitution, which he was responsible 
for’.230 The message was clear. Everyone had skeletons in their cupboards, 
including the Commander, who knew only too well that parliament had 
failed to approve amnesty for the military and that the police continued 
to investigate the deaths associated with the mutiny. The government was 
not going to bow easily to the military. Bainimarama ‘is a person who 
suffers from insecurity’, Kotobalavu declared in 2004, ‘and has a tendency 
to behave like an autocratic dictator’.231
Certainly, government now faced a much more pugnacious Bainimarama, 
one prepared to purge his senior officers in order to stay on top and 
to challenge political leaders who disregarded his authority or who failed 
to give him and his military the respect that he believed they deserved. 
It helped of course that Bainimarama’s vision for the military placed it at 
the very centre of Fiji, obliged to uphold the wellbeing of the country in 
addition to its defence and security duties. That this vision, inserted into 
the Taukeist 1990 Constitution, had been repealed in 1997 did not trouble 
him given that Qarase’s Government had also brushed aside so much of 
the 1997 Constitution. The events of 2000 and Bainimarama’s growing 
distrust of Fijian communal and political leaders quickly transformed the 
military ‘into an agent of partisan national politics’.232
Surprisingly, Qarase appeared to take the loyalty of the military for granted. 
He sought to reduce the court martial sentences of Labasa soldiers found 
guilty of mutiny. He even planned to halve the size of the RFMF and 
not renew Bainimarama’s five-year contract as commander. Bainimarama 
became aware of these machinations and laid his own plans. He recalled all 
soldiers guarding state officials and asked his officers to pledge support to 
230  Fiji Times, 10 January 2005.
231  Fiji Post, 21 March 2004.
232  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 294–95. In addition, the highly 
partisan Directorate of Army Legal Services probably fed Bainimarama’s incorrect interpretation of 
the status of constitutional clauses relating to the military (Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior 
chief ’, 2012, pp. 252–53).
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him. He called on the government to resign if it did not back the military. 
He increased military briefings with the President. In June 2003, he 
announced that he wanted his contract renewed in the following February 
and received endorsement from opposition politicians.233 But not from 
Permanent Secretary of Home Affairs Jeremaia Waqanisau; his very public 
denunciations of Bainimarama served only to make himself a target for 
military hatred.234 Also in Bainimarama’s sights were Waqanisau’s two 
deputies, former major Dr Lesi Korovuvala and Penijamini Lomaloma. 
He suspected both of trying to influence the President to reduce 
sentences. In August, Bainimarama recommended that the three senior 
home affairs officials be removed from office. Nothing happened. Instead 
the Attorney-General allegedly sought to bypass the President by seeking 
legislation to establish a parole board. By this means he alone could make 
recommendations for pardons and reduce sentences.235 Meanwhile the 
political attacks on coup investigations continued. In June, the GCC 
discussed a Tailevu proposal to close all investigations and issue a general 
pardon. In December, Adi Litia Cakobau called on the Senate to release 
all political prisoners and cease coup investigations.236 
An angry Bainimarama told his officers in December 2003 to prepare 
to take over government if it chose not to reappoint him. They urged him 
to desist, sending a copy of their advice to the Home Affairs Minister. 
Qarase probably read this to mean that Bainimarama did not enjoy the 
full support of the military and that a coup was unlikely.237 But, to ease 
tensions, he agreed in January to reappoint Bainimarama as commander 
for a final five-year term. Bainimarama was not mollified. He took revenge 
on his senior officers. Those who refused to pledge personal loyalty to 
him were purged at the start of 2004.238 Indeed, as political scientist 
233  Wainikiti Bogidrau, ‘Checkmate: why the army and state went head-to-head’, Review, 1 July 
2003; Dakuvula, ‘The unresolved issues’, 2004; Daily Post, 8 May 2003; Fiji Times, 6 June 2003.
234  Dakuvula, ‘The unresolved issues’, 2004. Allegedly Waqanisau recommended that 
Bainimarama’s contract not be renewed because the military had overspent its budget by $20 million 
in 2003 (Fiji Times, 23 March 2003).
235  Dakuvula, ‘The unresolved issues’, 2004. As the chair of the Prerogative of Mercy Commission, 
the Attorney-General already possessed similar powers.
236  Dakuvula, ‘The unresolved issues’, 2004. fijilive, 26 September 2003.
237  Victor Lal & Russell Hunter, ‘Smuggled papers show Bainimarama’s lust for power’, New Zealand 
Herald, 25 February 2012. The text appeared in the press in April 2004 (Fiji Sun, 7 April 2004).
238  They were Kadavulevu, Tuatoko, Raduva and two chief staff officers from Strategic HQ – 
Lt Col Akuila Buadromo and Commander Timoci Koroi. Baledrokadroka claims that Bainimarama 
demanded they draw up plans for a takeover, claiming that legal channels to effect his reappointment 
would take too long. Tuatoko argued that the Commander should not use the RFMF in this way to 
have his contract renewed (Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 218–23).
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Jon Fraenkel later noted, ‘Each subsequent spat served also as a loyalty 
test’.239 Qarase saw an opportunity to settle the dispute once and for all. 
In mid-July, he successfully advised the President to hold a commission 
of inquiry into Bainimarama’s purportedly treasonous activities but, the 
very next day – after a visit from Bainimarama – Iloilo suddenly reversed 
his agreement.240 Defeated, Qarase sent Waqanisau to Beijing as an 
ambassador. 
Bainimarama gave as good as he got; he demanded that the government 
transform its economic policies, educate people on the problems associated 
with coups, and end corruption. Much like Rabuka in 1987, he envisaged 
the military assuming new roles in commerce and politics and, in 2004, 
launched his ‘Military for Life’ concept, which immediately took form as 
a successful bid for engineer reservists to build Telecom satellite stations 
in 87 villages. Such initiatives, Bainimarama believed, were desperately 
needed for a RFMF ‘on the verge of burning out as it continues to work 
with insufficient resources’241 and as it sought to staunch the exodus 
of seasoned personnel. Indeed, by mid-2005, some 1,000 Fijians were 
serving as soldiers, guards and drivers in Iraq and Kuwait and over 2,000 
were members of the British military forces.242 But a lack of resources most 
explained the military’s constant overspending of its budget. Some was 
due also to inadequate controls over the purchase of goods and services 
and to the increased roles that the army played in maintaining domestic 
security and assisting with disaster relief. Additionally, peacekeeping 
duties were a real budget killer because, as operations increased, so did the 
proportions of monies spent on salaries and allowances, from 51 per cent 
in 1977 to over 80 per cent in 2002. Dagney Fosen argues that Fiji’s 
governments consistently failed to reimburse the military adequately for 
its duties, with the result that its administration, logistics and equipment 
239  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 218–23, Jon Fraenkel, ‘Fiji’s 
December 2006 coup: Who, what, where and why?’, in Fraenkel, Firth & Lal, The 2006 Military 
Takeover in Fiji, 2009, p. 46. 
240  Fiji Times, 24 July 2005. According to one account, Bainimarama used his knowledge of 
an attempt in late 2001 by businessmen close to Qarase to remove Iloilo from the presidency to 
sway the President to drop the investigation (Wainikiti Bogidrau, ‘Inside a palace coup’, Fiji Times, 
25 June 2005).
241  Fiji Sun, 23 October 2004.
242  Nic Maclellan, ‘Fiji, the war in Iraq and the privatization of Pacific Island security’, Australian 
Policy Forum, Nautilus Institute, 6 April 2006. Some recruiters were of deep concern. In one instance 
as many as 15,000 villagers paid a recruiter a registration fee of $150 just to be listed for work 
opportunities. Often this money came from church or village development funds. But, if realised, the 
benefits were lucrative. Remittances, valued at $200 million in 2005, surpassed sugar and garments 
in earning Fiji foreign exchange.
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needs suffered dramatically.243 Perhaps a small country like Fiji could 
never afford such a comparatively large military. Since 1978 its share of 
the government budget had jumped from 2.8 per cent to over 7 per cent 
in 2000;244 in post-coup years proportions were even higher. Although 
various reviews had been held to restructure and reform the military, most 
of them – like attempts to audit RFMF finances in the years after 1987 – 
came to nought. Only in 2006 did Fiji finally recognise that it had created 
a beast it could no longer control.
The warning signs had been there since 2003 and they emerged again in 
2005 when the government pressed ahead with its RTU Bill, despite fresh 
military opposition. This time the military employed new tactics, placing 
ministers under surveillance and, in some instances, allegedly stalking 
them. When the RTU Bill was read in parliament in June 2005, military 
officers filled the public gallery. A leaked report suggested it planned to 
remove the government if the Bill passed. The government responded by 
docking Bainimarama’s pay for exceeding the military’s budget, and tit-
for-tat allegations raged in the months ahead.245 A furious Bainimarama 
threatened to relocate his HQ into the home affairs section of Government 
Buildings in December and challenged both Home Affairs Minister Josefa 
Vosanibola and his CEO Korovuvala to come to the barracks and sack 
him. The head of the Public Service Commission, Anare Jale, threatened 
police retaliation should Bainimarama move against home affairs officials, 
and Police Commissioner Hughes put the newly formed Police Tactical 
Response Unit on standby.246 
Bainimarama denied threatening anyone but maintained that the military 
now no longer recognised the minister and was answerable to no one.247 
But he began preparations, allegedly telling his senior officers on Sunday 
243  Dagney Margrete Fosen, ‘RFMF in Fiji’s defence policy’, in CCF, Background Paper on the 
RFMF, 2003, pp. 11–14. Fosen notes that the military contributed to its budgetary problems; it was 
over ranked by some 333 personnel (CCF, Background Paper on the RFMF, p. 26).
244  CCF, Background Paper on the RFMF, p.10. 
245  Journalist Wainikiti Bogidrau argued that, because the government knew that the President 
would side with Bainimarama over the RTU Bill, it organised for the GCC to send a delegation to 
deliver a truce with the military. Nothing came of it. When the President later called Qarase to brief 
him and the Vice President on the Bill, he bluntly told him to drop it (‘Inside a palace coup’, 2005).
246  Set up in 2005 to replace the anti-terrorist functions of the CRWU on the recommendation 
of the 2000 Military Board of Inquiry and 2004 Security and Defence Review, it built on the 
foundations of the 1973 Police Mobile Force and Special Patrol Group. Based in Nasinu, it eventually 
comprised 138 staff and operated as a SWAT team. Bainimarama closed it down on 2 February 2007 
(Fiji Sun, 6 February 2007).
247  Serafina Qalo, ‘Champion of rights or lawbreaker?’, Fiji Times, 16 March 2006.
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8 January 2006 that he intended to take over the government. The next 
day he told them to rescue him if he was arrested. Jokapeci Koroi, Labour’s 
longstanding President, informed Fiji TV on 11 January that ‘I think he 
should do it because we are waiting, the Labour Coalition government, 
we are waiting to complete what we started in 1999 and 2000’.
I know a lot of people will disagree with me … I am not saying that 
I support it but you don’t know what kind of takeover he is going to do and 
I have a feeling its not going to be like in the 2000 and 1987 coup, no!248
It was a stunning performance for those of us watching it. It hinted at 
collusion between Labour and the military, something that only a few 
years ago would have seemed impossible. Here was a party that had twice 
been felled by military interventions apparently welcoming another. 
Back at the QEB the newly appointed Acting Land Force Commander 
Col  Jone Baledrokadroka probably drew similar conclusions. The next 
day he and two colleagues warned a surprised Commander that what he 
proposed was treason and he should resign. Instead Bainimarama rallied 
his officers and demanded Baledrokadroka’s resignation, accusing him of 
plotting a mutiny.249 He then escalated the tension, stationing three naval 
vessels in Suva Harbour purportedly to protect the President. A hastily 
convened National Security Council met as the police erected roadblocks 
in Suva. Perhaps fearing resistance, Bainimarama pulled back. Vice 
President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, who had replaced the convicted former 
Vice President Seniloli in early 2005 and increasingly acted as president 
due to Iloilo’s worsening health, got Qarase and the Commander together 
in February to produce an agreement that bound Bainimarama to normal 
civil service processes for airing grievances. In return Qarase agreed to 
take on board military concerns with the RTU and Qoliqoli  bills.250 
248  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 28 July 2011.
249  Fiji Times, 16 January 2006; see also Steven Ratuva, ‘Officers, gentlemen and coups’, Fiji 
Times, 25 January 2006. Fearing Bainimarama would move against him, Baledrokadroka closed 
access to the QEB on 12 January and sent two officers to Strategic HQ to inform the Commander he 
would not resign. Bainimarama accused him of threatening a mutiny and stood him down, pending 
a court marshal. Baledrokadroka eventually fled to New Zealand, and later successfully undertook 
a doctorate at ANU in Canberra before joining the UN Development Program. 
250  Journalist Robert Keith-Reid argued that Madraiwiwi was under pressure to get Bainimarama 
to moderate his anti-government rhetoric or else he would be forced to accept Qarase’s request for 
the Commander’s dismissal, an action that would not be easy. That same month Iloilo indicated he 
wished to retire but the military refused to countenance it (‘Fiji’s simmering election pot’, Island 




The  agreement did not survive. By March the planned fortnightly 
meetings between the two leaders were on hold, and Bainimarama again 
started issuing public statements ridiculing the government. Once more 
the Home Affairs Minister pressed for his removal and again the President 
did nothing. Bainimarama taunted the government, withdrawing the 
security detail for the Prime Minister and challenging the government 
to sack him.251
If anything, Baledrokadroka’s resistance forced Bainimarama to plan 
more carefully the steps he might undertake should his bluff be 
called. In  February, he had the military’s legal office draft two letters 
in preparation for a takeover. By accident they fell into the hands of 
Commissioner Hughes. The first – addressed to the Vice President – 
detailed Bainimarama’s complaints against the government. The second 
– citing the doctrine of necessity – outlined a legal justification for 
military action. Hughes allegedly showed these to the Australian High 
Commissioner who informed the American ambassador, Larry Dinger. 
Dinger thought it clear that Bainimarama would remove the government 
if it continued on its current course. At the end of February, Hughes met 
Bainimarama to dissuade him from such action. But the Commander was 
in no mood for turning. He reiterated his dismay at Qarase’s consistent 
leniency towards the rebels and their supporters. The army should have 
retained power in 2000, not surrendered it.252
The two men met again in the following month, this time to discuss 
another of Bainimarama’s concerns: the danger the Police Tactical 
Response Unit posed to the military’s monopolisation of weapons in 
Fiji. In 2005, the unit had purchased 123 pistols and 30 submachine 
guns to replace obsolete weapons and enable its members to be properly 
equipped for peacekeeping missions. Bainimarama argued that the 
consignment had  been for the military, while Hughes maintained that 
he armed the police only to meet criminal threats, not to encourage 
Fijians to confront Fijians. The two agreed to continue talking.253 Again 
Bainimarama was under pressure to pull back. The Vice President had 
251  Fiji Times, 18 & 20 March 2006.
252  Victor Lal, ‘Bainimarama’s behind-the-scenes backers’, 2012; evidence based on embassy 
correspondence obtained by Wikileaks. American cables described Bainimarama as an ‘erratic, 
sometimes violent leader, thin-skinned, often defensive and insecure, and prone to be wildly excessive 
in his reaction to criticisms’ (Philip Doring, ‘US cables reveal the brutality of Fijian regime’, Age, 
27 August 2011).
253  Fiji Sun, 17 March 2006.
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released legal advice that refuted the military’s longstanding claim to 
a constitutional role in politics. The DPP was about to make a decision on 
police investigations into the deaths of CRWU soldiers during the 2000 
mutiny. And, increasingly, civil society organisations and politicians were 
joining forces to condemn his destabilising actions. SDL director Jale 
Baba, clearly not a disinterested observer, restated his party’s opposition 
to Labour’s renewed call for an independent inquiry into the events of 
2000. ‘We cannot let the nation be held ransom by events of the past,’ 
he argued: ‘A commission of inquiry can be regressive in terms of nation 
building by opening up old wounds and scars.’254 But Bainimarama would 
have been less prepared for the responses of some nonaligned forces. 
Angie Heffernan, coordinator of the Pacific Centre for Public Integrity, 
and Virisila Buadromo, the executive director of the Fiji Women’s Rights 
Movement, declared that it was ‘now time for the military to step back 
and let Fiji’s constitutional and democratic processes work’. One cannot 
‘break the law to protect the law’, they pointed out.255
Elections were now due in Fiji, but the census – used for redistributing 
seats and last held in 1996 – had been postponed because of the elections. 
Normally this might not be of major concern but, since 2000, the 
number of IndoFijians emigrating had more than doubled. This reduced 
the FLP’s chances of winning an election in its own right, especially in 
open constituency seats. Redistribution might also reduce the number 
of closed communal seats it could contest.256 Obviously, Labour had 
no desire to insist on a census prior to elections, and the SDL – which 
believed it could win if it maintained Fijian unity – urgently sought 
a fresh mandate to dangle before Bainimarama.257 Bainimarama, however, 
remained undaunted. He faulted the government for holding elections 
without first conducting a census and escalated his campaign against it.258 
254  Fiji Times, 24 March 2006.
255  Fiji Times, 24 March 2006.
256  Estimates suggested that the IndoFijian population had fallen from 49 per cent to 38 per cent of 
Fiji’s total population between 1986 and 2004 (20,720 citizens – mostly IndoFijians – had emigrated 
since 2001) while the number of registered voters had fallen nearly 10 per cent, the electoral impact 
of which was compounded by rapid urbanisation (Islands Business, April 2006).
257  Despite 13 parties fielding 270 candidates and 68 independent candidates, the potential for 
ethnic division remained high. With the economy slumping and western Viti Levu as fractious as ever, 
Qarase had no reason to suppose that he could deliver Fijian unity. Hence his desire for Fijian parties to 
share preferences. To this end, veteran politician Tomasi Vakatora brought together a Grand Coalition of 
Fijian parties in early 2006 (NAP did not join) and Qarase finalised the union of CAMV and the SDL.
258  In fact, the stronger argument for delaying the elections lay in the inadequate time that the 
Electoral Office had for preparation. The week-long polling got off to a chaotic start on 7 May with 
inadequate ballot papers at polling stations and inaccurate rolls.
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Although Labour appeared to align itself with Bainimarama in January 
2006, Bainimarama did not rise to the party’s public bait. He had no 
wish to ally himself too closely with a party that he damned in the past. 
In any case, he had developed strong links with his former commander, 
Ratu Epeli Ganilau, and his new National Alliance Party (NAP) and 
anticipated its success in the 2006 election. In March, he told the Fiji 
Times: ‘The RFMF, and I as its head, have no particular political affiliation, 
nor do we support a party.’259
Nonetheless, in the lead up to the May elections in 2006, Bainimarama 
sent his soldiers into villages as part of a Truth and Justice Campaign 
against the SDL.260 On the same day as parliament dissolved, Bainimarama 
led 200 troops in camouflaged gear with military vehicles armed with 
machine guns through the streets of Suva. ‘We have taken it upon ourselves 
to be the watchdog of this nation for the simple reason that the same 
group of people who had a hand in the events of 2000 seem to be back,’ 
Bainimarama later argued. ‘The RFMF is all powerful and it has outlived 
a lot of governments and people,’ he warned.261 In an echo of the younger 
Rabuka, his new Land Force Commander Colonel Pita Driti dismissively 
declared that ‘Politicians are politicians, but we are professionals’.262
By the time of the Truth and Justice Campaign, however, Bainimarama’s 
drive against the SDL had begun to assume different characteristics. 
When  the scandal surrounding the SDL’s agricultural policies first 
erupted,  Chaudhry had suggested that the 2001 election might be 
illegitimate as a consequence. According to Baledrokadroka, a commonality 
of interest now drove Chaudhry and Bainimarama together, and it added 
a new feature to Bainimarama’s rhetoric.263 Qarase’s affirmative action bills 
had always been used to demonstrate his dangerous links with former 
rebels. Affirmative action itself had never been questioned. Now, however, 
259  Fiji Times, 14 March 2006. Journalist Maika Bolatiki claimed that Ganilau had formed the NAP 
‘as revenge for his removal as chairman of the GCC by the Government’ (Fiji Sun, 28 February 2005).
260  That this military campaign was covertly funded from the $1.5 million received from Telecom 
did not seem to jar with its anti-corruption message (Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 
2012, p. 248).
261  Fiji Times, 27 March & 10 October 2006. Lawyer Richard Naidu made essentially the same 
observation of the Rabuka government 10 years before: ‘Every time I look forward, I see what 
I  am supposed to have left behind … In the hazy background the same movers and shakers still 
move, shake and fix’ (A Griffen, With Heart and Nerve and Sinew: Postcoup Writing from Fiji. Suva: 
Christmas Club, 1997, pp. 358–59).
262  fijilive, 1 November 2006.
263  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, p. 224.
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ethno-nationalism came to be projected increasingly as denying Fiji’s 
peoples equality. The importance of this shift would not become fully 
apparent until much later, but in 2006 it was sufficient to enable the 
military to win new allies from among the IndoFijian population and 
to present itself as progressive, multiracial and modern in outlook. 
Importantly it forced Qarase to reconsider his attitude to power-sharing, 
although not with immediate effect.
Brij Lal believes that the 2006 election drove the tussle for power between 
Qarase and Bainimarama underground.264 Certainly the media blitz of 
campaigning smothered it, but with the sniping continuing – fuelled by 
lazy political rhetoric – it never strayed far from people’s minds. Qarase 
told his party faithful that all Fiji’s coups had been directed against the 
FLP and he could not guarantee that the same would not happen again if 
Labour won. Bainimarama retorted that this time his army had prepared 
for such eventualities.265 Rabuka entered the fray, declaring that ‘Fijians 
must unite and hold on to political leadership in their homeland’.266 
Qarase variously informed rallies that only a Fijian prime minister could 
understand the concerns of Fijians, that the prime minister must be 
Fijian, and – just ahead of polling – that if Labour won, Fijians would 
lose their lands like Maoris in New Zealand.267 Tupeni Baba, formerly 
of the FLP and now a SDL candidate, and Viliame Savu (NTLP) both 
also warned of instability if a ‘foreigner’ was elected.268 When the Fiji 
Post, partially owned by the SDL, argued on the eve of polling that the 
reform and downsizing of the military had to begin with Bainimarama, 
the military placed an advertisement in Fiji’s dailies saying ‘that any 
attempts to remove the Commander will not in any way deter or stop 
the RFMF as an institution promoting truth and justice and the values 
of good governance’.269
Nonetheless, the electoral outcome provided a fresh opportunity for 
contemplation. Enveloping Bainimarama’s bugbear – the CAMV – within 
the SDL enabled Qarase to regain office with an outstanding 80 per cent 
264  Lal, ‘Anxiety, uncertainty and fear’, 2009, p. 26.
265  Fiji Sun, 2 May 2006. He had earlier declared the organisers of the SDL and CAMV as ‘a threat 
to national security’ (fijilive, 24 February 2006). The outbreak of rioting in Honiara, capital of the 
Solomon Islands, in mid-April brought forth memories of Suva in 2000.
266  Fiji Sun, 23 February 2006.
267  Fiji Times, 24 March & 4 May 2006; fijilive, 30 April 2006.
268  fijilive, 29 April & 1 May 2006.
269  Fiji Sun, 7 May 2006.
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of the Fijian vote (45 per cent of the total vote). It was, however, a one-
seat majority and dependent on compliant independents for a working 
majority. Labour under Chaudhry similarly won 83 per cent of the 
IndoFijian vote (and 38 per cent of the total vote).270 Thus a much more 
politically polarised Fiji finally emerged, despite all the intentions of the 
1997 Constitution. Qarase had railed against the Constitution’s power-
sharing provisions during the election campaign and was expected to act 
as he had in 2001, shutting Labour out. But he changed tack on regaining 
office and offered Labour nine substantial portfolios within a multi-party 
cabinet. Possibly he planned to fracture the Labour Party while muting 
military criticism. If so, then an overly confident Qarase needlessly 
complicated matters by simultaneously vowing to curb the Commander. 
Predictably Bainimarama hit back, threatening martial law if the SDL 
continued to fight the army.271 
The sudden emergence of multi-party governance garnered unexpected 
widespread support. Labour stalwart Krishna Datt told parliament that 
‘We must arrest the vicious cycle of adversarial conflicts that have polarised 
our people [if we are to] unleash the creative potential of our people and 
restore their dignity … Without them we have no creativity, productivity 
and growth, no culture, no identity, no nation and no government in 
the true sense of the word’.272 Vice President Madraiwiwi similarly 
presented multi-party cabinet as a ‘unique opportunity to develop new 
paradigms and ways of doing things’. In contrast ‘for most of the period 
since 1987’, he declared, ‘we have been governed largely by indigenous 
Fijians with little pretence at involving the other communities who call 
this place home’.273
270  The EU considered the elections well conducted, despite some shortcomings. Of registered 
electors, 88 per cent turned out (compared with 78 per cent in 2001) and invalid votes stood at 
9 per cent (11 per cent in 2001) (fijilive, 21 September 2011). A massive education program preceded 
the elections and registration processes were much improved. This time only 11 seats were decided 
on preferences compared with 29 in 2001. Two independents – Robin Irwin (NE General) and Joji 
Konrote (Rotuma Communal) – gave the SDL a working majority. The United People’s Party (UPP) 
– in alliance with Labour – only gained two seats, but when Labour elected to join the multi-party 
cabinet, it severed its link with Labour and its leader Mick Beddoes became Leader of the Opposition. 
The NAP, NFP, PANU and VTLP all failed to win seats (Waden Narsey, ‘Let’s pull together for once’, 
Fiji Times, 19 May 2006).
271  Fiji Sun, 20 May 2006.
272  Fiji Times, 10 June 2006.
273  Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, ‘Making the right choices’, 2006.
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If the offer to respect the Constitution represented a genuine attempt 
by Qarase to reset Fiji’s politics and move away from the bitterness of 
the past six years, then he needed the support of both Chaudhry and 
Bainimarama to ensure success. Neither showed any sign that they would 
oblige. Chaudhry’s initial acceptance quickly became mired in party 
politics. The unionist Felix Anthony had entered parliament through an 
exchange deal that promised the sitting member, Vijay Singh, a Senate 
seat. But when Chaudhry handed his list of Senate nominees to the new 
Leader of the Opposition, Singh’s name was absent. Chaudhry claimed 
no deal had been made, but the party’s management board held a very 
different interpretation. It requested the list be returned, claiming that 
Chaudhry had no right to submit it, as he had not been endorsed as party 
leader.274
Fortunately for Chaudhry, his cane-farmer base dominated Labour’s 
National Council and he used it to frustrate the management board’s 
challenge to his authority and impose impossible conditions on Labour’s 
participation in the multi-party cabinet. Cabinet loyalty came second to 
party loyalty. Chaudhry feared losing control of Labour both to internal 
dissidents and to the SDL. But his strategy for maintaining control 
was undeniably shortsighted. Gone were the days when IndoFijians 
comprised half the population. As a dwindling minority, albeit still a large 
one electorally, Labour could never hope to win future elections in its own 
right. Increasingly it would need to demonstrate its capacity to attract 
Fijians ‘if it is not to remain on the sidelines’, as Vice President Madraiwiwi 
advised in an address in June. By frustrating multi-party governance, 
Chaudhry risked both Labour’s future and the kind of compromises that 
could deliver real win-win gains for Fiji’s economy and its peoples. Such 
moments come infrequently, Madraiwiwi noted.275
But Chaudhry had little time for such advice as tension with his senior 
colleagues escalated. By August the National Council began proceedings 
against five members of the management board.276 Few were surprised 
when two senior Labour ministers – Krishna Datt and Poseci Bune – 
contradicted Chaudhry’s advice, affirmed cabinet solidarity and accepted 
the SDL’s budget proposals, a key element of which – an increase in VAT 
274  fijivillage, 29 June 2006.
275  Madraiwiwi, ‘Making the right choices’, 2006.
276  These were ministers Bune and Datt, and backbenchers Anthony, Agni Deo Singh and former 
senator Atu Bain (Fiji Sun, 23 August 2006). They were formally expelled from the party in early 
2007 (Fiji Sun, 10 January 2007).
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from 12.5 to 15 per cent – Labour opposed. Of course the real problem 
facing Fiji had little to do with VAT. Its long-suffering economy had never 
fully recovered from the shock of 2000 and now suffered from low levels 
of investment due, in no small measure, to Fiji’s continued dependence on 
an overstaffed civil service whose cost-of-living adjustments continually 
forced government to divert resources away from projects. It had made 
little progress on corporatising government agencies or divesting its 
shareholding in interests such as Fiji TV.277 The SDL’s nationalist agenda 
also exacerbated problems facing the sugar industry. Sugar production 
had fallen 36 per cent over nine years as some 6,000 sugar leases expired 
and the halcyon years of EU subsidies ended.278 
The other once bright spot in the economy – the garment industry – 
had also faltered, employment halving in 10 years. Its single greatest 
loss came in 2005 when the end of US quotas wiped out 6,000 jobs.279 
Gold production was also down with the Vatukoula goldmine set to 
close. Little wonder that 35 per cent of the population lived below the 
poverty line and at least 10 per cent were squatters. The government 
seemed to have little to offer. GDP growth had averaged only 1.5 per cent 
since 2000, hardly sufficient to keep up with population growth; hence 
average per capita GDP growth realised negative 1 per cent over the 
same period. The  government pinned its hopes on tourism becoming 
a $1 billion industry in 2007 and growth picking up to 3.1 per cent in 
2006.280 The disjuncture between its election promises and the poverty 
of its economic strategies could not have been starker.
Possibly the state of the economy influenced Chaudhry’s decision not to 
join the cabinet. Instead he chose to become Leader of the Opposition, 
a  move that seemed to dash the high hopes held for the multi-party 
cabinet.  Both he and Qarase may have believed that the arrangement, 
which had Labour both in and out of government, would soon collapse 
in any case. Under such circumstances Qarase could at least say that he 
had genuinely attempted multi-party government as the Constitution 
stipulated. And Chaudhry could turn to his supporters and say that 
he had refused to sup with the devil. 
277  fijivillage, 24 October 2006; fijilive, 24 September 2006.
278  fijivillage, 27 October 2006.
279  Fiji Times, 11 October & 21 September 2006.
280  Fiji Times, 12, 13 & 25 September 2006. 
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Unexpectedly for both, then, the multi-party cabinet did not collapse. 
Despite no ground rules for multi-party cabinet, it muddled on with 
growing popular support. Brij Lal believes that had Chaudhry participated 
(in November 2006, as Qarase faced stronger fightback from the military, 
he was offered posts as deputy prime minister and minister for finance), 
Bainimarama – the second person on whom multi-party governance 
depended for success – might have acted differently as the year neared its 
end. At first Bainimarama did pledge support for multi-party governance. 
‘Given the right and congenial environment,’ he wrote in the military 
newsletter Mataivula News, ‘the concept will definitely succeed.’ He led 
a delegation to the Home Affairs Ministry in July and Vosanibola took 
one to the QEB, urging more cabinet ministers to visit.281 
Unfortunately, Qarase probably also counted on Chaudhry to maintain 
his opposition so that he would bear the brunt of popular disapproval. 
In short, Qarase had embarked on a dangerous game. Outsmarting the 
military and dividing Labour were becoming mutually exclusive strategies. 
Qarase could never have his cake and eat it too, particularly once his 
newfound enthusiasm for multi-ethnic unity demonstrated serious 
limitations when – against the advice of the Vice President – he blithely 
returned to his election agenda and reintroduced his controversial bills.282 
Often, as some political commentators noted, it is not the substance of 
proposed legislation that is at fault but the manner of its introduction. 
The Qoliqoli Bill was a case in point. Undoubtedly a legal framework 
would ultimately benefit hoteliers but, without sensible debate and 
consultation, the Bill quickly became a declaration of nationalist intent. 
On its introduction to parliament, the Minister for Lands berated hoteliers 
who questioned its wisdom, telling them to get out of the country if they 
did not like it. Such political bullying did not auger well for multi-party 
governance.283
The Indigenous Lands Claim Tribunal was similarly flawed. Modelled on 
New Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal, it sought to settle historic disputes. 
But  such disputes were not always between Fijian entities and the 
government; they were often between Fijians themselves. As fijivillage’s 
Yellow Bucket column asked, how far back should a tribunal look? 
281  Fiji Times, 28 July 2006.
282  Madraiwiwi had asked in June that ‘Six years after the events of May 2000 … is there any 
purpose served by the [RTU] Bill in the light of the divisions it has caused’? (‘Making the right 
choices’, 2006).
283  fijivillage, 13 August 2006.
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‘Does  it  include marauding chiefs like Ma’afu’,284 the Tongan chief on 
whose empire the Tovata confederation was built? And who should pay 
for the golden eggs that the goose would lay to right the wrongs of the past?
Predictably Bainimarama declared Qarase’s bills racist: ‘only a handful 
of people will benefit from these [proposals]’.285 Qarase also reinstated 
former CAMV ministers and released a new defence white paper, which 
again proposed reducing the size of the military and curtailing the power 
of future commanders. He even offered Baledrokadroka – suspended 
by Bainimarama for failing to support him and facing a possible court 
martial – a post as Commissioner of Prisons. Most pointedly he began 
a  police investigation into Bainimarama’s anti-government activities. 
The investigation into his alleged involvement in the bloody suppression 
of the 2000 mutiny rambled on without resolution. Qarase wanted 
rid of  Bainimarama. His government considered surcharging him 
for his misuse of public funds in the Truth and Justice campaign, but 
were only beginning to appreciate how out of control their military 
commander was.286
No matter how remarkable his performance, Qarase should have known 
that Bainimarama would react badly. In late September, Bainimarama 
told a group of passing-out cadets at a Fijian school in Serua that the 
government’s nationalist bills would drive Fijians back to grass skirts and 
cannibalism. Soon hoteliers would be leaving the country just as cane 
farmers had left their farms.287 Qarase could only repeat his mantra: 
‘This is a challenge to the legal authority and mandate of a government 
elected by the people to govern this country’. No political role existed 
for the military.288 During the next month Bainimarama stepped up his 
activism, warning business associates of the government, such as Ballu 
Khan, a joint owner with the NLTB of Pacific Connex, the company 
that supplied software services to the Board, to be careful. Khan – a Fiji-
284  fijivillage, 13 August 2006.
285  C Wilson, ‘Lies, lies, lies’, Fiji Sun, 10 November 2006.
286  Lal & Hunter, ‘Smuggled papers’, 2012.
287  Following a chance meeting between Bainimarama and a board member for Turtle Island on 
a flight from Sydney in September 2005, some tourist operators set out to woo the Commander. 
The owner of Turtle Island, Richard Evanson, who apparently felt cheated by Qarase over the Qoliqoli 
Bill and went on to back Ganilau’s NAP in the 2006 elections, invited Bainimarama and his family to 
spend Christmas at the resort where he was able to meet a special guest, US Republican senator John 
McCain (Rory Callinan, ‘Fueling Fiji’s coup’, Time Magazine, 20 December 2006).
288  Fiji Sun, 23 September 2006.
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born New Zealand citizen – angered the military by employing former 
CRWU prisoners as security guards.289 Bainimarama also cast his eye over 
his senior officers once more for signs of disloyalty.290
In mid-October 2006, on the eve of his departure to visit troops in West 
Asia, Bainimarama suddenly delivered an ultimatum: the government had 
three weeks in which to drop its ethno-nationalist legislation or resign. 
Rather than maintain stoic normality, Qarase panicked and blundered 
from disaster to disaster. Naturally enough he declared that his government 
would not be resigning. And the Police Commissioner refused to release 
military ammunition that had arrived at the Suva Wharf. It would be 
‘irresponsible to do so in the current climate’, Hughes argued. A couple of 
days later, on 31 October, soldiers raided the wharf ‘commando style’ in 
the early morning and removed 7.5 tonnes of ammunition.291 Six hours 
later Qarase went to the President and demanded that the Commander 
be stood down and replaced with Col Meli Saubulinayau while police 
investigated his latest threat to take over government. But the President’s 
subsequent directive met a wall of defiance from senior officers. Acting 
Commander Captain Esala Teleni told over 1,000 territorials and regulars 
at a two-week camp in Nabua that the army was Fiji’s last bastion of 
law and order, not the Fiji Police.292 And he released nine demands that, 
if Qarase complied with them, would prevent a military takeover. Secretly 
Qarase pleaded with Australia for military assistance only to be turned 
down and his pleas made public. The military will ‘not accept any foreign 
intervention’, Teleni warned. ‘Having another armed element is not good 
for the country,’ he added, pointing a finger at the police, ‘particularly 
if the rules of engagement are not clear.’293
In desperation, Qarase dropped the amnesty clause from the RTU Bill 
on 3 November and turned to the GCC for support, claiming that the 
longstanding impasse between the government and the military was an 
indigenous problem that should be addressed by the paramount body for 
Fijian matters. Now back in Fiji, Bainimarama would have none of it. 
He told the chiefs on 10 November that ‘there has never been any public 
declaration of those who are in government that the 2000 crisis was 
289  Fiji Sun, 26 October 2006.
290  Fiji Times, 29 October 2006. In late October, Bainimarama’s longstanding head legal advisor, 
Col Etueni Caucau, went on leave.
291  Fiji Times, 30 October & 7 November 2006.
292  Fiji Times, 4 November 2006.
293  Sydney Morning Herald, 11 November 2006.
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wrong … [Qarase] has never educated our people in the villages about the 
wrongs of 2000 which has resulted in a coup mentality’. Instead he stirred 
‘the emotions of the common people’ and released coup perpetrators 
under the guise of legal excuses. He had ‘given up’ on the government: 
‘Mr Prime Minister, we’ve had enough of your lies.’
For his part Qarase tried to place his government within historical context. 
He told the chiefs, ‘So long as … undercurrents of unhappiness and 
discontent … continue, we can never be assured about long term stability 
in Fiji’. The electoral results of 1987 and 1999 were ‘a harsh reminder 
that Fijian control of government’ could no longer be guaranteed in 
a democracy. ‘Fijians feel that they can no longer look to the government 
of the day for the protective role the British had established,’ he concluded: 
‘This concern was exacerbated by what they perceive to be the anti-Fijian 
policies of the People’s Coalition Government.’294 
Bainimarama clearly viewed Qarase’s performance as irrelevant; so too 
the GCC’s meeting. He dismissed it as ‘a waste of taxpayers’ money’. Given 
that many chiefs were tainted by their support for the 2000 coup, they 
should not be there.295 With the GCC rejected, Qarase was running out of 
options and the vacuum of action deafened. ‘While the lawful authorities 
are still in office they should act,’ one unidentified legal source told the 
press in late November: ‘If the Commander is to act first, it will be too 
late for those in lawful authority to do anything.’296 The police announced 
seven separate investigations, including the illegal removal of weapons, 
plotting the overthrow of government, illegally pressing the President to 
abort a commission of inquiry into Bainimarama’s actions, disobeying 
a lawful order, and financial abuse of office. Investigations into the deaths 
of CRWU soldiers in 2000 continued but now a new investigation began 
into 10 politicians, civil servants and former military officers who were 
inciting Bainimarama to commit treason. On 24  November, police 
searched the President’s office for papers incriminating Bainimarama. 
The Commander was not amused. ‘They want to look for a minute of 
conversation I had with the President and that conversation was never 
recorded,’ he thundered: ‘Qarase is selling our sovereignty to an Australian 
… [Hughes] should leave the country now for that action.’297 
294  Sydney Morning Herald, 11 November 2006; Fiji Sun, 11 November 2006; fijilive, 
11 November 2006.
295  fijilive, 11 November 2006.
296  Verenaisi Raicola, ‘Who will prevail in the end?’, Fiji Times, 30 November 2006.
297  fijilive, 25 November 2006.
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Hughes became increasingly frustrated as he learned the limits to what 
he could achieve ‘as an expat in a country with flawed politics’.298 He had 
requested the director of public prosecutions lay sedition charges against 
Bainimarama but the DPP seemed in no hurry to act. The office that 
had dismissed its Australian deputy DPP the previous year now refused 
to appoint the man slated to succeed him. But even without the speedy 
resolution of police cases, Hughes faced more fundamental issues with 
regard to Bainimarama. ‘The arrest scenario is one that is problematic 
because he normally accompanies himself with up to 25 fully armed 
military guards,’ Hughes told the press: ‘We are an unarmed police force; 
we are not able to effect a usual arrest.’299 At the end of November, after 
three ambassadors from Britain, the United States and Australia visited 
the QEB to plead with senior officers to pull back, the military raised the 
stakes higher. It would conduct exercises to train its troops to repel foreign 
intervention. Acting Commander Esala Teleni declared the ambassadors 
‘out of line’.300
The theatre was far from over. Bainimarama found time in his busy 
schedule to attend his granddaughter’s first communion in New Zealand. 
There he also found time to express to Auckland media his frustration 
with the Fiji police investigation into his alleged sedition. Back in Suva, 
Hughes spied an opportunity and asked NZ police to arrest Bainimarama 
for ‘perverting the course of justice in a foreign jurisdiction’. Such an 
action might at least avoid an armed confrontation in Fiji at a time 
when everyone was on edge. New Zealand had already withdrawn all 
but essential staff from its embassy after Bainimarama told its defence 
attaché that, if arrested in New Zealand, his troops would storm the High 
Commission.301 Hughes held similar fears for his family and sent them to 
298  Wikileaks, 21 December 2010; comment by NZ Deputy Foreign Secretary Alan Williams, 
30 November 2006.
299  fijilive, 28 November 2006.
300  Raicola, ‘Who will prevail in the end?’, 2006. Reports from the military suggested they had 
encouraged senior officers to mutiny, but US Ambassador Larry Dinger later said that they only tried 
to discourage a coup (fijilive, 5 April 2008). The meeting came, however, after Australia had sent three 
naval vessels to assist in the possible evacuation of Australian citizens. A Blackhawk helicopter crashed 
during manoeuvres, killing two crew on 29 November. The Fiji military easily escalated the Australian 
presence outside Fiji waters into a potential invasion threat.
301  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 25 June 2013; report based on High Commissioner Michael 
Green’s posthumous Persona Non Grata, Breaking the Bond – New Zealand and Fiji 2004–2007 




Australia.302 When New Zealand’s Prime Minister Helen Clark arranged 
for Qarase to fly down to New Zealand early on 29 November to meet 
with Bainimarama for a frank discussion of their differences, Hughes 
joined Qarase unannounced on the flight from Nausori, Suva’s airport. 
His plans came to nought. New Zealand preferred a political solution. 
‘The challenge remains for Qarase to find an adroit way to satisfy the military 
without exceeding what his domestic political base will tolerate,’ the deputy 
secretary of New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) 
– Alan Williams – believed.303 Bainimarama and Qarase had not met in 
nine months. New Zealand had already warned Bainimarama that, should 
he launch a coup, he and his wife would be banned from entering New 
Zealand and from visiting their grandchildren.304 MFAT held no high 
hopes for success but, to ease the atmosphere, it advised Bainimarama that 
neither New Zealand nor Australia intended to send troops to Fiji. After 
two hours and 25 minutes it believed progress had been made. Surreally 
Qarase gave in to all Bainimarama’s demands although with caveats. Bills 
would be withdrawn if found illegal, charges against the Commander 
would be withdrawn if the police so recommended, the military’s views 
on the Police Commissioner would be considered when his contract was 
reviewed, the future of the Tactical Response Unit would be reviewed, 
and so on. He needed to show ‘flexibility while insisting on due process 
and constitutionality’. Privately Bainimarama agreed to delay the onset of 
his coup until 4 December in order to give Qarase time to show ‘signs of 
earnest movement’. While Bainimarama headed home via a connecting 
flight in Auckland, New Zealand quickly returned Qarase directly to Nadi 
in order to give him a two-hour advantage to ‘shape the public perception 
of the meeting and signal that he is prepared to reach out to the military, 
the media and civil society in ways that will give Bainimarama reason to 
conclude that further steps towards a coup are not warranted’.305
302  Russell Hunter & Victor Lal, ‘Fiji police chief tried to get Bainimarama arrested in NZ’, 
New Zealand Herald, 18 February 2012.
303  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 20 December 2010, Wikileaks report. New Zealand’s Fiji-born 
Governor General Anand Satyanand opened the 10 am meeting, which was chaired by Foreign 
Minister Winston Peters. 
304  fijilive, 22 December 2010.
305  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 20 December 2010.
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New Zealand should have heeded the advice of its High Commissioner, 
Michael Green, who thought Bainimarama had no interest in genuine 
negotiations but would pocket ‘every concession with no reciprocity’,306 
or  Dinger, who counselled Wellington that ‘Being passive with bullies 
only encourages them’.307 Dinger also told Washington that Bainimarama: 
is  surrounded by a compliant officer corps that is feeding the 
commander’s sense of righteous grievance against the Qarase Government 
… he does not care about international reactions, including the possible 
loss of aid money from Australia, the US and New Zealand.308 
So it came to pass that Qarase returned home, Chamberlain-like, with 
a peace agreement, waving the agreed outcomes of their meeting. And 
Bainimarama returned disowning it, calling Qarase a liar. Stung, Qarase 
repeated his offer to review the three controversial bills and proposed 
a government information campaign on the 2000 coup. But he also 
asserted that Bainimarama was not above the law and should still be 
subject to investigation for the CRWU deaths and for sedition.309 It was 
hardly surprising then that, on 30 November, Bainimarama repeated his 
nine demands, declaring that the police should end its investigations of 
the military, that the armed Police Tactical Response Unit be disbanded, 
that the RTU and Qoliqoli Bills be withdrawn, and that the Police 
Commissioner and all cabinet ministers involved in the 2000 coup should 
resign. Hughes knew the writing was on the wall and headed for Australia. 
From Cairns he described Bainimarama as ‘deranged’ and ‘unstable’, and 
possibly still suffering post-traumatic stress from 2000.310 Bainimarama 
told Hughes not to return because he had caused all the problems between 
the army and police.311
On 1 December, with the coup’s deadline rapidly approaching, 
Bainimarama’s phoney war began to tell. Rumours circulated that the 
military had tried to capture Qarase the previous evening. Qarase took 
no chances. He left the capital and flew to Savusavu and later to Nadi. 
His cabinet similarly went to different locations, ‘effectively on the run 
from the military’, according to one observer.312 Several state CEOs did 
306  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 25 June 2013.
307  Hunter & Lal, ‘Fiji police chief ’, 2012.
308  Doring, ‘US cables’, 2011.
309  Sydney Morning Herald, 30 November 2006.
310  Sydney Morning Herald, 2 December 2006.
311  Fiji Times, 3 December 2006.
312  Simon Kearney, ‘Army seizes control of Fiji’, Australian, 2 December 2006.
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likewise. Iliesa Duvuloco, one of the perpetrators of the 2000 coup, 
thought it wise to leave the country. The Daily Post called on Australia to 
grant its staff asylum.313 The Ministry of Finance hastily issued a memo 
reminding the military that all ministries had to comply with standard 
expenditure limits and that it had already overspent its 2006 budget by 
$31 million.314 
In contrast, Bainimarama appeared relaxed. He attended the annual 
rugby match between the army and police, which the police won. Later 
on the Friday evening he again dismissed Qarase’s concessions. Qarase 
insisted that his government was ‘still in control’ and that the military’s 
deadline had been extended until midday the following Monday.315 
Back  in Australia, Hughes warned of dangers ahead for Bainimarama. 
The  Commander ‘doesn’t have the support of the government, of the 
President, of the police, of the churches, of the chiefs, of the people of 
Fiji,’ he told the BBC. Should Bainimarama push ahead, he could ‘foresee 
a popular uprising’.316 Earlier, fijivillage had reached a similar conclusion. 
Coups were only successful if they enjoyed Fijian support, as Rabuka’s had 
in 1987 and Bainimarama’s in 2000. Its Yellow Bucket column argued 
that the military was now in no position to execute a successful coup.317 
Both were terribly wrong. On Monday 4 December 2006, Bainimarama’s 
slow-motion coup began with checkpoints erected around Suva and the 
Police Tactical Response Unit’s armoury seized. Eight years would pass 
before Fiji returned to democratic government.
313  Malcolm Brown, ‘Fiji military chief already in power’, Age, 4 December 2006.
314  fijilive, 8 December 2006.
315  Sydney Morning Herald, 2 December 2006.
316  BBC, 5 December 2006.
317  Yellow Bucket, ‘Coup, what coup?’ fijivillage, 8 November 2006.
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1  The Director of the Fiji Human Rights Commission (FHRC), Dr Shaista Shameem, alluded 
to this in her report to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in mid-2007. She claimed 
that a coup refers to the removal of the head of state and constitution, not simply the dismissal of 
a government. Hence there had only been one coup in Fiji’s history, that in September 1987, after 
which Fiji became a republic (fijilive, 30 August 2007).
2  fijivillage, 23 December 2006.
Plus ça change …?
Frank Bainimarama’s coup on 5 December 2006 shared many features 
with Sitiveni Rabuka’s first coup back in May 1987. On both occasions, 
the military sought to dismiss the democratically elected government 
of the day, a goal easily achieved. But, on each occasion, sustaining that 
achievement under the umbrella of constitutionality proved impossible. 
Rabuka’s solution was a second coup five months later, which led to 
the formation of a republic and eventually to the creation of a new 
constitution in 1990. Bainimarama resisted a constitutional response 
until legal realities caught up with him in 2009. He finally introduced 
a new constitution in 2013.1
What made Bainimarama’s coup so different, however, and which 
partially explains its seven-year delay in constitutional resolution, was its 
anti-establishment character. Whereas Rabuka in 1987 simply wished to 
restore the status quo ante and return to power the Fijian elites that Timoci 
Bavadra’s Labour Party had democratically threatened, Bainimarama’s coup 
in 2006 necessitated a wholesale transformation of those elites and their 
power; indeed, he blamed ‘those indigenous Fijians in powerful positions 
who are power hungry and look after the interests of an elite group’ as the 
cause of Fiji’s problems.2 How extensive that transformation would be was 
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not immediately apparent. Bainimarama continued to refer to his coup 
as an overdue clean-up campaign. His early moves leant weight to the 
assertion. He sacked many state CEOs, began reorganising the police, Fiji 
National Provident Fund (FNPF) and Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), 
challenged the leaders of the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) (many of 
whom had supported both the 1987 and 2000 coups), and established a 
new Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC).
A few commentators, such as expatriate journalist Victor Lal, suggested 
that ‘What took place on December 5 cannot even be described as 
a coup’ because Laisenia Qarase and his ministers ‘simply abandoned their 
portfolios and ran away, creating a public necessity for the Commodore 
to step in and take executive authority in Fiji’.3 Others supported 
Bainimarama’s necessity defence: ‘Given Fiji’s turbulent past,’ journalist 
Graham Davis wrote, ‘it’s arguably a revolution that can happen only 
at the point of a gun, however much that might offend democratic 
sensibilities.’4 Some chose to accept Bainimarama’s good governance 
description of the coup. University of Fiji’s Satendra Nandan described it 
as ‘a coup to end all coups’,5 an assertion that gained the support of several 
civil society groups, but not the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF). 
Its director, Rev. Akuila Yabaki, declared ‘We don’t need a coup to end 
the coup cycle or to end racism, because we cannot break the supreme 
law of a country to protect the rule of law’.6 But others, including the 
Ecumenical Centre for Research, Education and Advocacy (ECREA), 
as well as some IndoFijian religious organisations and the Catholic 
Church were more equivocal. Back in 2001 the Roko Tui Bau, Ratu Joni 
Madraiwiwi, had placed high hopes on civil society to uphold democracy 
and human rights within Fiji.7 Clearly that had not come to fruition; 
many institutions hostile to previous coups were now prepared to grant 
3  Fiji Sun, 8 January 2007. Rabuka made a similar claim, arguing that Qarase could never be 
compared with Bavadra or Mahendra Chaudhry who ‘had to endure the hardships of incarceration as 
well as their ousting from office’ (Fiji Times, 15 August 2008).
4  G Davis, ‘It’s hail to the chiefs no longer’, Australian, 6 January 2007.
5  ‘Fiji coup could be its last’, Pacific Islands Report, PIDP, 21 March 2007. Professor Nandan told 
the anti-corruption symposium: ‘I know the Commander will not take us to heaven, but he may just 
and justly get us out of the hell-hole we’ve been digging for the past 20 years. He has not invoked 
indignity or mawkish religiosity nor mobs marching and bullying defenceless civilians or peasants – 
and that gives us hope. He has appealed to only one symbol of unity: our beloved country. And race 
is no longer bandied as the fact of life’.
6  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 14 May 2010.
7  J Madraiwiwi, ‘Fiji 2001: Our country at the crossroads’, 2001 Parkinson Memorial Lecture, 
University of the South Pacific, Wansolwara, 15 August 2001.
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legitimacy to military action. Fiji Human Rights Commission (FHRC) 
director, Shaista Shameem, even argued in a controversial report released 
in early January 2007 that the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) 
had a constitutional responsibility to pursue good governance, especially 
given ‘the rampant abuse of power, privilege, illegalities and wastage of 
wealth of the Qarase government, as well as its proposed discriminatory 
legislation which, if enacted, would have constituted a crime against 
humanity under international law’.8
Strangely for a coup designed to end Fiji’s reputation as ‘Coup-Coup 
Land’, it possessed all the by now familiar characteristics of previous coups. 
For a start Bainimarama – like Rabuka before him – could not control for 
all eventualities. For some time he had been able to manage President 
Josefa Iloilo – in his late 80s and displaying signs of dementia – through 
military personnel and friends in the presidential palace. Iloilo’s wife had 
also minimised government access to the President, and the Commander’s 
alternate office in Strategic Command at Berkley Crescent, adjacent to 
the Presidential Palace – originally conceived as a way to keep tabs on 
military commanders – had conveniently given Bainimarama unchecked 
access to the President.9 But the Vice President was a different matter. The 
Bauan high chief and articulate lawyer Madraiwiwi was nobody’s puppet. 
On the eve of the coup he persuaded Iloilo to release a statement declaring 
that he neither condoned nor supported the actions of the military ‘which 
were clearly outside the Constitution’.10 Hence, when Bainimarama did 
finally launch his coup, he did so without the planned endorsement of the 
President. As he put it on the day: ‘I, under the legal doctrine of necessity, 
8  S Shameem, ‘The assumption of executive authority on December 5 2006 by Commodore 
JV Bainimarama, Commander of the RFMF: Legal, constitutional and human rights issues’, Fiji 
Human Rights Commission, Suva, 3 January 2007, p. 31. This report, like Bainimarama’s coup 
announcement, relied on the repealed provisions in the 1990 Constitution that bestowed a watchdog 
function upon the military to justify its claims. The report prompted calls for Shameem’s resignation, 
opposition from fellow commissioners like Shamima Ali, the cancellation of NZ funding for the 
FHRC, and its suspension from the Geneva-based International Coordinating Committee of the 
National Institute for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Most critics believed the 
report supported dictatorship rather than constitutional democracy (e.g. Jonathan Edelstein, ‘Coups 
as a human right’, Fiji Sun, 7 January 2007; and Graham Leung, ‘Lawyers must cry freedom to the 
challenge in Fiji’, Fiji Times, 9 June 2009). Historian Brij Lal declared the notion of a constitutional 
coup an oxymoron (fijilive, 11 December 2007).
9  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 242–44.
10  Baledrokadroka, ‘Sacred king and warrior chief ’, 2012, pp. 266–67.
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will step into the shoes of the President given that he has been blocked 
from exercising his constitutional powers.’11 He then dismissed Qarase 
and appointed the 77-year-old military medical doctor, Jona Senilagakali, 
interim prime minister. 
The accidental Prime Minister immediately failed to impress as the 
harbinger of a new Fiji. In his first statement, he declared that he had 
‘been called by divine authority to do something for the people of 
Fiji’. What that might be remained uncertain. In defending the coup, 
Senilagakali also inadvertently undermined Bainimarama’s constitutional 
claims. ‘It’s an illegal takeover,’ he acknowledged, although its purpose 
was ‘to clean up the mess of a much bigger illegal activity of the previous 
government,’ adding that Fiji needed a different sort of democracy from 
‘the type … both Australia and New Zealand enjoy’.12 This logic, albeit 
for different reasons, had been employed to justify every coup in Fiji. 
In the past, nationalists deemed democracy incompatible with indigenous 
rights, thereby denying Fijians the right to accountability, transparency 
and equity, the foundations for any form of sustainable development.13 
Now Bainimarama deemed it at odds with Fiji’s development status,14 an 
assertion that gained the military some unexpected bedfellows. 
Aisake Casimira of the Pacific Conference of Churches argued that it was 
unwise for Fiji to pursue democracy at the same time as a free market 
economy. He declared that democracy could only be sustained with 
a strong welfare system. Yet, if history offered any lessons, it is that means 
are as important as ends. Political democratisation cannot be postponed, 
as Casimira suggested, in order to achieve economic democratisation. 
One is not possible without the other, as European countries learned 
prior to 1945. Economic democratisation also requires accountability, 
transparency and equity. By 2006, no coup had brought Fiji any closer 
to realising either political or economic democratisation. Nor had they 
assisted Fiji to transform its neocolonial economy, make the creativity 
and skills of all its peoples a driver of economic growth, and extend 
the boundaries within which they engage. Nationalistic assertions – 
11  Voreqe Bainimarama, press statement, 5 December 2006.
12  BBC, 7 December 2006.
13  Robertson & Sutherland, Government by the Gun, 2001, p. 127.
14  Bainimarama declared: ‘One must remember that the factors that bring about peace and 
harmony in any country are not confined to the word democracy. As an example last year I visited 
China … [and] witnessed a country that is … prosperous and peaceful despite the fact that it is 
regarded by many as not democratic’ (Australian, 11 December 2006). 
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whether on the grounds of race or development – were simply weapons 
of denial; they denied common human interests and needs, they denied 
opportunities for social partnerships, and they denied prospects for 
stronger intersectoral linkages and sustainable domestic growth. They did 
not provide a unique Fiji ‘road map to democracy’.15 
If Bainimarama’s coup failed to turn external sources of growth into more 
balanced internally oriented growth, then it too might go the way of all 
previous coups. Of course if Fiji’s new leader introduced policies that 
reduced social and economic inequalities, rewarded skills not privilege, 
stimulated domestic investment and increased real wages, he might 
transform Fiji society, decrease political instability, reduce emigration 
and enable the foundations for greater prosperity.16 All Fiji’s postcolonial 
governments and coup regimes neglected these opportunities in the past, 
invariably for reasons of race and class, with predictable consequences: plus 
ça change, plus c’est la même chose. Would Bainimarama’s contemporary 
endeavour prove any different? Did the manner of its birth predetermine 
its outcome? 
Undermining human rights
Military force is never an acceptable means to effect change. It simply 
reinforces coups as the weapon of choice for the disgruntled, as Rabuka 
conceded.17 Additionally, military force undermines the very institutions 
it purports to protect, as human rights activists noted earlier in 2006. 
It is unconstitutional for any institution to threaten to remove 
a government under any doctrine (legal or otherwise) based on a belief 
that the government is acting unconstitutionally. It is the function of the 
courts to determine unconstitutional action.18
15  A Casimira, ‘Democracy in many guises’, Fiji Sun, 18 February 2007.
16  R Robertson, ‘Fiji futuring’, paper presented to the Asia-Pacific Development Review 
Conference Fiji Forward 2000, 15–16 June 2006, Raffles Tradewinds, Suva, Fiji, in Pacific Economic 
Bulletin, 21: 2, 2006.
17  fijilive, 14 December 2006.
18  Fiji Times, 24 March 2006, p. 3; Angie Heffernan of the Pacific Centre for Public Integrity 
and Virisila Buadromo of the FWRM. 
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Indeed, the military’s own lack of respect for the rule of law, not only in 
overthrowing an elected government but also in its abuse of human rights 
and lack of financial transparency, undermined its reach for the moral 
high ground. In this respect, little distinguished Bainimarama’s military 
from Rabuka’s.
The first week of the coup began with Bainimarama declaring that his 
military would ‘respect the international conventions on human rights 
and humanitarian law’.19 But, by week’s end, a clear pattern of human 
rights abuses had been established. Former politician Kenneth Zink was 
first arrested for cursing at Bainimarama’s appearance on television while 
he was at the United Club. Soldiers forced him to run around a sports field 
at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks (QEB). On a second occasion in early 
January 2007, he was detained and assaulted in Nadi. Jale Baba, director 
of Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), Ted Young (a former Qarase 
minister) and Mere Samisoni (former MP and owner of the Bread Kitchen 
chain of bakeries) received similar treatment, sometimes being forced to 
do press-ups. Journalists were also questioned. Daily Post editor, Robert 
Wolfgramm, faced deportation. Ex–Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit 
(CRWU) soldiers at Pacific Connex were arrested and detained.20 
But worse befell Laisa Digitaki’s Young People’s Concerned Network. 
She  and colleagues provocatively constructed a shrine to democracy at 
her Lami office, with banners reading ‘Yes to Democracy No to Guns’. 
A  public relations businesswoman and partner of Fijian Holdings Ltd 
(FHL) managing director, Sitiveni Weleilakeba, she refused to acknowledge 
that the military’s state of emergency had legal validity,21 a challenge that 
would increasingly frustrate the regime in coming months. Armed men 
broke in and tore down the banners four days after the coup. Undeterred, 
Digitaki participated in a protest against the military government nearly 
two weeks later and was arrested but bailed. Then, on Christmas Eve, 
the soldiers came for her, taking her to Nabua where she was eventually 
united with a small group of dissidents rounded up by the military for 
special treatment: youth activists Pita Waqavonovono and Jackie Koroi, 
as well as Virisila Buadromo22 (Fiji Women’s Rights Movement (FWRM) 
19  fijilive, 5 December 2006.
20  Fiji Times, 9 December 2006.
21  Daily Post, 10 December 2006.
22  The US secretary of state presented Buadromo the International Women of Courage Award 
on 11 March 2008. 
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executive director) and her partner, lawyer Arshad Daud. Together and 
separately they were interrogated (Digitaki alleged that Land Force 
Commander Pita Driti participated, at one point threatening her with 
a pistol), before being taken out, assaulted and forced to run 10 kilometres 
back to their homes.23
‘The military needs to demonstrate humility not arrogance, altruism 
not selfishness, in all that it does,’ a Fiji Times correspondent wrote. But 
there was little chance of that as Bainimarama soon made clear: ‘These 
individuals should shut their mouths or else the military will shut it for 
them.’ Little wonder that CCF’s Jone Dakuvula feared who would be 
next.24 ‘Look,’ the new acting Police Commissioner reportedly argued, ‘the 
reality of things is, whatever legal rights you have, this is not a good time 
to be claiming them.’25 Indeed, by 15 February 2007, some 1,193 people 
had been arrested by the military for a range of offences,26 some meeting 
a far worse fate: Tailevu villager and land surveyor Nimilote Verebasaga 
tortured and beaten to death in early January, and 19-year-old Sakiusa 
Rabaka dead from injuries received in Nadi in late February. In both 
instances the military went to great lengths to protect the offenders from 
charges, even trying to send Rabaka’s killers out of the country to serve as 
peacekeepers in Iraq. ‘This is not good governance when the commander 
can’t reflect it within his own army,’ Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC) 
director Shamima Ali noted pointedly.27 For their comments, activists 
like Shamima Ali, Buadromo and Digitaki were regularly prevented from 
23  ‘Laisa Digitaki’s statement & sequence of events re pro-democracy group of five rounding up 
and bashing by the RFMF on December 24th–25th, 2006’, fijimediawars.blogspot.com.au/2014/09/
laisa-digitakis-story.html; Fiji Times, 26 December 2007. Driti was reportedly unhappy at being named 
in Digitaki’s statement; his unhappiness pushed Digitaki and Heffernan into hiding in January (fijilive, 
25 January 2007). Wikileaks later reported the US Embassy claiming that Chief of Staff Tevita Mara and 
Col Sitiveni Qiliho Tukaituraga were also present (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 15 February 2012).
24  Fiji Times, 26 December 2006; Fiji Sun, 26 December 2006. Bainimarama later alleged that 
NGOs only spoke out against the coup because they wanted to impress their foreign donors (Fiji Sun, 
28 January 2007).
25  Richard Naidu, interview, Fiji Sun, 16 January 2007.
26  Fiji Sun, 25 February 2007.
27  Fiji Sun, 30 October 2007. Only one soldier was tried for Nimolote’s death, receiving a three-
year sentence in April 2009. The men responsible for Sakiusa’s death – eight soldiers and one police 
officer – were finally tried and sentenced to jail for four years in March 2009. They were released 
under community service orders when the Constitution was abrogated a few weeks later. The police 
also share the military’s penchant for brutality. In mid-2007, Tevita Malasebe, a suspected thief, 
died in police custody at Valelevu. Two police were later convicted of murder. In September 2008, 
an escaped prisoner died of injuries received during his recapture by a new Police Strike Back team. 
FWCC deputy coordinator, Edwina Kotoisuva, claimed the team ‘brings out the machoism in the 
police officers’ (Fiji Sun, 20 September 2008).
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leaving the country to attend conferences or meetings. ‘Fiji’s Constitution 
is torn into pieces on a daily basis’ by the military’s ‘abuse of the basic 
human rights of citizens,’ Shamima Ali told the press.28 Perhaps aware 
that such abuses cost the military dearly in terms of public support, the 
new Attorney-General, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, argued in late February 
that the military should have the police charge people believed to be 
inciting instability, not take them to military HQ and interrogate them.29 
And, shortly after, Bainimarama announced that, henceforth, the military 
would be responsive to public views on human rights and ensure that 
excesses ceased. But, privately, EU diplomats alleged, he told them that 
if anyone insulted the army ‘of course we must have them taken to the 
barracks and have them beaten up’.30
Asserting constitutionality
Maintaining the pretence of constitutionality proved far more difficult, 
however, than dealing with human rights activists. Bainimarama had 
cited the doctrine of necessity as a way to head off such problems but, 
without doubt, the President’s refusal to play ball unsettled him. Taking 
revenge by dismissing Madraiwiwi and immediately forcing him from 
his residence,31 unlike government ministers who were at least given one 
month’s notice, solved nothing. Having the otherwise compliant head of 
state on side had always been a crucial part of Bainimarama’s plan for 
establishing the veneer of legality. To get back on track, he had now to 
persuade the GCC to reinstate Iloilo at its forthcoming meeting. But the 
chair of the Council, Ratu Ovini Bokini, was in no mood to comply. 
He still recognised the Qarase government and Iloilo as president. As far 
as he was concerned, Bainimarama’s action had no legal effect. He told 
reporters he had no intention of seeking Bainimarama out: ‘He has to 
make a request to me if he wants to meet me.’32
28  fijilive, 24 January 2007.
29  Fiji Times, 25 January 2007.
30  Doring, ‘US cables’, 2011. Bainimarama later argued that human rights conventions interfered 
with sovereignty (Fiji Times, 23 February 2008).
31  Fiji Times, 7 December 2006.
32  fijilive, 8 December 2006.
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But Bainimarama could be equally imperious. Australia’s Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer had just upped the ante by calling on Fiji’s citizens 
to launch a campaign of civil disobedience against the coup.33 On the 
same day that the Commonwealth suspended Fiji’s membership of its 
councils, Australia and New Zealand announced their intention to have 
the United Nations cut Fiji out from its peacekeeping duties, a role the 
RFMF depended on to maintain its size. In addition, the European Union 
warned that much of its projected aid to Fiji, particularly for its failing 
sugar industry, might now be in jeopardy. Back in Suva there was also 
bad news. With the finance CEO in hiding, the state IT Centre ceased 
to function, making it impossible to pay the 1,000 territorials called to 
the QEB. Amidst signs that the tourism industry was about to hit a new 
low, Emperor Gold Mining announced the closure of its once productive 
Vatukoula mine in western Viti Levu. 
In response Bainimarama sought to shore up popular support. He 
announced that members of a future interim government would have to 
apply for their posts following advertisement. He also announced that 
the prison on Nukulau Island, which housed 21 former coup makers, 
including George Speight, would be closed and the once popular island 
restored to Suva’s daytrippers. In addition, he scrapped Qarase’s planned 
2.5 per cent increase in VAT (to 15 per cent) and awarded all public 
servants a 2 per cent pay rise.34 Plans were also laid to reverse Fiji’s loss of 
skilled emigrants by enabling dual citizenship. 
Targeting dissidents also formed part of the fight back; so, too, the 
sacking of numerous public officials and raids on SDL headquarters for 
evidence of corruption. The military needed to project an image of both 
total control and steadfastness as its clean-up campaign began. It helped 
that several ECREA members defended the coup from a social justice 
perspective, declaring it Fiji’s first coup for multiracialism and against 
corruption and economic mismanagement.35 It helped also that two 
assumed co-conspirators quickly lent support, albeit qualified. Mahendra 
Chaudhry intimated that he would help Fiji return to democratic rule if 
everything was ‘constitutionally legal’; Ratu Epeli Ganilau asserted that he 
33  fijilive, 9 December 2006. 
34  Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 2006.
35  Paulo Baleinakorodawa, Father Kevin Barr & Semiti Qalowasa, ‘Time of uncertainty, 
opportunity’, Fiji Times, 19 December 2006. 
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supported ‘the cleaning up, but not the means’.36 Even Qarase appeared 
to give up the struggle, conceding that his government was unlikely to 
return. He forgave the Commander for his action ‘as life must go on’.37
But Fiji’s chiefs were not so forgiving. They pledged support for the 
Qarase government, maintained that Iloilo and Madraiwiwi were still in 
office, and refused to depart from the rule of law, a novel stance given 
the Council’s post-1987 record. But, when the 64-member GCC met 
on 20 December, Madraiwiwi was the only senior official in attendance. 
Qarase had not been allowed to return to Suva for the meeting and his 
Minister for Fijian Affairs probably thought it wise to be absent. Nor did 
Bainimarama attend. Bokini had refused to invite him as acting president 
and it seemed unlikely that the Council could guarantee the military 
the immunity from prosecution it sought for its takeover. Bainimarama 
even declined to receive a delegation from the Council. ‘The GCC has 
become the last hiding place for those evading the military,’ he declared, 
referring to the many non-members invited, including from the Assembly 
of Christian Churches in Fiji. The GCC had lost all credibility and its 
meeting was of no importance, his military spokesperson added.38 A split 
within the confederacies did not assist the chiefs’ cause. Burebasaga and 
Kubuna agreed to Iloilo appointing an interim government, but Tovata – 
whose Lau delegates included Ratu Tevita Uluilakeba Mara, head of the 
Third Fiji Infantry Regiment – could not reach agreement. 
Nonetheless, the Council’s stand highlighted a major problem for 
the military. As Richard Naidu pointed out, the GCC basically told 
Bainimarama that he was in breach of the Constitution. He could not 
claim to be the President. Iloilo remained in that role. To reappoint Iloilo 
as Bainimarama demanded would imply that Bainimarama was indeed 
the current President. The only way forward now for Bainimarama, 
Naidu suggested, was ‘to get rid of the Constitution’. Madraiwiwi thought 
similarly. The military were delusional and taking Fiji through ‘an Alice 
in Wonderland journey’ when they continue to assert that their actions 
are within the Constitution, he argued later that year. They would be 
better off abrogating the Constitution.39 So too Peter Ridgway, the former 
assistant director of public prosecutions: a new constitution was the only 
36  Daily Post, 9 December 2006.
37  fijivillage, 15 December 2006; Callinan, ‘Fueling Fiji’s coup’, 2006.
38  Fiji Sun, 19 December 2006; fijilive, 20 December 2006; Fiji Times, 22 December 2006.
39  J Madraiwiwi, ‘Mythic constitutionalism: Whither Fiji’s course in June 2007?’ paper to ‘The Fiji 
coup – six months on’ workshop, ANU, Canberra, 5 June 2007; Fiji Times, 11 June 2007.
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way to gain legitimacy and move forward.40 Not everyone saw things this 
way. Former Alliance politician and 1987 coup supporter Filipe Bole 
argued that ‘we have gone beyond the point of exploring the legality 
of the military takeover … The military has already established control of 
the country’. Echoing Qarase, he declared that Fiji ‘should move on and 
establish an administration to regain confidence’.41 
Bainimarama had similar thoughts, but remained flexible, later telling 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) leaders: ‘To abrogate the 
Constitution is no big deal if we have to find a way forward for Fiji’.42 
The GCC, however, maintained its stance of constitutionality. Its solution 
called on Qarase to tender his resignation and Iloilo to appoint an interim 
government ahead of fresh elections within 15 months. Bainimarama 
demurred: ‘We will return executive authority but we will not do it in 
a rush.’43 He plotted his next move. In early January 2007, after very 
publicly sending Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki and Chief Magistrate Naomi 
Lomaiviti on leave pending a corruption investigation, he reinstated Iloilo 
as president and announced Senilagakali’s resignation as interim prime 
minister. In a national address on 4 January, Iloilo declared: ‘I would have 
done exactly what the commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces 
… did since it was necessary to do so at that time. These actions were valid 
in law.’ ‘Cultural reasons’ had prevented him from acting earlier; now he 
intended to appoint an interim government.44 
Although the direct opposite of his statement a month earlier, Iloilo’s 
declaration of support demonstrated Bainimarama’s renewed power 
over the presidential office and, by implication, the GCC.45 While the 
chiefs licked their wounds, Iloilo bestowed immunity on the military 
and announced the formation of a new interim government. Despite 
promising transparency, many members of the government had not 
been among the 400 applications received. Nor was there any indication 
40  Fiji Times, 12 January 2007. ‘Fiji has to wake up from the dream that the Constitution has not 
been abrogated,’ he later argued. If the Constitution still existed, then all promulgations were null and 
void (fijilive, 18 July 2008).
41  Fiji Times, 22 December 2006.
42  Fiji Times, 2 June 2008.
43  Fiji Sun, 23 December 2006.
44  fijilive, 4 January 2006.
45  Graham Davis reported that Ratu Apenisa Cakobau (scion of the Cakobau family that formed 
‘the hand inside George Speight’s glove’) told him that ‘We still have the support of the ordinary 
people and he will have to deal with that … In the old days I would have eaten him’ (‘It’s hail to the 
chiefs no longer’, 2007).
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that the lessons of 2000 had been learned, that the new ministers 
would pledge to forego participation in future elections. And, despite 
previously dismissing many state board members for holding more than 
one position, Bainimarama emerged as both prime minister and military 
commander. No salary statements were disclosed.46 Four SDL ministers 
had applied for posts. None were successful. Instead Fiji Labour Party 
(FLP) (Chaudhry and Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi) and National Alliance Party 
(NAP) (Ganilau and Bernadette Rounds) members occupied finance, 
sports, tourism, and Fijian affairs posts respectively. Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum 
became Attorney-General; Poseci Bune, Public Service Minister; and 
Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Altogether there 
were 16 ministers but, according to economist Wadan Narsey, by failing 
to include SDL representatives, Bainimarama broke both the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution regarding multi-party governance and provided 
‘a recipe for further instability’.47
Regression and progression
At least the formation of a new interim government permitted the 
semblance of normality and an opportunity to pursue the coup’s 
purported agenda of good governance. The new administration was 
considerably smaller than Qarase’s bloated cabinet and its formation was 
quickly followed by the termination of 23 state CEOs, many only recently 
appointed, and their replacement by 16 permanent secretaries. This return 
to pre-reform public service leadership roles reflected Bune’s cost cutting 
measures and also included reducing the retirement age of public servants 
to 55 years. He argued that retirees could use their pensions to set up 
new businesses; but no one examined the impact such a policy might 
have on superannuation schemes, let alone the growing proportion of 
the population now cut asunder that might otherwise have formed an 
important market for businesses. Nor, apparently, the loss of skills from 
the most experienced group in the workforce. The move immediately 
affected over 900 teachers and 300 nurses, and sparked a series of union 
46  Fiji Sun, 16 January 2007, analysis by Brij Lal. Qarase saw the lineup as proof that the FHRC, 
the military, FLP and NAP had all participated in the overthrow of his government (Fiji Times, 
10 January 2007). Others saw it as confirmation of allegations by Andrew Hughes that Bainimarama 
was simply ‘a frontman for power seeking people in Fiji who failed in the last election’ (Fiji Times, 
6 December 2006).
47  Fiji Times, 15 February 2007.
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strikes in July and August when accompanied by wage cuts.48 Such back-
to-the-past planning demonstrated the paucity of innovative thinking. 
Initiating policies that might make a crucial development difference had 
eluded all postcolonial governments; Bainimarama’s interim government 
seemed poised to follow suit.
It did not help that Fiji was soon in the grip of a recession, in part 
the consequence of past SDL priorities, in part a product of declining 
access to preferential markets, but in part due also to a collapse of Fiji’s 
only vibrant sector, tourism, caused entirely by the December coup. 
Overall Fiji’s  GDP growth in 2007 declined 6.5 per cent from 2006 
to – 2.5 per cent, although at least 2 per cent of that decline had been 
anticipated prior to the coup.49 Not surprisingly, this mostly military-
induced recession reduced the capacity of the interim government to be 
proactive and grow its $3 billion budget. Losses in sugar earnings were 
expected eventually to reach 15 per cent and similarly in tourism.50 Public 
service wage cuts of 5 per cent reduced Fiji’s capacity to make its citizens 
more economically responsive, with some commentators arguing that it 
did not help that the new Minister for Finance also seemed stuck in the 
1970s and 1980s, unable to see beyond the public sector to drive growth, 
and using changes in tariffs ‘to take revenge on perceived enemies’.51 
Huge investments in public infrastructure, education and training, health 
and housing were required for Fiji to break out of its doldrums. Thirty-
five per cent of Fiji’s population lived in poverty, 12 per cent in squatter 
settlements. Among them were at least 5,000 affected by the expiry of 
land leases since 2000. Many were from Vanua Levu or western Viti Levu, 
48  Fiji Times, 22 & 25 January 2007. Strikes by some unions were averted by reducing wage 
cuts by 1 per cent (Fiji Times, 11 July 2007). Union and court challenges prevented the immediate 
implementation of the new retirement age.
49  Fiji Times, 2 March 2007.
50  fijilive, 13 February 2007; fijivillage, 31 March 2007. Tourism took four years to recover from 
the 2000 coup, and the 2006 coup was expected to have a similar impact, although an immediate 
discount on fares and bookings provided some recovery. The sugar industry’s prospects seemed 
bleaker, given the end of preferential trading in 2009, particularly if interim EU support failed to 
materialise. Since 1997 over 5,250 land leases had expired; 43 per cent were not renewed, sugar cane 
production had fallen from 4 million tonnes to 3 million by 2006, sugar production from 454,000 
tonnes to 310,000, and the number of growers from 22,304 to 15,730 (Bala Dass, ‘Ailing sugar 
industry’, Fiji Times, 3 August 2015). Employment in the garment industry had halved over the same 
period. Government debt had increased from 41 per cent of GDP to over 52 per cent during the 
Qarase government’s time in office, although 90 per cent of this was domestically sourced. Growth 
did eventuate and, by 2018, Fiji’s government budget exceeded $5 billion.
51  fijivillage, 5 March 2007.
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and they moved into the outskirts of Suva where already over 16 per cent 
of the population were squatters.52 But none of these much-needed 
investments were possible without substantial economic growth and 
capital outlays. And none would be forthcoming with expenditures down 
and the Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) maintaining tight fiscal and monetary 
policies. In fact the bank did not expect recovery until 2009. Meanwhile, to 
reach and sustain 5 per cent GDP growth required combined government 
and private investment to rise from its current level of 14  per  cent of 
GDP to at least 25 per cent. Government alone needed to lift its capital 
investment to 30 per cent of its annual budget.53 Given that the post-
coup environment made greater foreign direct investment unlikely, 
any government attempt to compensate with external borrowing could 
prove ruinously expensive.54 Not unexpectedly the interim government’s 
revised 2007 budget was little more than a coping mechanism, with few 
initiatives to promote growth or provide a platform for future investment 
and growth. ‘The economy is barely surviving,’55 Public Services Minister 
Bune acknowledged in mid-2007. 
Fiji had for too long failed to refashion and grow its agricultural and 
garments sectors. Bainimarama admitted also that it had failed to diversify 
its economy and become overly reliant on imported goods and services. 
Soon it would be buffeted by the headwinds of a global recession, which 
allowed Bainimarama to claim Fiji’s current economic problems were 
beyond his control.56 Overspending by the military, by 54 per cent in 
2007, did not assist. The Fiji Times accused it of double standards: ‘despite 
calling for accountability and transparency in others, the army sees no 
need to follow the same rules’.57 Such criticism, its spokesperson retorted, 
simply demonstrated the media’s lack of ‘understanding of the important 
function of the military in national development’.58
52  fijilive, 5 April 2007. Of those in poverty, 43 per cent were IndoFijians and 38 per cent Fijians 
(Fiji Times, 21 September 2006).
53  J Kotobalavu, ‘Statistics for Fiji’s future’, Fiji Times, 27 October 2008.
54  Fiji Times, 21 September 2006; see also M Reddy, ‘Growth policy lacking’, Fiji Times, 3 March 
2007; Fiji Sun, 5 March 2007; and Fiji Times, 6 & 7 March 2007. Spending on health and education 
fell by approximately $17 million.
55  fijilive, 19 July 2009.
56  fijilive, 6 March 2009.
57  Fiji Times, 28 November 2008.
58  Fiji Times, 27 November 2008. Nonetheless, at the start of 2008 Bainimarama announced 
‘Good Governance in the RFMF’ the military theme of the year (Fiji Times, 23 February 2008).
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While Bainimarama’s coup shared many features with Rabuka’s earlier 
coups, it differed in one crucial aspect. Fiji’s military leaders now shunned 
ethno-nationalism and promised the country a radically different future. 
Initially they focused on ‘cleaning up’ governance, but this strategy soon 
ran out of steam. Proving corruption would take time, possibly years. 
Efforts to fast track evidence failed dismally. The use of the international 
conman, Australian Peter Foster, to tape conversations with key SDL 
officials admitting corrupt practices in the 2006 election backfired 
when he escaped the country. By then he had tainted almost everyone 
he dealt with and the military distanced itself from the affair.59 Even 
the establishment of FICAC proved problematic. Its constitutionality 
was immediately challenged. Its newly appointed Malaysian chairman 
resigned under pressure from international law bodies and its first chief 
investigator, Inspector Nazir Ali, proved highly controversial. A former 
head of the Agricultural Scam investigation who had been stood down by 
Andrew Hughes in 2006, Nazir Ali turned his unwanted attention onto 
the police, raiding its headquarters in Nasinu and alleging fraudulent 
practices.60 FICAC also conflicted with the director of public prosecutions 
(DPP), until the High Court ruled that it had no right to prosecute cases.61 
Its raid on the Fiji Revenue and Customs Authority (FIRCA) in order to 
build a case against the suspended Chief Justice prompted the authority’s 
CEO to resign.62 
59  Foster had a long association with Fiji and had helped finance Tupeni Baba’s New Labour Party 
in 2001. Banned from Fiji in 2002, he had returned by 2006 when he was arrested for allegedly 
manufacturing false internet sites in order to smear a rival tourist resort. Facing fraud charges, he was 
rearrested by the Police Tactical Response Unit after being on the run for two weeks while attempting 
to flee to Tonga. After the coup he allegedly did a deal with the military but, in early January, he 
fled to Vanuatu where he was arrested and deported to Australia to face money-laundering charges 
(Fiji Times, 26 October & 20 December 2006; fijilive, 1, 2, 3 & 10 January 2007; Age, 6 February 
2007). Foster later claimed the Australian Government under John Howard facilitated the rigging of 
elections in 2006 (interview with Monica Attard, Sunday Profile, ABC Radio, 22 May 2009).
60  FICAC seemed out of control. It confiscated items donated by a visiting film crew to an old 
people’s home in Labasa. With the appointment of a new FICAC Deputy Commissioner from the 
military, and following the appointment of Captain Esala Teleni as Police Commissioner, Nazir Ali 
was soon transferred back to the police as Assistant Police Commissioner (Crime) (Fiji Times, 25 June 
& 15 July 2007). But after he complained to Bainimarama that Teleni and his deputy were plotting 
a coup, Nazir Ali was transferred to Levuka as station officer (Fiji Times, 4 February 2008). 
61  Fiji Times, 21 August 2007. Allegedly this did not prevent FICAC from threatening DPP 
officers with arrest for refusing to prosecute a case about which they had not been consulted. Within 
days, Nazir Ali was removed from the case and suspended (Fiji Times, 8 & 27 November 2007). 
FICAC gained similar powers to the DPP in 2016.
62  Fiji Times, 28 November 2007.
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FICAC’s lack of success did not appear to trouble the interim government. 
It simply moved on to the next stage of its Way Forward Reform Agenda, 
the establishment of a National Council for Building a Better Fiji 
(NCBBF), first mooted in February as a means to rid Fiji of its ‘politics 
of race’.63 Race had not always been central to Bainimarama’s clean-up 
campaign, but there were hints that it would form the most significance 
difference between his coup and those that went before. His quest to 
ensure justice for those who had led the putative 2000 coup, which 
had almost cost him his life and crippled the RFMF, had constrained 
the Qarase government’s ethno-nationalist objectives after 2001, but not 
sufficiently to prevent a showdown. That long lead-time provided ample 
opportunity for Bainimarama to garner support from an entirely different 
corner, as Madraiwiwi acknowledged:
This consisted of the Fiji Labour Party and a large majority of the Indo-
Fijian community, scarred by the events of May 2000 and a by sense of 
alienation from the SDL Government because of some of its policies. 
A majority of the minority communities also felt likewise i.e. marginalised 
and deprived of opportunities to benefit from Government assistance. 
It  also included the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, a significant 
section of civil society, elements in the judiciary and the professional 
classes as well as a portion of the private sector.64
Such support remained largely unspoken while Bainimarama focused 
on Qarase, possibly because it held no obvious value for achieving his 
objective. Immediately prior to the coup he briefly declared, ‘We will be 
one race’.65 Even after the coup, he made only occasional reference to his 
new support base. When challenging the chiefs, for example, he pointedly 
argued that ‘Indians are not the cause of the problem’.66 Instead he sought 
more diffusely to oppose discrimination, especially that encompassed 
within the Qoliqoli Bill or in Qarase’s affirmative action legislation. 
In February 2007, Bainimarama’s government decreed the removal of 
discriminatory provisions in the Social Justice Act and intimated that it 
would also review all educational policies; over 15,000 students had been 
denied educational assistance simply because they attended IndoFijian 
schools. Racism, Bainimarama declared, remained the principal cause 
of Fiji’s brain drain.67 
63  Fiji Times, 21 February 2007. 
64  Madraiwiwi, ‘Mythic constitutionalism’, 2007.
65  fijilive, 3 December 2006.
66  fijivillage, 23 December 2006.
67  fijilive, 14 & 16 February 2007; Fiji Times, 21 February 2007.
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Charged with developing policies on good governance, economic growth, 
financial reform, land utilisation and social change to take Fiji forward 
over the next 15 years, the NCBBF got off to a poor start.68 Few public 
submissions were received. The Methodists declared it illegal and the 
SDL declined to participate. Many provinces refused to permit NCBBF 
members to speak in their villages. As Madraiwiwi noted, it was ‘Impossible 
for a government that derived its power from the barrel of a  gun to 
enforce cordial community relations’. Ending racial discrimination might 
be a  laudable ideal, but Bainimarama’s military leadership provided no 
shining example for Fiji to emulate.69 
Nonetheless, the NCBBF persevered under the leadership of Fiji 
expatriate John Samy, formerly an economist at the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). Its principal task was to develop a People’s Charter that 
would establish binding rules for future governance. Samy argued that the 
Charter represented Bainimarama’s exit strategy; others were less charitable. 
Former Police Commissioner Isikia Savua called it a military prescription 
for future governments, similar to the demands Rabuka presented to 
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara at the end of 1987.70 Indeed, Angie Heffernan 
of the Pacific Centre for Public Integrity (PCPI) saw it expanding the 
military’s constitutional role71 while The Australian National University’s 
Brij Lal declared it a futile exercise that would never garner support or be 
binding on future governments.72 Of course the question still remained, 
could it ever be considered legal?73 Shamima Ali believed that the NCBBF 
never considered this question, although how the interim government 
would seek to legitimise it was, in her opinion, the key issue.74 And, as the 
NCBBF extended the reach of its deliberations to include the abolition 
68  Both Bainimarama and Catholic Archbishop Petero Mataca chaired the NCBBF. There were 
45 members invited to attend its first formal meeting in January 2008, mostly representing NGOs 
and political parties. Only 34 came, including eight cabinet ministers.
69  Fiji Times, 2 April 2008.
70  fijilive, 31 March 2008.
71  Fiji Times, 8 August 2008.
72  Fiji Times, 11 January 2008; 3 March 2008. Qarase claimed his government’s Strategic 
Development Plan for 2007–2011 also made it redundant (Fiji Times, 7 April 2008). Mick Beddoes 
of the United People’s Party (UPP) called it a ‘People’s Coalition Charter’, highlighting Labour’s 
association with the coup and with Samy, who had apparently been invited back to Fiji in March 2007 
by Chaudhry (Fiji Times, 3 March 2008; fijilive, 28 January 2008). Qarase derided it as a ‘Charter to 
end all coups’ (Fiji Times, 19 April 2008).
73  Jioji Kotobalavu, Qarase’s former CEO, while supporting electoral changes, noted that such 
changes would not be in accordance with constitutional procedure. Legal challenges might delay 
a future election (Fiji Times, 7 April 2008).
74  Fiji Times, 7 August 2008.
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of communal seats, the introduction of proportional representation, 
an end to affirmative action policies based on race, the creation of a new 
‘Fijian’ national name for all Fiji’s citizens, the integration of provincial 
development, and the development of a unified approach to land use, the 
likelihood of legal challenges grew stronger. 
With the release of the ‘People’s Charter for Change, Peace and Progress’ in 
August 2008, Qarase somewhat predictably argued that Fijians would be 
marginalised by attempts to mainstream them into national development 
plans.75 And, yet, mainstreaming made perfect sense for a country in 
which Fijians – as long recognised – now formed the overwhelming 
majority of the population. The 2007 census placed Fijians at 57 per cent 
of the population and IndoFijians at 38 per cent,76 a change that reflected 
both greater IndoFijian emigration rates and lower IndoFijian fertility 
rates. This change had electoral implications as Narsey later noted:
[B]y 2027, Indo-Fijians will comprise only 30% of all voters (assumed 
to be 18 years and over). The ethnic conflicts over political leadership or 
domination will be well and truly history by then.
And with the incidence of poverty roughly the same for Fijians and Indo-
Fijians (a third) if poverty alleviation resources are allocated to the poor 
only on the basis of need, the Indo-Fijian share will reduce from the 
current 36% down to a mere 26% by 2027. ‘Affirmative action policies’ 
will be a total non-issue.
So also should be ethnic shares of public sector jobs sought by school 
leavers, another hot political potato in the past.77
If this was the future that the People’s Charter sought to prepare Fiji for, 
it would have a hard task convincing those who had profited from ethnic 
allocations in the past. That included the FLP which recognised that 
the ending of communal seats and the introduction of voting based on 
proportional representation spelled the end of its chances of ever forming 
government in its own right as a predominantly IndoFijian party. Hence 
it expressed its dismay at the Charter’s proposals.78 The SDL did more 
than express disappointment. It attempted unsuccessfully to gain an 
75  Fiji Times, 8 August 2008.
76  Fiji Times, 1 November 2007. By 2030 Fijians are estimated to comprise 68 per cent of the 
population, IndoFijians 26 per cent.
77  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 21 March 2010.
78  Fiji Times, 11 September 2008.
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injunction to prevent further action on the Charter. The NCBBF had 
already distributed endorsement forms with copies of the Charter during 
its public feedback meetings. In early December 2008, it claimed to have 
consulted 80 per cent of Fiji’s adult population. Of the 70 per cent who 
responded, 92 per cent endorsed the Charter.79 The interim government 
considered this sufficient evidence of popular support. It knew only too 
well the risks inherent in a referendum. On 19 December 2008, President 
Iloilo endorsed the Charter and its implementation.
In part, the response of foreign governments to the December coup 
prompted the more explicit change in focus that the Charter represented. 
Australia and New Zealand had both opposed the coup and imposed travel 
bans on key political and military figures. While Pacific island leaders, 
especially those from fellow Melanesian states, generally supported non-
intervention in Fiji’s internal politics, their peak body, the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF), quickly assembled an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to 
negotiate an early return to democratic rule. Both it and the European 
Union called for elections by early 2009. Bainimarama took their call as 
an opportunity to raise the stakes. In late February, he announced that 
an election would be predicated on rapid economic recovery, the stability 
of government finances and, not surprisingly, an assurance of good 
governance. The earliest he could envisage elections would be in 2010 
given the need to hold an overdue census, create new electoral boundaries, 
re-establish an elections office and, importantly, amend the Constitution. 
This was the first time constitutional change had been mooted but, given 
Bainimarama’s overriding concerns about the conduct of Fiji politics post-
2000, it was unsurprising. As he noted, only a common roll could once 
and for all get rid of the ‘politics of race’.80 
In March 2007, when PIF foreign ministers met in Port Vila, Nailatikau 
informed them that to bring the election forward by one year, the 
NCBBF would have to establish new constitutional principles through its 
People’s Charter.81 Nonetheless, Bainimarama remained vague on dates, 
at one stage declaring that the more ‘people kept on with their opposition 
79  Fiji Times, 16 December 2008. According to Wikileaks, in late December 2008 Samy told 
the US ambassador that public approval for the charter had been strongly influenced by army 
intimidation (fijileaks.com, 22 March 2015).
80  Fiji Times, 21 February 2007.
81  fijilive, 17 & 21 March 2007. Bainimarama later claimed that the military would ensure that 




towards the government, [the more] it will prolong the duration to the 
election’.82 One year later he declared that there would be no elections in 
2009 if people did not adopt the Charter.83 In August 2008, he postponed 
the prospect of an election to late 2009 in order to effect changes in Fiji’s 
electoral laws, a stance that he reiterated at the start of 2009 when he told 
his troops it could take five to 10 years before elections were held.84 Once 
the President endorsed the Charter, however, Bainimarama held a political 
forum to gain consensus on electoral reform. Although unsuccessful, it – 
along with the earlier appointment of a new supervisor of elections and 
a decision to develop an electronic voter-registration system – provided 
evidence of some political movement for an international community 
grown tired of constant delays. At the start of 2009, the PIF told Fiji 
that it had ‘drawn a line in the sand’; Fiji would be suspended unless it 
declared a 2009 election by 1 May.85 
But there were limits to this strategy, as some analysts recognised. Former 
Australian intelligence analyst Daniel Flitton believed it threatened 
perpetuating instability, while Jon Fraenkel declared that ‘Fiji’s military 
leaders will not be coaxed into democracy by new sanctions or political 
attacks from Australia and New Zealand’.86 Divisions within the PIF 
also threatened to derail its united front. Samoa, whose Prime Minister 
Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi told Fiji’s people to ‘wake up’ and reclaim 
government, believed Bainimarama had no intention of relinquishing 
power. While Vanuatu and smaller Pacific states lobbied for Fiji, Tuilaepa 
openly supported the position taken by Australia and New Zealand.87 
Bainimarama refused to attend the Forum meeting, citing the devastating 
floods that had left nearly 2,000 people homeless as his reason. Qarase 
declared it ‘a lame excuse’. Consequently it was left to Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum to express his government’s frustration. ‘Holding elections 
82  Fiji Times, 20 October 2007. He also said that he would not stand in the next election and 
would probably not form a political party. Tired of being asked when the next election would be held, 
he gave 13 March 2009 as the date to Radio Fiji Gold listeners (Fiji Times, 18 August 2007).
83  Fiji Times, 11 January 2008. Bainimarama later argued that elections would only be held once 
all corrupt practices had been investigated. And, in September, he told radio listeners that if it took 
20 years to garner support for the Charter, then elections would wait 20 years (Fiji Times, 25 June 
& 15 September 2008).
84  Fiji Times, 28 January 2009.
85  Sydney Morning Herald, 28 January 2009. The Commonwealth secretariat followed suit, 
declaring it would extend Fiji’s suspension from its councils to the Commonwealth as a whole if it 
did not make significant progress (Fiji Times, 5 & 6 March 2009).
86  Age, 15 April & 23 January 2009. Bainimarama later confirmed Fraenkel’s comment: Fiji 
‘cannot be hurried into this endeavour by outsiders giving ultimatums’ (fijilive, 13 March 2009).
87  Fiji Times, 23 January & 2 March 2009.
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for the sake of elections is not going to achieve any proper outcome,’ he 
told Forum delegates at their meeting in Papua New Guinea, ‘nor will it 
achieve any long term democratic stability in Fiji.’88 
Clearly the dominant issue for the interim government remained 
unresolved: how could it legally introduce the changes anticipated by 
the Charter and confirm immunity for the military without first holding 
elections under the existing Constitution? Such an election provided no 
guarantees. If the SDL won, as many predicted, Bainimarama’s revolution 
would be transformed into a rout. These issues preoccupied Bainimarama 
and his government. ‘No one will move Fiji to elections,’ a  defiant 
Bainimarama told Auckland radio listeners after Commonwealth threats 
of suspension if Fiji did not demonstrate in 2009 considerable progress 
on returning to democratic governance. They might as well suspend 
Fiji now. But at least he could take comfort in the knowledge that the 
Commonwealth and United Nations were together engaged with Fiji’s 
key stakeholders, unlike the PIF. ‘The government has a plan,’ he declared 
at a press conference,89 but how that might ensure that the past did not 
repeat itself remained uncertain. 
At the second meeting of Leaders of Political Parties (LOPP) on 13 March 
2009, to which the media were denied access, Bainimarama pushed the 
18 parties represented in the direction he wanted and emerged with an 
agenda for the upcoming Commonwealth- and UN-sponsored President’s 
Political Dialogue Forum (PPDF). It emphasised constitutional reform 
and the People’s Charter. He urged participants to end the ‘blame game’, 
and make the paradigm shifts needed for Fiji to face its challenges.90 But 
claiming consensus was easier than demonstrating it and, within days 
of the leaders’ meeting, factions developed among the parties. Naturally 
Bainimarama gave the SDL special attention. After all, its challenge to the 
constitutionality of the interim government lay before the Supreme Court. 
In May 2008, he had recommended that the SDL not be permitted to 
88  Fiji Times, 22 January 2009; fijilive, 27 January 2009. New Zealand’s new Prime Minister 
John Key told Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum that he should be on trial. The Attorney-General accused him 
of personalising issues (Fiji Times, 29 January 2009).
89  Fiji Times, 5 & 6 March 2009. The plan focused on rebuilding the economy, not holding 
elections.
90  Fiji Times, 13 March 2009. Robin Nair claimed that the future role of the military was dropped 
from the agenda (Fiji Times, 17 March 2009). The Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) and 
several smaller parties proposed a bloc at the next LOPP to oppose rushing into early elections 
(Fiji Times, 7 April 2009).
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contest future elections.91 Driti also suggested in late March 2009 that it, 
the National Federation Party (NFP) and several civil society organisations 
should not participate in political dialogue, citing the need to prevent 
Fiji falling into an ‘abyss of lawlessness and disorder’ and to encourage 
constructive debate.92 Accordingly Bainimarama’s office sent letters to all 
political parties prior to the 9 April meeting in Suva making mandatory 
commitments to electoral reform to abolish communalism, support for 
government economic strategies, non-involvement with partisan media 
outlets, and working honestly to expedite the political process if parties 
wished to participate in political dialogue. Four parties, including the 
SDL, refused to agree to the terms and pulled out of the process.93 
Bainimarama’s determination to transform Fiji’s politics demonstrated 
a previously overlooked side to the man. Oppositional blog sites regularly 
referred to the coup as an Indian coup (because of Labour’s support) and 
later as a Muslim coup (largely because of Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum’s leading 
role). Hughes initially fed this perception when he described Bainimarama 
as ‘a front man for power-seeking people in Fiji’.94 Among themselves, 
diplomats described him as erratic, violent, thin-skinned and insecure. 
But Bainimarama’s more extensive agenda soon altered these perceptions. 
Since his appointment as Commander of the RFMF in 1999, he had 
become more resolute. Having seized power, another transformation 
began. As one journalist later noted, ‘Bainimarama [now] sees himself as 
Fiji’s Atatürk. He will never allow his democratic opponents to return to 
power, and he will relinquish power only on his terms’.95 Claims that the 
Commander was merely a front man disappeared.
Bainimarama’s determination to challenge Fiji’s chiefs in December 2006 
marked the start of this transformation, although anger and petulance often 
seemed more in play. In April 2007, prior to Iloilo’s departure to Australia 
for a medical examination, Bainimarama asked the GCC to appoint as vice 
president his Foreign Minister, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau. When it refused on 
the grounds that Nailatikau was part of an illegal regime, Bainimarama 
suspended future meetings of the Council and simultaneously ceased all 
91  Fiji Times, 28 May 2008.
92  Fiji Times, 27 & 29 March 2009.
93  Fiji Times, 9 April 2009. The SDL, NFP, Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP) and 
UPP pulled out and signalled they would hold a press conference instead.
94  Fiji Times, 6 December 2006.
95  Doring, ‘US cables’, 2011. Atatürk was the military leader who, after the First World War, 
transformed the Ottoman Empire into a modern secular Turkish state.
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membership by proclamation. There were shades here of Rabuka’s early 
‘angry young man’ stance against the chiefs. Indeed, tongue-in-cheek, 
Rabuka fired off an article to the press envisaging a chiefless Fijian society 
where all Fijian ‘command structures’ were militarised. Qarase warned of 
a violent Fijian reaction.96 Neither response occurred. Instead the GCC 
threatened legal action, prompting its eventual restoration in August, but 
with new rules that reduced its membership.97 Nonetheless, Bainimarama 
kept up the pressure, extending his anger also to the equally recalcitrant 
Methodist church. Chiefs, politicians and the talatalas (church ministers) 
kept Fijians suppressed and took advantage of them, he declared.98 
At the start of 2008, the rules were again clarified. No chief could be part 
of the GCC if he or she belonged to a political party, held dual citizenship 
or residency rights or had been a politician, a prisoner or bankrupt in 
the past seven to 10 years. Additionally, chiefs must have been officially 
installed by their vanua. Bainimarama now became chair of the GCC in 
order to reflect government views in council deliberations. The new rules 
created a storm of controversy. Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, whose past 
would clearly exclude him, claimed chiefs had of necessity to be involved 
in politics. ‘We are born to lead,’ he asserted.99 No longer, claimed CCF 
director, Rev. Yabaki. Many Fijian institutions had ‘passed their sell-by 
date’.100 Others criticised Bainimarama’s presence; he was not a chief and, 
as head of government, he would politicise the very body the reforms were 
meant to depoliticise. The rule on installation also generated controversy. 
Possibly 80 per cent of all chiefs had never been formally installed; indeed 
many did not need to be.101 Predictably, the rule changes threw the chiefs 
into confusion, as probably intended, and Bainimarama did not call an 
immediate meeting of his new-look GCC. Instead, in mid-December 
96  Fiji Times, 15 April 2007; Fiji Sun, 19 April 2007.
97  Fiji Sun, 13 & 19 April 2007. The restored GCC possessed 52 members. The President, 
Vice President and Prime Minister were no longer members. All commoners (like Rabuka) were 
excluded (Fiji Times, 28 August 2007). In addition, the Ministry of Fijian Affairs was ‘downgraded’ to 
a Department of Indigenous Affairs, Provincial Development and Multi-ethnic Affairs after a cabinet 
reshuffle in November.
98  Fiji Times, 31 October 2007.
99  fijilive, 13 February 2008; Fiji Times, 19 February 2008.
100  Fiji Times, 26 February 2008. Even the now-reformed Conservative Alliance – Matanitu Vanua 
(CAMV) appeared to agree. It demanded the NLTB change the redistribution of rental monies to 
advantage landowning units and not chiefs (fijilive, 8 January 2009).
101  fijilive, 1 April 2008. Later, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs became the designated GCC chair.
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2008, he brought together district chiefs in a Bose ni Turaga, the first 
since 2000, to demonstrate engagement and to gain its support for the 
People’s Charter.102 It was another snub to the GCC. 
Bainimarama also targeted the deposed Prime Minister, this time issuing 
14 new declarations against him, including aiding and abetting foreign 
powers to intervene in Fiji affairs. These declarations justified stripping 
him of any benefits as a former prime minister, including security, 
transport, medical treatment and pension. After eight months in exile, 
Qarase had returned to Suva for an SDL meeting in early September 
2007. Bainimarama declared him ‘a radical racist’ and a security risk; 
he did not ‘deserve anything from government because he has brought 
disaster to the country’.103 More substantial charges of corruption were 
laid in March 2008, however, alleging that Qarase had failed to declare his 
interest in family companies that had bought shares in FHL in the early 
1990s. Charges were later laid against the CEO of FHL.104
This was the first major new evidence of corruption for a government 
that had come to power promising to weed out the corrupt practices of 
the past. Two months later, a wider set of more contemporary allegations 
surrounding the NLTB enveloped its board members and Qarase. After 
2001 the NLTB had diverted trust funds belonging to extinct mataqali into 
its commercial arm, Vanua Development Corporation Ltd. Bainimarama 
revealed that some $12 million had been lost through VDCL schemes 
that flowed to Pacific Connex.105 But these charges were important for 
102  fijilive, 12 December 2008. Of 285 invitees, only 47 per cent accepted. A retreat to the Officers 
Mess in Nabua occupied the second of three days.
103  fijilive, 5 & 6 September 2007; 25 November 2007.
104  See Chapter 2 for further details. FHL had received a loan from the Fijian Affairs Board (FAB) 
in 1987 to boost provincial ownership. The 1992 FHL annual report, however, showed that 27 
private companies now owned 70 per cent of FHL, including companies associated with Qarase and 
Weleilakeba, financed by the Fiji Development Bank (FDB). Qarase was the managing director of 
the FDB, a FHL board member, and a financial advisor to the FAB. Weleilakeba was the FHL’s CEO. 
Private companies received 10 per cent dividends, the provinces 5 per cent. In 2012, the High Court 
found Qarase guilty on nine charges and sentenced the 71-year-old to one year in jail (Guardian, 
3 August 2012).
105  Fiji Times, 12 May 2008. In July 2014, NLTB former general manager Kalivati Bakani and 
board member Keni Dakuidreketi were sentenced to four and six years respectively after pleading 
guilty to using extinct mataqali funds and government grants to finance a private company (Fiji 
Times, 5 July 2014). The team investigating Fijian institutions was suddenly disbanded without 
explanation in March 2008. The focus on Pacific Connex took a new turn when the military beefed 
up security around Bainimarama in October and a few weeks later announced that it had foiled a plot 
by Pacific Connex personnel and others to assassinate the Commander (fijilive, 4 November 2007).
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another reason also. As time wore on, the interim government increasingly 
showed signs that it was not as divorced from the sins of its predecessors 
as it pretended.106
Human rights abuses certainly continued to reveal a military unwilling to 
exercise restraint. Sixteen people were arrested at the start of November 
2007, charged with plotting to assassinate Bainimarama, Chaudhry and 
Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum among others, and incite a military mutiny. The 
arrests, which bore all the hallmarks of a military sting, drew in a veritable 
list of known government opponents: Pacific Connex executives including 
Ballu Khan, Takiveikata, five former CRWU employees of Pacific Connex, 
as well as Baledrokadroka and Metuisela Mua.107 Khan was severely 
beaten during his arrest and nearly died. Only the intervention of the 
NZ High Commission secured him hospital treatment. The High Court 
eventually threw out the conspiracy charges against Khan because he had 
been detained unlawfully and denied access to a lawyer.108 He returned to 
New Zealand. For many observers the fear remained that the operation 
formed a pretext to discredit and detain people known to be opposed to 
the actions of the government,109 in much the same way Rabuka had used 
the discovery of weapons in 1988 to introduce a far-reaching Internal 
Security Decree.
But other examples of dubious practices quickly multiplied. Commander 
Francis Kean, Bainimarama’s brother-in-law, assaulted and killed his son-
in-law’s uncle at Bainimarama’s daughter’s wedding in late December 2006. 
106  US Ambassador Steven McGaan informed Washington on 22 December 2008 that the 
Attorney-General had been in default on several property loans for the past two years and that his 
bank refused to foreclose for fear that its expatriate managers would be deported (fijileaks.com, 22 
March 2015). Lt Col Ratu Mara alleged in 2011 that Khaiyum’s difficulties were resolved when the 
Tappoo company bought one of his properties at an inflated price in return for duty free concessions 
in the budget (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 23 May 2011), although the US ambassador claimed 
instead that he had sold the properties to law firms. The government dismissed Mara’s allegations as 
blog-fuelled justifications for his escape (fijivillage, 26 May 2011).
107  fijilive, 4 November 2007. Undercover military personnel (locally described as agent vinod) had 
worked on the so-called perpetrators for at least three months. DPP officers initially refused to prosecute 
the case when Nassir Ali presented it to them because they knew nothing about it. They were threatened 
with arrest (Fiji Times, 8 November 2007). The conspiracy, backed by the vanua, the Methodist Church 
and the international community (Takiveikata allegedly told the undercover agent that Australia would 
chip in $1 billion to kick start Fiji’s economy if Bainimarama was assassinated) and financed by Khan, 
involved blowing up the Nadi airport and the Monasavu dam with munitions from New Zealand 
(fijilive, 3 February 2010). The defence argued that the military floated the assassination plan to draw 
out opposition elements that might have been planning such an assignment.
108  fijilive,13 November 2008. Baledrokadroka served 40 days in jail until his charges were 
dismissed. Eight men were eventually found guilty in March 2010.
109  Fiji Times, 5 November 2007.
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Although given an 18-month sentence for manslaughter in October 2007, 
he remained a salaried officer throughout, even while serving his sentence. 
Released after six months, he served the rest of his sentence extramurally 
with the navy. Several observers drew parallels with the case of former Vice 
President Ratu Jope Seniloli and questioned whether nepotism had really 
been put to bed.110 The growing militarisation of civil service positions 
similarly failed to demonstrate a government determined to place Fiji’s 
governance on a sound footing; so too the lack of transparency over 
ministerial salaries. It did not help that ministers excused themselves from 
the 5 per cent cut imposed on all public servants in 2007, ostensibly due 
to higher workloads,111 or that Bainimarama received nearly $185,000 for 
leave owed since 1978. Other military officers were treated similarly.112
The military were not so forward at the start of 2009 when the worst 
flooding in 50 years hit the Western Division and wiped out vital 
infrastructure such as the Sigatoka and Nadi bridges. It took nearly a week 
to begin addressing the disarray at evacuation centres and to distribute 
food.113 Worse criticism – some international – followed Esala Teleni, 
seconded from the military as Police Commissioner in July 2007, when he 
berated IndoFijian police officers at Navosa for apparently telling the Fiji 
Sun that he was forcing them to convert to his brother’s New Methodist 
Church, which was conducting a moral crusade throughout the force. 
He called them backstabbers and liars. During 2009 he stepped up his 
Police National Crusade, claiming that its focus on building character was 
responsible for a 20 per cent decline in crime during the first half of the 
year. He believed Fiji would be crime free by 2012, telling Radio Legend 
FM listeners that he made decisions based on what the Holy Spirit told 
him to do. His comments won him little praise. The Jesus police were 
no better than the Taliban, Fiji Times editor, Netani Rika, claimed.114 
‘That’s what madmen who appoint themselves to office do,’ Samoa’s Prime 
110  Fiji Times, 2 & 3 November 2007. Kean was reappointed naval commander at the start of 
2009, sparking comparisons with Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, who the SDL released early from jail and 
allowed to resume his former position as Lands Minister, an act Bainimarama criticised at the time 
(Fiji Times, 17 January 2009). In 2014, Kean became Corrections Commissioner.
111  fijilive, 3 April 2008.
112  Fiji Times, 20 July 2008. The government refused to release the auditor general’s report on the 
leave payout, claiming it was only following constitutional procedure by insisting it go to parliament 
first.
113  Fiji Times, 15 & 16 January 2009.
114  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 18, 27 & 28 August 2009. In mid-2010, Teleni was moved 
sideways and became ambassador to China. His replacement declared the police in a state of disarray 
(Fiji Times, 20 December 2010); a health audit found 60 per cent of the force unfit (Fiji Times, 
24 February 2011).
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Minister quipped: ‘They appoint other madmen to positions of power’.115 
But they also, allegedly, acted more conventionally to punish officials who 
did not toe the government’s line. 
In March 2009, Charles Sweeney accused the government of illegally 
removing him from his role as Commerce Commission chair in order 
to shut down an inquiry into whether mobile telecommunications 
company Vodafone was trying to restrict deregulation of the industry 
and future competition in order to preserve its market dominance.116 
The new permanent secretary for foreign affairs, Ratu Isoa Gavidi, found 
himself suddenly dismissed and the High Commissioner to Papua New 
Guinea recalled when both contradicted the government’s position on 
Bainimarama’s attendance at the PIF in Papua New Guinea in January 
2009. Robin Nair lost his role as one of the interlocutors engaged to assist 
in facilitating political dialogue for apparently criticising Fiji’s regional 
policy and diplomacy.117 Parallels with previous government behaviour 
were all too obvious. And bizarrely, Joketani Cokanasiga, a former minister 
in Qarase’s interim government who had defended the agricultural scam 
as politically necessary to secure Qarase’s electoral victory in 2001, became 
Minister for Agriculture in a revamped cabinet in late August 2007.118
But the most egregious case concerned that of Finance Minister Chaudhry. 
Rumours had circulated on social media for some time that Chaudhry 
had amassed A$1.6 million in Australian accounts, money that had had 
never been reflected in his tax returns. These were funds raised in India 
after 2000 to assist in his possible resettlement to Australia, although in 
the years that followed he had always argued that any funds raised in India 
had been used to assist refugee farmers dislocated by the violence of 2000 
and housed at the Lautoka Girmit Centre and at Valelawa.119 Two  tax 
inspectors were dismissed for raising the matter with Bainimarama 
and the Police Commissioner. But, once full details were published in 
the local press, an act purportedly endorsed by the Military Council,120 
115  Fiji Times, 19 February 2009; fijilive, 18 February 2009.
116  Fiji Times, 3 & 5 March 2009.
117  Fiji Times, 24 & 29 January 2009. This did Nair no immediate harm; he later became ambassador 
to the United Arab Emirates and, from 2016 to 2017, permanent secretary for foreign affairs, until 
dismissed by Bainimarama in 2017 (Fiji Sun, 11 July 2017).
118  Fiji Sun, 20 January 2006.
119  Fiji Times, 23 August 2008. 
120  Fiji Times, 23 February 2008. Credit for the revelations belong to Victor Lal (victorlal.blogspot.
com) who first published elements of the story in the Fiji Sun during August 2007. Chaudhry threatened 
the Fiji Times with a $1 billion lawsuit, but later withdrew it (Fiji Times, 24 October 2008).
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the government had to take action. It appointed a three-member team to 
investigate the tax allegations, which very quickly cleared Chaudhry of 
wrongdoing. But the government also deported the Fiji Sun publisher, 
Russell Hunter, ostensibly for publishing the stories about Chaudhry’s 
alleged tax evasion. An amendment to the Immigration Act the very 
same day prevented the Immigration Minister’s decisions from being 
challenged by court orders.121 The Fiji Times also found itself exposed. 
The Attorney-General complained to its publisher, Evan Hannah, 
on 14 March about the newspaper’s coverage of a ban on the entry of 
Australian lawyer John Cameron to represent human rights activists.122 
Two months later the government pounced, bundling Hannah out of 
the country despite a High Court order from Justice Filimoni Jikoto 
preventing his deportation.123 Bainimarama described media reports as 
‘careless and irresponsible … inciteful and destabilising, posing a threat to 
national security and stability’. He threatened to shut down the media if 
coverage of his government did not improve.124 A new FHRC report by the 
former unionist and expatriate James Anthony backed the government’s 
assertion, calling for foreigners to be banned from employment by Fiji’s 
media, the creation of a new media tribunal to oversee its activities, and 
the introduction of sedition laws.125
These distractions could not, however, save Chaudhry. When a tax he 
imposed on Fiji’s water companies threatened to close the high-profile 
exporter Fiji Water in the following July, he found himself once more 
in the firing line from the Military Council. Police, allegedly acting on 
direct orders from Bainimarama, who was then in Beijing, questioned 
a Fiji Times journalist over an article critical of Chaudhry.126 But such 
intervention could not save the very diminished politician and, in mid-
121  Fiji Times, 26 & 27 February 2008.
122  Fiji Times, 20 March 2008. At the same time Graham Leung, who had been writing an article 
for the newspaper, claimed his computer had been hacked. A copy of that article found its way to the 
Attorney-General who warned Hannah not to publish.
123  Justice John Byrne subsequently stayed the order (International Bar Association, Dire Straits: 
A Report on the Rule of Law in Fiji. An International Bar Association Human Rights Institute Report. 
London, March 2009, p. 58).
124  Fiji Times, 1, 2 & 5 May 2008; Australian, 29 February & 9 May 2008. Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum 
argued that the newspaper should not have printed material from Cameron then before the courts. 
Munro Leys lawyers Richard Naidu and Jon Apted obtained a writ of habeas corpus from Justice 
Jikoto, which both Air Pacific and Air Terminal Services honoured, but Immigration placed Hannah 
on a plane to Korea instead.
125  Fiji Times, 4 March 2008. See also J Anthony, ‘Freedom & independence of the media in Fiji: 
A report’. Suva: Fiji Human Rights Commission, 2008.
126  Fiji Times, 11 August 2008.
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August, he and two Labour colleagues resigned from the cabinet, citing the 
need to prepare for elections now that the Charter had been completed.127 
Little wonder that Samy warned that it was imperative the government 
demonstrate ‘the highest standards of transparency and good governance’. 
Bainimarama conceded that his government did not operate as effectively 
as it might.128 Naturally his opponents were in rare agreement with him. 
He had failed to bring about effective change and appeared unable to keep 
to his 2009 election promise.129
Confronting recalcitrant foreign governments 
and judges
Foreign governments also came in for special treatment, despite Fiji’s need 
to restore relations in order to ensure the continuance of aid and market 
access. The European Parliament sent a delegation to Fiji in December 
2008 to pressure the interim government on its election commitments. 
Already, much-needed funds to raise standards in the sugar industry had 
been withheld pending firm developments on returning democracy and, 
although growing links with China provided some relief, they could not 
fully compensate.130 Fiji’s apparent vulnerability, however, did little to 
dampen its anger at what it perceived to be hostile statements from foreign 
governments. Driti allegedly harangued the US deputy assistant secretary 
about the conduct of the international community when the latter visited 
the country in April 2007.131 When Australia’s army chief, Lt Col Peter 
Leahy, suggested Australia develop stronger peacekeeping capabilities in 
order to intervene in unstable countries like Fiji, Bainimarama said he 
127  Fiji Times, 17 August 2008. Land Force Commander Col Mosese Tikoitoga later claimed 
Chaudhry had been dismissed for non-performance (fijilive, 28 March 2012). Tom Ricketts and 
Vayeshnoi also stepped down. Bune, no longer an FLP member, left the cabinet after a reshuffle in 
January 2008. In July 2010, Chaudhry was finally charged with money laundering, tax evasion and 
providing false information to the tax authorities (fijilive, 23 July 2010). But the case lingered in the 
courts. By 2012, time-barred tax declaration offences and money laundering charges were dropped, 
leaving him – at the insistence of the RBF – to face three counts of breaches of the Exchange Control 
Act (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 25 July 2012). In May 2014, the High Court found him guilty and 
fined him $2 million (Fiji Times, 3 May 2014).
128  Fiji Times, 23 August & 5 September 2008.
129  fijilive, 25 August 2008; both Beddoes and the CCF called for a government of national unity.
130  fijilive, 3 December 2008; $334 million of EU funds were suspended in 2008; the 2009 budget 
only compensated the industry with $5 million. In September, Fiji gained a $230 million soft loan 
from China for upgrading rural and squatter homes. During 2006 and 2007 Chinese aid to Fiji 
increased from US$23 million to US$160 million (Sydney Morning Herald, 21 April 2009).
131  Fiji Times, 29 April 2007.
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would ‘be waiting for them’.132 After New Zealand’s High Commissioner 
Michael Green criticised the interim government, Bainimarama expelled 
him for being ‘in our face’. A rugby match between Fiji 15s and the Junior 
All Blacks proved the last straw. To nominate ‘the enemy of the day, 
a Kiwi, to be the chief guest’, Bainimarama thundered, was ‘a disservice 
to the people of our country’. For all the bluster, Fiji did try to negotiate; 
Green could stay if New Zealand lifted its travel bans. The move backfired; 
New Zealand refused and extended the ban to senior officials and their 
families. Its Prime Minister, Helen Clark, accused the military of being 
‘so self-centred and narcissistic that it can’t understand why the rest of the 
world rejects its spin. It’s under pressure and lashing out unpredictably’.133 
The bans clearly had an impact. Fiji pulled out of the regional PIF 
meeting in Niue in August 2008 because New Zealand would only give 
the Fiji delegation transit visas. They were not permitted to stop over in 
Auckland. Although direct flights to Papua New Guinea weakened the 
effectiveness of Australia’s travel bans, they still rankled, especially after 
the United States denied Bainimarama a visa in November to attend an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting. Certainly they made more 
difficult Fiji’s ability to engage high-level personnel, but they also impacted 
on ‘innocents’, as the Attorney-General called them.134 Two students 
studying in New Zealand and whose fathers were senior public servants 
were denied re-entry to complete their studies. Members of sports teams 
faced similar difficulties. An angry Bainimarama accused Australia and 
New Zealand of being bullies and informed Wellington that he would 
deport the acting High Commissioner Caroline McDonald in retaliation, 
which he did on Christmas Eve. He also placed several journalists on 
an arrivals blacklist.135 Not unsurprisingly, Australia and New Zealand 
hit back. New Zealand expelled the Fiji High Commissioner. Both 
left Fiji off the list of Pacific countries eligible for participation in their 
Pacific guest workers scheme. Fiji accused AusAID of providing financial 
inducements to critics of its civil society. It accused both countries of 
trying to prevent it accessing World Bank and ADB aid facilitation. 
132  fijilive, 20 June 2007.
133  fijivillage, 15 June 2007; Fiji Times, 18 June & 3 July 2007.
134  Fiji Times, 23 December 2008.
135  fijilive, 16 & 20 December 2008. Smart sanctions had a downside. They pushed Fiji to form 
new alliances, often with China and India. At the start of 2009 the military announced it had 
reassigned its medical contract from New Zealand’s Wakefield Hospital to Batra Hospital in India 
(Fiji Times, 30 March 2009).
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Australia’s High Commissioner, James Batley, received anonymous death 
threats, forcing the High Commission to issue a voluntary recall of its 
diplomatic families.136 
Foreign opposition, manifested in the main as travel bans, at least provided 
the government an opportunity to play the nationalist card. When 
economic consequences might be damaging, as in the case of EU responses, 
Fiji chose engagement tactics instead. But, in many respects, opposition 
from its own judiciary and lawyers proved less easy to handle, in part 
because the interim government’s fragile façade of legitimacy depended 
solely on retaining their support. Assisting it, however, were judicial 
divisions that derived from former Chief Justice Sir Timoci Tuivaga’s 
advice to the military on its usurpation of power in 2000. Ironically his 
successor, Daniel Fatiaki, who Bainimarama suspended in early January 
2007, had supported Tuivaga’s actions. Fatiaki’s crime lay in being 
estranged from justices Nazhat Shameem (sister of the FHRC director), 
John Byrne and Anthony Gates who had opposed Tuivaga’s role in 2000 
and were now apparently reunited in their distaste of the former Qarase 
government and its policies. The coup provided them the opportunity 
to turn the tables. Accordingly, Gates – as the next most senior judge – 
replaced Fatiaki as acting chief justice in circumstances that were viewed 
as suspicious by many in the legal fraternity,137 including the Fiji Law 
Society whose Vice President, Tupou Draunidalo, the military regularly 
detained and prevented from leaving the country. Appeal Court President 
Justice Gordon Ward lost his home in a suspicious fire, Justice Gerard 
Winter had his car vandalised, and the military shadowed Justice Roger 
Coventry after he ruled against it in a case.138 Lawyer Graham Leung, who 
was instrumental in securing the withdrawal of the Malaysian FICAC 
Commissioner, told the June LAWASIA conference in Hong Kong that 
‘tyranny, arbitrariness and spite’ had perverted the rule of law in Fiji and 
that the judiciary now lacked even the appearance of independence. Gates 
had assumed responsibility for hearing Qarase’s constitutional challenge to 
the coup while many other senior judges appeared complicit either before 
or after the event.139 After six Appeal Court justices resigned en bloc in 
136  Fiji Times, 10 June 2008; Australian, 9 May 2008; Fiji Times, 16 May 2008; fijilive, 22 May 
2008. New Zealand travel bans did not apply to international sporting events hosted in New Zealand.
137  International Bar Association, Dire Straits, 2009, p. 40. Jitoko also gave support to Tuivaga.
138  International Bar Association, Dire Straits, 2009, p. 44.
139  G Leung, ‘Lawyers must cry freedom’, 2007. The High Court awarded Draunidalo costs after 
the Attorney-General dropped a case against her for expressing a lack of confidence in the judiciary 
(Fiji Times, 20 November 2007).
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September 2007 over Gates’ handling of court administration, FWRM’s 
Buadromo accused the interim government of handpicking judges who 
may decide on its legality.140 Coventry terminated his contract, declaring 
‘acquiescence the friend of illegality’.141
But not all of Fiji’s judges agreed. In October, the High Court finally 
ruled on Qarase’s substantive case against the military coup and Iloilo’s 
subsequent proclamations. Justices Gates, Byrne and Davendra Pathik 
declared the President’s actions lawful and valid, and dismissed the case. 
Responses were short and resigned. Leung described it a grievous blow 
‘to the fabric of the Constitution’, while Madraiwiwi argued that ‘what 
has been imposed on people will not endure because the majority of the 
population disagree with it’. Beddoes believed: ‘Ultimately it will all come 
to an end and the truth will come out, and in time all those involved in 
this large scale deception and fraud against the law abiding citizens of Fiji 
will be exposed.’142 
But that moment had yet to come. In December, the embattled Fatiaki 
gave up his struggle against the government and resigned as chief justice, 
despite no evidence of misconduct being found to warrant his suspension. 
Gates formally replaced him.143 For the moment the façade of legitimacy 
held, allowing Bainimarama to tell his international critics ‘there is no 
crisis in Fiji. You have a government in place that’s been held to be legally 
and validly appointed’.144 The High Court ruling made that claim difficult 
to refute.
The SDL, however, persisted with legal challenges. It registered a treason 
complaint against the government in September 2008, only to have 
the police refuse to investigate it and Commissioner Teleni accuse the 
140  Fiji Times, 11 February 2008. Shameem, Jocelynne Scutt, John Byrne, Daniel Gounder, 
Pathik and Isikeli Mataitoga replaced them. PCPI’s Heffernan demanded the interim government 
appointee, Justice Jocelynne Scutt, resign after she praised the FHRC (fijilive, 11 February 2008). 
Coventry resigned from the High Court citing differences with Gates (Australian, 29 February 
2008) but most Supreme Court judges stayed on. Not being appointed by the interim government, 
they could constitutionally still hear cases against it (Fiji Times, 3 May 2008). Australian Greg 
Bullard resigned after only one month as a magistrate, claiming a lack of judicial independence 
(www.coupfourandahalf.com, 23 November 2012).
141  International Bar Association, Dire Straits, 2009, p. 50.
142  fijilive, 22 October 2008; Fiji Times, 13 October & 20 December 2008. The IBA considered 
that, since two of the judges had been appointed since the coup, they breached the law of recusal by 
hearing the case (International Bar Association, Dire Straits, 2009, p. 21).
143  Fiji Times, 6 December 2008. The state gave Fatiaki $275,000 in settlement and he ended civil 
proceedings against it.
144  Australian, 29 January 2009.
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party of instigating instability. The Attorney-General called the SDL 
‘unpatriotic’.145 Attempts by the International Bar Association (IBA) to 
enter Fiji twice in 2008 were similarly unsuccessful, although this did 
not prevent the IBA reporting that the judiciary’s independence had 
been compromised, an allegation that the Attorney-General dismissed 
as without evidence.146 In November, however, when the SDL gained 
an injunction from Justice Jikoto stopping the NCBBF proceeding and 
the government making changes to the electoral system, Justice Byrne 
promptly stayed the injunction on the grounds that there was insufficient 
evidence that work on the Charter would lead to electoral changes.147 
When the Fiji Times published a letter calling the judicial system corrupt 
for its handling of Qarase’s constitutional challenge, the High Court 
fined the paper $100,000 in January 2009 and sentenced its editor, 
Netani Rika, to three months’ jail, suspended for two years. Although the 
paper’s publisher, Rex Gardner, who had replaced the deported Hannah 
the previous July, pleaded guilty, he was not convicted. Nonetheless, the 
government considered his plea grounds for declaring him a prohibited 
immigrant and ordered him to leave the country immediately.148 
Outspoken human rights activists and their lawyers were similarly dealt 
with by threats of contempt proceedings.149
Although the government seemed to survive every challenge to its 
authority, in reality it began to confront a perfect storm. International 
pressure on electoral commitments, media challenges, outspoken human 
rights activists, a fractured judiciary trumping each other’s decisions, and 
political objections to consensus on constitutional reform all began to 
converge in early 2009. The façade of legitimacy now wore thin. Into that 
storm rode three Sydney barristers, all members of Fiji’s Court of Appeal, 
called to judge the validity of the High Court’s October ruling on the 
2006 coup: Randall Powell, Ian Lloyd and Francis Douglas, the latter 
only recently appointed. On Thursday 9 April at 3 pm, they delivered 
a stunning Easter verdict to the nation, ruling that the government was 
illegal and that the President should immediately appoint a new caretaker 
prime minister to take the country to fresh elections. That ‘independent’ 
145  Fiji Times, 7 & 9 September 2008; fijilive, 7 September 2008. Beddoes lodged his own 
complaint the next day.
146  Fiji Times, 5 March 2009.
147  International Bar Association, Dire Straits, 2009, p. 54.
148  International Bar Association, Dire Straits, 2009, p. 62; Fiji Times, 27 January 2009.
149  Tupou Draunidalo had experienced this in 2007; so, too, John Cameron and Virisila Buadromo 
(International Bar Association, Dire Straits, 2009, pp. 58–64).
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prime minister should be neither Bainimarama nor Qarase.150 Qarase 
was certainly not dismayed. He declared justice served. Immediately 
Solicitor General Christopher Pryde approached the judges for a stay of 
their ruling, arguing that the result would be a political vacuum while 
the government sought an appeal. But Powell, Lloyd and Douglas replied 
that a stay of execution would make no difference. ‘The reality is that the 
country has a Constitution that everyone has to obey,’ they argued: ‘That’s 
the judgement of the Court and this Government should obey’.151 
Briefly it seemed it might. That evening Bainimarama appeared on 
television to announce his resignation as prime minister. His forces would 
ensure no disruption to law and order prior to an expected decision 
from the President on the way forward. The judges had already flown 
to Nadi to await a flight back to Sydney and were home by the time 
Iloilo addressed the nation late Good Friday morning.152 The Court had 
told him to appoint a third party as caretaker prime minister, but the 
Constitution made no provision for this, he argued. Hence Fiji, in legal 
terms, had not had a government since 3 pm the day before, but ‘you 
cannot have a country without a government’. Considerable progress 
had been made since 2006, he continued, citing the People’s Charter 
and the three meetings of political parties that had established the 
PPDF process. Consequently, after consulting with the Commander, he 
had decided to abrogate the Constitution in order to facilitate holding 
truly democratic parliamentary elections by September 2014. He would 
appoint an interim government to oversee this transition to a ‘new legal 
order’ over the next five years. Existing laws would remain in force but 
all judicial appointments were forthwith revoked.153 The next morning 
Iloilo swore in Bainimarama as prime minister and issued a 30-day state 
of emergency. All remaining nine members of his former government 
returned, resurrected by decree.154 
150  Fiji Times, 9 April 2009.
151  fijilive, 9 April 2009.
152  Sydney Morning Herald, 11 April 2009.
153  Fiji Times, 10 April 2009.
154  Fiji Times, 11 April 2009. Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum returned as Attorney-General and Minister for 
Justice, Electoral Reform, Public Enterprises and Anti-corruption; Nailatikau as Minister for Indigenous 
Affairs, Provincial Development and Multi-ethnic Affairs; Ganilau as Minister for Defence, National 
Security and Immigration; Cokanasiga as Minister for Primary Industries; Dr Jiko Luveni as Minister 
for Women, Social Welfare and Poverty; Bole as Minister for Education, National Heritage, Culture 
and Arts, and Youth and Sports; Captain Timoci Natuva as Minister for Works, Transport and Public 
Utilities; and Dr Neil Sharma as Minister for Health. Bainimarama, in addition to serving as Commander 
and Prime Minister, reassumed the portfolios for public service, people’s charter, information, finance 
and national planning, foreign affairs, international cooperation and civil aviation.
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The new order begins
This was the reset button that Bainimarama and his colleagues had been 
preparing for as their façade of legitimacy became more and more difficult 
to sustain by the start of 2009.155 For the majority of Fiji’s citizens, the 
change ushered in an unfamiliar world of media censorship and junta 
dominance but, for older citizens, it brought forth memories of the dark 
days that followed Rabuka’s own reset on 25 September 1987, although 
with one substantial difference. Whereas Rabuka quickly accommodated 
those he opposed after his second coup, this time there could be no 
accommodation and hence no foreseeable end to the drama.156 Coup 4.5, 
as some on social media referred to it, had two agendas: to complete the 
weakening of once powerful institutions such as the GCC and Methodist 
Church, and to hasten Fiji’s transformation without distraction from 
political parties and courts. But, even with the military as the only 
institution standing intact, the path forward proved difficult. Old issues 
did not drop away and past behaviours continued to distract. Most 
importantly the reset did not come with a new operating system to 
download. That had yet to be assembled.
Nonetheless, Bainimarama fronted the nation two days after the abrogation 
with confidence: ‘We must rid ourselves of our past prejudices, our past 
negative influences; we must be focused on building a better Fiji.’ And he 
outlined the tasks ahead: the introduction of modern governance systems, 
a liberalised economy, better roads and water supply, the eradication of 
systemic corruption, the integration of land as a benefit for indigenous 
Fijians with national economic growth, and the removal of politics from 
government decision-making. ‘We cannot be beholden to petty politics, 
communal politics, provincial politics and religious politics,’ he argued. 
The Appeal Court had tried to force Fiji to an early election under the 
old system, but the majority of people wanted electoral change first, 
155  Bainimarama told Al Jazeera’s 101East program in July 2009 that they were always going to get 
rid of the Constitution at some stage. But it was just a coincidence that the Constitution was abrogated 
less than 24 hours after the court’s judgement (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 15 August 2009).
156  Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum also claimed that, unlike Rabuka, they were not locking up judges 
and treating people in an undignified manner. There was no violence, and law and order prevailed 
(Australian, 15 April 2009). But, like Rabuka, Bainimarama was rewarded by the President for his 
services, becoming a Companion of the Order of Fiji in late March. Driti and Col Mohammed Aziz 
were made Officers of the Order of Fiji (fijilive, 24 March 2009).
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he claimed.157 Hence the abrogation of the Constitution to make way for 
reforms and the introduction of Public Emergency Regulations (PER) to 
prevent opposition from stalling reforms. Freedom of speech had caused 
problems in the past; now government alone would make decisions.158 
Later, at a pre-budget consultation, he declared, ‘We need to change 
people if they don’t think the way we want them to think’. Until an elected 
government returned, ‘we need to keep people in line’.159
And it did. Over the course of 2009 and subsequent years a long series of 
decrees and government pronouncements began to reshape governance 
and the basis on which Fiji’s citizens interacted with each other. Courts 
were forbidden to entertain any challenge to the abrogation of the 
Constitution or to any decree issued after 5 December 2006.160 Some 
lawyers and judges in Suva and Lautoka – on the recommendation of 
the Fiji Law Society (FLS) President, Dorsami Naidu, turned up to the 
courts on the first working day after the Constitution had been abrogated. 
Police prevented them entering and detained Naidu. Almost immediately 
the FLS lost its power to issue practising certificates to lawyers or to 
investigate complaints. A new chief registrar, Major Ana Rokomokoti, 
fulfilled that role. She and six government officers raided the FLS office 
to obtain complaint files against FLS members. Police also seized files 
relating to military personnel held at the DPP’s offices. The DPP, Josaia 
Naigulevu, and his assistant were dismissed. Shortly after, a new Office 
of Accountability and Transparency came into being to administer code 
of conduct and freedom of information decrees and, by the end of the year, 
an independent Legal Services Commissioner oversaw the performance of 
lawyers.161 There were other significant changes also. The legal age became 
18 years, a change that placed women and men on the same footing for 
157  fijilive, 12 April 2009. Bainimarama argued on NZ’s Radio National that the appeal judges wrote 
the bulk of their 52-page judgement before coming to Fiji (Sydney Morning Herald, 16 April 2009).
158  Australian, 15 April 2009. Neither police nor soldiers could be held accountable for actions 
undertaken under the PER, but individuals could be detained without charge for up to seven days. 
Meetings of more than three people required prior approval. The regulations stayed in place until 
7 January 2012.
159  fijilive, 17 September 2009.
160  fijilive, 23 April 2009. This applied also to the FHRC.
161  fijilive, 27 November 2009; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 23 September 2009; fijilive, 
27 November 2009; Daily Post, 15 April 2009; Amnesty International, Fiji: Paradise Lost – A Tale 
of Ongoing Human Rights Violations. London, 2009, p. 27. During 2008 the FLS began examining 
complaints against the Attorney-General and threatened to debar him. Graham Leung refused to 
register under the arrangement, but most lawyers did. The new DPP, John Rabuku, allegedly sacked 
the assistant DPP, Andie Driu, for declaring that she was loyal only to the law and nothing or no one 
else (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 24 June 2009).
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the first time and removed parental approval for those under 21 seeking 
to marry.162 Civil servants, with few exceptions, had now no choice but 
to retire at 55 years. Dual citizenship, again with full future voting rights, 
also became possible for the first time.163 
The abrogation of the Constitution and the dismissal of all judges 
effectively closed down the justice system until new judges and magistrates 
could be appointed. For six weeks no chief justice existed until Gates 
resumed the position. Meanwhile, the public lost all legal protection 
against human rights violations. The police and military continued to 
detain and intimidate human rights activists and known critics. Driti 
made clear what they might now expect: 
There are only a few people who I could term as adversaries – but I would 
discourage them from doing anything … otherwise they will be in for 
something really hard in terms of how we will treat them this year.164 
Lawyer Imrana Jalal had been threatened with rape immediately after 
the 2006 coup by a mystery phone caller she suspected was military. She 
believed that the same military lawyer who had orchestrated the call was 
using FICAC to persecute her and her husband, Ratu Sakiusa Tuisolia, 
an economist and former deputy CEO of Rabuka’s prime ministerial 
office in the mid-1990s. Tuisolia had been dismissed as CEO of Airports 
Fiji Ltd after the 2006 coup, the Nadi airport business he transformed 
from a loss-making venture in 2003 into a profitable operation. Facing 
unemployment, Tuisolia established a restaurant business in Suva – the 
Hook and Chook – with his wife as a partner. Immediately FICAC 
pounced. The couple had briefly operated their restaurant prior to 
receiving a licence. Normally only a $20 council fine, the infringement 
suddenly became a major issue for the corruption body. When in late 
2009 a magistrate pointed out the inappropriate use of resources being 
devoted to a case she believed outside FICAC’s jurisdiction, she – like 
other magistrates who opposed FICAC submissions – had her contract 
terminated. In 2010, the High Court finally exposed the futility of its 
pursuit of Tuisolia but, of course, FICAC did not really seek judicial 
162  Fiji Times, 20 May 2009; fijilive, 17 July 2009. This applied, for example, to marriage, access 
to alcohol and future voting. Previously, men could marry at 18 and women at 16.
163  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 19 July 2009. 
164  stuff.co.nz, 6 January 2010.
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resolution; rather it sought to wear perceived opponents down.165 At the 
start of 2010 a new decree provided a different weapon to use against 
critics of the regime – the removal of pension rights. Rabuka became one 
of the first affected.166
Sometimes intimidation brought physically damaging consequences, as 
Iliesa Duvuloco and five nationalists discovered when they were arrested 
on 17 April for distributing pamphlets and severely beaten. George 
Speight’s brother, Samisoni Tikoinasau, met a similar fate for distributing 
anti-government DVDs in early 2011.167 Other former politicians, like 
Mere Samisoni, were harassed. At the end of 2011 she and four former 
politicians were detained for four days and charged with inciting political 
violence.168 Trade unionists were also an easy target, although many union 
leaders had quietly supported the coup. But with Chaudhry’s departure 
from government, a falling-out began which escalated in mid-2011 when 
news leaked of government proposals for an Essential National Industries 
Decree designed to depoliticise and curtail union activities in banking, 
telecommunications, utilities, broadcasting and aviation industries. 
At  the urging of the Fiji Trades Union Congress (FTUC), unable to 
directly challenge the decree, the Australian Transport Workers Union 
briefly threatened industrial action, while the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU) urged Australian businesses to stop importing Fiji-made 
garments. Both actions endangered two crucial industries. Exports in 
the garment sector were already down 25 per cent since 2009. A similar 
call for the United States to end preferential access for Fiji goods also 
threatened Pacific Fisheries Company’s (PAFCO) tuna and Fiji Water’s 
exports. Consequently the government moved quickly. Police broke up 
a FTUC meeting in August 2011 and banned further union meetings, 
even social events. It regularly arrested and detained union leaders like 
Felix Anthony and Daniel Urai, who did not always help their cause by 
appearing with anti-government coalitions in Australia that called for 
the government’s dismissal. Towards the end of 2011, the government 
165  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 7 January 2010; fijilive, 29 January 2010; Fiji Times, 2 November 
2010. The High Court issued a permanent stay on most of the charges in mid-2010. Tuisolia was 
later acquitted of additional charges laid against him as CEO of Airports Fiji Ltd. They both moved 
to Manila to work for the ADB.
166  fijilive, 22 January 2010. The ban on pensions for former parliamentarians was lifted in May 
2010, but this did not apply to Qarase who had received no pension after his removal in December 
2006. Only in late 2014 did Qarase settle for back payment of $584,000 (Fiji Sun, 28 December 2014).
167  Amnesty International, Fiji, 2009, p. 23; Fiji Times, 25 March 2011.
168  fijilive, 4 January 2012.
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reinforced its anger by turning back a five-member ACTU delegation. 
In September 2012, it asked an International Labour Organization (ILO) 
delegation to leave Fiji.169
The government had long viewed the human rights community as a thorn 
in its side because of its incessant public commentary. For example, in 
May 2011, FWCC director Shamima Ali claimed that it was all very well 
to issue decrees prohibiting violence against women, but she wanted to 
see the law actually implemented. Two months later, in a similar vein, 
the FWRM executive director, Buadromo, urged police to implement 
a gender sensitisation program before beginning campaigns against sexual 
offending. The government welcomed neither input. The Commissioner 
of Police, Brigadier General Ioane Naivalurua, told Buadromo to come 
into the ring and not talk from the outside: ‘If she has nothing to offer, 
then she should shut up’. When she did not, they dragged her from an 
internal FWRM planning meeting and closed it down. But Buadromo 
was not easily cowed.170
For high-profile dissidents such as Methodist officials, harassment did 
not usually arrive with direct violence. In February 2010, 15 ministers 
were detained after disregarding an order to prevent known Taukeist 
church ministers, like Manasa Lasaro and Tomasi Kanailagi, attending its 
planned annual conference, the Bose Ko Viti, in August. General Secretary 
Rev. Tuikilakila Waqairatu warned Bainimarama of bloodshed should 
the conference not go ahead at Lomanikoro in Rewa, the home of Ro 
Teimumu Kepa, Marama Roko Tui Dreketi and head of the Burebasaga 
confederacy and a former SDL Education Minister. That action resulted 
in seven additional ministers and Kepa being detained and charged with 
contravening the Public Order Act, breaching PER and inciting public 
disorder. For some Fijians, Kepa’s arrest demonstrated the risks inherent 
in using Church affairs to advance political agendas.171 Bainimarama 
told the Church to refrain from politics and practice being peacemakers 
169  fijilive, 21 July & 13 December 2011; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 8 December 2011; 
crosbiew.blogspot.com, 20 September 2012. Both were photographed at a Fiji Democracy and 
Freedom Movement rally in Sydney in July (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 18 July 2011).
170  Pacific Scoop, 13 May 2011; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 2 July 2011; fijilive, 24 August 2011.
171  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 22 & 23 July 2009. Her children posted a video of the event on 
YouTube. Crosbie Walsh memorably wrote: ‘The prostrate bodies of slaves should no longer be used 
as rollers to launch [the Catholic] Ro Teimumu’s or anyone else’s waqa drua’ (crosbiew.blogspot.com, 
23 July 2009). Apparently the Vunivalu of Rewa, Ro Epeli Mataitini, agreed. He allegedly assisted 
16 police officers to slip into Lomanikoro, a village accessible only by river, at night and arrest her 
(www.coupfourandahalf.com, 26 July 2009). Charges against Kepa were dropped in September 2010.
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and nation-builders instead. When they continued to resist conditions 
placed on future meetings, he banned the Church from holding its annual 
conference, in all likelihood – he said – for the next five years.172 Shortly 
after Bainimarama dealt a similarly decisive blow to another rebellious 
Fijian institution, the GCC; with the abrogation of the Constitution, he 
declared, it no longer existed.173 He also announced Iloilo’s retirement as 
president. In a further snub to the defunct GCC, he replaced Iloilo with 
the candidate the GCC had refused to endorse as his deputy, Ratu Epeli 
Nailatikau.174
There were, of course, other political issues left hanging by the 
Constitution’s sudden abrogation, but the government was in no mood to 
be rushed. It announced a new National Dialogue Forum to replace the 
aborted PPDF in February 2010, stating that this time political parties or 
communally based organisations could not be represented. Additionally, 
participants would have to accept the charter, keep focused on the future, 
and have no criminal record or be facing criminal charges.175 To make 
his intentions clear, Bainimarama announced that he would step down 
in 2014.176 Consultations for a new constitution would not begin for 
another three years, however, but once developed the Constitution would 
mandate racial equality, incorporate the provisions of the People’s Charter, 
and provide for a common name for all citizens to build social cohesion.177 
To that end a new office for a Strategic Framework for Change began 
implementing the Charter, amending the criteria for scholarships and 
directing that all race-based names of schools be changed. In September 
2009, the Fiji School of Nursing announced that, henceforth, entry 
would be determined only by grades and geographical criteria, not race. 
A decree in 2010 officially changed the term used to describe indigenous 
172  fijilive, 31 July 2009; Amnesty International, Fiji, 2009, p. 23. Circumstances repeated 
themselves in 2011 after the Church reappointed its current leadership for a further three years in 
defiance of government wishes for ministers facing charges to stand down (Fiji Times, 24 August 
2011). The Church had to await the lifting of PER to hold its first annual general meeting in 2012.
173  fijilive, 2 August 2009. The declaration was belatedly formalised in March 2012 with the 
iTaukei Affairs Revocation Regulation Decree 2012.
174  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 28 July 2009; fijilive, 30 October 2009. Immediately after the 
abrogation, Bainimarama made Nailatikau Vice President. Memberships of troublesome provincial 
councils were sometimes purged, especially those – such as Rewa – that consistently opposed the coup 
or the charter (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 20 November 2011).
175  Fiji Times, 15 November 2009. The forum never met.
176  Fiji Times, 11 February 2010.
177  fijilive, 12 June & 2 August 2009.
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Fijians to iTaukei.178 Henceforth all Fiji’s citizens were Fijians. But, on 
the constitution itself, there was little movement. The National People’s 
Charter Advisory Council urged Bainimarama in May 2011 to fast-
track constitutional development and to that end recommended the 
establishment of a Constitution Commission. At the Attorney-General’s 
conference in December, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum outlined the overriding 
principle behind future elections: one person, one vote, one value. Voter 
registration for national and municipal elections would be centralised. 
Electronic voting might be considered, but there would be no more 
ethnic voting.179
When Bainimarama introduced the Strategic Framework for Change on 
television in July 2009, he specifically focused on non-political issues, in 
particular land and government reform. The National People’s Charter 
Advisory Committee would establish a monitoring centre to grade 
the progress of reform in all ministries and departments. A year later, 
Bainimarama announced that the military would align its corporate plan 
with the People’s Charter and hold regular meetings with the Strategic 
Framework for Change Committee.180 It is difficult to determine exactly 
how transformative these decisions were. With land, however, there were 
more than just progress reports. The Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act 
(ALTA) disappeared under a new land-reform program, replaced by the 
Native Land Trust Act with leases up to 99 years possible.181 Bainimarama 
promised to make the distribution of lease monies to landowners more 
equitable, and to make more land available for productive use, especially 
idle land. A land use bank would see to that.182 He repeated his stand 
178  fijivillage, 21 November 2009; fijilive, 8 September 2009. The Ministry for Indigenous Affairs 
now became the Ministry for iTaukei. The name change, first introduced in 2009, became mandatory 
in July 2010. Because the i is an article, the former description ‘Fijians’ or ‘indigenous Fijians’ is 
rendered as the Taukei from this point on in the text wherever the English ‘the’ is also used, or simply 
as Taukei where an article is not appropriate.
179  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 1 June, 12 July & 7 December 2011.
180  fijilive, 22 April 2010; crosbiew.blogspot.com, 22 December 2010.
181  Fiji Times, 14 January 2010.
182  Monies now went directly to mataqali and bypassed chiefs. In 2016, the government preserved 
$12.5 million of lease monies due to over 30,000 Taukei minors in a trust account. It claimed also 
that the rate of land leases renewals had risen from 50 per cent in 2006 to 65 per cent in 2010. 
The NLTB (now rebadged the iTaukei Land Trust Board or TLTB) wanted renewal rates to rise to 
90 per cent (Fiji Times, 22 February 2011). Lease monies available for distribution also increased, 
from $24 million in 2000 to $64 million in 2014. In 2016, however, Biman Prasad cast doubt 
on these figures, claiming that between 2007 and 2014 only 59 per cent of leases were renewed 




when foreshadowing land reforms in December 2009. He would protect 
Taukei land ownership and tenant security, but he would also ensure the 
fair distribution of rental income. When the Commissioner Western 
addressed the Ba Provincial Council a year later with firmer details, the 
chiefs – principal beneficiaries of existing laws – were clearly unimpressed. 
The goose still laid golden eggs but no longer for them. Bainimarama 
wanted rural Taukei integrated into the modern economy, not serving 
the demands of the chiefly system.183 The chiefs lost access to 30 per cent 
of lease monies. Except for the 15 per cent that went to the NLTB, later 
reduced to 10 per cent, all lease monies were now distributed to mataqali 
members equally.184 A Land Use Decree in 2010 enabled unused native 
and crown land to be put into a land bank that the government could use 
to attract new investors. Sixty per cent of mataqali members had to agree, 
but the bait lay in their potential to earn 100 per cent of lease monies.185 
Communications also formed part of his strategy, in particular its 
management. In December 2009, he formed a Central Agency for Roads, 
which merged the 13 different organisations previously responsible for 
overseeing Fiji’s 9,000 kilometres of roads.186 For Bainimarama, after three 
years of politicking, such changes in direction assumed new importance. 
The economy had to be kickstarted; constitutional change came a poor 
second in terms of priorities. He had told the media as much in the 
month before the Constitution’s abrogation. Few understood his intent 
at the time.187 
183  fiji.gov.fj, 1 July 2009; Fiji Sun, 2 December 2009; Fiji Times, 5 November 2010. Deductions 
from the TLTB fell from 15 per cent to 10 per cent over the course of 2013, adding further to 
the sums available for distribution to the vanua. The chiefs were unimpressed. ‘We are the people’s 
leaders,’ claimed Nadroga paramount chief, Ratu Sakiusa Makutu, ‘and we are not just here to sit idle 
and do nothing.’ Bainimarama told the Naitasiri Provincial Council that the Taukei are educated and 
do not need chiefs or the GCC to make decisions for them. That the GCC had not met for five years 
had made no difference to the performance of provincial councils although the ending of payments 
to chiefs at least reduced conflicts over chiefly titles (fijilive, 22 & 25 March 2012).
184  These changes made a considerable difference to mataqali members. Sefanaia Sakai cites the 
example of the Yaya mataqali in Makare village that earned $1,600,000 from the Nepani government 
quarry. Previously its 77 individual members earned only $9,350 each from the lease, with the bulk 
of benefits accruing to their chief ($480,000) and the NLTB ($400,000). By 2014, with the TLTB 
proportion at 10 per cent and the special allocation to chiefs gone, individual mataqali members earned 
twice as much as before (Sefanaia Sakai, ‘Insecurity of Taukei land as an issue in the 2014 general 
election: real threat or political gimmick?’, in Vijay Naidu & Sandra Tarte (eds), ‘No Ordinary Election’: 
The Fiji General Election of 2014. Special issue. The Journal of Pacific Studies, 35:2, 2015, p. 55).
185  Sefani Sakai, ‘Native land policy in the 2014 elections’, in Steven Ratuva & Stephanie Lawson, 
The People Have Spoken. Canberra: ANU Press, 2016, pp. 147–49. 
186  fijilive, 2 December 2009.
187  Fiji Times, 6 March 2009. He told a press conference that ‘All my government and officials need 
worry about now is our economy,’ not electoral deadlines.
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There were obvious reasons for Bainimarama’s focus. His coup had robbed 
Fiji of any prospect of growth. The economy contracted sharply in 2007 
and again in 2010, in part because of rising food and fuel costs. The global 
recession also impacted on tourism, although Australian markets were 
shielded and Fiji became more attractive as a tourist destination for cash-
strapped New Zealanders. Cane farmers continued to experience declining 
returns (down 36 per cent since 2006), their predicament worsened by 
the loss of EU aid for sugar reforms. Over 3,000 growers abandoned the 
industry between 2006 and 2009, precipitating a 45  per  cent collapse 
in sugar production by 2011.188 In September 2009, the government 
scrapped the farmer-funded Sugar Cane Growers Council in a bid to 
reduce the influence of rival cane-grower bodies at a time when increased 
road charges bit into farmer pockets.189 The Sugar Marketing Board also 
disappeared as part of a savings drive. Remittances were now the only 
bright spot in the economy, helping to keep the country afloat.190
Tight foreign exchange controls (which remained in place until late 
2011)  and a currency devaluation of 20 per cent swiftly followed 
the launch of the ‘new legal order’ in April, pushing inflation to over 
9 per cent and shrinking economic growth to negative 1.4 per cent in 
2009; hence the perceived importance for civil servants to retire early. 
Compulsory retirement forced nearly 2,500 civil servants out by mid-
2009. By planning to reduce civil service numbers from 26,000 to 20,000, 
the government hoped to lower salary costs by 20 per cent. Ending the 
provision of housing for many public servants also cut costs. In addition, 
it planned to turn government departments, such as those dealing 
with water and  government supplies, into statutory bodies in order to 
raise productivity.191 Here too were shades of Rabuka’s ‘New  Fijian’ 
privatisation programs after 1987. Necessity drove uncomfortable 
188  Dass, ‘Ailing sugar industry’, 2015. 
189  Fiji Times, 9 September 2009. The NFP had earlier dominated the Sugar Cane Growers 
Council. But Chaudhry had sacked its chairman and councillors, put his own people in charge and 
disallowed fresh elections until 2010. The council was replaced in 2015 by a nine-member council 
comprising three government and six cane-producer nominees, still paid for by a levy on growers. 
The government proposed adding appointed reps from eight sugar districts in 2016. The Fiji Sugar 
Corporation (FSC) also struggled to repay a $85 million loan from the Indian Exim Bank and 
required injections of $164 million from the state. Works associated with the Qarase-era (2005) loan 
to upgrade the four FSC mills were three years behind schedule by 2010 and allegedly suffered from 
poor Indian workmanship and substandard equipment.
190  Between 2007 and 2010 remittances probably earned Fiji some $400 million per annum, 
surpassing both sugar and tourism as the sector with the greatest impact on the Fiji economy 
(B Prasad, ‘Growth must result in more for us’, Fiji Times,12 September 2015).
191  fijilive, 15 July & 31 December 2009; Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 2012. Critics argued 
that early retirement compromised the quality of education (fijilive, 2 September 2009).
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similarities. A 3 per cent increase in bus fares pushed ECREA to collect 
20,000 signatures demanding reduced fares for school children. Stung, 
Bainimarama granted free bus travel for school children192 and included 
in the budget for 2010 a new food voucher program for the elderly and 
disabled, adding bus concessions for them also in 2011. Additionally, 
squatter assistance and relocation programs, housing-rehabilitation 
loans, improved family assistance, free text books and caps on school fees 
projected government resolve to assist the poor. A new low-cost housing 
project for nearly 2,000 families began with Chinese support at Tacirua 
East in Suva.193 It would never be enough. By early 2010 new estimates 
placed 45 per cent of the population in poverty and the government 
applied for an IMF loan of $1 billion to pay for all its proposed civil 
service, public enterprise, FNPF, land and agricultural reforms.194 By the 
close of the year, government debt and liabilities comprised 92 per cent 
of GDP, far above the 60 per cent level recommended by economists. 
To compensate, the government increased VAT from 12.5 to 15 per cent, 
but lifted its imposition on basic food items. The end result could only be 
less growth and more pain.195
The state of the economy demonstrated the dangers facing the new legal 
order. With emergency regulations extended every month and imposing 
indefinite censorship, with critics once more arrested, detained, prevented 
from leaving the country or forbidden to speak at conferences, it was hard 
to see how the government truly believed that it enabled a ‘stable socio-
political platform conducive for nation-building initiatives’.196 No news 
192  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 9 September 2009; fijilive, 26 November & 16 October 2009.
193  fijilive, 13 September 2010.
194  fijilive, 20 April 2010; crosbiew.blogspot.com, 14 April 2010. The loan was never taken and 
the government obtained the required finances at greater cost from alternative sources. FNPF lost 
$327 million on its investment in the Natadola and Momi tourism developments, forcing it to reassess 
the viability of its fund, in particular the subsidy given pensioners by current members. In 2012, it cut 
the conversion rate for its pensions from 15 per cent to 8.7 per cent (G Rashbrooke, ‘Reform of the Fiji 
National Provident Fund’, www.actuaries.org/HongKong2012/Papers/MBR12_Rashbrooke.pdf).
195  Kevin Barr argued in a letter that the Fiji Times refused to publish that devaluation and delays 
in raising basic wages and VAT increases would have negative impacts, particularly for those living 
below the poverty line (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 1 February 2012). In August 2012, he resigned 
as chair of the Wages Council in frustration at the government’s consistent failure to implement wages 
orders since 2008 (Fiji Times, 18 August 2012).
196  fijilive, 21 July 2009; Bainimarama’s address to the Asia Pacific Institute for Broadcasting 
Development Conference in Nadi. Chaudhry attacked Bainimarama’s thinking, arguing that it 
isn’t possible to just shelve resolution of the political crisis for three years to focus on economic 
development. Only a stable inclusive democratic political environment would restore investor 
confidence (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 15 July 2009). The IMF agreed. A visiting team in 2011 
warned that medium growth prospects would remain weak without improvements in the political 
situation (Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 2012).
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is not always good news, and silence is not necessarily golden; certainly 
not for investors pondering the potential Fiji offered. If anything PER 
weakened confidence and provided the diverse opposition a platform on 
which they could agree. At the forefront of this contest lay the media and 
foreign governments. Neither survived their exchanges well.
Decreeing compliance and respect
PER immediately hit the media hardest. ABC and New Zealand 
journalists were deported. Radio Australia’s FM relay stations in Fiji 
were closed. PACNEWS relocated to Brisbane. The newly promoted 
information permanent secretary, Lt Col Neumi Leweni, warned media 
to comply with directives and not focus on the negative. PER gave 
him authority to revoke the licences of any media outlet that failed to 
comply.197 To assist implementing indefinite censorship, censors from the 
Ministry of Information and police were stationed in news offices to filter 
stories. The newspapers protested. The Daily Post published a pointedly 
nonsensical article about the amazing feat of a man getting onto a bus; the 
Fiji Times printed blank pages. Fiji TV cancelled its regular evening news. 
They were told to desist. Articles about popular protests in countries like 
Thailand were also denied. Radio talkback shows had to submit topics 
of discussion to the Ministry for Information one week in advance.198 
In late 2009, economist and University of the South Pacific (USP) dean 
of Business, Biman Prasad, cautioned the government while launching 
a special journal issue on the media:
Because of censorship, people are turning to blogs to get their news. These 
blogs are not governed by any rules or standards. People are being misled 
and are being incited. Government will have more legitimacy if it allows 
the media to operate freely and independently.199
197  fijilive, 13 May 2009.
198  Daily Post, 15 April 2009; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 29 July 2009 & 17 February 2000.
199  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 14 October 2009. Crosbie Walsh argued that anti-government 
blogs recorded 5,000 visits per day, over 1,000 from within Fiji (crosbiew.blogspot.com, 12 December 
2010). The military also relied upon the blogs for information. Solely on the basis of information on 
various websites, Driti and Lt Col Jone Kalouniwai (head of Military Intelligence) told Bainimarama 
in September 2010 that he should sack Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum because of his alleged dealings. 
Bainimarama told them to come back when they had evidence (Fijileaks, 21 November 2013).
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The government did not respond. Amnesty International believed media 
censorship existed solely to hide the government’s actions and breaches 
of human rights, and to suppress critical comment.200 Already prior to 
September 2009, 20 journalists had been intimidated by detention and 
the fijilive website temporarily taken down after it posted pictures of 
a bomb scare in Suva.201
Fiji news websites had proliferated after the late 1990s. Their presence 
made a significant difference to reporting during the 2000 coup compared 
with 1987, when Rabuka could more easily control the dissemination 
of news nationally and internationally by simply closing down media 
outlets or imposing strict controls on their operation. All international 
communications went through Fiji International Telecommunications 
Ltd (FINTEL) and could be monitored or stopped. But automated 
telecommunications and the internet rendered these measures obsolete, 
as the interim government discovered immediately after December 2006 
when a plethora of new blog sites emerged, many drawing on rumour 
and gossip and being, in the main, hostile to what they saw as an illegal 
military junta running roughshod over the wishes of Fiji’s people.202 Hence 
the government began targeting individuals thought to be contributing to 
hostile blogs. 
When, in late May 2009, the pro-regime Real Fiji News website accused 
lawyers of being behind Raw Fiji News, police again detained Richard 
Naidu and Jon Apted, along with Qarase’s lawyer, Tevita Fa, seizing their 
computers and copying their hard drives for forensic examination.203 
200  Amnesty International, Fiji, 2009, pp. 16, 19 & 21.
201  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 28 May 2009. It would be taken down again in August 2010 and 
its editor, Richard Naidu (the journalist, not the lawyer), detained when it leaked news of the end of 
Police Commissioner Teleni’s tenure ahead of a government announcement (www.coupfourandahalf.
com, 30 July 2010). Foreign media were also targeted; the ABC’s Sean Dorney, Fairfax’s Michael Field 
and NZ TV One’s Barbara Deaver were banned from Fiji (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 13 April 2009).
202  Raw Fiji News (www.matavuvale.com/forum/topics/raw-fiji-news-your-live), Soli Vakasama 
(solivakasama.wordpress.com), Stuck in Fiji Mud (stuckinfijimud.blogspot.com.au/), Fiji Today (fijitoday.
wordpress.com/), Tears for Fiji (tearsforfiji.blogspot.com.au/), fijicoup2006 (www.fijicoupin2006.com/), 
Luvei ni Viti (solivakasamablog.wordpress.com/2009/04/21/luvei-viti-children-of-fiji/), Discombulated 
bubu (discombobulatedbubu.blogspot.com/), Intelligentsiya (intelligentsiya.blogspot.com.au/) and 
coupfourpointfive (www.coupfourandahalf.com/) were but a few of the critical websites. Others like the 
Graham Davis’s grubsheet (grubsheet.blogspot.com.au/) and Crosbie Walsh’s site Fiji: The Way It Was, 
Is and Can Be (crosbiew.blogspot.com), were more nuanced. Additional sites belonged to media outlets, 
academic programs and journals, and individuals. It may have been a jungle, misleading for the unwary, 
but it was certainly an improvement on the media poverty Rabuka induced and that Bainimarama was 
powerless to emulate.
203  Australian, 21 May 2009.
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Smart phones had yet to make an impact in Fiji, but Fiji’s citizens took 
to the internet with gusto.204 If sites could not be taken down (and 
some sites were blocked), then restricting access could be tackled more 
conventionally. In late May 2009, the government announced that 
internet cafes (along with amusement centres and billiard rooms) could 
only operate from 6 am to 5 pm. Restrictions applied to other businesses 
also.205 But, still, the websites persisted, even attempting to organise by 
blog a surprise anti-government demonstration in late 2010 by riding 
on the coat tails of an approved women’s and children’s human rights 
gathering in Suva’s central Sukuna Park. A twitchy government banned 
both. But, as Crosbie Walsh, now a blogger himself, pointed out, this was 
no longer simply a law and order matter but a propaganda war. Crude and 
clumsy government responses to challenges did little to win the hearts and 
minds of the people it claimed to be working for.206
There were other, similarly unsubtle, ways that the pesky media could 
be dealt with. Ministries were ordered to cancel advertising contracts 
with the Fiji Times in September and not publish notices in the paper. 
In November 2009, a National Spectrum Decree cancelled ownership of 
all radio and television frequencies. Existing frequencies used by stations 
were deemed temporary, subject to reallocation by the Attorney-General 
as he saw fit without compensation and without recourse to the courts. 
The decree potentially advantaged the state-owned Fiji Broadcasting 
Corporation (FBC), whose CEO was the Attorney-General’s brother, 
Riyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. When talks were later held on a new media decree, 
the Australian News Ltd–owned Fiji Times and the Yasana Holdings–
owned Fiji TV were excluded for not recognising the contemporary 
legal system and the status of government.207 Worse was to come. A new 
204  About 34 per cent of Fiji’s population were internet users by 2014, and nearly 30 per cent or 
260,000 were Facebook users (Jope Tarai, Romitesh Kant, Glen Finau, Jason Titifanue, ‘Political 
social media campaigning in Fiji’s 2014 elections’, in Naidu & Tarte, ‘No Ordinary Election’, 2015, 
p. 92). Broadband usage increased fourfold and mobile phone usage increased 7 per cent per annum 
between 2007 and 2014 (Fiji Sun, 26 November 2016).
205  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 26 May 2009. Only essential businesses (pharmacies, bakeries 
and service stations) could open until 9 pm, for the cost of a $20 weekly permit. Service stations and 
bakeries could also remain open after 9 pm.
206  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 12 December 2010.
207  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 8 September 2009; Australian, 21 November 2009; Fiji Times, 
17 December 2009. Yasana Holdings owned Fiji TV on behalf of Taukei provincial councils. It also 
owned PNG’s EMTV. 
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Singapore-inspired Media Industry Development Decree came out in 
early April 2010 for discussion and mandated that all media organisations 
had to be 90 per cent locally owned. The implications for the News 
Corporation Fiji Times and for the 51 per cent Australian-owned Daily 
Post were obvious.208
The government had long claimed that, once the media decree came into 
force, PER would go. Now critics understood why: a Media Industry 
Development Authority (MIDA) would enforce self-censorship as well 
as oversee media and cross-media ownership rules, a Media Tribunal 
would deal with complaints, and all stories over 50 words had to carry 
the author’s name. Penalties for non-compliance could go as high as 
$100,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organisations.209 Immediately 
critics pounced. The CCF claimed the new rules violated the principles 
of the People’s Charter, while Auckland journalism professor David 
Robie claimed it would open ‘the door to vindictive abuse in a climate of 
dictatorship and the singling out of media organisations that do not toe 
the media line’. The blog site coupfourpointfive believed it spelled the end 
of investigative journalism of the kind that brought down Chaudhry.210 
Not everyone agreed. The Pacific Islands News Association (PINA) 
thought it too early to adopt a position, while former Daily Post editor 
Thakur Ranjit Singh lamented the failure of mainstream media to tell 
the real story behind the coup and thought Bainimarama only wanted 
journalists to take greater responsibility for shaping a new modern Fiji.211 
Indeed, whether they wanted to or not, the media had to comply. The 
decree came into force at the end of June 2010 and, by the close of the 
following September, the Fiji Times had been sold to Mahendra Patel, 
a  long-serving member of its board and owner of the Motibhai group 
of companies, who in 2011 would be sentenced to one year’s jail for abuse 
208  The cross-media rules also created uncertainty. Hari Punja owned shares in both Communications 
Fiji and Fiji TV while William Parkinson’s Communications Fiji also operated stations in Papua New 
Guinea (Australian, 5 July 2010).
209  fijilive, 8 April 2010. Professor Subramani became chair of MIDA with Matai Akauola (PINA 
manager), Christopher Pryde (Solicitor General), Aselika Uluilakeba (children’s representative), Peni 
Moore (women’s representative) and Jimaima Schultz (consumers’ representative).
210  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 9 & 10 April 2010.
211  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 10 April 2010; Pacific Scoop, 15 April 2010. PINA’s response saw 
a rival Pasifika Media Association attack it for being under Bainimarama’s spell (fijilive, 22 August 
2010). CCF director Akuila Yabaki claimed that Bainimarama was obsessed with the potential for 
elements of previous coups to overthrow him and feared a return to 2000 circumstances and popular 
uprisings; hence PER and new media laws (Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 2014).
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of office while chair of PostFiji.212 It remained to be seen, however, whether 
the Media Industry Development Decree would produce the compliant 
and respectful media the government craved. 
Diplomatic cold war
Certainly, compliance and respect were not forthcoming from many 
foreign governments and international organisations. The Australian 
Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, set the tone after the abrogation 
of the Constitution by immediately declaring the regime ‘a military 
dictatorship’213 and, with New Zealand, lobbied the United Nations to 
cease using Fiji peacekeepers.214 Because Fiji had failed to nominate an 
election date by 1 May, the condition laid down by the PIF at its Port 
Moresby meeting in January, it faced automatic suspension from the 
regional body. Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum seemed certain it would not happen. 
‘I admire his optimism,’ NZ Foreign Minister Murray McCully quipped. 
Fiji was suspended, the first such suspension in the regional body’s 38-year 
history. Bainimarama immediately asked for a summit with Australia and 
New Zealand. They refused. Bainimarama had used the same strategy prior 
to expelling the NZ High Commissioner in 2007, hoping – according 
to Wikileaks – to show Australia and New Zealand as the problem and 
drive a wedge between the two countries and PIF members. The British 
High Commissioner told McCully ‘that the time had come to push Fiji 
down the list of priority until conditions deteriorated sufficiently to allow 
212  Australian, 9 October 2010; Fiji Times, 13 April 2011. The change in ownership brought in 
a new publisher, Dallas Swinstead (previously with the Herald Weekly and Age in Melbourne and Fiji 
Times editor in the late 1970s), and a new editor, Fred Wesley. Existing editor Netani Rika resigned 
temporarily to allow the paper to begin on a fresh note. Patel appealed his sentence, lost an appeal 
in 2014 and failed to return from Sydney for sentencing (Fiji Sun, 25 November 2014; Australian, 
25 November 2014).
213  Fiji Times, 14 April 2009.
214  Fiji Times, 17 April 2009. This was more than a symbolic matter. Fiji had some 578 soldiers, 
police and military observers on UN missions in Sinai, Israel–Syria, Iraq and Sudan in 2009. In late 
April, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd implied that lobbying had been successful but, at the start 
of May, 12 Fiji police left for Darfur (fijilive, 1 May 2009). In September, UN Secretary General Ban Ki 
Moon told NZ Prime Minister John Key that reductions in Fijian numbers would only apply to future 
operations (Fiji Times, 26 October 2009). However, fresh Fijian peacekeepers were still being sent to 
Iraq in October (Australian, 4 November 2009) and, by 2011, 1,252 were engaged in Iraq (275), Sinai 
(994) and Sudan (six), one third of the RFMF’s regular troops (fijilive, 25 February 2011).
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for improved engagement’.215 If only it was so simple. Within a short 
time, Bainimarama met a 25-member Chinese delegation at the Shangri-
La Fijian Resort in Sigatoka to discuss Chinese investment and, in early 
2010, the Chinese ambassador described Fiji as a paradise for investors 
under the leadership of the Bainimarama government.216 
The mutually convenient love affair had been long in the making. 
China sought to use Fiji’s apparent isolation as a way to demonstrate its 
usefulness to the Pacific. Premier Wen Jiabao’s early plans to raise China’s 
stakes in Fiji had become mired in the turmoil of 2006 but, in early 
2009, then Vice President Xi Jinping visited Fiji, much to the chagrin 
of Australia, which attempted unsuccessfully to prevent him transiting 
through Australia. Xi’s visit consolidated the growing links between 
the two countries: direct air services, relaxed visa regulations and direct 
shipping links. Fiji now looked north, not south or west. It appointed 
Isikeli Mataitoga its first ambassador to Russia. It began steps to join 
the Non-Alignment Movement and formed new relationships with 
17 countries, including Cuba. In 2011, it opened embassies in Indonesia, 
South Africa and Brazil.217
Fiji’s foreign policy assertiveness strengthened its hand against Australian 
and New Zealand pressure. Bainimarama told Mark Davis on an episode 
of SBS’s Dateline entitled ‘Perfectly Frank’ that he could not simply give in 
and have an election to please Australia and New Zealand: ‘We’re trying to 
change the mindset of the people from racial issues that developed in the 
last ten years to what we want to take Fiji to – equal suffrage.’ Change is 
not an easy thing to do; it takes time, he argued. Only ending the race card 
‘will stop all coups’.218 But, like the PIF, the Commonwealth Ministerial 
Action Group refused to listen. It urged Fiji to reactivate the PPDF process 
and inform it by September of its intention to hold an election before 
215  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 29 December 2010. Suspension also meant that Fiji was barred 
from participating in the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) and PACER regional 
trade discussions, something Fiji, as the second largest economy in the Pacific after Papua New 
Guinea, saw as both counterproductive and illegal. The Forum promised only to brief Fiji officials 
after trade talks (fijilive, 7 & 8 August 2009).
216  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 13 April 2010. Chinese investment comprised 37 per cent of foreign 
direct investment by 2014, compared with only 2.9 per cent in 2009 (Fiji Times, 30 October 2014).
217  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 28 April 2011; crosbiew.blogspot.com, 17 August 2009; Fiji Sun, 
26 May 2010; fijilive, 25 September 2011.
218  fijilive, 27 July 2009; www.sbs.com.au/news/dateline/story/perfectly-frank.
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October 2010.219 Bainimarama did not and Fiji was fully suspended from 
the Commonwealth on 2 September 2009. ‘Two democratic, non-racist 
institutions oppose a military regime and so  unwittingly continue to 
extend support for undemocratic, racist policies,’ Crosbie Walsh observed, 
and ‘undermine the wobbly efforts of the military regime (sic!) to impose 
democratic non-racist policies’.220
In some respects the Suva-based PIF came out worst from these 
suspensions, not Fiji. The divisions – apparent since 2006 – now became 
raw. Bainimarama accused Samoa’s Prime Minister Tuilaepa of trying 
to engineer the removal of the PIF secretariat to Apia221 and criticised 
Australia and New Zealand – who funded the PIF – of exercising undue 
pressure on its Pacific member states. The PIF remained important to 
Fiji. Its former director of economic governance, Roman Grynberg, 
claimed the PIF is part of what makes Fiji the centre of the Pacific. Yet 
Bainimarama’s beef was not with the PIF per se but with Australia and 
New Zealand, although at the time the distinction became blurred.222 
Bainimarama did have, however, a means to lobby among the Pacific 
states that bypassed the PIF. That way took the form of the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG), which comprised the three largest Pacific states 
(Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu). In July, Vanuatu 
supported Bainimarama’s roadmap and promised to lobby for Fiji’s right 
to remain in the PIF and have a place at Pacific trade talks. In October, 
Papua New Guinea also promised to lobby Australia and New Zealand 
on Fiji’s behalf.223 It was a small opening and Bainimarama and his new 
219  fijilive,1 August 2009. When Sir Paul Reeves visited Fiji as the Commonwealth envoy a 
week later, he emphasised that the Commonwealth still intended to assist Fiji return to democracy 
(www.coupfourandahalf.com, 10 September 2009).
220  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 2 September 2009.
221  Tuilaepa invited Bainimarama to Samoa for a chat but Bainimarama wanted Tuilaepa to come 
to Fiji instead; ‘It might change the way he sees us’, adding ‘don’t come alone. Bring your friend Toke 
Talagi with you’. At the Cairns PIF meeting in August, the Niuean premier had called on Fiji’s people 
to rise up against Bainimarama (Pacific Scoop, 12 September 2009).
222  Islands Business, January 2010. This did not stop Fiji pressuring the Forum secretariat by 
delaying a work visa to its new director of economic governance, Australian Chakriya Bowman, 
in January 2010.
223  fijilive, 11 July & 16 October 2009.
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Foreign Minister, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola,224 took care to cultivate it, 
hinting that the MSG might open its next meeting – which Fiji would 
chair – to other Forum island states.225 
Fiji also sought to assuage EU sensitivities, telling Brussels that the 
government would decree parts of the 1997 Constitution dealing with 
the rule of law, human rights and democracy. The European Union 
responded, promising substantial dialogue and a new bilateral agreement. 
And Fiji reminded the United States of its current and past support for 
American initiatives in Iraq and the Sinai and of its role in the Solomon 
Islands.226 But it could do little to make Australia or New Zealand adopt 
a more conciliatory approach. Not surprisingly, in the absence of economic 
sanctions – which both countries and the European Union claimed not 
to be contemplating – the focus of the Fiji Government’s anger fell once 
more on the issue of travel bans and, in particular, their impact on Fiji’s 
ability to staff its judiciary.
The Chief Justice, Anthony Gates, claimed that Australian travel bans 
made it difficult for him to recruit judges from Sri Lanka, which he had 
toured in August. Most appointees had to endure lectures from Australian 
High Commission officers in Colombo about the dangers in accepting 
positions in Fiji. Australia claimed it approved their visas, but apparently 
failed to tell the Sri Lankans, who withdrew their applications and flew, 
instead, via Korea to avoid transiting Australia. Gates regarded Australian 
interference as an attempt to undermine Fiji’s judiciary and he took to 
Bainimarama a tape that one Sri Lankan judge had made of a conversation 
with Australian officials. 
NZ travel bans also concerned Gates. In October, Justice Anjala Wati 
applied to the New Zealand High Commission for a humanitarian visa. 
Her baby needed urgent eye surgery. Its response indicated that the request 
fell within ‘the parameters of New Zealand’s travel sanctions’. An appeal 
brought no relief. Only when Gates raised the matter in the media did New 
Zealand relent and offer a visa, but ‘subject to absurd restrictions’ such as 
224  The former High Commissioner to Papua New Guinea and ambassador to Japan appeared 
a strange choice as Foreign Minister because of his background. A former secretary to the South 
Pacific Bible Society, he had gained notoriety as a founding member of the Taukei Movement, which 
supported Rabuka’s 1987 coups. He served also as a cabinet minister in Rabuka’s governments in the 
1990s and became leader of the SVT in 1999. He again served in Qarase’s interim government in 
2000 and 2001, before losing his seat to CAMV.
225  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 2 November 2009.
226  fijilive, 19 November 2009.
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‘no shopping’.227 ‘If you bully there will be some retaliation,’ Bainimarama 
later told NZTV’s Sunday program. He accused New Zealand of trying to 
destroy first its economy and now its judiciary.228 And retaliate he did by 
immediately expelling New Zealand’s acting Deputy High Commissioner 
Todd Cleaver and Australia’s High Commissioner James Batley, and 
simultaneously recalling Fiji’s envoys in the two countries. In Suva, Brij 
Lal told the ABC that Bainimarama wanted to be seen as standing up 
to two bullies in the region and defending Fiji’s sovereignty and honour. 
But the real issue, he said, concerned the integrity and impartiality of 
the judiciary. The military seized him, interrogated him at the QEB, and 
deported him.229 Contrary views were not permitted.
Bainimarama immediately offered talks with Australia and New Zealand, 
as he had done before. He held meetings with EU representatives to 
demonstrate the value of dialogue. An IMF team visited the country 
in early December. The United Nations still received Fiji troops for 
peacekeeping duties and China maintained its aid program. Australia is 
‘pissing in the wind’, the Sydney Morning Herald quoted Fiji Times editor, 
Netani Rika. Australia and New Zealand might have had more success had 
they done more earlier to demonstrate the difference between democracy 
‘and the form of government we have had for the last 40 years’, he said. 
Instead their silence now posed as ‘complicity in the problems we face’.230 
Fiji needs incentives to democratise, not punishment, the former 
Constitutional Review Committee chair and now Commonwealth 
envoy Paul Reeves remarked. Australia’s parliamentary secretary for the 
Pacific islands, Duncan Kerr, agreed. In August 2009, he met US officials 
privately to seek American support for re-engagement with Fiji. He 
believed Australia close to exhausting its diplomatic options on Fiji with 
little apparent effect. Forcing economic collapse on Fiji would only cost 
Australia dearly and weaken other Pacific states as well. Australia – Kerr 
added – had secured Fiji’s suspension from the PIF but did not know what 
to do next. Bainimarama could not simply give up power, as Australia 
wanted, ‘as he would end up at the mercy of his enemies’. Either find a safe 
227  Fiji Times, 4 November 2009; Pacific Scoop, 3 November 2009.
228  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 16 November 2009.
229  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 4 & 5 November 2009; Australian, 4 November 2009. Two 
months later the government completed its revenge on the outspoken Brij Lal. It denied his wife, 
Padma Lal, a former advisor to the PIF secretariat but then working in Fiji for the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature, entry into Fiji and declared her a prohibited immigrant.
230  fijilive, 2 December 2009.
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way for him to exit or do business with him.231 His colleagues, however, 
insisted on maintaining Australia’s hardline stance and Kerr resigned as 
parliamentary secretary in mid-December. Prime Minister Rudd preferred 
to look north to Asia and – in the eyes of many Pacific leaders – had little 
time for them.232 He did not replace Kerr. Two weeks later, New Zealand 
Prime Minister John Key took up Kerr’s mantle, offering to re-engage. 
Bainimarama’s perseverance appeared to have paid off, but the cold war 
was far from over. He claimed only to be encouraged by New Zealand’s 
change in stance.233 
Nonetheless, Bainimarama immediately tested the waters, announcing in 
January 2010 his intention to appoint Lt Col Neumi Leweni, formerly 
military attaché to China and permanent secretary for information but 
subject to Australasian travel bans, Fiji’s new High Commissioner to New 
Zealand. Two weeks later, New Zealand and Australia’s foreign ministers 
met to discuss Fiji and agreed to reopen their missions but not appoint 
heads of mission. Fiji had first to learn how to agree to disagree, ‘to conduct 
a good civilised diplomatic conversation’.234 Foreign Minister Kubuabola 
met briefly with McCully and Smith and received their determination. 
Leweni would not be going. Worse followed.
Fiji had hoped to regain the initiative when it chaired the next MSG 
meeting at Natadola in late July 2010. Bainimarama called it MSG Plus, 
having invited 10 other Pacific states to attend in a clear challenge to 
the Forum. But his ambitions were trumped by Australia, which had 
rapidly increased aid to Vanuatu. Somewhat undiplomatically, Australia 
announced that the MSG meeting would not take place, leaving a weak-
looking Vanuatu Prime Minister, Edward Natapei, to claim that the MSG 
had been cancelled because Fiji failed to restore democracy. An angry 
Bainimarama told Auckland Radio Tarana that such constant interfering 
231  Age, 19 December 2010.
232  Islands Business, March 2010. Peter Thomson, a former Fiji diplomat, had advocated a similar 
position since 2006: Australia was punishing Fiji without achieving anything and destabilising the 
region. He returned to Fiji in 2010 and became Fiji’s very successful permanent representative to the 
United Nations (Australian, 22 July 2010).
233  fijivillage, 4 December 2009; fijilive, 23 December 2009; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 
24 December 2009.
234  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 5 February 2010. Steven Ratuva had counselled Fiji not to act 
triumphantly but to pursue ‘quiet diplomacy’ in its cold war with Australia and New Zealand. Win-
win, not attack and counterattack strategies were more likely to succeed (Pacific Scoop, 5 February 
2010). Bainimarama tried to seize the moral high ground after the event by claiming Australasian High 
Commissioners could not be reappointed until travel sanctions ended (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 
25 February 2010).
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might make Fiji unprepared for elections in 2014. To drive home his 
point, he expelled Australia’s acting High Commissioner, Sarah Roberts, 
for ‘unfriendly acts’ and for interfering in Fiji’s internal affairs.235 And 
he went ahead with his Natadola meeting, renaming it ‘Engaging with 
the Pacific’. In all, 11 of the 14 PIF nations came, including the largest 
states – Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Was this a 
new south-west Pacific bloc in the making, one that excluded Polynesia 
and particularly Samoa? Bainimarama kept everyone guessing. He had 
denied Forum representatives the right to observe progress towards 
democratic change in Fiji, and he now temporarily suspended Fiji from 
MSG meetings. He told his guests that it was time to move beyond ‘the 
traditional sphere of influence dictated to by our colonial past by certain 
metropolitan powers’.236 And, as if to demonstrate that intent, he travelled 
next to the Shanghai Trade Fair where he declared that Fiji should ditch its 
ties with Australia and turn to China for support. Fiji had already relaxed 
immigration rules for Chinese students and tourists; now it announced 
that Rabuka’s former Finance Minister, Jim Ah Koy, would head Fiji’s 
mission in Beijing. China promised a government delegation for Fiji’s 
40th anniversary of independence on 10 October 2010, the auspicious 
triple 10. And it agreed to fund a MSG secretariat in Port Vila.237
Bainimarama was on a roll. He wanted both Australia and New Zealand 
out of the PIF. When Key offered to bring Fiji back into the regional 
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) trade talks, 
Fiji demurred. PACER was no longer a promising instrument for 
development. It had been corrupted by regional politics. If Fiji came back, 
it would be on its own terms.238 With Australia and New Zealand’s strategy 
for dealing with Fiji in tatters and with no new approach forthcoming, 
Steven Ratuva believed fragmentation now threatened the Pacific’s regional 
bodies.239 Indeed, when PIF leaders met in Vila in August 2010, many 
were absent and sent senior officials instead; even Australia’s new Prime 
Minister, Julia Gillard, failed to attend. The MSG, however, patched up its 
differences and, at the long-delayed meeting in Honiara, Vanuatu handed 
over leadership to Fiji after a reconciliation ceremony.240 It was time for 
235  Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July 2010; Australian, 14 July 2010. 
236  fijilive, 23 July 2010. Bainimarama mooted the idea of a Regional Police Academy.
237  Age, 12 August 2010; fijilive, 22 August 2010.
238  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 10 August 2010.
239  Fiji Times, 9 August 2010.
240  fijilive, 15 December 2010. It helped that a vote of no confidence in the Vanuatu parliament 
had seen Natapei replaced as prime minister by Sato Kilman in early December.
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Australia and New Zealand to step back and allow Pacific countries to take 
the lead, former New Zealand diplomat, Gerald McGhie, argued.241 Kerr 
stepped out of the shadows to urge Australia to focus on practical steps to 
help Fiji address poverty, land reform and the plight of the sugar industry. 
It should get Fiji back into trade talks, and not focus on the democracy 
agenda to the detriment of all else.242 Fiji responded positively. Solo Mara, 
now permanent secretary for foreign affairs, claimed Fiji was willing to re-
engage with Australia and New Zealand. But the two countries had first 
to treat Fiji with respect and recognise its government.243
Relations with the United States had, of necessity, to be handled more 
delicately. Fiji had enacted a comprehensive anti-human trafficking law in 
its Crimes Decree, which replaced the old Penal Code, and begun a series 
of training programs on trafficking for law-enforcement officers. These 
measures assisted to reduce its risk level for human trafficking sufficiently 
to remove US Congress mandated sanctions on approvals for loans needed 
from the World Bank, the IMF or the ADB.244 These were important 
safeguards for Fiji, but the United States itself sent mixed signals. It clearly 
wanted to resist the build-up of Chinese interests in the Pacific and its 
demonstration of intent to stay with Fiji took shape in the form of a 
large new embassy complex in Suva’s Tamavua Heights. The Chinese had 
also constructed an embassy complex on the waterfront at Nasese. In late 
September 2010, the United States signalled its intention to re-engage 
with Fiji but, almost immediately, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
announced that she intended to work with Asia and Australia to persuade 
Fiji to introduce democratic government. Bainimarama responded quietly. 
The United States should work directly with Fiji instead.245 
For the RFMF, this hardening stance was particularly worrying. The 
intended withdrawal of US troops from both Iraq and Afghanistan 
promised greater opportunities for Fiji soldiers on UN and civil contracts, 
but only if the United States did not oppose their presence.246 US travel 
bans also impacted on senior Fiji officials, including the Chief Justice, 
241  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 9 October 2010.
242  Radio Australia, 9 November 2010.
243  fijilive, 29 November 2010.
244  Islands Business, July 2010.
245  fijilive, 30 September 2010; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 8 November 2010; fijilive, 9 November 
2010.
246  J. Baledrokadroka, ‘Showtime as the US call’s Bainimarama’s bluff’, www.coupfourandahalf.com, 
8 November 2010.
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the Attorney-General and the Solicitor General who had travel visas to 
the United States denied in 2010. Not until the next year did Fiji get the 
United States to rethink the issue of visas for UN and multilateral fora. 
Even the United Nations could be problematic. It blocked Driti from 
leading an Iraqi peacekeeping mission. Fiji recalled Berenado Vunibobo 
as its permanent representative at the United Nations in April 2010 and 
replaced him with Peter Thomson, hoping for more active promotion 
of Fiji’s interests in New York.247 The wider international context could 
never be taken for granted, no matter Fiji’s mostly pyrrhic victories against 
Australia and New Zealand. But Bainimarama could hardly complain. 
After all, he alone had chosen to ride the tiger. And he appeared to be 
riding well.
In March 2011, the long-awaited MSG summit took place in Suva, funded 
by the Chinese. It gave Bainimarama everything he wanted, recognition 
of the Charter and the roadmap. The meeting included representation 
from Indonesia and Luxembourg, the latter lobbying for a seat on the 
Security Council ‘in Australia’s backyard’, according to Graham Davis. 
‘Bainimarama is getting the last laugh,’ he added.248 Foreign Minister 
Rudd, already lobbying in Africa for Australia’s own tilt at a seat, remained 
unmoved; he would not legitimise ‘what has been a very ugly military 
coup’. He maintained the same line at the Commonwealth Ministerial 
Action Group in London during May, relenting only on Fiji’s engagement 
with the United Nations as peacekeepers.249 So too PIF in September 
2011, when it met in Auckland and refused to alter sanctions against Fiji 
but agreed to reconsider Fiji’s participation in PACER talks. But, again, 
New Zealand had second thoughts. Foreign Minister McCully pondered 
allowing Fiji officials to attend the 2012 Rugby World Cup in Auckland 
in return for concessions. ‘We should hold our nerve,’ the NZ Herald 
counselled; it just might give Bainimarama ‘one more chance to make us 
look foolish’.250 
247  fijilive, 14 January & 8 December 2011. 
248  grubsheet.blogspot.com, 28 March 2011.
249  Australian, 10 May 2011. Kubuabola claimed that there could be no real re-engagement with 
Australia as long as Rudd remained in office.
250  NZ Herald, 4 April 2011.
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The Lowy Institute’s Fiji poll, released in September, added to that 
concern.  It found that 66 per cent of Fijians supported Bainimarama, 
39  per  cent strongly; hence the Fiji Government’s claim that three-
times more Fijians supported Bainimarama than Australians supported 
Gillard.251 If Bainimarama’s government had not previously fully 
appreciated the need to properly manage public relations – especially to 
the outside world, it certainly did now. In October 2011, it hired the 
Washington-based public relations firm, Qorvis Communications, for 
this purpose, resulting in a splurge of new government websites, twitter 
accounts, YouTube profiles and newswire reports all promoting a very 
upbeat message. Bainimarama’s December Huffington Post article, ‘A win 
for the 99 per cent’, became an early example, its title a direct appeal to 
the sentiments of Americans angry at the inequalities the global financial 
crisis had brought into stark relief. Here was a small country prepared 
to reduce or eliminate taxes for 99 per cent of taxpayers.252 What greater 
evidence of its progressivism did people require? 
Riding the tiger
For any leader coming to power through the sheer weight of military 
muscle, longevity depends overwhelmingly on the maintenance of military 
support. Bainimarama understood this well, always insisting on amnesty 
for military offences and quickly coming to the defence of soldiers caught 
breaking the law. ‘I cannot afford to discard my men after they finished 
the job done for you and your family,’ he declared after soldiers were 
videoed beating captured prison escapees in September 2012: ‘I will stick 
by my men.’253 Bainimarama’s opponents understood this also. Whenever 
possible they spread rumours through their websites that suggested 
rumblings in the Military Council or hinted at major divisions within 
the military itself. Often their whispers were malicious, implying, for 
example, that Bainimarama intended to assume the presidency in order 
251  Sydney Morning Herald, 8 September 2011. Carried out by Tebbutt Research and supervised 
by a former chair of Newspoll, the survey of 1,032 citizens found that 98 per cent wanted democracy 
and 47 per cent thought the government could be doing more to restore it. Wadan Narsey questioned 
the survey’s results, given that it was conducted only in urban and peri-urban areas of Viti Levu and 
not truly random (intelligentsia.blogspot.com, 9 September 2011).
252  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 24 December 2011; Huffington Post, 13 December 2011. Allegedly Fiji 
paid Qorvis $86,200 per month for its services (Fiji Times, 1 September 2015). The 2017–18 budget 
made provision for a $1 million payment to Qorvis.
253  Australian, 12 March 2013.
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to allow Muslims under the leadership of their pet hate – the Attorney-
General, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum – to take over government. Sometimes 
they were opportunistic, seeking to exploit changes in military personnel 
to suit a preconceived narrative. But, with PER still in force and local 
media censored, government silence merely deepened the vacuum in 
which rumours thrived. As Walsh argued, prior to Qorvis’s appointment, 
government inaction not only played into the hands of opponents but 
also ensured its continued misrepresentation overseas.254 Events in 2010 
and after demonstrated just how dangerous this could be.
By 2010, Fiji Water had become Fiji’s most recognisable export. In many 
ways, the iconic little bottle and its contents represented the value of 
utilising the success of one industry – tourism – to leverage another. That 
Fiji’s tourism included a number of very exclusive resorts also helped 
ensure that America’s fashionable and environmentally conscious elite 
wanted to be seen with a product that the company’s managers sold as 
ancient water untouched by humans. They product-placed it wherever 
appropriately possible, including at the White House, to enhance its 
exclusive appeal. Thus connectivity and marketing made Fiji Water the 
fourth-most imported water bottle in the United States by 2004, with 
the company valued at some US$50 million. By 2009, it was number 
one. Little wonder former Finance Minister Chaudhry thought he had 
hit upon a goldmine when he announced a new 20-cent tax on water 
exports in 2008. After all the company paid next to no tax, sheltered assets 
in tax havens, employed a 700-strong workforce confined largely to the 
Yaqara Valley (near Rakiraki) – which sits above the aquifer from which 
the company draws its water – and contributed comparatively small 
sums to local charities, at least until government attention spurred it to 
become more charitably active.255 But Chaudhry had not counted on the 
influence of Fiji Water’s director of external affairs, David Roth, who was 
close friends with the Mara family, in particular Ratu Epeli Ganilau. Roth 
254  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 2 March 2011.
255  Anna Lenzer, ‘Fiji Water: Spin the bottle’, Mother Jones, September–October 2009. The 
company is allegedly owned by an entity in Luxembourg while its trademarks (including the 
capitalised word FIJI) are registered in the Cayman Islands. By 2010 Fiji Water was involved in the 
renovation of a primary school, paid funds into a local village trust and contributed to local clean 
water, education and health projects for local villages at a cost of around $4 million. In addition, it 
paid Yaqara Pastoral Company $1.8 million per annum for using its land. But it had paid less than 
$1 million in corporate taxes since 1995 and the new tax could bring in about $22 million (compared 
with $0.5 million under the old tax) to the government for a product that annually earned Fiji Water 
about US$170 million or $330 million in local currency.
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instantly closed the plant, took the opportunity to sack 300 workers, and 
waited. The knives had been out for Chaudhry for some time; this time 
they fell and Chaudhry went.
Fast-forward to 2010 and a financially strapped government again put 
new water taxes back on the table. This time Bainimarama drove the 
reform and was in no mood to be swayed. When Fiji Water objected, he 
went on the offensive, reiterating the government’s case. Despite being 
Fiji’s fourth-largest export, water brought the government little in export 
revenue. Fiji Water practiced transfer pricing. This time, when Fiji Water 
threatened to close its business, Bainimarama – in China with a trade 
mission – declared he would reopen it and call for international tenders.256 
He ordered Roth out of the country for interfering in Fiji’s internal affairs 
and sent Homelink, a security company comprising former soldiers, 
to guard the site. Epeli Ganilau, then acting prime minister as well as 
Minister for Immigration, allegedly attempted to get his brother-in-law, 
President Nailatikau, to block Roth’s deportation. He failed and resigned 
on 16 November in protest. The next day Roth flew out of Fiji and two 
weeks later Fiji Water caved in.257
Fiji Water was never the catalyst for the events that unfolded, but it did 
present a rare public manifestation of a growing rift between some of 
Bainimarama’s political and military supporters, most notably those 
connected with the Mara family. The falling-out was not sudden and may 
well have been the result of resentments or disquiet stretching back over 
many years. We do not know. The people involved have not said. But Epeli 
Ganilau’s sudden departure from office for ‘personal reasons’ followed 
other initially unexplained changes in military roles and appointments. 
In late October 2010, Bainimarama unexpectedly announced that he had 
replaced Driti as Land Force Commander with Col Mosese Tikoitoga. 
Simultaneously he replaced the 3FIR Commander, Lt Col Ratu Tevita 
Uluilakeba Mara with Major Amani Suliano. No reasons were given, but 
Driti and Mara were sent on leave. Additionally, Major Ana Rokomokoti, 
who had lost her role as chief registrar in June 2010, was dismissed as 
a military officer. Then, in January 2011, Brigadier General Mohammed 
256  fijilive, 30 November 2010. The tax increased from 0.33 cents to 15 cents per litre. 
257  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 17 November 2010. Fiji Water executives seemingly believed 
they were indispensible to Fiji’s economy, one claiming ‘Without Fiji Water, Fiji is kind of screwed’ 
(Lenzer, ‘Fiji Water’, 2009). The increase in tax did not harm Fiji Water. By 2015, its exports 
exceeded $200 million, it had added a third production line, and diversified into mango and pawpaw 
production (Fiji Times, 19 July 2016).
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Aziz inexplicably resigned as deputy chair of FHL for ‘personal reasons’. 
Shortly after Bainimarama announced investigations into fraud at FHL 
had ceased.258 All four were allegedly close colleagues. 
In February 2011, Bainimarama indicated that he would determine 
the status of Driti and Tevita Mara in April after they had taken their 
leave. It was not enough for anti-government bloggers who suggested 
that the Presidential Palace had been raided, that the President was 
about to be sacked and that a purge of the military forces was underway. 
Tikoitoga denied the existence of any split in the military259 but the 
sudden appearance of Driti and Mara in the Suva Magistrates Court 
in May on charges of sedition and incitement to mutiny immediately 
suggested otherwise. A raid in early 2011 on the home of Ben Padarath, 
a former NAP candidate in 2006 and nephew of Driti, had allegedly 
uncovered papers detailing a plot against Bainimarama.260 Mara at least 
was unbowed. Out on bail, he announced that Lau province no longer 
supported the People’s Charter.261 Such defiance could not be sustained 
for long, and Mara plotted an escape, pretending to go fishing off the 
coast of Kadavu on 9 May. In reality he had a Tongan naval patrol boat 
258  fijilive, 25 October 2010, 19 January & 11 February 2011; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 
25  October 2010. FHL’s chair and managing director also resigned. Aziz retained an important 
military role as chief of staff, the second-ranked position in the military. Social media sites alleged 
that Aziz conspired with Driti and Tevita Mara to remove Bainimarama and Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, 
but saved his job by cooperating with Bainimarama (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 10 May 2011). 
Driti argued that Mara and Aziz had brought him in and that he had approached Bainimarama in 
September 2010 to request Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum’s removal but Bainimarama refused to act, telling 
him to get evidence before raising the matter again (Fijileaks, 21 November 2013). Driti allegedly 
also told a disaffected Major in October that he would remove Bainimarama when the latter visited 
Sudan in late October and revoke his passport so he could not return. A new administration would 
be appointed to take the country to elections in 2011. Apologies would be made to the Methodist 
Church and GCC, and Australian and NZ troops used to contain any potential internal threats. But 
unfortunately for Mara, the Major informed the head of Military Intelligence who told Bainimarama 
of the plot. On 24 October 2010, Mara and Driti were summoned to Bainimarama’s office and sent 
on leave, after which – they were told – they would have to resign their posts and leave the military 
(High Court Judgement, Criminal Case 0005 of 2012, State v Driti, 26 November 2013).
259  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 2 March 2011; fijilive, 7 March 2011.
260  The Suva Magistrates Court subsequently dismissed the case against Padarath.
261  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 4 & 5 May 2011. Michael Field argued that the original fallout resulted 
from sexual improprieties, although Tevita Mara insisted it derived solely from the Military Council’s 
desire to soften the government’s image by removing Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum (crosbiew.blogspot.com, 
16 May 2011). The evidence against Mara came from a conversation with a disaffected fellow officer, 
Major Manasa Tagicakibau, during a trip to Korea in July 2010, the same officer who testified against 
Driti (Tonga Chronicle, 26 May 2011; Fijileaks, 26 November 2013). That officer had conducted his 
own surveillance operation on Mara in February 2010 and noted the undocumented movement of 
weapons and ammunition from the QEB to the Grand Pacific Hotel, which housed some of Mara’s 
3FIR troops. He watched Mara closely over coming months and recorded their conversations. 
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pick him up and take him to the safety of Nuku’alofa where, as a close 
relative of King George Tupou V, he gained immediate refugee status and 
eventually citizenship.262 
Once in Nuku’alofa, however, the fugitive issued a series of increasingly 
strident statements. He declared Commodore Bainimarama ‘weakened 
by ill health, morally and intellectually bankrupt’, ‘no more than Aiyaz 
Khaiyum’s hand puppet’, and a megalomaniac ‘inspired entirely by the 
self importance of a lowly and inadequate man’. His depravity was such 
that he had even beaten three female human rights activists immediately 
after the 2006 coup; the women in question had actually identified 
Driti as their torturer. His intellectual weakness meant that he ‘hardly 
understands the speeches prepared for him by Khaiyum’. ‘Navy people 
are stupid,’ he stated. His evidence: the devious Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum 
had convinced the weak Bainimarama in mid-2010 to rule indefinitely; 
his roadmap for 2014 no more than ‘a deceitful plan’.263 All in all, the 
ideals of 2006 that had so inspired Tevita Mara and the RFMF had slowly 
morphed into schemes for self-enrichment. But Mara had awoken from 
his dreams. Like a true chief he would lead Fiji back to democracy and, 
to start the process, he called for tougher sanctions against the regime.264
Tevita Mara did not have it entirely his own way. Bainimarama called him 
‘immature’ and ‘shallow’. He was sidelined for ‘things that he did’ that he 
was not supposed to do ‘and it started from there and he talked against 
the government and went against the government’. But for a man who 
now expected to work with expatriate democracy movements ‘to end the 
dictatorship’, Mara did not enjoy the respect he might have anticipated. 
262  Tevita Mara’s casual departure had severe costs for those who inadvertently helped him escape. 
An Estonian fisherman, who had taken him out to the island from which he made his escape, spent 
nearly 17 months fighting obstruction of justice charges. A close friend was deported. For a time, 
Tonga’s breach of Fiji’s territorial waters raised tensions between the two countries and, at one stage, 
Tonga stationed a naval boat at Minerva Reef in Fiji’s EEZ (exclusive economic zone). Fiji did make 
an extradition request. The Economist speculated how that might have been handled by Tonga’s Chief 
Justice Michael Scott, a former Fiji High Court judge, refugee from Fiji and opponent of Fiji’s Chief 
Justice Gates (21 May 2011). Both Australia and New Zealand ignored Fiji’s extradition requests.
263  Fijileaks’ claim that Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum had secretly bought the internet domain for the 
FijiFirst Party in November 2009 contradicts Tevita Mara’s assertion that the Attorney-General 
manipulated Bainimarama and plotted perpetual dictatorship in 2009. Fijileaks inadvertently 
revealed an Attorney-General purposefully taking the necessary steps to provide a political platform 
for the government as it planned the country’s return to democracy (22 March 2015).
264  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 16 May 2011; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 16 & 23 May 2011. 
He  also alleged collusion with businesses in return for backhanders and that both Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum and Bainimarama received incomes of over $700,000 per annum for handling multiple 
portfolios.
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Coupfourpointfive presented an interview with Mara interspersed with 
comments on his role in the events of 2006 and after, accusing him of 
forming the hit squad that burned down the homes of dissidents and 
intimidated the judiciary. He did not deny the allegations; he claimed 
only to be acting under the command of Bainimarama and that ultimately 
he would answer to the people. When he visited New Zealand to speak to 
the Fijian diaspora, Nik Naidu from the Coalition for Democracy in Fiji 
filed a criminal complaint against Mara for the torture of hundreds of Fiji 
citizens.265 His grand tour of Pacific states similarly ran into difficulties. 
Solomon Islands officials refused to meet him. The Mara phenomenon 
fizzled out and, in Fiji, he became a nonperson.266 Driti, however, became 
a prisoner. On 26 November 2013, Justice Paul Madigan found Driti 
guilty of inciting mutiny and sedition and sentenced him to jail for 
five years.
The clumsy actions of two of the most senior officers in the RFMF 
served to demonstrate Bainimarama’s mastery of his role as Commander. 
Deliberations on a new constitution in 2012 and 2013 demonstrated 
similar mastery of his political role as prime minister. According to his 
government’s roadmap, 2012 was the start of constitutional consultations, 
and to that end Bainimarama announced on 2 December 2011 that he 
would lift the onerous PER on 7 January. He used the occasion to list 
his government’s many achievements, pointing out that none would 
have been possible if politicians, religious organisations and self-
interested individuals had been permitted to fan the flames of prejudice 
and intolerance ‘behind the façade of a free press’. Thus PER – he 
claimed – had provided the necessary stability for reform and change.267 
But to ensure his government’s achievements were not lost, a new 
constitution had to include certain non-negotiable principles: common 
and equal citizenry, a secular state, the removal of systemic corruption, 
an independent judiciary, the elimination of discrimination, good and 
265  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 19 July 2011.
266  The government’s Land Use Unit confiscated the Seaqaqa Sugarcane Estate that his father 
had established and which Mara managed, purchasing it from the FDB and leasing it to the 
FSC. The land had been left idle and the estate had defaulted on loan repayments for machinery 
(www.coupfourandahalf.com, 24 August 2012).
267  Age, 7 January 2012; Address to Nation, no. 13. Suva: Ministry of Information, 2012. 
The removal of PER, however, did not mark a return to the status quo ante; a new Public Order 
(Amendment) Decree addressed issues such as terrorism, offenses against public order, racial and 
religious vilification, hate speech and economic sabotage. Individuals could be held for two days 
without charge and up to 14 days with the approval of the Commissioner of Police and responsible 
minister. In February 2012, a State Proceedings (Amendment) Decree gave ministers legal protection 
(and media organisations that might quote them) (fijilive, 10 February 2012). 
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transparent governance, social justice, one person – one vote – one 
value, the elimination of ethnic voting, proportional representation, and 
a voting age of 18 years.268 Immunity remained the one unmentioned 
non-negotiable principle, although it featured in the decree establishing 
a Constitutional Commission and in the military’s late submission to the 
Commission.269
In March 2012, came the appointment of 73-year-old Kenyan professor 
Yash Ghai – a renowned constitutional expert who had recently worked on 
the Kenyan and Nepalese constitutions – as chair of the Fiji Constitution 
Commission (FCC).270 Its commissioners comprised Fijians Taufa 
Vakatale, Satendra Nandan and Penelope Moore, as well as South African 
Christina Murray. Directed to hold public consultations and receive 
submissions during the course of the year, the FCC would submit a draft 
constitution to the President in December. That draft would then be 
reviewed by a constituent assembly, comprising representatives from civil 
society organisations, political parties, churches and government, with the 
end result presented to the President in late February 2013. Meanwhile 
government would undertake voter registration. It had already purchased 
over 380 Canadian electronic voter registration units and put together 
a military-led registration team that included two electoral consultants 
from Australia and New Zealand.271 Elections would now be held over 
one day instead of the customary week.272
After years of false starts and delays, Fiji at last appeared on the cusp 
of democratic restoration, although not everyone viewed the coming 
consultations positively. Unionist Felix Anthony queried the government’s 
mandate for a new constitution and, from Tonga, Tevita Mara questioned 
the neutrality of the commissioners, while Qarase argued that the last 
268  Fiji Constitutional Process (Constitution Commission) Decree (no. 57 of 2012), fiji.gov.fj, 18 
July 2012.
269  fijilive, 22 December 2012. The military submitted that the Prescribed Political Events Decree 
2010 be extended to cover the period up until the formation of a new government in 2014. The 
unconditional amnesty, however, did not include the takeover of government on 19 May 2000 and 
the subsequent military mutiny.
270  The FCC cost $2,514,507 to operate, funded entirely by Australia, New Zealand, the European 
Union, the United States and Britain.
271  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 24 May 2012. By the end of 2012, some 504,588 voters were 
registered, 80 per cent of all domestic voters; 40 per cent being in the Central Division, 38 per cent in 
the West, 17 per cent in the North and 5 per cent in the East (fijilive, 5 September 2012; Fiji Times, 
12 December 2012).
272  fijilive, 3 September 2013.
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parliament should be reconvened instead.273 Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum 
dismissed them as critics who wanted to return Fiji to the dark ages of 
nepotism, elitism and racism.274 Tikoitoga asserted that, because the 
new constitution would end the race-based politics that had previously 
drawn in the military, it heralded an end to the era of coups.275 Indeed, 
Commissioner Nandan predicted that the new constitution would 
become a sacred document that no one would want to destroy.276 
Nonetheless, Bainimarama feared losing control. Rival politicians who 
attempted to influence the constitutional process by privately meeting with 
Ghai unsettled him. So too the public airing of views that the government 
had successfully suppressed during the past six years. In fact Ghai had 
quickly established the FCC’s independence by criticising continued 
government media restrictions.277 By mid-October, his Commission 
had held 120 meetings around the country and received over 7,000 oral 
and written submissions, some of them unreconstructed declarations of 
resistance: Fiji should become a Christian state, only the Taukei should 
be called Fijian, the GCC should be reinstated, dual citizenship should 
be ended and all soldiers involved in the 2000 coup stripped of their 
medals. Chaudhry wanted the 1997 Constitution returned; his son, 
Rajendra Chaudhry, called for the return of the GCC. Rabuka wanted 
old Taukei schools like Ratu Kadavulevu School, Queen Victoria School 
and Adi Cakobau School exempted from zoning because they were ‘the 
last bastion of iTaukei identity in a country that can have its indigenous 
community very rapidly marginalised’. Krishna Datt called for a civic 
education program and a truth commission.278 
273  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 9 March & 31 May 2012.
274  fijilive, 22 March 2012.
275  fijilive, 21 March 2012.
276  Fiji Times, 4 September 2012.
277  Economist, 30 March 2013. At the start of October 2012 the High Court fined the Fiji Times 
$3,000 for quoting a foreigner who questioned the independence of Fiji’s judiciary. The CCF was 
fined $20,000 for a similar offence in May 2013 and its director, Akuila Yabaki, sentenced to three-
months jail, suspended for one year (CCF, An Analysis: 2013 Fiji Government Constitution. Suva: 
CCF, 2013, p. 56).
278  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 18 & 19 October 2012; Fiji Times, 14 & 16 October 2012. An 
SDL submission encompassed many of these features, although its recommendations for a 71-seat 
parliament promised to reduce the number of communal seats and introduce a mixed member 
proportional voting system. Of the 7,170 submissions, 66 per cent were from iTaukei; 24 per cent, 
IndoFijians; and 10 per cent, Others.
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Many of these submissions potentially threatened the government’s plans 
for Fiji if the Commission took them seriously. The all-embracing nature 
of the Commission’s public seminars at the USP also concerned the 
government. Not surprisingly, tensions between it and the Commission 
grew, flaring up in October over the issue of appointments. In accordance 
with the provisions of its establishment decree, the FCC appointed 
Madraiwiwi in October as a legal consultant, and he sat in on a series of 
Commission meetings, including a two-day workshop on the ‘Military 
in Transition’ that I attended at the request of the Commission.279 To me 
the commissioners seemed troubled. They received mixed messages from 
the government. Allegedly the Attorney-General would countermand 
agreements reached with Bainimarama. But there was no confusion around 
the government’s response to Madraiwiwi’s appointment. It declared 
a conflict of interest and questioned his impartiality; he had participated 
in the Bauan submission that called for the creation of a Christian state. 
Madraiwiwi withdrew and Ghai rightly called the attack unfair.280
The government saw red and rushed out a Fiji Constitution Process 
(Constitution Commission) (Amendment) Decree 2012 at the end of 
October to reduce its exposure to risk. Because the Commission had 
already travelled extensively and received a large number of consultations, 
the government deemed further public consultations following the 
production of a draft constitution no longer necessary. In addition, it 
no longer required the FCC to seek and present to the President public 
reactions to its draft. Further, the Commission had now to publish 
each month a statement of its accounts and a list of all staff, including 
consultants.281 The sudden change angered Ghai. To change the rules 
halfway through violated the Commission’s independence.282 But 
Bainimarama insisted Ghai had only to produce a constitution, not solicit 
the opinion of people opposed to government. Ample scope existed for 
public discussion once the constituent assembly began, he claimed.283 
Events quickly proved him wrong.
279  Held in the Veiuto parliamentary complex, 18–19 October 2012. The workshop canvassed the 
possibility of government moving towards personalised authoritarianism masquerading as democracy. 
Several participants believed Fiji had reached a dangerous moment as the government had seen the 
conservative submissions from the countryside.
280  fijilive, 1 & 4 November 2012; Fiji Times, 8 November 2012. Commissioner Moore later 
argued that ‘we were getting a strong feeling from government that we were out to get them’ (Fiji 
Times, 15 January 2013).
281  fiji.gov.fj.
282  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 31 December 2012.
283  Fiji Times, 8 November 2012.
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On 21 December 2012, Ghai presented his Commission’s draft 
Constitution to the President. In the days before and after he made very 
clear that he found Fiji to be a state but not a nation, its society deeply 
fragmented, ‘full of anxiety’ and unable to cope with the rapid changes 
that had taken place over the past 30 years. The challenge, he believed, 
was to give people a sense of all things at play, and an understanding of 
how they might reconcile highly valued traditional principles with change 
and build a nation out of diverse communities suspicious of each other. 
To assist, the Commission had crafted a constitution that it hoped would 
shift the identity, politics and institutions of Fiji from their community 
bases to ones derived from equal citizenship. To achieve this, culture had 
to be separated from the state and the common interests of communities 
given preference over their differences. The alternative had always cost 
Fiji dearly in terms of social harmony, the retention of skilled labour, 
the productive use of resources, cultural and artistic development, and 
cooperation. No longer!284
Herein lay danger for Bainimarama. In striving to create the basis for 
a vigorous democracy as a way to reduce the risk of future coups, the 
Commission’s Constitution trod on many toes, and rightly so; however, 
many of those toes belonged to military feet. Its leaders did not take 
kindly to the loss of their role as guardian of the Constitution and the 
people’s welfare, and their restriction to defence only. No longer would the 
President be associated with the military, even as Commander-in-Chief. 
Instead, under this Constitution, parliament possessed total control over 
the RFMF. Discipline forces could not obey illegal orders and their much-
coveted immunity came with a caveat; immunity applied only to soldiers 
who renounced their crimes and swore an oath of allegiance disowning 
their previous support of illegal regimes. Immunity would not be possible 
for future offences. 
The Commission’s Constitution also brought the GCC back to life, 
although only as a civil society organisation with no parliamentary role as 
before. Because the Taukei now comprised the overwhelming majority of 
the population, they no longer required special protection. Hence there 
would be no Senate. Instead there would be a single house of parliament 
made up of 71 members. Sixty members would be elected from four 
multi-member districts (24 from the Central Division, 22 from the West, 
284  Fiji Times, 13 December 2012; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 27 December 2012.
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nine from the North and five from the East). The remaining 11 would 
come from party lists depending on their party’s proportion of votes. The 
Commission believed that this system would make it easier for small parties 
to get in, but not so many as to be destabilising. It would avoid racially 
divisive contests and enable quotas for women (one third of candidates in 
the first two elections, and half thereafter). In addition, parliament would 
have a reduced four-year term, cabinets would be limited to a maximum 
of 14 ministers (up to four of whom could be brought in from outside 
parliament), and a prime minister could serve for no more than eight 
years. Uniquely, it mandated an annual national people’s assembly 
consisting of the President, Speaker, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Leader 
of the Opposition, 10 Members of Parliament and 95 representatives of 
local government, constitutional commissions and civil society nominees. 
This assembly would assist parliament to elect a president and change the 
Constitution, consider challenges confronting the nation, and examine 
progress towards national goals.285 While laudably promoting a democracy 
that gave its citizens greater voice, the Commission’s assembly added yet 
another complication for Bainimarama to digest. 
The prospect of having to surrender to a caretaker government six months 
before the election equally worried an already anxious Bainimarama. 
The Commission’s transitional arrangements also called for an independent 
interim electoral commission and a transitional advisory council that, 
among other tasks, would amend or repeal any decrees inconsistent 
with the new Constitution. By removing the prospect of continuity, 
such measures potentially doomed Bainimarama’s 2006 experiment. 
Not surprisingly, he struck back.
A day after presenting the draft Constitution to the President, 
police confronted Ghai as he attempted to collect 600 copies of the 
Constitution. They seized the copies and burned galley proofs in front of 
him. The incident became a public relations disaster; newspaper headlines 
screamed ‘Government burns Constitution’. Ghai told Radio Australia 
that the incident ‘shows such contempt for our work and in turn contempt 
for the people who had come out in their thousands and thousands to 
give us their views [and] participate in the process’. Clearly dejected, he 
added, ‘I felt not just a betrayal, I felt will Fiji ever have a democratic 
constitution?’286 But the government had no intention of letting him off 
285  FCC, Explanatory Report on the Draft Constitution. Suva, December 2012.
286  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 28 December 2012.
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the hook. Tikoitoga accused Ghai of wilfully ignoring the government’s 
amended decree and usurping the role of the constituent assembly. 
His behaviour was ‘unbecoming’. Foreign powers funded the FCC; hence 
it did not feel that it was answerable to Fiji. It took advisors from unions, 
political parties and NGOs, with the result that its Constitution was not 
all its own work.287 A short campaign to undermine the Commission’s 
Constitution had begun.
At the start of January 2013, the President issued a decree allowing 
the government to amend the FCC Constitution, suggesting that it 
represented a recipe for over-governance and financial ruin.288 Tough 
new rules for political parties were also released. Party names had to be 
in English (to reduce ethnic appeals), the signatures of 5,000 members 
from across Fiji were required with applications, and a fee of $5,005 paid. 
Union officials could no longer serve as party officials nor, of course, 
public officers (excluding the President and members of the government). 
Companies and unions could not make donations to political parties, and 
anyone sentenced for a period of six months or more during the past five 
years would be unable to hold office in a party.289 Regional or provincial 
parties were clearly a thing of the past. So too the future of many of 
the country’s current 16 political parties, not to mention the plans for 
a new party made at the start of January by some 400 trade unionists and 
NGOs in Nadi. In fact, by May, only the FLP and NFP had successfully 
navigated the registration process although, by this time, the FLP had 
become a shadow of its former self.290 The SDL did not believe it had 
time to meet its own constitutional requirements and elected to form 
a  completely new party, the Social Democratic Liberal Party with the 
same SDL acronym. Ro Teimumu Kepa became its president. When a late 
amendment to the Political Parties Decree forbade the use of acronyms 
derived from deregistered parties, the SDL had no alternative but to use 
287  Fiji Times, 5 January 2012; fijilive, 9 January 2013.
288  Fiji Times, 11 January 2013.
289  Fiji Times, 16 January 2013. The Political Parties Registration, Conduct, Funding and 
Disclosure Decree 2013 determined that the 5,000 signatures (previously only 180) be comprised 
of 2,000 from the Central Division, 1,750 from the Western Division, 1,000 from the Northern 
Division and 250 from the Eastern Division.
290  Chaudhry remained the focus of division within the party, with many members believing 
that he wished to see his son installed as a future leader. As a shadow leader, he remained firmly 
in control. At a FLP conference in Nadi on 25 August 2012, 83 per cent of delegates were NFU 
officials or members and a further 13 per cent were beholden to Chaudhry, according to one report 
(www.coupfourandahalf.com, 28 August 2012).
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the clumsier SODELPA as its abbreviated name.291 The United People’s 
Party (UPP) terminated itself and its former leader Mick Beddoes joined 
SODELPA.292
On 21 March 2013, Bainimarama presented a much delayed new draft 
Constitution to the nation, announcing also a change to the consultation 
process: ‘My fellow Fijians, you will be the new Constituent Assembly.’ 
No doubt dropping the requirement for review by a constituent assembly 
enabled some of the three months lost in rewriting the Constitution to be 
made up, particularly as the public were now given only 15 days to respond 
to the draft. But most likely Bainimarama wished to avoid empowering 
yet another body – this time a populist one – to determine the future of 
the nation and the role of the military. The Economist argued that this 
decision cost him the opportunity to preside over a new durable and 
legitimate political order.293 It is just as likely, however, that Bainimarama 
believed his action regained him that opportunity. The very next day he 
announced that he would run for election.
Bainimarama presented Fiji with a slimmed-down draft Constitution, 
half the size of its ill-fated predecessor, outlining an equally slimmed-
down four-year single house of parliament, comprising just 45 members 
proportionally drawn from an open list system comprising Fiji’s four 
divisions.294 Candidates would have to be Fiji citizens only, resident in Fiji 
for at least two years prior to an election, and not been subject to 12 months 
imprisonment or longer during the previous five years. Significantly there 
would be no caretaker government, no National People’s Assembly, no 
GCC, no re-examination of its decrees, the President would be chosen 
by the parliament for a three-year term, and the military would regain 
its 1990 role to secure the welfare of Fiji’s people. The Prime Minister 
would be all-powerful, being the Commander-in-Chief of the RFMF 
(to reduce the possibility of future coups)295 and responsible for advising 
the President on appointing the military commander, the Chief Justice 
291  Pio Tabaiwalu, ‘The genesis of the Social Democratic Liberal Party: A struggle against the odds’, 
in Ratuva & Lawson, The People Have Spoken, 2016, p. 194.
292  fijilive, 28 January 2013. The United Voters Party (formerly the General Voters Party) changed 
its name to the UPP in 2004.
293  Economist, 30 March 2013.
294  The numbers were 18 members from the Central Division, 16 from the Western Division, 
seven from the Northern Division and four from the Eastern Division.
295  Comment by Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, crosbiew.blogspot.com, 18 April 2013.
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and the President of the Appeal Court, the latter two in conjunction 
with the Attorney-General, who would also advise the Judicial Services 
Commission on the appointment of all judges.
Nailatikau stressed that this less bureaucratic constitution incorporated 
the salient features of the FCC Constitution and gave prominence to an 
elected parliament, rather than ‘an unelected assembly of NGOs’. He also 
commended it for introducing for the first time an extensive range of 
socio-economic rights and for including recognition of customary land 
ownership.296 The President did not acknowledge, however, that the 
Constitution now contained no provision for the rights of women or for 
cultural and linguistic rights, and that customary land ownership brought 
no specific protections. 
The short time allowed for public responses clearly indicated where 
government priorities lay. Although the Attorney-General and his team 
subsequently held 19 public meetings on the draft Constitution, none of the 
1,093 written submissions was ever released for public scrutiny.297 Instead 
on 22 August 2013 the President approved an amended Constitution. It 
became law with still further changes on 6 September, much to the dismay 
of 14 FWRM and youth protestors who objected to the assent process 
and were arrested for assembling without a permit.298 Days later the CCF 
released a damning assessment of Fiji’s fourth Constitution, claiming that 
it failed to satisfy many of the government’s non-negotiable principles 
by concentrating power in the executive, undermining the independence 
of the judiciary and incentivising future coups by making constitutional 
change more difficult.299
Specifically, the CCF criticised the powers given parliament to limit the 
extensive rights and freedoms outlined in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, 
which it claimed transformed them into aspirations. Courts were no 
longer bound to interpret the Bill of Rights with reference to international 
law and could only deal with cases brought by individuals whose rights 
had been directly contravened. Parliament had now gained five additional 
296  Fiji Times, 13 April 2013. It did however recognise indigenous rights for an equitable share 
of royalties resulting from the exploitation of land or seabed.
297  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 26 August 2013.
298  Fiji Times, 7 September 2013.
299  Changing the Constitution required a 75 per cent majority in parliament and in a referendum. 
The following section draws on the CCF’s An Analysis, 2013. See also Wadan Narsey’s ‘The costs of 
compromise: A dead-end parliamentary farce’, narseyonfiji.wordpress.com, 21 February 2016.
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members since the earlier draft, in itself not an issue, but a new provision 
required that parties and individuals win at least 5 per cent of the total 
vote in order to gain a seat in what was now a single national constituency, 
even if they obtained more individual votes than successful candidates. 
The provision consolidated the power of large parties. Strangely, given 
the rationale for its birth, no constitutional check existed to prevent the 
return of communal politics. The government clearly believed a single 
constituency sufficient to promote trans-ethnic voting and doom once 
powerful ethnically based parties. But nothing compensated for the failure 
to present measures to raise the proportion of women in parliament.
Despite originating from a disregard for due process, this was no poorly 
conceived and rushed Constitution.300 It specifically maintained the powers 
government had grown accustomed to after 2006. Although the President 
regained the ceremonial role of Commander-in-Chief and could now 
serve up to two three-year terms, the Prime Minister retained enormous 
powers, appointing all independent offices through the Constitutional 
Offices Commission and determining – among others – the salaries of 
the Chief Justice and the President of the Court of Appeal. The Attorney-
General also continued to enjoy wide powers over the judiciary and 
independent bodies. The CCF believed the Public Service Commission, 
the Judicial Services Commission, even the Electoral Commission, would 
all become highly politicised. Not surprisingly, the new Constitution 
diminished the influence of the Opposition in parliament. Its leader 
no longer participated in appointments. Nor did the Opposition 
automatically chair the Public Accounts Committee. Unaccustomed 
to oversight, government had no intention to insist on it now. Hence 
parliament would also no longer scrutinise the rules and regulations of 
constitutional offices and commissions. Existing decrees would remain, 
unchallengeable in court even if they contradicted the Constitution. And, 
predictably, no caretaker administration would control the transition to 
this brave new world.
300  Chantelle Khan, director of the Social Empowerment Education Programme, argues that 
‘by intercepting, circumventing and overriding due process’, the government has consistently 
undermined the ‘practices of democracy at all levels’ (‘Reflections on the September 2014 elections: 
A CSO perspective’, in Naidu & Tarte, ‘No Ordinary Election’, 2015, p. 67).
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Most political parties preparing for participation in the 2014 elections 
resigned themselves to the new Constitution, only demonstrating 
their displeasure by boycotting the government’s official constitutional 
presentation. An ad-hoc grouping of SODELPA, FLP and NFP – the 
United Front for a Democratic Fiji – claimed to reject the Constitution 
and presented a submission to the President’s office. Kepa argued that 
the Constitution had been designed to prevent the perpetrators of the 
2006 coup from ever having to account for their unlawful actions, and 
did not reflect the will of the people.301 But Fiji’s political parties had no 
appetite for a boycott; perhaps they hoped that history might repeat itself. 
After all, Labour and the NFP had both participated in the 1992 election 
under a Constitution they despised and had succeeded in influencing its 
change. Indeed, Rabuka declared the new Constitution ‘a better starting 
point’ than the 1990 one and urged people to accept it and move forward. 
He had already announced his departure from politics and once more 
apologised for his role in the 1987 coups.302 Even former Constitutional 
Commissioner Nandan stressed its positives; there could no longer be 
a Leader of the Opposition from a party with only one other member 
and elected with only a few thousand votes.303 Surprisingly, international 
responses were also muted.
The EU’s director of External Action Services said simply that the new 
Constitution provided sufficient grounds for the European Union to 
restart political dialogue with Fiji.304 Australia’s position throughout 
Fiji’s process of constitution-making had been complicated by its own 
political turmoil. Rudd had become Foreign Minister when Gillard 
assumed the prime ministership in June 2010. He stood down from that 
role prior to his first challenge to her leadership in February 2012. Fiji 
anticipated that Australia might change its approach with Bob Carr as 
the new Foreign Minister. Hence, Bainimarama used the occasion to 
criticise Australian policy, claiming it had been governed by pride not 
policy. Rudd ‘personalised issues’ and failed to follow New Zealand and 
301  Australian, 7 September 2013; www.coupfourandahalf.com, 24 October 2013.
302  fijilive, 26 August 2013, 30 January 2013. Rabuka had issued another more comprehensive 
apology for ‘the wrong’ committed in 1987 in a paid advertisement with the Fiji Times (1 January 2012).
303  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 31 August 2013. He alluded to the status of Mick Beddoes as Leader 
of the Opposition after the 2006 election, representing the UPP with only two MPs.
304  fijilive, 27 October 2013. 
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the United States in renewing ties with Fiji.305 For ‘short-term political 
gain’, he had ‘arrogantly’ dumped his country’s asylum seeker problem on 
Melanesia.306 Julie Bishop, the opposition spokesperson on foreign affairs, 
echoed Bainimarama’s concerns and dared Carr to lead a new direction on 
Fiji and open dialogue. 
Carr refused, however, despite acknowledging Fiji’s progress towards 
democratic elections. In May, Australia pressured Japan to deny 
Bainimarama a seat at the Pacific Alliance Leaders Meeting Forum.307 
It  also pressured the World Bank to reject a $88 million loan for 
hydropower construction, with the result that the China Development 
Bank stepped in with a $70 million soft loan for a project now to be 
built by the Chinese company, Sinohydro.308 With China’s presence in the 
Pacific visibly increasing and with the American FBI training Fiji police 
in Suva, the pressure was on Carr to make a formal change to Australia’s 
stance on Fiji. Australia had already quietly doubled its aid to Fiji in 2012 
and, at the end of July, Carr finally announced the implementation of 
full diplomatic relations. Travel sanctions would ease and be dealt with 
on a case-by-case basis. Hence, when the Attorney-General travelled 
to Brussels to chair the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
(ACP) Ministerial Trade Committee and its talks with the European 
Union, Australia permitted him to transit through its airports.309 
In 2013, Fiji chaired both the G77 plus China grouping at the United 
Nations and the International Sugar Council.310 By this time Pacific 
ACP leaders had severed their link with the PIF in order to allow Fiji’s 
305  Fiji Times, 28 February 2012.
306  Guardian, 29 July 2013.
307  Australian, 8 March & 18 May 2012; ABC News, 9 March 2012.
308  Australian, 29 May 2013. Chinese foreign direct investments in Fiji increased from $194 million 
in 2011 to $389 million in 2014 (Fiji Times, 25 October 2014); aid stood at US$333 million between 
2006 and 2013, compared with US$252 million from Australia (Economist, 25 March 2015).
309  Fiji Times, 27 June 2012; Age, 31 July 2012; crosbiew.blogspot.com, 24 October 2012. 
Australian aid rose from $33.7 million to $65.6 million.
310  Peter Thomson actively engaged with the United Nations as Fiji’s permanent representative 
and helped Fiji develop diplomatic relations with 63 new nations after 2009. At the same time 
Fiji secured a new Asia-Pacific Island Developing Group within the UN Asia Group for lobbying 
purposes (Makereta Komai, ‘Fiji’s foreign policy and the new Pacific diplomacy’, in G Fry & S Tarte 
(eds), The New Pacific Diplomacy. Canberra: ANU Press, 2015, pp. 114–17). In 2014, Thomson 
became president of the executive committee for the UN Development Program, the UN Population 
Fund and the UN Office of Project Services.
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full participation.311 Australia’s strategy lay in tatters. Jon Fraenkel, now 
at Victoria University of Wellington, claimed that Bainimarama had 
cleverly used anti-Australian rhetoric to gain credibility in the region. 
Of course the siege mentality it induced also played an important role 
in Fiji, especially ‘among the new elite that cluster around the interim 
government’.312 ‘To them, we are a land of coups, failed institutions and 
a military dictator,’ Kubuabola reflected: ‘There exists a condescending 
and patronising tone to almost every statement and media report that 
comes out of Australia and New Zealand.’313 New Zealand similarly 
lifted some travel bans. Bainimarama called it ‘insincere, unneeded and 
too late’.314
At the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Richard Herr and Anthony 
Bergin agreed with the changed stance of Australia and New Zealand. 
‘Using the Pacific Island Forum against Fiji,’ they wrote, ‘was tantamount 
to cutting off our nose to spite our public face in the Pacific Islands.’ 
Bainimarama had sidelined the PIF in a way that excluded Australia and 
New Zealand.315 In late August 2012, he held another ‘Engaging with the 
Pacific’ meeting in Nadi, deliberately prior to a PIF meeting in the Cook 
Islands to maximise attendance and embarrass the PIF. Shortly after, 
in September, China’s second-most senior leader, Wu Bangguo, visited 
Fiji and denounced ‘strong countries’ for bullying Fiji and excluding it 
from the PIF. Fiji was now a port for China’s satellite communication 
vessels and Wu handed over a $200 million concessional loan for road 
construction.316
Having been wrong-footed for so long by Fiji and under pressure to 
adopt a different policy, Australia’s response to Fiji’s constitutional 
shenanigans suddenly became uncharacteristically muted. Unlike New 
Zealand, it declined to slap Fiji for trashing the Ghai Constitution. Carr 
311  Relations with Papua New Guinea soured at the end of 2013 when Fiji objected to High 
Commissioner Peter Eafeare continuing as dean of the diplomatic corps in Fiji. PNG’s Prime 
Minister, Peter O’Neill, withdrew the offer for a Fijian to chair the proposed Pacific ACP secretariat 
(Islands Business, January 2014). In 2016, the relationship degenerated further when Fiji proposed 
continuing to ban imports of canned beef, biscuits and rice from Papua New Guinea under the MSG 
Trade agreement on biosecurity grounds. Papua New Guinea threatened to invoke a trade dispute and 
ban Fiji poultry imports (Fiji Times, 1 & 8 September 2016).
312  Australian, 18 February 2014.
313  Australian, 27 January 2012.
314  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 17 September 2013.
315  R Herr & A Bergin, ‘Fiji vital to an effective regional system’, Australian, 3 August 2012.
316  Age, 26 September 2012.
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said he understood why the Constitution had to be amended; recreating 
‘an unelected GCC would seem to give rise to the suggestion that ethnic 
divisions in the country were going to be exaggerated’.317 The Australian’s 
Rowan Callick wondered whether Carr could really come to terms with 
what Bainimarama wants. ‘After 6 years of steadily chiseling away at Fiji’s 
Parliament, the courts, the media, the chiefs, the Methodist church, the 
army has this year suddenly accelerated the process of embedding itself 
in sole command for the long term,’ he wrote: ‘It is difficult, however, to 
understand … how absolute power does not lead, in this single case alone 
in world history, to absolute corruption.’318 However, the Opposition’s 
Julie Bishop told the Australia–Fiji Business Forum in Brisbane in 
July 2013 that ‘It is now time to rebuild the bridges’.319 Unsurprisingly, 
the Constitution barely received a mention. Australia needed a strong 
presence in Fiji, the Australian’s foreign editor Greg Sheridan argued, to 
pursue its interests in the South Pacific.320 
In September 2013, Bishop’s Liberal–National Coalition won office in 
Australia and quickly moved to cement what Carr had timidly begun. 
In  mid-February 2014, she met Bainimarama in Suva, offering full 
restoration of defence ties and Fiji’s participation in its New Colombo 
Plan and seasonal worker program. PIF’s Ministerial Contact Group also 
offered Fiji restored membership following its elections. But Bainimarama 
had no intention of restoring the status quo ante. He had fashioned a 
more independent and stronger international presence. In September 
2013, he told the UN General Assembly that his quest for a constitution 
‘worthy of the Fijian people’ had lost his country many friends: 
They abandoned us and sought to punish us with sanctions; we sought 
their assistance but they turned their backs on us. They chose to support 
a form of democracy, governance and justice in Fiji that they would never 
have accepted for themselves.321 
317  Australian, 12 & 16 January 2013.
318  R Callick, ‘Poll tests diplomatic will of Canberra’, Australian, 2 April 2013.
319  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 31 July 2013.
320  Australian, 17 February 2014. ANU academic Scott MacWilliam claimed that the real reason 
Australia changed tack was because it needed the MSG to help with the resettlement of refugees 
(crosbiew.blogspot.com, 16 February 2014).
321  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 26 September 2013.
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Savouring the moment, he held the first Pacific Islands Development 
Forum (PIDF) in Nadi in late April and announced that this new coalition 
of Pacific island governments, civil society organisations and business 
would be headquartered in Suva. The PIF no longer served the interests 
of Pacific islanders. Australia and New Zealand should not be both 
members and donors, Kubuabola added. They would not be members of 
the new PIDF.322 
Tasting victory
With his international critics in their place, Bainimarama confidently 
moved his country towards elections on his terms. In January 2014, 
with Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum as the Elections Minister, he established 
a new Electoral Commission under Fiji Law Society President, Chen 
Bunn Young.323 The acting permanent secretary for justice, Mohammed 
Saneem became the Supervisor of Elections, with an Australian as his 
deputy. Over the months leading up to the 17 September elections, new 
rules and procedures were rolled out. Voters were issued with identity 
cards that contained biometric data and photos. To prevent vote stacking, 
each polling station could accommodate only 500 voters. No political 
party flags or signs would be permitted within 300 metres of polling 
stations and, during the novel single election day, which was declared a 
public holiday, no political advertising would be allowed.324 In addition, 
all electioneering would stop two days before polling in order to give the 
electorate space to reflect unencumbered by politicking.325 
The 2014 budget similarly prepared the way for Bainimarama’s elections, 
providing salary increases for public servants and huge concessions 
in education: subsidised bus fares, free textbooks and free schooling. 
At last Bainimarama had an expanding economy to assist him, boosted 
by infrastructure projects and growing business confidence after years of 
322  Fiji Times, 27 April 2014; Australian, 29 April 2014. The PIDF also represented Fiji’s frustration 
with the MSG and its determination to launch a regional body it could control. At the last moment, 
the PNG Prime Minister cancelled his attendance at the Forum (Islands Business, January 2014).
323  Its members were elections specialist Father David Arms, civil-society activist Alisi Daurewa, 
playwright Larry Thomas, businessman James Sloane, accountant Jenny Seeto and sociologist 
Professor Vijay Naidu. 
324  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 1 June 2014. Pre-polling would enable up to 60,000 isolated voters 
to participate. In addition, Fiji nationals living overseas could also register and pre-vote.
325  This did not prevent the use of government billboards ostensibly promoting non-political 
matters such as development projects and road safety.
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decline.326 Bainimarama had announced his intention to run for election 
with a new political party back in August 2013. In November, he indicated 
that he would quit the military in order to lead the party, stepping down 
on 5 March 2014. Tikoitoga succeeded him as Commander of the RFMF. 
Bainimarama’s new party did not materialise, however, until the end of 
that month when he began a two-day bus tour of Viti Levu to collect the 
signatures needed to register the party to be known as FijiFirst (FFP). 
The process of collecting signatures around the country took over one 
month, at the end of which it could boast over 40,000 signatures. FijiFirst 
also proved an apt slogan for Bainimarama. His was a party for Fiji, not 
a select few, a charge he had plenty of opportunity to repeat.327 
SODELPA played directly into his hands. The 68-year-old Ro Teimumu 
Kepa, Marama Bale na Roko Tui Dreketi, the traditional head of the 
Burebasaga confederacy, represented everything Bainimarama opposed: 
tradition, privilege, the status quo ante. When she gave her inaugural 
address to SODELPA in March 2014, Kepa declared it her mission 
to defeat the dictatorship that had stolen the last elected government. 
She would stop the beatings, threats and incarcerations, of which she had 
personal experience. She would rededicate Fiji to God328 and resume the 
multi-party cabinet model the SDL began. She would ask the Supreme 
Court to provide its opinion on the status of the 1997 Constitution, 
clearly placing the new Constitution in jeopardy. She would re-establish 
the ethnic divisions for scholarships and review the changes made to the 
distribution of lease monies that had so disadvantaged the chiefly elite. 
She would review the whole question of land leases and bring back the 
GCC.329 In short, she would ‘Reclaim Fiji’.
326  GDP growth wavered around 2 and 3 per cent between 2010 and 2012. In 2013, it grew by 
4.7 per cent, in 2014 by 5.3 per cent (tradingeconomics.com/fiji/gdp-growth-annual).
327  Fiji Times, 6 May & 31 March 2014.
328  Perhaps deliberately, there was always some confusion as to whether this meant Fiji would 
be declared a Christian state. Qarase suggested it did, although Kepa emphasised only SODELPA’s 
Christian mission (see Jacqueline Rye, ‘Religion, the Christian state and the secular state: Discourses 
during the 2014 Fiji General Election’, in Naidu & Tarte, ‘No Ordinary Election’, 2015, pp. 35–48). 
In August, the newly elected President of the Methodist Church, Rev. Tevita Nawadra Banivanua, 
forthrightly declared that his Church would remain apolitical and accept a secular state (Fiji Times, 
26 August 2014). This did not prevent the secretary for Christian Citizenship and Social Services, 
Rev. Iliesa Naivalu, from circulating a letter two weeks prior to the elections to 56 Methodist divisions 
endorsing SODELPA (Fiji Sun, 25 September 2014).
329  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 14 March 2014.
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Kepa’s promise to restore the GCC drew the ire of Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. 
Qarase, whose recent imprisonment prevented him from standing for 
election, retorted that ‘as an IndoFijian’, the Attorney-General had no right 
to tell iTaukei what to do.330 But, of course, like every Fijian, he had a right 
to speak about any institution that might impact on Fiji’s governance and 
all its citizens. Predictably, Bainimarama accused SODELPA of wanting 
to take Fiji back to the politics of fear: ‘It is the same old tired political 
faces who brought Fiji to its knees in the first place through their petty 
squabbling and division.’331 When SODELPA ‘sacked’ Rabuka because of 
his role in 1987, Bainimarama’s attack appeared vindicated.332 It was the 
same when the party used Kepa’s personal connections to chiefly houses to 
open doors for its candidates. SODELPA represented a past Bainimarama 
claimed he wanted to put behind Fiji. ‘We will consign them to history, 
once and for all bury them, ignore their false promises – and set our eyes 
on the future we can build together, One Nation, putting Fiji first to 
make Fiji great,’ Bainimarama argued: ‘Don’t judge me by my promise. 
Judge me by the achievements I’ve already delivered.’333 
SODELPA’s focus constrained its ability to take on FijiFirst. The vanua 
should retain its distance from political parties, Madraiwiwi warned, 
and allow the Taukei to choose freely. It would, however, take at least 
a generation for the perceptions that Bainimarama wanted to foster to 
be realised.334 Nonetheless, as journalist Nemani Delaibatiki noted, 
SODELPA’s discriminatory policies reduced its appeal to non-Taukei 
voters at a time when it could not match the FFP in organising large 
public meetings. To minimise the potential for dissent, it held small 
pocket meetings without the presence of the media.335 Meanwhile the 
60-year-old Bainimarama presented himself as an agent for change, an 
image with traction across the Pacific because he had stood up to Australia 
and New Zealand. Tongan politician Akilisi Pohiva believed Bainimarama 
had the political will to make things happen. Newspaper polls prior to 
the election appeared to confirm FijiFirst’s popularity. At the end of June 
2014, the Fiji Sun–Razor poll gave it 59 per cent of popular support 
330  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 13 July 2014.
331  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 14 March 2014.
332  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 2 May 2014. Beddoes declared Rabuka’s most recent apology insufficient.
333  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 21 July 2014; see also Nicola Baker & Haruo Nakagawa, ‘“Known 
unknowns and unknown unknowns” in the 2014 Fiji election results’, in Naidu & Tarte, ‘No Ordinary 
Election’, 2015, p. 126.
334  Fiji Sun, 19 May 2014.
335  Fiji Sun, 4 September 2014.
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compared with 8 per cent for SODELPA, 5 per cent for the FLP and 
8 per cent for the NFP. Bainimarama received an outstanding 73 per cent 
as preferred prime minister; no other party leader exceeded 7 per cent.336 
As Brij Lal later noted, ‘He had all the advantages of incumbency, name 
recognition, a  public profile, media on his side, campaigning on the 
public purse, and a desire on the part of the voters for stability, which he 
promised’.337 
And he retained the loyalty of the military, which remained centre stage 
in the consciousness of many voters, in part because, during the weeks 
leading up to the election, 45 Fijian peacekeepers were captured by the 
rebel Al Nusra group after evacuating Camp Faouar on the Syrian side of 
Golan Heights, where 500 Fiji troops monitored the border between Israel 
and Syria as part of a UN Disengagement Observer Force. They were held 
for two weeks in captivity, before being released on 11 September after 
Fiji requested Qatar mediate on its behalf.338 Five days later and one day 
before the election, in an exercise that echoed Bainimarama’s own actions 
prior to the 2006 election, the military marched through Suva. Journalist 
Rowan Callick reported that the exercise delivered a clear message to 
all Fijians: the army was still there and would tolerate no nonsense.339 
On the same day, during the media blackout, Bainimarama held a public 
thanksgiving ceremony for the safe release of his peacekeepers.340
It is tempting to suggest that FijiFirst’s confidence heading into the election 
dictated the late release of its manifesto just 10 days before the election, 
but it may also have been tactical, enabling it to minimise the impact of 
criticism from rival parties. In many respects, FijiFirst had mixed results 
to crow about when it came to the economy. Certainly Bainimarama’s 
government had dismantled the telecom monopoly and no longer bowed 
to powerful Taukei interests or big business. It had seized back control of 
Air Pacific from Qantas in 2012 and renamed it Fiji Airways, bought new 
airliners and returned the company to profitability in 2013–14. Similarly, 
336  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 5 July 2014.
337  Australian, 17 August 2014.
338  Two separate groups of Filipino peacekeepers evaded capture (Daily Mirror, 12 September 2014).
339  Australian, 17 September 2014. Allegations that Qatar paid US$2.5 million for their release 
have never been confirmed by the United Nations.
340  David Robie, ‘“Unfree and unfair?”: Media intimidation in Fiji’s 2014 elections’, in Ratuva & 
Lawson, The People Have Spoken, 2016, p. 90. The Methodist Church refused to attend the interfaith 
service on the grounds that it might be a political event (Lynda Newland, ‘From the land to the sea: 
Christianity, community and state in Fiji and the 2014 elections’, in Ratuva & Lawson, The People 
Have Spoken, 2016, p. 120).
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its stewardship of Fiji Pine and Tropik Woods returned profits for the 
first time in 40 years.341 It had formed its own Fiji National University 
(FNU) in 2010, and had belatedly stimulated long-overdue infrastructure 
development, much of it funded by rising debt, increasingly denominated 
in Chinese yuan.342 And private investment now reached 15 per cent of 
GDP. Historically the level was significant (private investment managed 
only 3.5 per cent of GDP in 2010), enabling the government to reach 
its investment target of 28 per cent of GDP. Success now reflected badly 
on the record of the government after 2006, and infrastructure did 
not bring immediate opportunities to reduce unemployment or raise 
minimum wages.343 Nonetheless, in 2013, the economy’s growth rate had 
finally recovered from coup-induced shrinkages and risen over 4 per cent; 
the year 2014 promised to be even better.
Low growth carried dangers for FijiFirst; hence its focus on policies for 
amelioration, which had the added advantage of impacting more directly 
on the average voter: increased electricity subsidies and free medicines for 
low-income families, a basic level of free water and an extension of clean 
water initiatives, the maintenance of zero VAT on basic food items and 
medicines, lowered age eligibility for social security, increased scholarships 
and education loans for tertiary education, and the extension of free 
education to preschool. But there were new initiatives also: an increase in 
teacher numbers, an emergency package for farmers, a new agricultural 
research council, fertiliser subsidies, affordable housing programs and 
squatter development, first home grants, $10 million to assist iTaukei 
develop their own lands, and major highway developments. Surprisingly, 
341  Fiji Sun, 10 December 2014.
342  Government debt rose 40 per cent (2006–14) to 56 per cent of GDP in 2010 (above the IMF’s 
40 per cent target, although this had been adjusted to 60 per cent after the GFC), with domestic 
sources of debt (mostly the FNPF) shrinking from 83 per cent to 73 per cent of all loans. Foreign 
lenders comprised 12.8 per cent of GDP by mid-2017. Chinese loans represented one quarter of 
Fiji’s foreign debt ($158.5 million) in 2014, up from 2.6 per cent or $7.6 million in 2008 (Fiji 
Times, 30  October 2014, 12 September 2015, 30 May 2016, 7 July 2017). Under the energetic 
leadership of Dr Ganesh Chand, the first vice chancellor, the FNU brought together six once separate 
institutions (Fiji Institute of Technology, Fiji School of Nursing, Fiji School of Medicine, Fiji College 
of Agriculture, Fiji College of Education and Lautoka Teachers College) across 33 campuses and 
centres serving over 20,000 students.
343  Biman Prasad argues that remittances, low interest rates and credit prompted recovery based on 
consumption, not growth-based on production. Key performing sectors like retail, construction and 
transport were not the largest sectors of the economy where employment was greatest (‘Growth must 
result in more for us’, Fiji Times, 12 September 2015). Minimum wages remained at $2 per hour 
because of employer pressures on the government. Only in 2014 were they raised to $2.32, still far 
below the poverty line of $4.20 (crosbiew.blogspot.com, 7 July 2015).
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FijiFirst (temporarily) resurrected Ratu Mara’s plan to nationalise 
the purchase of oil (more eggs for the nest), but it called also for the 
introduction of digital TV, the rollout of e-governance platforms and the 
greater provision of microfinance to individuals and small businesses.344
Predictably the Labour Party saw the manifesto as a blatant vote-buying 
tactic to offset its poor record in government. Electricity subsidies were 
needed because the government had overseen a 10-fold increase in 
electricity costs to the average family, free water to 80 per cent of the 
population could not be achieved, and free milk to class one students 
overlooked its responsibility for doubling the price of milk. Chaudhry 
argued that Bainimarama’s ‘record in government showed unprecedented 
increases in poverty levels, unemployment and cost of living’. His promises 
now were hollow. He could not be trusted.345
But Chaudhry faced his opponent from an unfamiliar position. His 
recent conviction barred him from participation and effectively left the 
FLP leaderless. Long-simmering tensions over his leadership produced 
a breakaway faction (the People’s Democratic Party or PDP) and provided 
Fiji’s oldest political force, the National Federation Party, an opportunity 
to regain ground it had lost since 1999. Economics professor Biman Prasad 
became its new leader at the end of March and attempted to refashion the 
party and – more actively than other parties – to court the new youth 
vote.346 Draunidalo became its new president. A human rights activist, she 
was intimately connected across the political spectrum.347 
344  FijiFirst, ‘Our manifesto’, fijifirst.com.
345  flp.org.fj, 12 September 2014.
346  See Patrick Vakaoti, ‘Fiji elections and the youth vote: token or active citizenship?’, in Ratuva 
& Lawson, The People Have Spoken, 2016, pp. 157–75. No evidence exists that youth represented a 
singularly different cohort, although with the reduction in voting age to 18 the potential existed for 
under 25s (now 19 per cent of voters) to demand more nuanced policies. No one in that age group was 
elected to parliament, however, and only four from the 30 to 39 cohort. Combined, the two cohorts 
possibly comprised over 50 per cent of the voting population (Tarai et al, ‘Political social media 
campaigning’, Naidu & Tarte, ‘No Ordinary Election’, 2015, pp. 90–92; David Arms, ‘Analysing the 
open list system of proportional representation in Fiji’s 2014 General Election: A perspective from the 
Fiji Electoral Commission’, in Naidu & Tarte, ‘No Ordinary Election’, 2015, p. 14).
347  Her late father, Col Savenaca Draunidalo, was a senior military officer under Nailatikau and 
Rabuka, a politician, public servant and, allegedly, a 2000 coup conspirator. Her late mother, Adi Kuini 
Vuikaba, was equally well connected within the Fijian chiefly elite and served as leader of the Labour 
Party following the death of her second husband, Dr Timoci Bavadra, the man who first led the Labour–
NFP Coalition to victory in 1987. Vuikaba also led the Fijian Association Party after 1998 until 2000.
289
4 . PlUS çA ChANGe …?
Nonetheless, the party’s efforts to produce a stronger multicultural 
face to the electorate were seriously damaged when three of its Taukei 
candidates were deliberately targeted in late July by unilateral government 
changes in electoral laws and forced to withdraw.348 And, like the FLP 
and SODELPA, it was left lamenting the past eight years lost to good 
governance and human rights, and promising to deliver a more positive 
future: average annual GDP growth since 2006 had languished at 0.6 per 
cent since Bainimarama seized power, national debt had nearly doubled, 
youth unemployment had growth massively, poverty – by some estimates 
– had risen from 31 per cent to over 45 per cent, and Bainimarama had 
regressed towards import substitution strategies and an ill-conceived 
retirement policy.349 But, as Narsey later noted, FijiFirst’s bread-and-
butter pledges (and its delivery of infrastructure into long-neglected 
rural communities) carried far more weight with an electorate keen to 
move forward than dwell on constitutionality, law or revenge.350 And, as a 
harbinger of life under FijiFirst, Fiji’s economy did grow in 2014 by over 
5 per cent and tourism boomed.
On 17 September 2014, Fiji finally went to the polls under the watchful 
eyes of 92 multinational observers.351 Only 18 per cent of the 247 
candidates were women. IndoFijians comprised just 38 per cent of the 
electorate. With an impressive 85 per cent turnout and a low informal 
vote (0.75 per cent, despite the complexities around identifying 
candidates by number), FijiFirst achieved a landslide victory, winning 
60 per cent of the vote and 32 of the 50 seats; SODELPA gained only 
28 per cent of the vote and 15 seats; and the NFP 6 per cent and three 
seats. Four parties (including the FLP) and two independents failed to 
make the 5 per cent threshold and received no seats. Only eight women 
were elected (another joined parliament several months later following 
348  They were academic Jone Vakalalabure, former magistrate and lawyer Makereta Waqavonovono 
and former national rugby player Seru Rabeni (Fiji Times, 8 August 2014). The requirement for 
a two-year residency prior to voter registration had been removed earlier but now returned, affecting 
candidates who had studied overseas. The rule did not apply to public servants who lived overseas in 
the performance of their work.
349  Biman Prasad’s address to the Fiji Teachers Union (www.coupfourandahalf.com, 30 April 2013).
350  Fiji Times, 21 September 2014.
351  The Multinational Observer Group reported the elections free and fair, but recommended 
that political party identification be included on candidate lists, that the requirements for registering 
parties be less onerous, that parties should be able to hold meetings without permits, and that the poll 
numbers assigned to candidates be drawn earlier in order to allow their parties time to publicise them 
(fijivillage, 14 April 2015).
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a resignation).352 Seventy-one per cent of IndoFijians, 50 per cent of 
Taukei and 80 per cent of other minorities voted for Bainimarama’s party; 
0.4 per cent of IndoFijians, 46 per cent of Taukei and 1.4 per cent of 
other minorities voted for SODELPA.353 With 16 Taukei, 15 IndoFijian 
and two Other MPs, FijiFirst also became the most representative party 
in parliament. SODELPA comprised only iTaukei, while the small NFP 
managed one Taukei and two IndoFijian MPs.
This was, as Vijay Naidu and Sandra Tarte note, an historic election in so 
many ways: the first held in Fiji under proportional representation, one 
person – one vote – one value, a single national constituency, and a single 
electoral roll. All these features were designed to remove past gerrymanders 
and reduce the impact of ethnic appeals on electoral outcomes. There were 
other firsts also. All successful political parties were headed by a woman 
either as president or leader. Eighteen-year-olds could now vote, with 
the result that youths (18–25 years) comprised nearly 20 per cent of the 
electorate.354 In fact, 47 per cent of voters were under 35 years, 75 per 
cent of whom voted in 2014 for the first time. Hence the significance of 
social media in this election, utilised with varying effectiveness by all the 
352  The 5 per cent threshold equated to 27,000 votes. Four seats were effectively transferred to 
FijiFirst (three) and SODELPA (one). Many FijiFirst members sneaked into parliament with low 
personal votes, the lowest being 600 votes (Wadan Narsey, ‘Critical issues for 2017’, Fiji Times, 
31 December 2016). Women clearly earned no advantage from the new voting system. Although 
they gained 16 per cent of seats compared with 11 per cent in 2006, the number of women elected 
remained the same.
353  Fiji Times, 21 September 2014; Australian, 20 September 2014; Steven Ratuva, ‘Shifting 
democracy: electoral changes in Fiji’, in Ratuva & Lawson, The People Have Spoken, 2016, pp. 28–34. 
Dr Jiko Luveni also became Fiji’s first female Speaker of parliament. See also Asenati Liki & Claire Slatter, 
‘Control, alt, delete: How Fiji’s new PR electoral system and media coverage affected election results for 
women candidates in the 2014 election’, in Naidu & Tarte, ‘No Ordinary Election’, 2015; and Gordon 
Nanau, ‘Representative democracy, the Constitution & electoral engineering in Fiji: 2014 & beyond’, in 
Naidu & Tarte, ‘No Ordinary Election’, 2015, pp. 71–88, 17–34. Had the People’s Democratic Party not 
split from the FLP, the FLP might have been able to achieve two seats. But with only 3 per cent of the 
vote each, they were excluded by the 5 per cent threshold rule, as were the two independents. The rule, 
not an uncommon feature with proportional representation (Germany and New Zealand have a similar 
threshold), is designed to favour political parties and reduce the potential for parliamentary instability 
(Nanau, ‘Representative democracy’, 2015, pp. 23–24). Chaudhry, however, believed the FLP’s loss was 
due solely to his inability to contest the election (Fiji Sun, 10 July 2017). Because of its narrow electoral 
appeal, SODELPA required 80 per cent of the Taukei vote to win, an impossible task given many Taukei 
did not register or vote, and others viewed FijiFirst as a way to address the past dominance of eastern 
chiefs (Baker & Nakagawa, ‘Known unknowns and unknown unknowns’, 2015, pp. 116, 123).
354  ‘Introduction’, Naidu & Tarte, ‘No Ordinary Election’, 2015, p. 5. Unlike previous voting 
systems based predominantly on closed lists, the open list provided more power to voters than parties 
in determining who would be elected.
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parties.355 It was also the first time an election had been held in a single 
day, and without the long queues that had once been a feature of polling. 
Over 2,000 polling stations and 14,000 polling officials saw to that. 
The Economist noted that ‘The result, by in effect legitimatising the coup, 
has shocked the country’s intellectual elite’,356 although Narsey more 
accurately reflected that the Bainimarama government could never have 
survived so long had it not enjoyed the support of that intellectual elite: 
Lawyers, former High Court judges, business men and women, accountants 
and auditors, public relations experts, university administrators and 
academics, opportunists from abroad, and at some critical times, some of 
our own colleagues and friends from the union movement.357 
Yet it is also important to bear in mind that Bainimarama could also never 
have survived had his government not become responsive to popular 
needs and pushed ahead with long-neglected infrastructure development. 
That alone distinguished him and FijiFirst from SODELPA’s chiefly 
sponsored forebears: Qarase’s SDL, Rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni 
Taukei (SVT), and the final decade of Mara’s Alliance. Indeed, FijiFirst rode 
into office on Bainimarama’s popularity as a leader for change and stability, 
demonstrating how far he had travelled since 2006 when many diplomats 
found him unpredictable and angry.358 He alone won 41 per cent of the 
popular vote and drew in 70 per cent of FijiFirst’s support.359 By removing 
the gerrymander of provincialism and communalism, the single electorate 
355  Tarai et al., ‘Political social media campaigning’, 2015, pp. 89–114. FijiFirst outdid all other 
parties and independents in terms of the number of subscribers to its Facebook pages, but responded 
to and engaged less with its audience than SODELPA. The image that the parties conveyed on social 
media, however, probably mattered more: Bainimarama came across as a friendly family man, Kepa 
as a formal chief, while NFP candidates presented themselves with stilted studio images (Tarai et al., 
‘Political social media campaigning’, 2015, p. 109). Joseph Veramu’s report (‘Our rising generation’, 
Fiji Times, 5 January 2017) claimed that 91 per cent of 15–35-year-olds (35.5 per cent of the 
population) possessed mobile phones (72 per cent possessed mobiles with the internet), 83 per cent 
held Facebook accounts, and 38 per cent Twitter accounts.
356  Economist, 20 September 2014.
357  crosbiew.blogspot.com, 29 March 2014, Address to the Fiji Public Servants Association AGM.
358  Sometimes the old Bainimarama resurfaced. He sent an abusive text to Father Kevin Barr 
after Barr tweeted that the Chinese flag should replace the Union Jack in the corner of any new 
Bainimarama-endorsed Fiji flag. Barr was also threatened with expulsion (Australian, 18 January 
2013). In June 2013, a FTV sports editor was forced to resign for accusing Bainimarama’s daughter 
– the CEO of the Fiji Sports Council and organiser of a nearby high school event – of playing music 
too loudly (Robie, ‘Unfree and unfair?’, 2016, p. 86). 
359  Bainimarama won four times more votes than Kepa, enabling his party to win many more 
seats than might have been the case had distribution been determined by individual candidate votes 
(Ratuva, ‘Shifting democracy’, 2016, p. 32).
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open list proportional system advantaged his nationally inclusive party 
and disadvantaged those based on sectional, provincial and communal 
interests. So too the weakening of traditional politics as Fiji’s population 
grew more urban and Viti Levu based. The 2014 election and the rules 
under which it was conducted represented an unprecedented rout of the 
old order.
293
Conclusion: Playing the 
politics of respect
Hubris
In the months that followed Rear Admiral (Ret) Voreqe Bainimarama’s 
electoral victory, the rout did not dissipate. Almost immediately the 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) announced Fiji’s readmission and Australia’s 
Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, visited Bainimarama to proclaim the 
formal removal of sanctions, new investments in job-creation programs, 
the relaunch of senior officials’ meetings and the inclusion of Fiji in its 
seasonal workers and New Colombo programs.1 Bishop’s quick response 
did not, however, check Bainimarama’s determination to consolidate 
Fiji’s changed foreign policy position. Fiji returned to PIF but refused 
to participate in its leaders’ meetings or back away from its desire to 
reform PIF’s architecture.2 Fiji also maintained its ‘hardline’ on the 
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus trade 
talks.3 In  Brisbane for an Australia–Fiji Business Forum later in 2015, 
Bainimarama reminded his audience: ‘It is a great shame … Australia and 
1  Fiji Times, 1 November 2014.
2  Islands Business, 21 January 2015. Fiji proposed that its former Foreign Minister, Kaliopate 
Tavola, be PIF’s new secretary general. He supported Bainimarama’s stance that Australia and New 
Zealand become donors and development partners of PIF only, and not sit at the leaders’ table. 
Bainimarama deliberately avoided PNG’s Prime Minister at the Japanese Pacific Islands Leaders 
Meeting in early 2015, fearing he would be lobbied to attend the forthcoming Moresby Forum.
3  Fiji rejoined the trade talks but held out for long-term improved market access, the maintenance 
of policy space, and binding commitments on labour mobility and development cooperation. There 
were ‘not enough pluses in the PACER for Fiji to commit’, Bainimarama claimed (Fiji Times, 8 & 
17  May 2016). In September 2016, Bainimarama refused to sign PACER Plus: it was ‘too one-
sided, too restrictive, places too many obligations on us that we cannot afford to meet’ (Fiji Times, 
15 October 2016). Australia and NZ officials, however, believed it possible to conclude the agreement 
in 2017, the eighth year of negotiations (Fiji Times, 1 February 2017).
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New Zealand – our traditional friends – turned their backs on us when 
we set out to substitute a flawed democracy in Fiji with a proper one like 
theirs.’ And he added: 
How much sooner we might have been able to return Fiji to parliamentary 
rule if we hadn’t expended so much effort on simply surviving. If you 
had been more understanding. More engaged. Been able to recognize 
that defending the status quo in Fiji was indefensible, intellectually and 
morally.4
The lesson, Foreign Minister Inoke Kubuabola claimed shortly after the 
elections, was simple: Fiji ‘can never again permit [itself ] to be dependent 
– politically, strategically or economically – on a narrow group of powerful 
countries’.5 
Days later, Bainimarama hosted both India’s new Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi and China’s President Xi Jinping in Fiji. They came, Bainimarama 
declared, because they regard Fiji as important: ‘They acknowledge us as 
a regional leader – a preeminent island nation that is also playing an increased 
role on the wider global stage.’6 Fiji’s years in the cold had permitted it 
to develop a powerful sense of difference with the past. It had established 
new diplomatic missions, joined the Non-Alignment Movement, gained 
alternative military support from Russia,7 chaired the G77 + China and 
the International Sugar Organization, and created a new regional body, 
the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), the latter still a bone of 
contention with Australia and New Zealand.8 Its UN ambassador, Peter 
Thomson, became President of the UN General Assembly in September 
2016. And Fiji had developed a Green Growth Framework as a blueprint 
4  PACNews, 15 November 2015.
5  Fiji Sun, 15 October 2014.
6  Fiji Sun, 18 November 2014.
7  Russian support was long in the making. Its Foreign Minister visited Suva in 2012 and 
Bainimarama pushed for a deal to supply much-needed new weaponry to its Golan Heights 
peacekeepers when he went to Moscow in 2013. In January 2016, some 25 containers of Russian 
arms and equipment, worth an estimated $19 million, arrived in Suva, initially creating public 
confusion as to its purpose. Bainimarama later declared that the Blackrock military base in Nadi 
would become a new peacekeeping training institute (Economist, 23 January 2016).
8  Fiji Times, 1 September 2015; Australian, 8 September 2015. Bainimarama accused the two 
neighbours of continuing to lobby Pacific countries not to attend PIDF meetings. Only eight of 14 PIF 
leaders attended the 2015 PIDF. Its acting secretary general, Amena Yauvoli, soon left to become – 
briefly – ambassador for climate change and oceans. In April 2016, he emerged as the new director 
general of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), a sign perhaps that Fiji wished to reinvigorate 
an organisation its former leader claimed lacked sufficient support from MSG governments (Fiji Sun, 
9 April 2016). Samoan François Martel replaced him as PIDF Secretary General in September 2015, 
hoping to focus the PIDF on sustainable development through blue-green economies.
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for development that allowed it to challenge the climate change policies 
of its large neighbours, gain prominence on the  world stage for green 
leadership, become chair of the 23rd session of the Conference of Parties 
(COP 23) 2017 to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
at the latter’s secretariat in Bonn,9 and co-chair the UN Conference 
on Oceans. ‘Make no mistake, our resolve in the last eight years, our 
strategic direction as a nation and our ability to think outside the box,’ 
Bainimarama asserted, ‘has gained Fiji much respect around the world.’10 
This stance was not going to change.11
At home, Bainimarama delivered the same message. When parliament 
met for the first time in mid-October 2014, it was at the old parliament 
site in the downtown Government Buildings, not at Rabuka’s former 
Veiuto complex. There is ‘something deeply symbolic about having 
brought history full circle to this chamber’, Bainimarama declared. His 
President agreed; it served to ‘draw a line under the years of division 
that have held Fiji back and herald a new era of unity and purpose’.12 
But, as Nailatikau gave his address to the newly assembled parliament, 
it became apparent that FijiFirst had no intention of reaching out to 
its opposition, especially over the Constitution and parliamentary 
procedures. Instead it would focus on programs already begun: increasing 
9  Fiji Sun, 2 June 2015. Fiji became the first nation in the world to ratify the Paris Agreement 
following the UN Climate Change Conference in December 2015, promising to generate all its 
electricity needs from renewable sources by 2030 and to cut emissions by 30 per cent (Guardian, 
16 February 2016). Climate change is a real issue for Fiji. By mid-2015 it had spent $2 million 
relocating three villages threatened by rising sea waters and had identified another 45 (Fiji Times, 
24 June 2015) under threat. The World Bank estimated Fiji would spend $478 million by 2020 on 
coastal protection, much of it on sea walls (Fiji Times, 31 July 2016). Fiji also offered to provide a 
permanent refuge to people from Kiribati and Tuvalu should they be displaced as a result of rising seas 
(Fiji Times, 25 May 2016).
10  Fiji Sun, 18 November 2014. Anna Powles and Jose Sousa-Santos are uncertain as to the long-
term impact of new players such as China and Russia on the Pacific. Fiji has not supported China’s 
position on South China Sea access, despite receiving nearly $700 million in Chinese aid between 
2006 and 2013 (more than Australia’s $620 million contribution), but it did abstain during the UN 
General Assembly vote on Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Nonetheless, Fiji’s courting of 
new partners has effectively shifted its foreign policy and challenged the South Pacific’s traditional 
security orthodoxy (‘Principled engagement: rebuilding defence ties with Fiji’, Lowy Institute Analysis 
paper, Sydney, July 2016).
11  Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte are more circumspect, believing this a journey with no obvious 
end (G Fry & S Tarte, The New Pacific Diplomacy. Canberra: ANU Press, 2015, p. 15). Powles and 
Sousa-Santos are similarly uncertain as to how the PIF rift will play out, but believe that Australia 
and New Zealand ‘will have to be smarter in their engagement’ with Fiji and the Pacific (‘Principled 
engagement’). Meanwhile Bainimarama continues to push boundaries, requesting Fijian visa-free 
access to Europe’s Schengen zone in 2016 (Fiji Times, 7 December 2016).
12  Fiji Sun, 14 October 2014. Of course Veiuto represented both Rabuka’s failed communal 
politics and the site of the 2000 coup.
The GeneRAl’s Goose
296
water and electricity subsidies to the poor, providing squatters with long-
term leases, encouraging the commercial development of Taukei land, 
extending the Tertiary Education Loan Scheme, providing free education 
also to preschools, raising the minimum wage and supplying low-income 
earners with free hospital procedures and medicine.13 When combined 
with funding for long-neglected infrastructure, the government believed 
it had a winning formula that could take it beyond the next election. 
In 2016, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum described as unprecedented the economic 
growth in excess of 4 per cent that had occurred over the past three years, 
and proudly noted that government interventions for those at the bottom 
of the socio-economic scale meant that, rather than widen disparities 
between rich and poor, growth had actually reduced poverty levels by 
more than 3 per cent.14 ‘Compassion for the vulnerable’ represented 
a hallmark of Bainimarama’s leadership, he argued.15
The strategy caught the opposition parties off guard; they accused the 
government of remaining in campaign mode. But the real problem, 
Steven Ratuva noted, lay with their refusal to respect the election 
process.16 The  National Federation Party (NFP), he argued, needed 
to expand its appeal. It began the parliamentary session focusing on 
decrees, media restrictions, deteriorating services, and the unexplained 
discrepancies highlighted in the tabled Auditor-General’s reports from 
2010. It demanded a review of the 2013 Constitution and supported the 
Social Democratic Liberal Party’s (SODELPA) petition to reinstate the 
Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) on the grounds that the public were not 
consulted on its abolition.17 It called for a government of national unity 
and requested dialogue on ‘critical issues’. It opposed the government’s 
repeal of the death penalty in the Royal Fiji Military Forces Act.18 
13  Fiji Times, 8 October 2014. In 2016, Bainimarama claimed that he wished to be known as the 
first prime minister to make education free to all Fijians (Fiji Sun, 13 January 2016).
14  Fiji Sun, 21 July 2016.
15  Fiji Sun, 10 December 2016.
16  Fiji Sun, 10 April 2015. 
17  Fiji Sun, 30 April 2016.
18  As NFP President, Draunidalo expanded the debate, calling the United Nations a useless 
institution that sponsored mercenaries and let genocides occur (Fiji Sun, 20 February 2015).
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With such a huge majority, Bainimarama felt no pressing need to deviate 
from his revolution. Instead he announced plans for a new flag for Fiji to 
better reflect his achievement in creating a new Fiji.19 And he indulged in 
petty politics. An unforeseen discrepancy in the registration of the NFP 
auditors saw the small party threatened with exclusion from parliament 
at the start of 2016,20 leaving its leader, Biman Prasad, impotently railing 
against the lack of bipartisanship, the continuance of draconian media 
decrees, the lack of fundamental rights, dictatorial and inconsistent 
economic management, and the development of a culture of servility and 
sycophancy.21
The larger SODELPA presented a different challenge. Certainly it 
raised similar issues as the NFP, with MP Niko Nawaikula provocatively 
suggesting that the government’s refusal to review the Constitution was 
tantamount to inviting another coup.22 He and his leader, Ro Teimumu 
Kepa, were members of the Fiji Native Tribal Congress, which, since 
2010, had claimed that Bainimarama – and later his Constitution – 
breached UN-mandated indigenous rights by abolishing the GCC and 
the exclusive Fijian name, and by denying iTaukei self-determination.23 
The matter quickly came to a head in late 2014 when small groups of 
Taukei in Nadroga and Ra, under the influence of a Taukei expatriate 
19  Fiji Times, 10 March, 7 July & 24 December 2015. Public responses to the proposal were 
muted and the opposition refused to engage in the process. Bainimarama argued that the flag carried 
both colonial and Bauan features, and Fiji now needed a more modern design. But, after witnessing 
how Fijians rallied around the flag during Fiji’s first Olympic gold win in August 2016, he dropped 
the new flag from his list of priorities (Fiji Sun, 18 August 2016).
20  The NFP’s auditors were not registered with the Fiji Institute of Accountants. Nineteen days 
later on 19 February 2016, the suspension ended when the NFP filed legal action in the High Court. 
Wadan Narsey argues that the suspension enabled the government to seize control of the Public 
Accounts Committee and change standing orders (Fiji Times, 21 February 2016). Undoubtedly 
this move assisted the government to reduce scrutiny of the Auditor-General’s 2010–14 reports, 
which revealed that salaries to then ministers had bypassed Finance and been paid through a private 
accounting form, Aliz Pacific Ltd, owned by a relative of the Attorney-General. The Auditor-General 
questioned the lack of supporting documentation. The government did not respond to questions 
from then PAC chair, Biman Prasad (Fiji Times, 7 November 2014; 17 September 2015).
21  Fiji Times, 30 January 2016. Prasad highlighted the Prime Minister’s pettiness: telling 
opposition leaders to ‘jump in a deep pool’ and advising gay people to shift to Iceland if they wished 
to marry, did not – he claimed – produce a worthy legacy. See also Prasad’s address at the Centre for 
Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 26 May 2016 (Fiji Times, 4 June 2016).
22  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 17 October 2014.
23  Fiji Times, 20 April 2015. In 2016, Kepa admitted in parliament that she now supported the 
use of ‘Fijian’ as a common name. To date, however, the party has not officially corrected its stance 
(Fiji Sun, 13 February 2016).
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who urged them to rise up against the Bainimarama government, 
declared their provinces sovereign Christian states. As a consequence, by 
September 2015, 63 persons had been arrested and charged with sedition.
Although SODELPA distanced itself from the Taukeists, it sang from the 
same hymn sheet. Both Kepa and her deputy, Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, 
used much of their parliamentary time attacking government policies as 
anti-Taukei. Lalabalavu criticised the government’s planned divestment 
of shares in state enterprises on the grounds that the entry of foreign 
companies reduced opportunities for Taukei investments and exposed the 
country to human trafficking, drugs and terrorism.24 Kepa complained 
that government moves to prioritise places at state boarding schools 
for rural students would victimise iTaukei, and she insisted that the 
Constitution be put to a referendum.25 As late as May 2016, Kepa referred 
to the government as a dictatorship and suggested that, when SODELPA 
becomes the government in 2018, it would take to task those journalists 
‘who are props of the dictatorship’.26
Such attacks enabled Bainimarama to assume the high moral ground. 
‘SODELPA keeps summoning up the past and preying on the fears of 
the iTaukei people about the security of their land and their way of life,’ 
he told the Kadavu Provincial Council in February 2015: ‘It is divisive. 
It is offensive. And it simply isn’t true … There is no threat to iTaukei – to 
our land, culture, institutions or religion.’27 He told school cadets in Nadi 
that ‘The future for Fiji isn’t one of a privileged few keeping only the best 
for themselves and not sharing with other ordinary common Fijians’.28 
But he was not above baiting SODELPA. Only English could be spoken 
in parliament and chiefly titles were not to be used. ‘When you walk out,’ 
he declared, ‘you can pick it up again, your Ratu, your Adi, and you walk 
out with it.’29 
24  Fiji Times, 13 December 2014. The Fiji Electricity Authority (FEA) became an early target 
for divestment.
25  Fiji Times, 13 April & 24 December 2015.
26  Fiji Sun, 4 May 2016.
27  Fiji Sun, 20 February 2015.
28  Fiji Sun, 23 April 2015.
29  Fiji Times, 11 February 2015.
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As Ratuva commented, SODELPA was a dream opposition for 
FijiFirst. By constantly focusing on Taukei issues and the 2006 coup, it 
placed itself exactly where the assertively inclusive FijiFirst wanted it.30 
Discontent within SODELPA did the Opposition no favours either. 
Discontent derived in part from its stunning defeat in the 2014 elections. 
Kepa blamed her party’s defeat on Bainimarama’s fear-mongering. 
Prior  to  voting, Bainimarama implied that Suva would burn again 
if FijiFirst lost power and Kepa claimed that fear drove voters into his 
arms.31 But, having focused so much on Taukei matters during the election 
campaign, it soon became clear that some of her MPs held different views 
on what mattered to iTaukei. In fact, some issues around which the 
party appeared to present a united front were potentially destabilising. 
For example, while Kepa and Nawaikula regarded the disestablishment 
of the GCC as a pivotal symbol of Bainimarama’s trashing of indigenous 
rights, MPs like Mosese Bulitavu believed that indigenous rights should 
not be used as a reason for the re-establishment of the GCC. Far from 
being a traditional indigenous institution, he argued, the GCC had been 
a colonial-era ploy by Bau to assert dominance over Fiji and eradicate the 
influence of once powerful tikina such as Verata. Indeed, the whole chiefly 
system, he asserted, was politicised by the descendants of the dominant 
chiefs of 1874 to augment their authority.32
These were not new arguments, and equating Taukei rights with 
indigenous rights had long been bedevilled by the problem of how to 
define the group. Who are Taukei? Who are not? Prior to 1990, most Fiji-
born descendants of Pacific islanders were considered Taukei for voting 
purposes. Rabuka’s 1990 Constitution stripped that status from them. 
Attempts were then made to excise Taukei of those with mixed heritage. 
Hence Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara’s fears that the same fate awaited Lauans 
in Viti Levu.33 Group rights, as opposed to human rights, always carry 
this risk.
30  Fiji Sun, 10 April 2015. SOLDELPA’s weakness is potentially FijiFirst’s weakness also. Should 
SODELPA abandon its communal and chiefly focus and transform itself into a national party like 
FijiFirst, it may become a credible alternative government in the future.
31  Fiji Sun, 28 September 2014. Mick Beddoes claimed SODELPA lost because ‘the election 
process was compromised’ (Fiji Sun, 25 October 2015).
32  Fiji Sun, 10 October 2015.
33  fijilive, 16 October 2000. Qarase’s government attempted to impose Taukei colonial patrilineal 
criteria on Rotumans also.
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Unsurprisingly, then, confusion over indigeneity abounds. Bainimarama 
has described iTaukei, Banabans and Rotumans as indigenous peoples 
of Fiji, although Banabans (from Kiribati) only settled in Fiji (on Rabi 
Island) after 1945. When Rotuman Jioji Konrote became the new Fiji 
President in October 2015, Brij Lal welcomed him as Fiji’s first ‘non-
indigenous’ president.34 Clearly indigeneity and Taukei identity are not 
one and the same. iTaukei and Rotumans may meet one UN criterion by 
having ‘historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies’, 
even if in different parts of Fiji. They do not, however, satisfy other criteria, 
for example, that they ‘form at present non-dominant sectors of society’.35 
Add to that the complexities of colonial institutions and customs that are 
accorded traditional status by some indigenous peoples but not others, 
and a recipe for division and hatred soon emerges. Hence Bainimarama’s 
desire to call everyone Fijian, to reject ethno-nationalism, and move on 
with what he sees as more important issues facing modern Fiji. ‘We drew 
a line under the past,’ he declared: ‘We reset the national compass.’36
Not so SODELPA, but its problems were not solely confined to its 
backward-looking agenda. Many within the party blamed Kepa and 
Laisenia Qarase for its failure to win the 2014 election. They were 
unhappy with the party’s management. Kepa did not inform them 
of Mick Beddoes’ appointment as principal administration officer in 
the Opposition office or of her support for Biman Prasad as chair of 
the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee and Richard Naidu as 
a  member of the Constitutional Services Commission. When shadow 
portfolios were apportioned, Kepa chose education, not the iTaukei affairs 
and sugar portfolios that Bainimarama held in addition to being prime 
minister. Thus she lost the opportunity to directly confront Bainimarama 
on the floor of the parliament; that role went to her deputy instead.37 
34  www.coupfourandahalf.com, 19 October 2015.
35  The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Manual for National Human Rights 
Institutions. Sydney & Geneva: Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions and the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013, p. 6.
36  Fiji Times, 4 March 2015. Bainimarama told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva that 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples did not readily apply in Fiji. The Taukei had 
not been dispossessed of their land; their land, culture, traditions and languages were protected in the 
Constitution and were not under threat (Fiji Sun, 4 March 2015).
37  Fiji Sun, 20 October 2014. Some MPs in her party wanted Aseri Radrodro, an accountant 
and auditor, as the Public Accounts Committee chair instead. Additionally, some SODELPA MPs 
opposed granting NFP members front bench seats in parliament, given that the NFP had rejected 
being in coalition with SODELPA prior to the elections (Fiji Sun, 15 May 2016). Such dissatisfaction 
weakened Opposition solidarity.
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By boycotting the special sitting of parliament for an address by Indian 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, she failed to rise above party politics. 
She also led SODELPA out of the chamber during the budget address. 
She undertook an unendorsed and reportedly disorganised tour of 
Vanua Levu. And she returned from the United States without attending 
a UN indigenous conference, claiming that she had been treated with 
disrespect.38
A report on the state of SODELPA in mid-2015, requested by five 
MPs led by Bulitavu and Aseri Radrodro, criticised party governance, 
financial management and leadership. It recommended Kepa’s expulsion. 
A disciplinary committee meeting subsequently cleared her of wrong 
doing39 but, with the party divided, no clear way forward seemed 
possible, especially after its deputy leader, Lalabalavu, seen by some as 
a possible successor, was banned from parliament for two years in May 
2015 for making a derogatory comment about the Speaker of the House. 
He had also attempted to bring Sitiveni Rabuka into the party prior 
to the elections.40 Later he tried to install him as a vice president, but 
Kepa refused and Rabuka reportedly resigned from the party. With the 
subsequent resignations of general secretary Pio Tabaiwalu, Beddoes 
and Pita Waqavonovono from their posts, SODELPA appeared to reach 
a new low. Even if Lalabalavu had assumed the leadership, it is unlikely he 
would have received the support of dissidents, who wanted to keep chiefs 
out of the frontline.41 
To foster unity, SODELPA pardoned Kepa instead. But, during 2016, 
discontent rumbled on, focusing on her unadvertised appointment of 
Adi Laufitu Malani as her personal assistant and her dogged pursuit of 
the GCC lost cause.42 Kepa seemed unwilling or unable to escape her 
chiefly straitjacket. Perhaps for that reason she announced in June 2016 
her intention not to recontest party leadership. In the tussle that quickly 
followed, Rabuka finally made his way back into political leadership, 
38  Fiji Sun, 24 May 2016. No one met her at Los Angeles from where she intended to transit 
to New York.
39  Fiji Sun, 13 December 2015.
40  Fiji Sun, 3 & 11 September, 22 October 2015. In June 2016, the NFP’s Tupou Draunidalo was 
similarly excluded for the remainder of the parliament for making a derogatory comment (Fiji Times, 
4 June 2016); the same fate awaited Opposition Whip Ratu Isoa Tikoca – for making anti-Muslim 
remarks (Fiji Sun, 30 September 2016).
41  Fiji Sun, 12 July 2016. 
42  Fiji Sun, 3 February, 12 & 26 April 2016; see Neelesh Gounder, ‘The Opposition in an effective 
democracy’, Fiji Times, 28 May 2016.
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hoping to repeat his 1992 performance as leader of the Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), and promising to make SODELPA relevant 
to more Fijians by abandoning ethno-nationalism.43 
Nonetheless, some party members were unhappy with yet another return 
to the past. They believed that Rabuka was too close to the military 
machine they conveniently blamed for all Fiji’s political woes. Indeed, no 
Opposition leader except Rabuka attended Constitution Day ceremonies 
in September 2016. The national interest, he declared, should always come 
before party interests, a line that distanced him further from some of his 
new colleagues. Party resignations soon followed and – in the absence 
of clear party policies on cooperation – the task of creating an effective 
Opposition coalition and widening its support base ahead of elections in 
2018 remained a work in progress.44 When the government proposed an 
increase in parliamentary allowances, SODELPA could not even maintain 
unified opposition.45
Bainimarama did not have it all his own way, however. The militarisation 
of the police force remained an ongoing issue after the resignation of 
Commissioner Ben Groenewald, a South African appointed only in May 
2014 to secure organisational and operational changes ahead of elections 
and to end its reputation as ‘a brutal force’. He cited continued military 
interference in policing, a reference to three police officers who had 
beaten and sexually assaulted an escaped prisoner in 2012. Groenewald 
had reopened the case after the military recruited the officers, claiming 
the police had abandoned them. Brigadier General Sitiveni Qiliho now 
replaced Groenewald as Police Commissioner in November 2015 but, 
before long, found himself embroiled in controversy when he re-employed 
43  Kepa remained the parliamentary Opposition leader, indicating that she would not contest 
the next election. Both Kepa and Lalabalavu officially announced their withdrawal in January 2017. 
Reportedly Lalabalavu approached Rabuka in April 2016 to succeed Kepa as party leader (Fiji Sun, 
8 May 2016; 14 January 2017).
44  Fiji Sun, 2 & 25 June, 8 & 28 September 2016. Former youth wing member Pita Waqavonovono 
and Beddoes were reported to be establishing their own political party and planning a grand coalition 
ahead of the 2018 election (fijivillage, 19 November 2016). Opposition to Rabuka centred on 
his coup leadership in 1987 and the similarity of his credentials and outlook with Bainimarama’s. 
Beddoes called removing a leader (Kepa) who had polled the SODELPA’s largest votes (35 per cent of 
its votes) ‘an act of lunacy’ (Fiji Sun, 26 June 2016). NFP President Draunidalo took the opportunity 
to claim her party the only one fit to contest the next elections; its members and leaders had never 
planned or taken part in coups. She argued that the NFP had to differentiate itself and would not 
engage with people involved in coups. Her leader, however, did not endorse this strategy (Fiji Times, 
27 June 2016; Fiji Sun, 27 June 2016). 
45  Lalabalavu and Rabuka presented contradictory advice on the parliamentary allowance vote to 
their parliamentary members (Fiji Sun, 6 October 2016).
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police officers who Groenewald had stood down over the 2014 sexual 
assault and death of a robbery suspect in Nadi and the sexual assault 
of another prisoner. Qiliho claimed they were needed in the fight against 
Fiji’s rising crime rate. The Chief of Intelligence and Investigations, Harry 
Brown, resigned in protest.46
Another resignation surprised in late 2015. Brigadier General Mosese 
Tikoitoga had only been Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces 
(RFMF) for one year, but allegedly proved too independent, promoting 
officers of his choice into senior roles and denying Bainimarama’s personal 
bodyguards access to the Queen Elizabeth Barracks officers’ mess. Not 
long after, Rear Admiral Viliame Naupoto became the new RFMF 
Commander and Tikoitoga was ‘exiled’ as ambassador to Ethiopia.47 
Fresh human rights issues also arose; a Lautoka internet café owner alleged 
that he had been tortured by police in late November 2015 after he sent 
copies to the Police Commissioner and the Attorney-General of plans to 
destabilise the government. His house was later firebombed in an attack 
reminiscent of military special ops after 2009. Bizarrely, historian Brij Lal 
and his economist wife, Padma Lal, remained barred from returning to 
Fiji.48
Disturbing as these matters were, they did not unsettle the government or 
force it to reach out to the Opposition parties. Instead, strong economic 
growth bolstered government confidence. Four per cent GDP growth in 
2015 permitted an optimistic budget at the end of the year, with VAT 
reduced to 9 per cent, and record spending on land development, roads, 
water and electricity. To much fanfare, the government announced 
a new $103 million infrastructure loan from the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the first for Fiji in 23 years. Bainimarama 
claimed only to be reversing the neglect of former governments and 
predicted that unemployment would fall and that tourism, already 
46  Fiji Sun, 9 February 2016; Fiji Times, 3 April 2016. The police, like the military, had also to 
confront its own violent past. In July 2016, images of Colo villagers beaten and tortured during drug 
raids in 2009 circulated on social media (Fiji Times, 13 July 2016). Eight former police officers and 
one soldier were found guilty in late 2016 of the sexual assault and rape of robbery suspects near 
Sigatoka in 2014, one of whom who later died of his injuries. They were sentenced variously from 
seven to nine years (Fiji Sun, 12 November 2016; Fiji Times, 22 November 2016). Burglaries increased 
31 per cent between 2014 and 2015. In 2016, carjackings and home invasions also increased. 
47  Fiji Times, 12 & 20 November 2015; Fiji Sun, 10 November 2015; Economist, 23 January 
2016. At the same time, Mohammad Aziz returned from long service leave as Deputy Commander.
48  Fiji Sun, 17 December 2015; Fiji Times, 16 December & 4 July 2015.
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comprising 30 per cent of GDP, would soon be a $2 billion industry.49 
Fiji Airways opened new services to Singapore and San Francisco. 
Barry Whiteside, governor of the Reserve Bank of Fiji, predicted growth 
in mineral water, garments, timber, mining and manufacturing in the 
years ahead and noted that remittances had become the largest foreign 
exchange earner for Fiji after tourism. He also predicted that attention 
to micro and small-to-medium enterprises would ‘make growth more 
inclusive for rural dwellers’.50
But there were dangers. Despite the International Monetary Fund praising 
Fiji for becoming a more equal society, ECREA’s Father Kevin Barr doubted 
government claims that poverty had fallen to 28.1 per cent: Fiji’s cost of 
living had risen over 40 per cent since 2009, domestic violence and crime 
had increased, so too the number of squatters.51 VAT may have fallen, but 
not necessarily in a way that assisted the poor, given that exemptions for 
basic food and medicines were removed. In addition, continued economic 
growth remained too dependent on debt, and increased debt (46 per cent 
of GDP and projected to rise to 50.4 per cent by mid-2017) potentially 
threatened both Fiji’s B+ credit rating52 and the viability of its major 
internal lender, the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF). 
49  Fiji Times, 18 April & 25 May 2016; Fiji Sun, 17 November 2015; Financial Review, 
18 November 2015. The World Bank opened a new liaison office in Suva in May 2016.
50  Fiji Times, 19 July 2016. Remittances reached $492 million in 2015, 28 per cent higher than in 
2014 ($354 million), reinforcing the government’s claim that its focus on the education and welfare 
of its people would pay dividends in the long run. In 2016, remittances rose a further 6 per cent to 
$530 million and to $605 million in 2017 (Fiji Times, 1 September 2016, 7 July 2017). Whiteside 
anticipated that an expansion in Australia’s seasonal worker program for agriculture, tourism and 
aged care, together with British army recruitment, would strengthen labour mobility further. He also 
congratulated the garment industry for developing niche products such as designer and sportswear 
that enabled it finally to realise the value of high end products. It now earned $100 million annually, 
and employed 7,000 workers, 90 per cent being women. Dependence on Australasian markets for 
sales, however, and a falling Australian dollar hampered growth. The rising US dollar increased the 
cost of raw materials (Fiji Times, 9 December 2016; 28 February 2017). Whiteside believed a similar 
niche awaited micro and small enterprises with virgin coconut oil and seaweed production. 
51  PACNews, 21 April 2016; crosbiew.blogspot.com, 29 April 2009.
52  Fiji Times, 28 April & 23 June 2016. Welfare and debt promised a bleak future, according 
to Biman Prasad (Fiji Times, 3 December 2014); however, due to economic growth, the debt to 
GDP ratio had fallen from 56 per cent at the end of 2010, where it had been stuck since 2000, and 
is forecast to fall to 43 per cent of a much larger economy by mid-2017 (Fiji Times, 30 May 2016; 
Joseph Veramu, ‘Budget and Prospects’, Fiji Times, 7 July 2017). Over 70 per cent of Fiji’s debt is held 
internally.
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Once more, the consequences of agricultural neglect loomed large, 
especially in the long-suffering sugar industry where the government 
proposed legal sanctions to compel greater production.53 Pine and 
mahogany industries were also affected by longstanding neglect, their 
potential for value-adding largely unrealised. Land-tenure laws and 
policies similarly constrained investment in agriculture.54 Neglect imposed 
a drag on growth, but was not responsible for the sharp fall in projected 
GDP growth for 2016, from 3.7 per cent to 2.4.55 On this occasion, the 
cause lay in the unexpected. Cyclone Winston – a category 5 hurricane, 
the strongest ever recorded in the southern hemisphere – struck Fiji on 
20 February and left a $2 billion trail of disaster as it tracked between the 
two main islands with wind speeds up to 233 kilometres per hour: 44 lives 
53  Fiji Times, 9 May 2016. Only 52.5 per cent of cane-farming land remained cultivated in 2016, 
sugar production had fallen 30 per cent since 2006 (from 310,000 to 220,000 tonnes), and the 
number of growers had also fallen 30 per cent (from 18,636 to 12,872). With costs of production 
close to $50 for a tonne of cane, returns from the $75 price for a tonne of cane put the average 
grower on an income of $4,500, well below the minimum wage. Further problems loomed for the 
industry; EU sugar quotas end in October 2017 and British importer Tate & Lyle ceased purchasing 
Fair Trade sugar from Fiji in August 2015. Some 5,000 members of the Lautoka Cane Producers 
Association had relied upon Fair Trade income since 2012 to subsidise sugar production (Fiji Times, 
4 December 2016). Prasad urged the government to boost production by guaranteeing growers 
$90 a tonne (Fiji Times, 30 July 2016). Instead, its 2016 Sugar Cane Industry Bill proposed the 
complete nationalisation of the financially stricken Fiji Sugar Corporation and the introduction of 
draconian penalties to enforce harvesting and planting (Fiji Times, 14 May & 23 November 2016). 
Diversification plans for two mills were put on hold (Fiji Times, 31 May 2016), despite the lack of 
cane for crushing making all the four mills unviable (Biman Prasad, ‘Sugar sector anaysis: Caught up 
in cobwebs’, Fiji Times, 4 March 2017; the cyclone-damaged Penang mill in Rakiraki closed in early 
2017). So, too, plans to pay farmers for the quality of cane they delivered to the mills, rather than its 
weight (Fiji Times, 30 December 2016). Fiji still dreamed, however, of replacing agricultural imports 
with local produce, especially for the tourist sector, but also made slow progress (Financial Review, 
18 October 2015). Indeed, agriculture’s contribution to GDP continued to decline, from 12 per cent 
in 2006 to 8 per cent in 2016 (Fiji Sun, 1 December 2016). 
54  Fiji Times, 19 July 2016. Address by Reserve Bank of Fiji governor Whiteside to the 2016 ADB 
Pacific Update Conference held at University of the South Pacific. Mahogany stagnated, with little 
investment in replanting (Fiji Times, 14 November 2016). Bainimarama commited to redevelop the 
pine industry, with new resources to extend the industry in 2017 to maritime islands like Kadavu 
(Fiji Sun, 22 January 2017).
55  This was temporarily restored to 3 per cent at the time of the 2016–17 budget. Projections of 
3.6 per cent GDP growth for 2017 and 3.2 per cent in 2018 and 2019 allowed Sayed-Khaiyum to 
forecast an unprecedented nine consecutive years of growth from 2010 (Fiji Sun, 21 July 2016).
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and 40,000 homes lost, 419 schools damaged, 160 schools destroyed, and 
an estimated $200 million loss in crops. The devastation impacted nearly 
40 per cent of Fiji’s population and drove up inflation.56
Bainimarama’s government rose quickly to the challenge and introduced 
novel initiatives. It launched a successful adopt-a-school program as 
a target for foreign aid,57 as well as an adopt-a-village fund. ‘Help for 
Homes’ provided $88 million in immediate financial assistance for home 
owners earning less than $50,000. Depending on the nature of damage, 
a home owner received a card loaded with up to $7,000, redeemable at 
any hardware outlet.58 The FNPF also allowed members to withdraw 
up to $5,000 and, by May 2016, it had disbursed nearly $300 million. 
In addition, government paid social welfare benefits as a lump sum for 
three months to assist some 44,000 families recover.59 In its budget in 
56  Fiji Times, 5 March 2016, 27 March 2017; Fiji Sun, 21 January 2017. Sugar production 
fell over 26 per cent to 164,330 tonnes in 2016 (Fiji Times, 31 December 2016); however, major 
tourism areas were less affected, enabling a faster recovery for the Fiji economy (Fiji Times, 30 May 
2016; Fiji Sun, 4 December 2016). Fiji Electricity Authority infrastructure damage alone stood at 
$30 million. The Fiji Development Bank, which allocated 20 per cent of its loans to agriculture, 
reported losses of $4 million and immediately provided assistance to farmers and businesses 
affected (Fiji Times, 24 January 2017). Inflation peaked at 6.8 per cent in January 2017 (Fiji Times, 
28 February & 26 March 2017), with half attributed to kava price increases. By May 2017, inflation 
had fallen to 2.5 per cent (Fiji Times, 5 July 2017).
57  India, for example, pledged to adopt 20 schools and gave the government $2.7 million. 
In 2016, India also donated $10.6 million in cash, relief materials, equipment and seeds. Indonesia 
contributed to the reconstruction of Queen Victoria School, and other governments, including 
Japan, which contributed $3.2 million for four schools, also committed resources to the school-
rebuild effort. The Fiji Government committed $207.9 million in the 2016–17 budget (Fiji Times, 
26 January & 2 February 2017; Fiji Sun, 21 January 2017).
58  The program was extended in late 2016 with an additional $20 million. Of course its success 
depended on retail hardware outlets being able to deliver the materials required. Evidence soon 
emerged that many were unable to deliver as promised, especially concrete blocks, roofing iron and 
timber (Fiji Sun, 5 August 2016; Fiji Times, 6 September 2016). Additionally, many areas were 
excluded from the first round of assistance and had to endure a long wait until the second round 
began at the end of 2016. A lack of documentation also frustrated tendering for school rebuilding, 
with deadlines for completion pushed back until October 2017. Until then students had to make do 
with tents (Fiji Sun, 23 December 2016).
59  Fiji Times, 9 & 22 March, 28 & 30 April 2016. Parliament rushed through a False Information 
Act in April 2016 to prevent abuse of cyclone assistance. By the end of May, some 22,100 homes 
had been assisted through the Help for Homes initiative. But the constant impact of withdrawals for 
education, housing, medical bills, unemployment and funeral costs from the $5 billion FNPF meant 
that 75 per cent of its 403,316 members now had less than $10,000 remaining in their pension 
accounts. Only 14 per cent had balances above $50,000 (Fiji Times, 1 & 2 August, 13 October 
2016). Its chair, Ajith Kodagoda, believed inadequate financial literacy misled 200,000 members 
into withdrawing funds after Winston and neglecting the consequences for their retirement (Fiji Sun, 
1 March 2017).
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June it reinforced its welfare credentials further, expanding poverty 
and pension schemes for the disadvantaged, and continuing medical, 
electricity and water subsidies to the poor.60 
Inevitably, politics entered reconstruction efforts. Bainimarama refused 
a SODELPA request to rebuild damaged churches. A secular state had 
of necessity to restore buildings and public infrastructure that benefited 
all Fijians; hence it would remain focused on homes, schools and health 
centres, and prioritise the provision of water and electricity services.61 
Rabuka accused Bainimarama of deliberately fostering a culture of 
dependency that denied people the capacity to be resilient.62 Prasad called 
for an investigation into the two large hardware firms most responsible for 
long delays in providing materials under the Help for Homes initiative. 
They had accepted government money but apparently found it more 
profitable to export scarce materials than deliver them to cyclone victims. 
The government, Prasad claimed, failed to confirm their stocks prior to 
handing over money.63 But, if anything, Cyclone Winston demonstrated 
– at least in the short term – both the government’s competence and its 
resolve to maintain its goals.64 Certainly the World Bank celebrated its 
efforts, declaring it a model for the Pacific. The government’s individual 
lump sum of $600 to 10 per cent of the population pumped nearly 
$20 million into the economy in the three months following Winston, 
when pump-priming was most needed to keep the economy going.65 
Additionally, Fiji’s Rugby Sevens gold win at the Rio Olympic Games 
in August 2016 gave Fiji’s people and its government an important 
psychological boost, and a rare moment to come together to celebrate an 
historic achievement after such a difficult year. 
60  Recovery after Winston (assisted by remittances and foreign aid) permitted the government 
to push on with expanding medical training and services, to plan the establishment of a new pilot 
training academy in association with Boeing and Airbus, to develop Nadi’s Black Rock military 
facility as a peacekeeping centre, to obtain special vehicles for disaster relief, to shift the target of 
infrastructure development from large projects to rural roads, bridges and wharves, and to increase its 
focus on education.
61  Fiji Times, 21 & 30 April 2016.
62  Fiji Times, 29 August 2016.
63  Fiji Times, 5 & 13 December 2016. The two companies were dropped from the second phase 
of the initiative and the Attorney-General threatened them with penalty and interest charges.
64  Sayed-Khaiyum, as Minister for Economy, drew attention to the work of the Construction and 
Implementation Unit within the ministry for progressing the rebuild and ‘building back better within 
budget’ (Fiji Sun, 21 January 2017).
65  Fiji Sun, 22 February 2017.
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Nonetheless, dangers still lay ahead. At the end of 2016 the Reserve Bank 
revised GDP growth for the year down to 2 per cent, acknowledging both 
the greater damage Winston had inflicted on Fiji’s cane belt, forests and 
aquaculture than originally supposed and the slow pace in rehabilitation 
efforts forced by crippling shortages in building materials and persistent 
wet weather.66 Major flooding from a tropical depression at the end of 
2016 inflicted further hardship on many of the same areas that Winston 
had hit. So, too, did an unexpectedly prolonged decline in tourism 
arrivals after Winston.67 The Reserve Bank’s GDP downgrade potentially 
threatened hopes for 3.8 per cent growth in 2017 and the government’s 
boast of nine consecutive years of strong growth. A new $840 million 
ADB and European Investment Bank loan in December 2016 for water 
supply and waste management in greater Suva promised to maintain 
the government’s infrastructure drive, and the Attorney-General quickly 
reminded Fiji that Bainimarama’s commitment to modernise Fiji for all 
Fijians, ‘not just a select few’, remained a core feature of his leadership.68 
Nonetheless, 2016 demonstrated FijiFirst’s inability to anticipate external 
shocks to the economy. Growth could never be taken for granted and 
decline now might even embolden Fiji’s opposition parties ahead of 
elections in 2018.69 Any political or economic stumble could puncture 
FijiFirst’s aura of invincibility. Hence the Attorney-General’s concern at 
the end of 2016 to remind Fijians what FijiFirst had achieved.
66  Fiji Times, 17 November 2016.
67  Fiji Times, 13 December 2016. The tropical depression (TD04F) hit Ra hard; 66 per cent 
of Ra’s river crossings were damaged by TD04F and Winston. The cost of repairs could only be 
sustained over several years. Cyclone Winston also had a long-term impact on tourism and, although 
tourist numbers rose during the year (principally from New Zealand and China), earnings in the 
September quarter were 10 per cent lower than in 2015. From November 2015 to November 2016 
visitor arrivals rose 5 per cent, although Australian arrivals (50 per cent of the tourism market) fell 
1.2 per cent. However, data for the year up until May 2017 suggested tourist numbers had increased 
7.7 per cent (Fiji Times, 4 July 2017). Fiji Airways retained its plan for a new service to Adelaide 
in mid-2017, and with new resorts opening in 2017, Fiji still hoped to achieve one million tourist 
arrivals by 2020 (Fiji Times, 31 December 2016, 31 January 2017).
68  Fiji Sun, 10 December 2016.
69  Indeed, sociologist Tui Rakuita suggested that FijiFirst would struggle to retain the support it 
gained in 2014 because of substantial rebuild delays after Winston (‘Analysing the polls’, Fiji Times, 
25 February 2017). The Tebutt-Times poll at the start of February gave FijiFirst only 37 per cent of 
the vote, compared with 13 per cent for SODELPA and one per cent for the NFP. Forty per cent 
of those polled remained undecided (Fiji Times, 26 February 2017). 
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It may seem a simple thing, but by establishing our shared identity as 
‘Fijians’, the Constitution sent a clear message that every Fijian is equal 
under the law and equally entitled to the benefits of our nation’s progress. 
That mantra has driven the progress we have made over the past decade 
to reverse the years of discrimination that plagued Fijian society and 
stagnated our national development.70 
But for opposition parties, the past did not always appear so simple. 
Hence, Amnesty International’s report on torture in Fiji in mid-December 
2016 provided an ideal opportunity for them to come together against 
FijiFirst. The report noted Bainimarama’s concession that beatings are 
‘deeply engrained in parts of the Fijian psyche’, but argued that: ‘When 
the military is involved in policing matters, human rights violations 
are more likely to occur and they are less likely to be held accountable 
for their actions.’71 Immediately Draunidalo launched an attack on 
the decrees and immunity provisions inserted in the Constitution as 
a cause of Fiji’s dangerous culture of impunity. Silence reigned from her 
opposition colleagues, however, leaving an unchallenged Sayed-Khaiyum 
to declare the report selective and biased. Chief Justice Gates also 
reinforced Bainimarama’s claim that beatings were common long before 
1987 and the coups. The report, he maintained, neither offered solutions 
nor acknowledged government responses.72 
Responsibility for the opposition’s paralysis lay in part with Rabuka’s 
resurrection. No sign existed by the end of 2016 that he could revitalise 
SODELPA or heal the differences within and between the parties to 
lead a united struggle against FijiFirst or at least enhance cooperation. 
SODELPA’s continued claim for preferential Taukei treatment risked 
the broader multicultural appeal it required to challenge FijiFirst, while 
Rabuka’s leadership created tensions, especially within the NFP, which 
70  Fiji Sun, 8 December 2016. Bainimarama’s attendance at the launch of a dubious Instacharge 
app in late 2016 could have become such a stumble. Foreign media claimed he endorsed the app, 
which its promoters claimed enabled mobile phones to recharge within 30 seconds (Guardian, 
3 December 2016), but local media only reported that he sought to spruik Fiji’s fast growing 
information and communications technology sector, now comprising 6 per cent of GDP (Fiji Times, 
4 December 2016).
71  Amnesty International, Beating Justice: How Fiji’s Security Forces Get Away with Torture. London: 
2016, pp. 4–5. Fiji ratified the UN Convention against Torture (CAT) in March 2016 and hosted 
a  regional workshop on CAT at Natadola in October. It sought a seat on the UN Human Rights 
Council.
72  Fiji Times, 13 December 2016; Fiji Sun, 11 December 2016. The British government and the 
UNDP were working with Fiji to establish new procedures for interviewing prisoners.
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could ultimately disadvantage both parties.73 If anything, Rabuka’s past 
haunted him: If we cannot work together, he argued, then any electoral 
victory against the government will be hollow, like Mahendra Chaudhry’s 
in 1999 when opposition parties ‘ganged up against the SVT, they won, 
and then they saw who the winner was … They did not like it’. ‘If we 
combine to defeat someone, then what?’ he pondered.74 Fiji’s electoral 
landscape was reset in 2014, but political parties born from the struggles 
of a past era could not be remade.
Perspectives
Bainimarama’s election victory in 2014 is now part of Fiji’s history. 
But histories are of necessity confined by their parameters; the shorter 
the timeframe for analysis, the narrower their context. To some extent 
this effect is understandable, but it can distort perceptions. This study 
focuses only on Fiji’s postcolonial years and, in particular, on a coup-
riven period of nearly 30 years. That might seem a long time but, against 
Fiji’s three millennia of human settlement, it is very short. We know 
very little about that greater epoch to enable valuable comparisons for 
contemporary studies. Only from the late 18th and 19th centuries, when 
the world began to envelop the Pacific islands, are Fiji’s histories better 
understood, and their complexities suggest that it would be foolish to read 
into contemporary history the detail of what preceded. This, however, is 
precisely how many people do read their past, with the result that their 
reimagined 19th century has become the tempting tradition against 
which all change is judged; temptation being greatest when contemporary 
advantage is sought.
73  Fiji Sun, 23 & 24 December 2016. When Rabuka called for a united struggle against FijiFirst, 
he made clear that other opposition parties should recognise SODELPA’s superior status. Their 
supporters should unite behind SODELPA (Fiji Times, 30 November 2016). That clearly did not 
accord with Draunidalo’s preferences, and at the start of 2017 she quit as President of the NFP. 
SODELPA replaced Prasad as shadow Minister for Economy with its own Radrodro in July 2017 
(Fiji Times, 10 July 2017). Rumours suggested she might join Waqavonovono’s proposed Hope party. 
Meanwhile Rabuka began coalition talks with the Fiji Labour Party and its breakaway United Fiji 
Freedom Party. At the start of 2017, it is unclear whether the NFP will join in a coalition against 
FijiFirst or if sufficient common interests could sustain a coalition divided over so many issues 
(Fiji Sun, 28 January 2017). The formation of a new Unity Fiji Party in May 2017, along with the 
campaign ambitions of the People’s Democratic Party, seemed to suggest that FijiFirst would find 
itself pitted against a very divided opposition in 2018 (Fiji Sun, 30 May 2017).
74  Fiji Times, 28 September 2016. 
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But the past is never so bound. Because we stand with one foot in the past 
and with the other reaching for the future, when we do look back or stare 
ahead, the perpetually changing present constantly challenges what we 
glimpse. Like ancient navigators on high seas, we seek a star to guide us. 
For many people in Fiji, the Constitutions have become their stars, with 
each new deviation scrutinised to ascertain distance from the original 
reference. But this way of viewing change can be misleading if it carries 
the assumption that the first reference point, a constitution embedded in 
the politics of communalism, represents a national lodestone with deep 
roots in an ancient past of Taukei order.
How, then, might we view Fiji, a country that is both clearly and 
simplistically the product of very different migratory histories: early 
settlement by Lapita Polynesians followed much later by waves of 
Melanesians from the Solomons and Vanuatu? To that mix we should add 
the influx of Tongans during the past three centuries, the distortions of 
early globalisation visited upon Fiji by trade, guns and disease, the rising 
power of Bau in the mid-19th century and the growing consolidation 
of political alliances. Bau’s ambitions were in part thwarted by British 
colonialism although, thereafter, the Tongan-dominated Lau and small 
Bauan powerhouse found new ways to extend their influence as colonial 
allies. Consequently, a fundamentally different Taukei order under the rule 
of eastern chiefs and colonial officials quickly took shape in the late 19th 
century, characterised by the subjugation of Colo and the introduction 
of still more migrants, this time indentured labour from northern and 
southern India engaged to establish an economy on which colonial 
government could depend for income. This new order established the 
modern features of Taukei tradition: standardised language, Christianity, 
mataqali land ownership, consolidated village settlements and provincial 
identities, as well as stable chiefly governance, at the apex of which stood 
the newly created (Great) Council of Chiefs. Similar processes of change 
impacted on the fragmented Indian population; small-scale cane farming, 
urbanisation, education, political–industrial organisation, the withering 
of caste, and the immigration of a business class from Gujarat and Punjab 
began to produce a new IndoFijian community. The wider world had 
come to Fiji and transformed it beyond recognition.
Then, after nearly 100 years, a global wave of decolonisation caught 
up with Fiji, pushing colonial officials to conspire with leaders from 
both communities, which remained largely disparate, to establish an 
independent state. Their vision: to perpetuate chiefly influence by 
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positioning the Taukei against the country’s most recent immigrants, 
whose labour had assisted to develop an economy that was the envy of 
Pacific island countries and – ironically – enabled the chiefly elite to retain 
its largely rural Taukei support base. The 1970 Constitution gave General 
Electors (Europeans, Chinese and people of mixed descent) the balance 
of power in the lower house of parliament but, in the upper house, the 
Taukei dominated, courtesy of GCC nominees. Communal democracy, 
however, possessed a crucial flaw; it worked only for as long as communal 
unity survived. For countries like Fiji embarking on a new adventure of 
independence and development in an increasingly globalised world, such 
unity could never be guaranteed, particularly since – given its very recent 
roots – no homogeneous communities existed outside of their political 
constructs.75 
Britain had form when it came to paying lip service to democracy in 
its former colonies, particularly those it had ruled over by fostering 
division. In Fiji’s case, Britain’s failure to transcend its own narrow 
colonial strategies cost the country dearly after 1970. True, Mara preached 
multiracialism and Fiji prospered in the brief flush of independence. But, 
by 1977, new economic realities set in and the communal dream soured 
with Sakeasi Butadroka’s resistance to chiefly domination, rural neglect 
and the continued presence of IndoFijians. Fiji faltered. By 1982, Mara’s 
multiracialism had become a protectionist façade. Enter Timoci Bavadra 
and his new Labour Party with an issues-based agenda in 1987 and the 
whole edifice crumbled as Rabuka and his military – itself a product 
of globalisation – swept them aside in the country’s first military coup. 
Rabuka sought to preserve the very interests Bavadra wanted to reform but, 
in doing so, he inadvertently transformed them in ways that ultimately 
weakened them further. Absolute Taukei paramountcy had always been 
the dream of Taukeists (although they disagreed on its form) but its 
75  Brij Lal, ‘Where has all the music gone? Reflections on the 40th anniversary of Fiji’s independence’, 
Contemporary Pacific, 23: 2, 2011, p. 416. Fiji has always been something of a Pacific melting pot, as its 
long history demonstrates. To disregard diversity by constructing the notion of a Taukei race or, for that 
matter, an IndoFijian race was always bound to turn out badly. Race is a social invention designed to 
cause division, as philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah reminds us in his 2016 BBC Reith Lectures, 
Mistaken Identities (www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00729d9/episodes/guide). Madraiwiwi similarly 
argued that the notion that the Taukei could only protect their rights by maintaining racial unity 
‘is an arid concept conveniently used by politicians to advance their own interests and agendas’. He also 
argued that ‘With the erosion of traditional structures and authority, pre-existing differences have begun 
to re-emerge’ (‘Ethnic tensions and the law’, 2004). See also Ratuva (‘Politics of ethno-national identity’, 
2008) for a discussion of the syncretic nature of communalism.
313
CoNClUSIoN: PlAyING the PolItICS of reSPeCt
achievement removed the one element that fostered communal unity – 
the threat of IndoFijian political dominance. Hence Taukei differences 
quickly multiplied, energised by the provincial basis for Taukei politics 
enshrined in Rabuka’s 1990 Constitution and by continued rural neglect. 
With party loyalty near impossible, dysfunction soon followed. Stung 
also by declining economic growth and rising poverty, Rabuka sought 
allies from his erstwhile IndoFijian rivals with a constitutional reset in 
1997.76 Unfortunately, it did no more than put icing on what remained 
fundamentally a communal cake. It could never escape the confrontational 
straitjacket communalism inflicted on Fiji’s politics, as Taukei nationalists 
and rogue soldiers demonstrated again during George Speight’s 2000 
civilian coup when they seized parliament and launched raids across the 
country to keep out the IndoFijian-led People’s Coalition government that 
Rabuka’s unpopularity had inadvertently brought into power the previous 
year through a new voting system designed to promote cross-communal 
cooperation. Thus Fiji arrived at its second lost decade.
Of course it could be said that nothing in politics is certain. But, in 2000, 
this was not how many people in Fiji read their politics. Instead, stargazers 
asserted that Fiji had merely corrected its course, history had repeated 
itself, confirming a veritable coup cycle in ‘Coup-Coup Land’. Once again 
the military stepped in, swept aside both the Coalition government and 
Speight’s rebels, and handed power to a new alliance of Taukei politicians, 
business leaders and chiefs. Fiji’s subsequent history might have been very 
different had its recently appointed military commander imposed on 
Fiji the wishes of the populist Speight and his clique of chiefly allies and 
military supporters. But he did not. Instead he allowed the re-establishment 
of what many Taukei viewed as the natural status quo. And  yet, there 
was something very different about the ambitious Bainimarama that 
was not immediately apparent. He was no princeling or chief handed 
a leadership role in the military because of his status, as had been the case 
with some of his predecessors. He hailed from a province sceptical of the 
eastern chiefly elite. He struggled with army officers who disrespected his 
naval background or believed that they were more deserving of military 
leadership. He endured an assassination attempt during an unprecedented 
rebel mutiny in 2000. That background set him apart from the elite that 
76  Fiji Times, 6 September 2016. Rabuka later claimed that his 1997 Constitution returned 
constitutional power to the people. But while processes of consultation have varied considerably, 
no constitution in Fiji has ever been put to the popular vote.
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he restored to power, a separation that became ever more apparent each 
time it sought to accommodate the former rebels. In the end, alienation 
and ambition transformed separation into divorce.
Despite superficial appearances, Fiji’s fourth coup in late 2006 differed 
from its predecessors. Bainimarama sought to avoid Rabuka’s mistakes 
after 1987 by maintaining the levers of power and the Constitution. Even 
when left no choice but to abrogate the Constitution nearly three years 
later, he refused to rush into a new constitution. Instead he began to 
transform elements of Fiji: Taukei deference to tradition, the provision 
of golden eggs to sustain the old elite, the power enjoyed by the media 
and judiciary, rural neglect and infrastructural inertia. And he brazenly 
navigated international hostility to his illegal regime. Then, having 
accepted an independent process for developing a new constitution, 
he  rejected its outcome, fearing it threatened his hold on power and 
would restore much of what he had undone. Instead he reset electoral 
rules, abolishing communalism in order to remove the base of the old 
elite and to provide Fiji’s people a non-communal foundation for voting. 
This, Steven Ratuva and Stephanie Lawson argue, brought Fiji’s political 
system – for the first time in its history – closer to the standard model of 
liberal democracy.77 
Government still remained the familiar goose but, this time, its golden 
eggs were distributed more equally than before through lease monies 
that now bypassed chiefly hands; through welfare and educational 
programs that were no longer racially determined; and through massive 
public road, water and electrification projects. True – like Mara, Rabuka 
and Qarase – Bainimarama had cronies, and the military continued to 
benefit excessively from his ascendency. But Bainimarama’s outstanding 
controversial achievement remains undoubtedly his rebooting of Fiji’s 
operating system in 2013. Gone were the single-member electorates 
favouring rural areas and Fiji’s aristocrats. Instead, to paraphrase Scott 
MacWilliam, he marginalised the ‘indigenous buccaneers’ who used 
the ‘screen of identity’ to justify their access to state assets and power.78 
Rabuka had once pondered just such an outcome: 
77  Steven Ratuva & Stephanie Lawson, ‘The people have spoken’, in Ratuva & Lawson, The People 
Have Spoken: The 2014 Elections in Fiji. Canberra: ANU Press, 2016, p. 2.
78  Scott MacWilliam, ‘“Not with a bang but a whimper”: SODELPA and the 2014 elections’, 
in Ratuva & Lawson, The People Have Spoken, 2016, p. 217.
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hopefully we can introduce certain policies and systems in which we can 
work at getting our chiefs into an effective ruling group, not to the extent 
that they rule the politics of the nation, but they rule their own little 
vanuas and the divisions of the vanua effectively, capable of understanding 
the modern democratic systems that we now live in.79
But he could never bring himself to realise it. Restoring multiracialism 
in 1997 remained his sole achievement.
In essence, Bainimarama had become Bavadra Mark II, returned as 
a military avenger, and that difference goes some way to explain the 
cost of Fiji’s misadventure. From late 2006 until September 2014, 
Bainimarama and his government rode roughshod over human rights, 
legal and constitutional systems, business rights and media freedoms, 
acts Bavadra would never have contemplated or endorsed.80 His was 
a  military dictatorship that transformed itself into what MacWilliam 
calls a ‘militarised democracy’, albeit an unreconstructed military subject 
to none of the equal opportunity reforms imposed on Fiji.81 How that 
democracy performs and survives remains yet to be seen.82 It helps that 
the dividing line is, at least officially, no longer communal, as Ratuva and 
Lawson note,83 and as the Attorney-General emphasises:
When politicians are elected through an electoral system that divides 
society on the basis of ethnicity, it encourages an ethnic way of thinking and 
incentivises ethnic favouritism. Racism has been at the base of Fiji society 
since Colonial times, and it has always been used as a means to preserve 
the power and influence of the elites. When Fijians are homogenised 
into groups on the basis of ethnicity, we are unable to address intragroup 
injustices, such as gender, economic participation and socioeconomic 
rights. Government’s work is therefore focused on those Fijians on the 
margins of society. We are using the promotion of socioeconomic rights to 
overcome the racist paradigm that has been used by the elites to withhold 
resources and opportunities for the rest of society.84
79  Islands Business, July 1991.
80  Some readers may object to the comparison, but Bainimarama and Bavadra shared much in 
common: both objected to the focus on race, they wanted all citizens to be called Fijians, they wanted 
to democratise Fijian institutions, and they wanted greater equalisation in the distribution of wealth.
81  MacWilliam, ‘“Not with a bang but a whimper”’, 2016, pp. 225–26.
82  Politics academic Sandra Tarte believes that, while ‘coup leaders may be the enemy of democracy 
… they can also reinvent themselves as its strongest ally’ (‘What Rabuka’s return means for Fijian 
politics’, eastasiaforum.org, 5 August 2016).
83  Steven Ratuva & Stephanie Lawson, ‘Concluding note: the election to end all coups’, in Ratuva 
& Lawson, The People Have Spoken, 2016, pp. 278–79.
84  Fiji Sun, 8 December 2016. Comments made during a meeting on contemporary forms 
of racism and intolerance with the UN Special Rapporteur, Matuma Ruteere, in Suva.
The GeneRAl’s Goose
316
But Sayed-Khaiyum’s promotion of what he sees as Bainimarama’s most 
impressive achievement overlooks the greatest challenge to his legacy, 
namely the legitimacy of the new parliamentary system, and in particular 
– to quote Ratuva and Lawson again – that it becomes ‘integral to 
a democratic political culture and is accepted by all’. They argue that extra 
parliamentary processes have been painful and destructive, leaving Fiji 
desperately in need of greater democratic space. Means are as important as 
ends and can also have a lasting impact if a sense of victimhood generates 
a cycle of vengeance and counter vengeance.85 
Jon Fraenkel makes a similar point. Fiji may not be ‘a consolidated semi-
authoritarian state’, but it remains politically highly fragile: ‘Much of 
its present orientation depends on the prime minister and his attorney 
general’. Without them, ‘Fiji would probably change direction’, Fraenkel 
argues, assuming of course that the military permits change.86 Rabuka 
directly acknowledged that dilemma in late 2016, as we noted earlier: 
‘If we combine to defeat someone, then what?’87 Hence the importance 
of FijiFirst reaching out to Opposition parties rather than playing the 
politics of respect, bringing them along on the journey and, above all, 
providing them a stake in a constitutional reset. 
At the close of 2016, Fiji’s longest reigning public intellectual, Wadan 
Narsey, outlined what that journey might involve in 2017, a series of 
much-needed constitutional changes: an end to the 5 per cent threshold 
which (he argues) disenfranchises candidates and mocks the notion of 
one person – one vote – one value, the reintroduction of constituencies 
to restore MP accountability to electorates, the addition of a closed-
list system to ensure proportionality and raise the number of women 
in parliament, the use of party symbols on ballot boxes, the removal 
of government control over the Election Office, Electoral Commission 
and the Media Industry Development Authority, and the removal of 
legislation and decrees that discourage the media from performing its 
watchdog role. For the sake of future generations, Narsey argues, mere 
tinkering will not suffice.88 No process as formal as he suggests, however, 
85  Ratuva & Lawson, ‘Concluding note’, 2016, pp. 275–77. As Vice President, Madraiwiwi had 
similarly argued that ‘Diversity is a strength rather than a weakness’ but, to gain from it, Fiji needed 
‘a practical vision of how to affirm and strengthen diversity in the context of uniting the nation’ 
(‘Challenges and opportunities in Fiji today’, fijilive, 20 April 2006). Only engagement would succeed.
86  Jon Fraenkel, ‘In the Pacific, two cheers for democracy’, Inside Story, 13 December 2016.
87  Fiji Times, 28 September 2016.
88  Wadan Narsey, ‘Critical issues for 2017’, 2016.
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has emerged since 2014. Instead, Opposition leaders have been harassed 
for attending a constitutional forum89 and Prasad has been left bemoaning 
the lack of a middle ground and questioning whether democracy is really 
working in Fiji. Military dictatorship, he believes, has simply transformed 
itself into parliamentary dictatorship.90 
How different might Fiji be today had Rabuka accepted Bavadra’s 
legitimacy in 1987? Lawyer Richard Naidu once remarked ‘that Fiji would 
have been a better place, with a better vision, if the doctor [Bavadra] 
had been allowed to see out his shift’.91 Of course we will never know 
how the confines of communalism would have played out under Bavadra. 
But we do know what Rabuka’s actions ultimately cost Fiji in terms of 
political and economic misadventure, and more. Economically, according 
to Narsey, the coups have cost Fiji some $10 billion between 1987 and 
2010. This equates to about two years’ GDP, or two years’ income for 
every household and company, an effective decline in GDP of 30 per 
cent. This, he argues, ‘is not just a failure on the part of our political and 
military leaders, but a failure of the populace at large’.92 Indeed, Narsey 
notes, the coups have left Fiji ‘morally gutted, from the top down’ and, 
because people turned a blind eye to corruption, treason and injustice, 
a silence now enshrouds the country.93 Back in 2005, the former deputy 
director of public prosecutions, Peter Ridgway, wrote:
The silent majority in Fiji is too big. Too many people are comfortable 
making a quid and not wanting to rock the boat. Too many people see 
themselves as powerless to change things but they are not. Public opinion 
is a most powerful motivator for all government to behave ethically. 
I  don’t think Fiji understands the importance of participation in their 
own democracy. My message to Fiji is: it is your democracy, use it.94
89  On 5 September 2016, Chaudhry, Prasad and Rabuka attended a Pacific Dialogue forum on 
the 2013 Constitution. Five days later, they and organiser Jone Dakuvula, unionist Attar Singh, and 
SODELPA’s Tupeni Baba were arrested and detained for two days by police for attending a forum 
held without a police permit. Eventually the director of public prosecutions refused to proceed with 
the case, arguing that the arrests had been highly selective (Fiji Sun, 18 October 2016). Police also 
shut down a three-day Sugar Forum at the Pearl Fiji Resort in Pacific Harbour in early September 
because its organisers had similarly gained no permit.
90  Fiji Times, 16 & 30 January 2016, 4 June 2016. 
91  Griffen, With Heart and Nerve and Sinew, 1997, p. 356.
92  Wadan Narsey, ‘Costly coups: No catching up’, Fiji Times, 11 December 2007.
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The late Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi similarly argued that ‘Ultimately the 
best guarantor of the rule of law is not the State and the branches which 
comprise it but the recognition by people of its value and their willingness 
to fight for and uphold it’.95 Lawyer Graham Leung also had his own take 
on Fiji’s contemporary misadventure: 
The real problem in Fiji is feudal cliques refusing to relinquish power, an 
army that refuses to recognise its limitations in a democracy, and failed 
politicians of all persuasions and opportunistic businessmen who support 
them, see nothing wrong in undermining electoral verdicts.96 
That may still be Fiji’s future, unless Bainimarama’s government works 
hard to combine economic and social reforms with greater democratic 
space for popular voices. The 2012 FCC draft Constitution proposed 
such a  space and its rejection has given Fiji’s democracy the potential 
for more authoritarian practices. ‘At the end of the day, democracy and 
pluralism are fragile human experiments,’ the London-based historian 
Sunil Khilnani warns, ‘and they are also very easy to destroy.’97 Reforming 
the 2013 Constitution, without returning to its mythical communal 
lodestone, now remains Fiji’s greatest challenge and it is one that the 
Bainimarama government should proactively address, rather than push 
its divided opposition parties into constitutional confrontation. Similarly, 
alienating business leaders and cane farmers by failing to consult about 
important reform initiatives can needlessly transform allies into enemies 
ahead of elections when democratic support from many fronts will be 
required.98 And, when that day comes, as inevitably it will, Fiji’s future 
prosperity and stability will be better assured if all parties and all Fiji’s 
people accept the cosmopolitan basis of Bainimarama’s 2013 reset and not 
resort to identity politics.
95  Madraiwiwi, ‘Ethnic tensions and the law’, 2004. He added: ‘Until that point is reached, the 
journey to it must be seen and appreciated for what it is. In a society such as ours where divisions exist 
both inter-ethnically and within communities, the process of nation-building of which the rule of law 
is an integral part, requires a deft balancing of priorities in a fair and inclusive manner. This allows 
everyone to be part of the challenge that we need to face together’.
96  Australian, 7 May 2009.
97  BBC, 15 March 2016; the director of London’s India Institute reflecting on India’s moment for 
change and the need for leaders to take a long view.
98  The Fair Reporting of Credit Act and the Sugar Cane Industry Bill are examples where the 
government has allegedly failed to consult adequately prior to legislating reforms, thus creating the 
impression that it remains in its pre-election decree mode (Neelesh Gounder, ‘Elective dictatorship’, Fiji 
Times, 7 May 2016; Richard Naidu, ‘True democracy and the cost of credit’, Fiji Times, 30 April 2016).
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CoNClUSIoN: PlAyING the PolItICS of reSPeCt
Speaking of an earlier opportunity ‘to develop a new paradigm and 
ways of doing things’, Madraiwiwi believed such moments rare in Fiji’s 
collective experience. ‘Kunekune na yaloka ni dilio is a Fijian expression 
that captures the essence,’ he argued. It refers to a bird so adept at hiding 
her eggs that they are mostly never found. ‘Having found the egg on this 
occasion,’ he asked, ‘what are we going to do with it? The choice is ours 
to make.’99 
But the bird also deserves attention. There is always the danger that, 
without reform, a time will come when Fiji’s leaders find not only 
their much-coveted eggs missing or broken but Rabuka’s bird well and 
truly cooked.
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